Picon Transportation, Inc. v. Pomerantz , 814 S.W.2d 489 ( 1991 )

BURNETT, Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The majority held that the trial court erred in rendering judgment in an amount in excess of jurisdictional limit. I conclude that the trial court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction over Pomerantz’s cause of action. Accordingly, I would dismiss the cause of action.

In his original petition, Pomerantz sought recovery of “not less than” $30,860 in actual damages, “not less than” $20,000 in exemplary damages, and “[p]re-judgment interest at the maximum legal rate from September 8, 1986, [the date of the accident] until judgment,” which totalled $50,860 exclusive of interest. Picon entered a special exception alleging that Pom-erantz pleaded damages exceeding the minimum jurisdictional amount, and that it was entitled to know the maximum amount of damages claimed. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 47 provides that “... upon special exception the court shall require the pleader to amend so as to specify the maximum amount claimed.” Pomerantz amended by seeking recovery of “not less than” $19,000 in exemplary damages, which lowered the minimum amount of recovery sought to $49,860, just within the trial court’s maximum jurisdictional limit.

County courts at law are creatures of statute. The legislature set a minimum jurisdiction of $500 and a maximum jurisdiction of $50,000 excluding interest for the Collin County court at law. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.0452(a)(2) (Vernon 1988). The legislature intended such courts to be courts of concurrent but limited jurisdiction. Id. A plaintiff must plead jurisdictional facts that bring it within the statutory limits of the county court to avoid disrupting the legislative jurisdictional scheme. By using the language “not less than,” Pomerantz sought recovery beyond the jurisdictional limits of the Collin County court at law because he placed no ceiling on the damages for which he sought recover. Thus, I would hold that the trial court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction over this case because the amount in controversy, as determined from Pomerantz’s first amended original petition, exceeded $50,000.

When it is apparent from the face of the record that the trial court rendering judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court has jurisdiction over the case for the purpose of declaring the invalidity of the judgment and dismissing the cause of action. Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 356, 346 S.W.2d 823, 827 (1961) (original proceeding); Williams, 101 Tex. at 387, 108 S.W. at 157. Because the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Pomerantz’s cause of action, its judgment is void. Williams v. Steele, 101 Tex. 382, 387, 108 S.W. 155, 157 (1908); Tejas Toyota, Inc. v. Griffin, 587 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex.App.—Waco 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.).