People v. Stevens , 460 Mich. 626 ( 1999 )

AFTER REMAND

Brickley, J.

We granted leave in this case to determine whether the Fourth Amendment requires the exclusion of evidence obtained under a valid search warrant, and during a search of proper scope, because of a violation of the “knock and announce” principles.¹ If the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion, then we must also determine whether evidence obtained after a violation of our “knock and announce” statute must be excluded. Given that the evidence would have been discovered despite any police misconduct and that excluding the evidence because of the misconduct puts the prosecution in a worse position than it would have been without the police misconduct, we hold that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies in the present case. Additionally, we fail to discern any legislative intent to have the exclusionary rule apply to violations of our “knock and announce” statute. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress.

FACTS

At approximately 6:00 P.M. on August 10, 1994, the police purchased narcotics from the defendant’s female companion. The police then followed the woman to defendant’s home where she had told a confidential informant she kept the “stash.” After the police determined that the defendant was on probation for a controlled substance conviction, they decided to raid the house. The police obtained a search warrant and arrived back at the house at 12:32 A.M. on August 11, 1994, at which time there were no lights on in the house and the police did not observe any signs of activity or hear any footsteps. The officers knocked on the door repeatedly and announced in a loud voice that they were police officers. After an eleven-second wait, the officers began a forced entry that took an additional fifteen to eighteen seconds. The defendant was found sleeping in his bedroom, which was approximately twenty-five feet from the front door.

Corporal Alex Ramirez of the Dearborn Police Department participated in the raid. He testified that it was the general practice of the Dearborn Police to wait ten or eleven seconds before beginning a forced entry. Additionally, Corporal Ramirez testified that, when executing a search warrant, the Dearborn Police Department made no distinction between daytime and nighttime executions relative to the time the officers wait between the knock and announcement and forcing entry into the dwelling. Ramirez also testilled that the fact that defendant was on probation for a controlled substance conviction made no difference in how long Ramirez waited before forcing entry into the house. The trial court found that this entry violated the knock-and-announce statute, MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6). Additionally, the trial court found that the police officers acted unreasonably in executing the search warrant and that the defendant’s constitutional guarantee under the Fourth Amendment had been violated. Therefore, the subsequent search and seizure of evidence were constitutionally invalid, and the exclusionary rule should be applied. The trial court thus granted the defendant’s motion to suppress.

The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Wilson v Arkansas, 514 US 927; 115 S Ct 1914; 131 L Ed 2d 976 (1995). The Court of Appeals also gave the prosecution the opportunity to “establish that, based on particularized facts known to the police at the time of executing the warrant, the threat of physical harm to law enforcement personnel or the existence of reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed may establish the reasonableness of an otherwise insufficiently announced entry.”

After being denied rehearing by the Court of Appeals, the defendant appealed to this Court, arguing that the remand was inappropriate because the prosecution had conceded that the present record was adequate and complete on the question of the sufficiency of the announced entry. This Court agreed with the defendant, vacated the Court of Appeals order, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s granting of the motion to suppress. The prosecutor now appeals to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling regarding a motion to suppress for clear error. People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983). However, in the present case, we review the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts. “Application of constitutional standards by the trial court is not entitled to the same deference as factual findings.” People v Nelson, 443 Mich 626, 631, n 7; 505 NW2d 266 (1993). The application of the exclusionary rule to a violation of the knock-and-announce component of the Fourth Amendment is a question of law. “The standard of review is de novo with regard to questions of law.” People v Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 522; 581 NW2d 219 (1998).

Additionally, we consider whether the evidence obtained after a violation of our “knock and announce” statute must be excluded. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 698; 564 NW2d 13 (1997).

ANALYSIS

I

The prosecutor brings this appeal, arguing that, while the police officers may have violated the knock- and-aimounce statute, MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6),² the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the exclusionary rule applies where the police make a search of proper scope under a valid warrant.

In deciding to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court relied upon People v Polidori, 190 Mich App 673; 476 NW2d 482 (1991). That Court found:

Although there is no Michigan case that directly deals with the sanction that should follow a violation of the knock-and-announce statute, we agree with a number of other jurisdictions that the requirement that officers identify themselves and state their authority and purpose before entering a private residence has its roots in the Fourth Amendment.

Consequently, when the method of entry violates the knock-and-announce statute, the exclusionary rule may come into play if the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness is also offended. Because the primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee is to prevent unreasonable invasions, if a police officer has a reasonable cause to enter a dwelling to make an arrest, his entry and search are not unreasonable. If the police officers have a basis to conclude that evidence will be destroyed or lives will be endangered by delay, strict compliance with the statute may be excused. Similarly, if events indicate that compliance with the statutory requirements would be a useless gesture, the requirement that the police officers wait for admission may also be excused.

