Parent v. Great Northern Paper Co. , 1981 Me. LEXIS 726 ( 1981 )

GODFREY, Justice,

with whom ROBERTS, Justice, joins, concurring.

I concur in the result. If it were clear from the language of the commissioner’s order that the commissioner thought the employee first suffered acute pain from his epididymitis as the result of the work-related incident but that his pain, even though disabling, was not an “injury” within the meaning of the compensation act, I would think the appeal should be sustained. In my view, pain alone can be disabling and the resulting disability should be compensa-ble despite the absence of any lesion, muscle strain, or other objectively observable change of physical condition. I would reach that conclusion by applying our settled rule that when a work-related incident “lights up” or precipitates the disabling effects of disease theretofore quiescent, the resulting disability is compensable. E. g., Goldthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant, 154 Me. 214, 218, 145 A.2d 362, 364 (1958); Gagnon’s Case, 144 Me. 131, 65 A.2d 6 (1949); Martriciano v. Profenno, 127 Me. 549, 143 A. 270 (1928); Mailman v. Record Foundry & Machine Co., 118 Me. 172, 106 A. 606 (1919).

However, I am constrained to concur in the result reached by the Court because, on the evidence of record, the commissioner could have found against causation on another ground: namely, that he did not believe there had been sufficient proof of any change whatever in the employee’s condition attributable to the incident at work. If he believed, for example, that the onset of acute pain was purely coincidental with the lifting incident at work and that the underlying epididymitis was wholly un-caused by the employment, he was correct in finding no causal connection between the employment and the disability. Despite my doubts that such was the case, I agree that we should not go behind the findings the commissioner made in response to claimant’s general motion to “find the facts.”