Rouse v. Theda Clark Medical Center, Inc. , 302 Wis. 2d 358 ( 2007 )

JON E WILCOX, J.

¶ 1. This is a review of an unpublished court of appeals decision, Rouse v. Theda Clark Medical Center, Inc., No. 2005AP2743, unpublished slip opinion (Wis. Ct. App. October 4, 2006). The court of appeals affirmed a judgment of the Calumet County Circuit Court, Donald A. Poppy, Judge. Judge Poppy dismissed with prejudice Aaron T. Rouse's (Rouse) action against the University of Wisconsin Hospital & Clinics Authority; Patrick Keller, M.D.; Scott Dull, M.D.; Everett Hughes, M.D.; Aaron Johnson, M.D.; and Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc. (collectively UWHCA)¹ because Rouse failed to provide notice pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80.²

¶ 2. This cáse presents one issue: Is the UWHCA, as a statutorily-created, public body corporate and politic, a "political corporation" for the purposes of § 893.80? We hold that the UWHCA is a "political corporation" because of the power and structure provided by the legislature in Wis. Stat. ch. 233. The circuit court properly dismissed Rouse's action against the UWHCA with prejudice.³ Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.

I — H

¶ 3. On May 19, 2001, Rouse was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The vehicle he was driving reportedly hit a tree, rolled repeatedly, and burst into flames. Rouse suffered multiple fractures and burns.

¶ 4. From the scene of the accident, Rouse was transported to Theda Clark Medical Center in Neenah, Wisconsin. After receiving some treatment, MedFlight transported Rouse to the University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics (UW Hospital) in Madison, Wisconsin. At UW Hospital, Rouse received further treatment.

¶ 5. Over three years after receiving treatment for his injuries, Rouse commenced a medical malpractice action against the UWHCA; Theda Clark Medical Center, Inc.; Christopher E Hugo, M.D.; Mark Westfall, D.O.; OHIC Insurance Company; Thomas L. Tolly, M.D.; Jeffrey S. Burkett, M.D.; and Injured Patients & Families Compensation Fund.

¶ 6. The UWHCA filed a consolidated motion to dismiss. The UWHCA asserted that Rouse failed to serve the notice of claim required by Wis. Stat. § 893.80. In support of its motion, the UWHCA filed an affidavit from Rosemary Waitkus, Risk Management Analyst at the UWHCA. The affidavit stated that in her position she maintained the files for all notices of claims received by the UWHCA. The affidavit also stated that in reviewing the files she did not locate a notice of claim from Rouse.

¶ 7. In responding to the motion to dismiss, Rouse argued that § 893.80 did not apply to his case because the UWHCA does not fall within the scope of § 893.80. To support his position, Rouse also filed an affidavit and exhibits. The exhibits were the paramedics' report and the medical records from Theda Clark Medical Center and UW Hospital.

¶ 8. Because materials outside of the pleadings were submitted and considered by the court, the circuit court treated the UWHCA's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. In a written decision, it concluded that the UWHCA was a "political corporation" as set forth in § 893.80. The circuit court believed that the UWHCA's purpose is governmental in nature. In addition, the circuit court found it to be significant that the institution that preceded the UWHCA, the University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics, was protected by sovereign immunity. The circuit court stated that the legislature was aware of the predecessor's immunity and if the legislature intended for the immunity not to extend to the UWHCA it could have easily eliminated the immunity in the new legislation that created the UWHCA. The circuit court dismissed the action on its merits with prejudice. Costs of $950.73 were assessed against Rouse.

¶ 9. Rouse appealed the circuit court's decision to the court of appeals. The court of appeals filed a certification with this court. The certification noted that the legislature's treatment of the UWHCA led to conflicting views as to its nature. The court of appeals described the UWHCA as a body that possesses some qualities of a public entity, but that the legislature created the UWHCA as a way to make the University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics more competitive with private hospitals. In addition, the court of appeals noted that in Takle v. University of Wisconsin Hospital & Clinics Authority, 402 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2005), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that the UWHCA did not have sovereign immunity. This court denied the certification.