* * *

There is no claim that a search carried out in compliance with the statute would have resulted in the destruction of the evidence, increased the danger to the police officers, or been a useless gesture. Under these circumstances, we can only conclude that the police officers acted unreasonably when they executed the search warrant. Because there was no evidence introduced at the suppression hearing to justify the simultaneous forced entry of defendant’s home, we can find no reason to excuse the police officers from complying with the requirements of our knock-and-announce statute. [Id. at 676-678 (citations omitted).]

In affirming the trial court in the present case, the Court of Appeals relied on People v Asher, 203 Mich App 621, 624; 513 NW2d 144 (1994), in holding that “if the method of entry violates the knock-and-announce statute, the exclusionary rule must apply.” People v Stevens, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 28, 1997 (Docket No. 199175), slip op at 6. In Asher, the police, in executing a search warrant, violated the knock-and-announce statute by entering the residence within five seconds of knocking and announcing. The Asher Court stated, “We would not conclude that a timing error in the execution of a valid search warrant offends the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement.” Id. at 624.³ However, the Court felt compelled by Administrative Order No. 1990-6 to follow Polidori and suppress the evidence.

n

We first consider whether police officers’ violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights requires exclusion of the evidence. The introduction into evidence of materials seized and observations made during an unlawful search is prohibited by the exclusionary rule. Weeks v United States, 232 US 383; 34 S Ct 341; 58 L Ed 652 (1914), overruled on other grounds in Elkins v United States, 364 US 206; 80 S Ct 1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960); Silverman v United States, 365 US 505; 81 S Ct 679; 5 L Ed 2d 734 (1961). Additionally, the exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction into evidence of materials and testimony that are the products or indirect results of an illegal search, the so-called “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).

The exclusionary rule, which provides for the suppression of illegally obtained evidence, originates in three decisions of the United States Supreme Court around the turn of the century. Weeks, supra, Adams v New York, 192 US 585; 24 S Ct 372; 48 L Ed 575 (1904), and Boyd v United States, 116 US 616; 6 S Ct 524; 29 L Ed 746 (1886). US Const, Am IV, provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Therefore, the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 9; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968); People v Faucett, 442 Mich 153, 157-158; 499 NW2d 764 (1993).

The federal constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures have been extended to state proceedings through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 655; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); People v Nash, 418 Mich 196, 211; 341 NW2d 439 (1983) (opinion of Brickley, J.); People v Burrell, supra at 448, n 15. Under the circumstances of this case, art 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution is to be construed as providing the same protection as that of its federal counterpart. See People v Toohey, 438 Mich 265, 270-271; 475 NW2d 16 (1991), and People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 25; 475 NW2d 684 (1991).⁴ Therefore, defendant’s motion to suppress implicates his federal constitutional rights. Faucett, supra at 158.

m

In determining whether exclusion is proper, a court must “evaluate the circumstances of [the] case in the light of the policy served by the exclusionary rule . . . .” Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 604; 95 S Ct 2254; 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975). “ ‘The rule is calculated to prevent, not repair. Its purpose is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it. . . . [D] espite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.’ ” Id. at 599-600 (citations omitted).

The exclusionary rule has its limitations ... as a tool of judicial control. . . . [In] some contexts the rule is ineffective as a deterrent. . . . Proper adjudication of cases in which the exclusionary rule is invoked demands a constant awareness of these limitations. ... [A] rigid and unthinking application of the . . . rule . . . may exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime. [Terry v Ohio, supra at 13-15.]

As stated by this Court:

The exclusionary rule forbids the use of direct and indirect evidence acquired from governmental misconduct, such as evidence from an illegal police search.

Three exceptions to the exclusionary rule have emerged: the independent source exception, the attenuation exception, and the inevitable discovery exception. [People v LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496, 508-509; 556 NW2d 498 (1996) (citations omitted).]

In Nix v Williams, 467 US 431; 104 S Ct 2501; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984), the United States Supreme Court considered whether there is an exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence that inevitably would have been discovered regardless of the constitutional violation. In explaining the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, the Court stated:

The core rationale consistently advanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections. This Court has accepted the argument that the way to ensure such protections is to exclude evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high social cost of letting persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their crimes. On this rationale, the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired.

By contrast, the derivative evidence analysis ensures that the prosecution is not put in a worse position simply because of some earlier police error or misconduct. [Nix v Williams, supra at 442-443.]

