Commonwealth v. Williams , 468 Pa. 357 ( 1976 )

POMEROY, Justice

(concurring).

I agree with the Court that the evidence in this record is sufficient to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property under § 3925 of the Crimes Code. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925. I thus agree that the Superior Court erred in reversing the trial court’s conviction.

The problem as to sufficiency arises because an essential element of the crime involved is knowledge on the part of the defendant that the property of which he is in possession has been stolen. As in most such cases, there was here no direct proof that Williams had such knowledge. The Commonwealth’s case thus rested upon circumstantial evidence, and relied in part on the long-recognized common law “presumption” that the element of knowledge as to the stolen character of goods can be deduced from the unexplained possession of goods which in fact have recently been stolen.

The scope of this presumption has been constitutionally troublesome because of its due process and Fifth Amendment implications. In Commonwealth v. Owens, 441 Pa. 318, 271 A.2d 230 (1970), our Court, the present writer dissenting, rejected the contention that “common experience suffices to demonstrate that a possessor of a recently stolen pistol more likely than not knew or had reason to know that the weapon had been stolen.” Id. at 325, 271 A.2d at 234. As a consequence the Court concluded that the presumption offended the due process rights of the accused. In Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 288 A.2d 727 (1972), we transformed the “presumption” into an “inference” and, by so doing, avoided the constitutional infirmities which troubled the Court in Owens. We there held that “the connection between the proof of the unexplained possession of the recently stolen property and the permissible inference as to who stole the property meets the constitutional mandate . and the proof of the required facts supplies the necessary nexus which due process demands.” 447 Pa. at 109-110, 288 A.2d at 737-738.^*

The confusion inherent in the fine conceptual distinctions between presumptions and inferences and between the reasonable-doubt standard and the “rational connection” and “more likely than not” tests was dispelled to a substantial degree by the United States Supreme Court in its opinion in Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973). In Barnes, the Supreme Court squarely faced the issue whether the common law “inference” of guilty knowledge from the possession of recently stolen goods violates due process. In upholding the use of the inference the Court concluded: “On the basis of this evidence alone common sense and experience tells us that petitioner must have known or been aware of the high probability that the checks were stolen. . . . Such evidence was clearly sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner knew the checks were stolen.” Id. at 845-846, 93 S.Ct. at 2363, 37 L.Ed.2d at 387 (citations omitted). A year later, in Commonwealth v. DiFrancesco, 458 Pa. 188, 329 A.2d 204 (1974) our Court had occasion to consider with some care the impact of Barnes on our previous decisions in this area of the law. We there noted that when the term “presumption” is used in the criminal law it generally connotes only a standardized permissible inference. Id. at 193 n. 3, 329 A.2d at 207 n. 3. See also Commonwealth v. Turner, 456 Pa. 116, 317 A.2d 298 (1974). We went on to conclude that “the constitutionality of a standardized inference invoked to establish an essential element of the crime charged must be judged by the reasonable doubt standard.” Commonwealth v. DiFrancesco, 458 Pa. at 196, 329 A.2d at 209. See also Commonwealth v. Turner, supra at 232, n. 3, 317 A.2d 300, n. 3. In my view, the decision of the trial court in the case at bar comports with the teachings of Barnes and DiFrancesco. Accordingly, I agree with the Court that the judgment of the trial court should be reinstated.

* In my concurring and dissenting opinion in Shaffer, I set forth the reasons for my dissent in Owens, as well as my reasons for concurring in part with the result of the lead opinion in Shaffer, as quoted in the text, supra. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 114, 233 A.2d 727, 741 (1972) (Pomeroy, J. concurring and dissenting).