¶ 10. Following this court's denial of the certification, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order of dismissal. The court of appeals noted its concerns with the application of § 893.80 to the UWHCA, but found itself bound by the judicial notice this court took in Lewis v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 2001 WI 60, ¶ 25 n.18, 243 Wis. 2d 648, 627 N.W.2d 484, that the UWHCA was one of only three government-owned hospitals in Wisconsin.

¶ 11. Rouse filed a petition for review with this court, which was granted.

II

¶ 12. We review a grant of summary judgment independently, while applying the same methodology as the circuit court. AKG Real Estate, LLC v. Kosterman, 2006 WI 106, ¶ 14, 296 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 835. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).

¶ 13. In this case, there is no genuine issue of material fact. We must interpret § 893.80 to determine whether the UWHCA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Statutory interpretation presents an issue of law that we review de novo. Megal Dev. Corp. v. Shadof, 2005 WI 151, ¶ 8, 286 Wis. 2d 105, 705 N.W.2d 645.

• ¶ 14. Interpreting § 893.80 in this context presents an issue of first impression. Courts have addressed the predecessor of the notice of claim requirement in § 893.80. Townsend v. Wisconsin Desert Horse Ass'n, 42 Wis. 2d 414, 423, 167 N.W.2d 425 (1969)(concluding the notice of claim requirement did not apply to the state or its agencies); Majerus v. Milwaukee County, 39 Wis. 2d 311, 316, 159 N.W.2d 86 (1968) (stating that failure to comply with the notice of claim requirement was not a jurisdictional defect, if it was a defect at all). They have also addressed the term "political corporation," but in the context of obtaining personal jurisdiction. Hagen v. City of Milwaukee Employee's Ret. Sys. Annuity & Pension Bd., 2003 WI 56, ¶ 15, 262 Wis. 2d 113, 663 N.W.2d 268 (citing Milwaukee City Charter § 36-09-6 for the proposition that the City of Milwaukee Employees' Retirement System/Annuity and Pension Board was a political corporation); Watkins v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 88 Wis. 2d 411, 416-18, 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979)(interpreting Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4)(a), which deals with obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant that is a political corporation or body politic). Courts have also addressed the status of the UWHCA as an entity. Takle, 402 F.3d at 772-73 (concluding that the UWHCA did not have sovereign immunity); Lewis, 243 Wis. 2d 648, ¶ 25 n.18 (taking judicial notice that the UWHCA was a government-owned facility). However, a court has not previously interpreted the term "political corporation" in the context of § 893.80 and determined whether the UWHCA falls within its scope.

¶ 15. Our goal in interpreting statutory provisions is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, which we assume is expressed in the text of the statute. State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. To this end, absent ambiguity in a statute, we do not resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation and instead apply the plain meaning of the words of a statute in light of its textually manifest scope, context, and purpose. Id., ¶¶ 45-46. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable understanding. Id., ¶ 47. If a statute is ambiguous, we may examine extrinsic sources in order to guide our interpretation. Id., ¶ 50.

¶ 16. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1)(a) provides the following:

(1) Except as provided in subs, (lg), (lm), (lp) and (8), no action may be brought or maintained against any volunteer fire company organized under ch. 213, political corporation, governmental subdivision or agency thereof nor against any officer, official, agent or employee of the corporation, subdivision or agency for acts done in their official capacity or in the course of their agency or employment upon a claim or cause of action unless:

(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the event giving rise to the claim, written notice of the circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, political corporation, governmental subdivision or agency and on the officer, official, agent or employee under s. 801.11. Failure to give the requisite notice shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice of the claim and the claimant shows to the satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency or to the defendant officer, official, agent or employee....

Wis. Stat. § 893.80(l)(a) creates a notice of claim requirement for a plaintiff suing a "political corporation."