The inevitable discovery exception generally permits admission of tainted evidence when the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been revealed in the absence of police misconduct. “If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.” Id. at 444. If the evidence would have been inevitably obtained, then there is no rational basis for excluding the evidence from the jury. In fact, suppression of the evidence would undermine the adversary system by putting the prosecution in a worse position than it would have been in had there been no police misconduct. Id. at 447.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit set forth the following factors in applying the inevitable discovery doctrine:

[T]here are three basic concerns which surface in an inevitable discovery analysis: are the legal means truly independent; are both the use of the legal means and the discovery by that means truly inevitable; and does the application of the inevitable discovery exception either provide an incentive for police misconduct or significantly weaken fourth amendment protection? [United States v Silvestri, 787 F2d 736, 744 (CA 1, 1986).]

In Wilson, supra at 937, n 4, the Supreme Court reserved the question whether the inevitablediscoveiy exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply to searches deemed unreasonable only because officers armed with a warrant failed to make a proper announcement at the door. Footnote 4 states, in relevant part:

Analogizing to the “independent source” doctrine applied in Segura v United States, 468 US 796, 805, 813-816; 104 S Ct 3380, 3385, 3389-3391; 82 L Ed 2d 599 (1984), and the “inevitable discovery” rule adopted in Nix v Williams, 467 US 431, 440-448; 104 S Ct 2501, 2507-2511; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984), respondent and its amici argue that any evidence seized after an unreasonable, unannounced entry is causally disconnected from the constitutional violation and that exclusion goes beyond the goal of precluding any benefit to the government flowing from the constitutional violation. Because this remedial issue was not addressed by the court below and is not within the narrow question on which we granted certiorari, we decline to address these arguments. [Wilson, supra at 514 US 937, n 4.]

The dissent contends that there is no indication “that the Court was actually contemplating that a worthy question existed.” Post at 657. However, in United States v Ramirez, 523 US 65, 72, n 3; 118 S Ct 992; 140 L Ed 2d 191 (1998), the Court stated:

After concluding that the Fourth Amendment had been violated in this case, the Ninth Circuit further concluded that the guns should be excluded from evidence. Because we conclude that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, we need not decide whether, for example, there was sufficient causal relationship between the breaking of the window and the discovery of the gun to warrant suppression of the evidence. Cf. Nix v Williams, 467 US 431; 104 S Ct 2501; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984); Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).

While the Court either declined or found no need to address the issue whether a possible Fourth Amendment violation required suppression of the evidence in both Wilson and Ramirez, it is quite clear from the Court’s statements that there has to be a causal relationship between the violation and the seizing of the evidence to warrant the sanction of suppression.

IV

The Fourth Amendment must be applied under a standard of reasonableness. Ker v California, 374 US 23; 83 S Ct 1623; 10 L Ed 2d 726 (1963). “[I]n some circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home [notwithstanding a valid search warrant] might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Wilson, supra at 934. “The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis governs the method of execution of the warrant.” United States v Ramirez, 523 US 71.

“[T]he Fourth Amendment ‘has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.’ ” United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906; 104 S Ct 3405; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984). Repeatedly, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized “that the State’s use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.” Pennsylvania Bd of Probation & Parole v Scott, 524 US 357, _; 118 S Ct 2014, 2019; 141 L Ed 2d 344 (1998).

The Court has stressed that the “prime purpose” of the exclusionary rule “is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Application of the exclusionary rule “is neither intended nor able to ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.’ ” Rather, the rule “operates as ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’ ” [Illinois v Krull, 480 US 340, 347; 107 S Ct 1160; 94 L Ed 2d 364 (1987) (citations omitted).]

“The purpose of excluding evidence seized in violation of the Constitution is to substantially deter future violations of the Constitution.” Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 166; 107 S Ct 515; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986).

As [a judicially created remedy], the rule does not “proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons,” but applies only in contexts “where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served” .... Moreover, because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its “substantial societal costs.” [Scott, supra at 118 S Ct 2019.]

The exclusionary rule is not meant to put the prosecution in a worse position than if the police officers’ improper conduct had not occurred, but, rather, it is to prevent the prosecutor from being in a better position because of that conduct. Nix, supra at 443.

Significant disincentives to obtaining evidence illegally— including the possibility of departmental discipline and civil liability — also lessen the likelihood that the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception will promote police misconduct. ... In these circumstances, the societal costs of the exclusionary rule far outweigh any possible benefits to deterrence that a good-faith requirement might produce. [Id. at 446.]

The Nix Court was addressing whether the prosecution must prove the absence of bad faith when seeking to invoke the inevitable discovery exception. The existence of both state and federal disincentives for police misconduct, other than exclusion of evidence, is also applicable in an analysis of the inevitable discovery exception for violations of the “knock and announce” requirement.

