United States v. One 1939 Model De Soto Coupe, Motor No. S6-27,687 , 119 F.2d 516 ( 1941 )

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge

(dissenting).

It was stipulated that Myers, prior to the purchase of the automobile, had a reputation with the Alcohol Tax Unit Agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for violating the laws of the United States relating to liquor. There was no other evidence tending to show that Myers had a reputation for violating the laws of the United States or of any state relating to liquor. From the stipulation it appears that the basis of the reputation with the agents was a prior arrest for a transaction which did not constitute a violation of federal law and a suspicion that Myers was engaged in the transportation of liquor into the state of Oklahoma contrary to law.

The specific question presented is whether these facts established a reputation within the meaning of 27 U.S.C.A. § 40a (b).

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that words in common use are to be given their ordinary and generally accepted meaning, unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended a different meaning. ¹

In Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 250, 45 S.Ct. 73, 69 L.Ed. 265, the court said:

“The words of a statute are to be read in their natural and ordinary sense, giving them a meaning to their full extent and capacity, unless some strong reason to the contrary appears.”

In Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560, 52 S.Ct. 211, 213, 76 L.Ed. 484, the court said:

“The rule which should be applied is established by many decisions. ‘The legislature must be presumed to use words in their known and ordinary signification.’ Levy’s Lessee v. McCartee, 6 Pet. 102, 110, 8 L.Ed. 334. ‘The popular or received import of words furnishes the general rule for the interpretation of public laws.’ Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 251, 261, 14 L.Ed. 925.”

The word “reputation” has a well known and ordinary signification. It is the repute in which a man is held by his neighbors or associates. ²

In the statute the word “reputation” is unqualified. Had Congress intended it to mean reputation among law enforcing officers, it would have been a simple matter to have added the qualifying phrase “among law enforcing officers.” Congress having omitted the qualification, I do not think we are justified in reading it into the statute. ³

For the foregoing reasons, I am constrained to dissent.

1 Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560, 52 S.Ct. 211, 76 L.Ed. 484; Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U.S. 319, 327, 52 S.Ct. 568, 76 L.Ed. 1128; Lincoln v. Ricketts, 297 U.S. 373, 376, 56 S.Ct. 507, 80 L.Ed. 724; Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 250, 45 S.Ct. 73, 69 L.Ed. 265; Spano v. Western Fruit Growers, 10 Cir., 83 F.2d 150, 152; Von Weise v. Commissioner, 8 Cir., 69 F.2d 439, 441; Sanborn v. Commissioner, 8 Cir., 88 F.2d 134, 137.

2 Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, p. 1123; 2 Bouv. Law Dict., Unabridged, Rawle’s Third Revision, p. 2903; Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. III, § 692; Id., Vol. V, § 1615; 54 C.J., p. 688; United States v. One 1936 Model Chevrolet Pick-Up Truck, D.C.Tenn., 21 F.Supp. 165, 166; State v. Brown, 33 Utah 109, 93 P. 52, 53; Dave v. State, 22 Ala. 23, 39; Commonwealth v. Webb, 252 Pa. 187, 195, 97 A. 189, 192.

3 See United States v. C. I. T. Corporation, 2 Cir., 93 F.2d 469, 470, 471; United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 De Luxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 225, 59 S.Ct. 861, 83 L.Ed. 1249; United States v. One Terraplane Sedan, D.C.N.Y., 23 F.Supp. 710, 712, 713.