¶ 17. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(lm) relates specifically to medical malpractice claims, stating the following:

With regard to a claim to recover damages for medical malpractice, the time period under sub. (1) (a) shall be 180 days after discovery of the injury or the date on which, in the exercise of reasonable diligencé, the injury should have been discovered, rather than 120 days after the happening of the event giving rise to the claim.

Read together, §§ 893.80(1)(a) and (1m) require that a person bringing a medical malpractice claim against a "political corporation" must serve it with "written notice of the claim," § 893.80(1)(a), within "180 days after discovery of the injury or the date which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the injury should have been discovered." Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1m).

¶ 18. An entity that falls within the scope of § 893.80(1)(a) must affirmatively plead that the plaintiff failed to comply with it. Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶ 24, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59. If the plaintiff failed to provide written notice, he or she may still be able to satisfy § 893.80(l)(a). Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(l)(a) explicitly provides that the notice requirement may be satisfied by a plaintiff that gave the entity actual notice of the claim, as long as the actual notice did not cause a prejudicial impact on the entity. Given that § 893.80(lm) modifies only the timing for the notice, the actual notice aspect of § 893.80(1) (a) would also apply in medical malpractice cases.

¶ 19. The notice of claim statute provides a condition precedent that limits "' "the time within which a certain prescribed act, necessary to the enforcement of [the plaintiffs] cause of action, shall be done."'" Snopek v. Lakeland Med. Ctr., 223 Wis. 2d 288, 295, 588 N.W.2d 19 (1999) (quoting Ocampo v. Racine, 28 Wis. 2d 506, 509, 137 N.W.2d 477 (1965) and Troschansky v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 110 Wis 570, 571, 86 N.W. 156 (1910)). A plaintiffs failure to satisfy the condition precedent provided by § 893.80 results in a loss of the right to proceed with the action against the governmental entity. Id. Requiring such notice enables governmental entities to "investigate a claim against an employee, to avoid needless litigation, and to settle all reasonable claims." Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 227 Wis. 2d 100, 120, 595 N.W.2d 392 (1999); see also Thorp, 235 Wis. 2d 610, ¶ 23.

¶ 20. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 is entitled "Claims against governmental bodies or officers, agents or employees; notice of injury; limitation of damages and suits." Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 is part of Subchapter VIII of Wis. Stat. ch. 893, which is entitled, "Claims against governmental bodies, officers and employees." Titles used in the statutes are not considered part of the statutes. Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6). They may, however, be persuasive evidence when interpreting a statute. Kontowicz v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 2006 WI 48, ¶ 35, 290 Wis. 2d 302, 714 N.W.2d 105.

¶ 21. The legislature has not provided a definition of "political corporation." When giving a statute its plain and ordinary meaning, courts refer to dictionaries to define those terms not defined by the legislature. State v. Wittrock, 119 Wis. 2d 664, 670, 350 N.W.2d 647 (1984). Wisconsin Stat. § 990.01(1) provides that "[a]ll words and phrases shall be construed according to common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed according to such meaning."

¶ 22. The term "political corporation" is synonymous with the term "public corporation." Black's Law Dictionary 344 (7th ed. 1999). A "public corporation" is "[a] corporation that is created by the state as an agency in the administration of civil government." Id. An "agency" is "[a] governmental body with the authority to implement and administer particular legislation." Id. at 63. Stated another way, a "political corporation" is an entity created by the legislature that is authorized to implement enactments of the legislature.

¶ 23. Determining whether the UWHCA constitutes a "political corporation" requires an assessment of the nature of the entity. Assessing the nature of an entity requires a consideration of the power and structure of it, as conferred by the legislature. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 424, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973). Wisconsin Stat. ch. 233 enumerates the power and the structure of the UWHCA.

¶ 24. After providing definitions for the chapter, the legislature explicitly states its intent to create "a public body corporate and politic to be known as the 'University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority.' " Wis. Stat. § 233.02(1). Though relevant to our inquiry, we look beyond such a "legislative denomination" to the power and structure of the entity. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d at 424.