MCL 780.657; MSA 28.1259(7) provides:

Any person who in executing a search warrant, wilfully exceeds his authority or exercises it with unnecessary severity, shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 1 year.

Additionally, 42 USC 1983 allows civil remedies when the knock-and-announce principles have been violated.⁵ In Aponte Matos v Toledo Davila, 135 F3d 182 (CA 1, 1998), the plaintiffs brought a 42 USC 1983 action against police officers who searched the plaintiffs’ home for violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by failing to knock and announce before breaking down the door with an ax. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found the officers immune because the search took place before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson and was, therefore, reasonable. However, implicit in the court of appeals analysis is that subsequent searches that violated Wilson would fall within the reach of § 1983.

Admittedly, the exclusionary rule is sometimes needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections, even though this may be at a great cost to society. However, in the present case, the evidence would have been discovered despite any police misconduct. Additionally, there are both state and federal disincentives to deter police misconduct.

Given that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, allowing the evidence in does not put the prosecution in any better position than it would be in had the police adhered to the knock-and-announce requirement. However, excluding the evidence puts the prosecution in a worse position than it would have been in had there been no police misconduct. Therefore, the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule should be available to the prosecution in the present case.⁶

v

Given that application of the exclusionary rule is not an appropriate remedy for the Fourth Amendment violation in the present case, we now address whether the exclusionary rule is appropriate for the violation of the state statute. “Whether suppression is appropriate is a question of statutory interpretation and thus one of legislative intent.” People v Wood, 450 Mich 399, 408; 538 NW2d 351 (1995) (Boyle, J., concurring). “When a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction or interpretation is unnecessary and therefore, precluded.” Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992) (citations omitted).

A fundamental principle guiding this Court is that a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation. People v Plumsted, 2 Mich 465, 469 (1853). If, however, judicial interpretation is proper, then this Court must determine the Legislature’s intent employing “ ‘a reasonable construction considering its purpose and the object sought to be accomplished.’ Additionally, it is the primary objective in statutory interpretation and construction to effectuate legislative intent without harming the plain wording of the act.” Lorencz, supra at 377 (citation omitted). Adherence to the language and legislative intent of a statute is essential to ensure that “courts . . . declare the sense of the law” and do not “exercise will instead of judgment . . . .” Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, No 78, Kramnick, ed (England: Penguin Books, 1987 [originally published in 1788]), p 440. [Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65; 503 NW2d 435 (1993).]

Nothing in MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6) alludes to the exclusionary rule being a valid remedy for violation of the statute. Rather, the Legislature enacted MCL 780.657; MSA 28.1259(7) to serve as a sanction for someone who exceeds or exercises authority unnecessarily when executing a search warrant.⁷

“The per se exclusionary rule arose out of and applies to constitutionally invalid arrests.” People v Lyon, 227 Mich App 599, 611; 577 NW2d 124 (1998). In Lopez v United States, 373 US 427, 440; 83 S Ct 1381; 10 L Ed 2d 462 (1963), the United States Supreme Court cautioned that to exclude material evidence “must be sparingly exercised” because it would interfere with the function of a criminal trial, which the Court described as the determination of the truth or falsity of the charges.

The Legislature has not chosen to specifically mandate the sanction of excluding evidence seized as a result of the violation of MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6). Nothing in the wording of the statute would suggest that it was the legislators’ intent that the exclusionary rule be applied to violations of the “knock and announce” statute. Therefore, we decline to infer such a legislative intent. To do otherwise would be an exercise of will rather than judgment.

Additionally, the “knock and announce” statute does not control the execution of a valid search warrant; rather, it only delays entry. One stated puipose of this delay by police officers is to allow the occupants “a brief opportunity ... to order [their] personal affairs before the [officers] enter.” United States v Kane, 637 F2d 974, 977 (CA 3, 1981).⁸ In the present case, the officers were operating under a valid search warrant. The police purchased narcotics from defendant’s female companion and followed the woman back to defendant’s home. After determining that the defendant was on probation for a controlled substance conviction, the police sought and obtained a search warrant. Neither party contests the validity of the search warrant.

We are persuaded by the rationale employed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v Jones, 149 F3d 715 (CA 7, 1998). In dicta, that court stated:

It is hard to understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but “inevitable” once the police arrive with a warrant; an occupant would hardly be allowed to contend that, had the officers announced their presence and waited longer to enter, he would have had time to destroy the evidence. [Id. at 716-717.]