¶ 25. In creating the UWHCA, the legislature decided that the board of directors would be either state employees or appointed by government officials. Wis. Stat. § 233.02(1). Specifically, the board is composed as follows:

(a) Three members nominated by the governor, and with the advice and consent of the senate appointed, for 3-year terms.

(am) Each cochairperson of the joint committee on finance or a member of the committee designated by that cochairperson.

(b) Three members of the board of regents appointed by the president of the board of regents.

(c) The chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Madison or his or her designee.

(d) The dean of the University of Wisconsin-Madison Medical School.

(e) A chairperson of a department at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Medical School, appointed by the chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

(f) A faculty member of a University of Wisconsin-Madison health professions school, other than the University of Wisconsin-Madison Medical School, appointed by the chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

(g) The secretary of administration or his or her designee.

(h) Two nonvoting members appointed by the governor, one of whom shall be an employee or a representative of a labor organization recognized or certified to represent employees in one of the collective bargaining units specified in s. 111.05 (5) (a) and one of whom shall be an employee or a representative of a labor organization recognized or certified to represent employees in one of the collective bargaining units specified in s. 111.825 (lm).

Id. The directors are not compensated, but do get reimbursed for actual costs they incur in performing their duties. Wis. Stat. § 233.02(3). Directors are also protected from civil liability that may arise from the performance of their duties, except if it constitutes willful misconduct. Wis. Stat. § 233.02(4).

¶ 26. The legislature granted the UWHCA "all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out the purposes and provisions of [ch. 233]." Wis. Stat. § 233.03. The UWHCA is specifically authorized to take actions such as adopting bylaws, policies, and procedures for "the regulation of its affairs and the conduct of its business," Wis. Stat. § 233.03(1); suing and being sued, Wis. Stat. § 233.03(2); accepting gifts and grants, "but not including research grants in which the grant investigator is an employee of the board of regents," id.; procuring insurance on debt obligations, Wis. Stat. § 233.03(5); engaging in collective bargaining with collective bargaining units recognized or authorized by statute, Wis. Stat. § 233.03(7); participating in corporations or partnerships that provide health-related services, if various state entities and officials are presented with the proper access to documents, Wis. Stat. § 233.03(9); issuing bonds in accordance with state statute, Wis. Stat. § 233.03(11); and constructing and improving facilities on state-owned land, provided statutory conditions are satisfied, Wis. Stat. § 233.03(13).

¶ 27. The legislature also imposed duties on the UWHCA. Wis. Stat. § 233.04. Wisconsin Stat. ch. 233 details leases and affiliation agreements the UWHCA must enter with the University of Wisconsin System board of regents. Wis. Stat. §§ 233.04(7) and (7m). While the leases and agreements are in place with the board of regents, the UWHCA must

maintain, control and supervise the use of the University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics, for the purposes of:

1. Delivering comprehensive, high-quality health care to patients using the hospitals and to those seeking care from its programs, including a commitment to provide such care for the medically indigent.

2. Providing an environment suitable for instructing medical and other health professions students, physicians, nurses and members of other health-related disciplines.

3. Sponsoring and supporting research in the delivery of health care to further the welfare of the patients treated and applying the advances in health knowledge to alleviate human suffering, promote health and prevent disease.

4. Assisting health programs and personnel throughout the state and region in the delivery of health care.

Wis. Stat. § 233.04(3b). It must also enter into a contractual services agreement with the University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics Board for employees. Wis. Stat. § 233.04(4). In the event that the joint committee on finance does not approve an extension or renewal of a lease or agreement, the UWHCA facilities will transfer to the board of regents. Wis. Stat. §§ 233.04(7g)(b) and (7p)(b).