The officers were armed with a valid search warrant. Defendant does not argue that the officers’ search exceeded the scope of that warrant. It was not the means of entry that led to the discovery of the evidence, but, rather, it was the authority of the search warrant that enabled the police to search and seize the contested evidence. Therefore, the searching and seizing of the evidence was independent of failure to comply with the “knock and announce” statute.

As in Jones, the discovery of the evidence in the present case was inevitable, regardless of the illegalities on the police officers’ entry into defendant’s home. One of the purposes of the statute is to allow a defendant a brief opportunity to put his personal affairs in order before the police enter his home. United States v Kane, supra at 977. It is not meant to allow the defendant the time to destroy the evidence. In the present case, the police did not exceed the scope of the search warrant. Therefore, they would have discovered the contested evidence, unless the defendant had been afforded the opportunity to destroy the evidence. The timing of the police officers’ entry into the home in no way affected the inevitability of the discovery of the evidence.

CONCLUSION

In the present case, the police were acting under a valid search warrant and within the scope of that warrant. Even though the method of entry into the dwelling violated the knock-and-announce principles, the evidence inevitably would have been discovered. There are both state and federal sanctions for such violations that serve as deterrents for police misconduct that are less severe than the exclusion of the evidence. Additionally, exclusion of the evidence will put the prosecution in a worse position than if the police misconduct had not occurred. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence because of the violation of the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, we fail to discern any legislative intent to have the exclusionary rule apply to violations of the “knock and announce” statute.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court.

Weaver, C.J., and Taylor, Corrigan, and Young, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.

1 We note that the prosecution concedes that both the Fourth Amendment and the “knock and announce” statute have been violated in the present case. Therefore, our analysis concerns whether application of the exclusionary rule is the appropriate sanction for either of these violations.

2 MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6) provides:

The officer to whom a warrant is directed, or any person assisting him, may break any outer or inner door or window of a house or building, or anything therein, in order to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance, or when necessary to liberate himself or any person assisting him in execution of the warrant.

3 We note that the United States Supreme Court has held that “ ‘in some circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” United States v Ramirez, 523 US 65, 70; 118 S Ct 992; 140 L Ed 2d 191 (1998), quoting Wilson v Arkansas, supra at 934.

4 Const 1963, art 1, § 11 provides:

The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.

5 42 USC 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purpose of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

6 We note that Michigan courts adhere to the view that a state court is bound by the authoritative holdings of federal courts upon federal questions. However, where there is no decision by the United States Supreme Court and the federal courts disagree on the interpretation of the federal issue, this Court will adopt a view which appears to be most appropriate. Schueler v Weintrob, 360 Mich 621, 633-634; 105 NW2d 42 (1960).

While some federal courts have found that the appropriate remedy for a knock-and-announce violation is suppression, see United States v Bates, 84 F3d 790, 795 (CA 6, 1996) (“unless exigent circumstances exist, the failure of state law enforcement officials to knock and announce their presence will render the evidence procured during the ensuing execution of a warrant inadmissible”); United States v Moore, 91 F3d 96 (CA 10, 1996) (affirming the trial court’s suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the “knock and announce” rule); United States v Marts, 986 F2d 1216 (CA 8, 1993) (in rejecting the government’s good-faith defense, the court held that exclusion is the only appropriate remedy for violations of the “knock and announce” rule), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in dicta that “[i]t is hard to understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but ‘inevitable’ once the police arrive with a warrant . . . .” United States v Jones, 149 F3d 715 (CA 7, 1998). Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit favorably quoted Jones in holding:

[T]he exception that is most pertinent to this case goes by the name of “inevitable discovery” and refuses to suppress evidence seized in an unconstitutional search if it is shown that the evidence would ultimately have been seized legally if the constitutional violation had not occurred. [United States v Stefonek, 179 F3d 1030, 1035 (CA 7, 1999), citing Nix v Williams, supra; United States v Jones, supra; United States v Cabassa, 62 F3d 470, 472-473 (CA 2, 1995).]

Given that the federal courts disagree on whether the “inevitable discovery” doctrine is applicable to “knock and announce” violations, we feel free to hold that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule should be available to the prosecution in the present case.

7 The dissent argues that “this Court has, on numerous occasions, been compelled to apply exclusionary sanctions to statutory violations.” Post at 649. However, in citing cases where the statutory violations have resulted in suppression, the dissent does not address whether the referenced statutes already contained a remedy or sanction for a violation of those statutes.

8 In addition to providing an opportunity for an occupant to put his personal affairs in order before the police enter his home, Kane, supra at 977, states that the requirement also reduces the potential for violence to both officers and occupants, prevents damage to private property, and symbolizes respect for a person’s right to privacy in the home.