¶ 28. The UWHCA duties also include updating the state on various matters. It must annually submit a report to the governor, each house of the legislature, president of the board of regents, and the secretary of administration. Wis. Stat. § 233.04(1). The report must include an audited financial statement and information on patient care, education, research, community services activities, and accomplishments of the UWHCA. Id. In addition to the annual report, the UWHCA must provide on a monthly basis the secretary of administration with financial and statistical information that he or she requires. Wis. Stat. § 233.04(9).

¶ 29. Wisconsin Stat. ch. 233 also addresses issues related to bonds, including the issuance of bonds, Wis. Stat. § 233.20, the security of bonds, Wis. Stat. § 233.21, the refunding of bonds, Wis. Stat. § 233.26, and the amount of outstanding bonds, Wis. Stat. § 233.27. The UWHCA must include a statement on the face of all bonds that "[t]he state is not liable on bonds and the bonds are not a debt of the state." Wis. Stat. § 233.22. The state also

pledges to and agrees with the bondholders, and persons that enter into contracts with the authority under this chapter, that the state will not limit or alter the rights vested in the authority by this chapter before the authority has fully met and discharged the bonds, and any interest due on the bonds, and has fully performed its contracts, unless adequate provision is made by law for the protection of the bondholders or those entering into contracts with the authority.

Wis. Stat. § 233.23.

¶ 30. Wisconsin Stat. ch. 233 also establishes many other duties, which address issues ranging from how the UWHCA maintains records, Wis. Stat. § 233.12, to requiring it to operate a poison control center, Wis. Stat. § 233.04(10).

¶ 31. Given the power and structure of the UWHCA, we conclude that it is a "political corporation." The legislature created the UWHCA. It has a statutory purpose, which includes providing high-quality care to the medically indigent, maintaining an environment for instructing future health care providers, leading efforts to reduce human suffering and promoting of health, and assisting with the delivery of health care around the state. The voting members of its board of directors are either public officials or appointed by public officials. It has a duty to engage in collective bargaining. It must enter into agreements and leases with the state. It must update the state on a consistent basis. The state is ensured access to the UWHCA's financial statements. In the event there is a failure to extend or renew an agreement or lease, facilities transfer to the board of regents. The power granted by the legislature, and the structure it has imposed on the UWHCA, indicate that the legislature intended the UWHCA to be a political corporation. Therefore, it falls within the notice requirement of § 893.80.

¶ 32. Some features of the UWHCA are shared with private entities. For instance, it does not receive general purpose revenue from the state. It can sue and be sued. It can buy and sell real estate. Nevertheless, the legislature empowered it to act within a framework that is closely reviewed by the state. The power and structure of the UWHCA based upon Wis. Stat. ch. 233 leads us to conclude that the legislature intended a plaintiff to serve it with a notice of claim.

¶ 33. Because the UWHCA falls within the scope of § 893.80, the circuit court properly dismissed Rouse's action against the UWHCA with prejudice. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 requires that a person bringing a medical malpractice claim against an entity that falls within the scope of the statute serve it with "written notice of the claim," § 893.80(l)(a), within "180 days after discovery of the injury or the date on which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the injury should have been discovered." Wis. Stat. § 893.80(lm). Rouse did not provide the UWHCA such notice. The UWHCA affirmatively pled that Rouse failed to provide it with the proper notice. Rouse did not provide the UWHCA with actual notice. Rouse could not maintain his action against the UWHCA.

¶ 34. Rouse argues that § 893.80 should not have even applied to his case because of the exclusivity of Wis. Stat. ch. 655 when a person brings a medical malpractice claim.

¶ 35. Wisconsin Stat. ch. 655 does provide the exclusive procedure for a person to pursue a malpractice claim against a health care provider. State ex. rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 499, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978). Three sections in particular indicate the exclusivity of Wis. Stat. ch. 655. Wisconsin Stat. § 655.006(l)(a) provides that "every patient, every patient's representative and every health care provider shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted to be bound by this chapter." Wisconsin Stat. § 655.005 provides that "[a]ny person listed in s. 655.007 having a claim or a derivative claim against a health care provider or an employee ... for damages for bodily injury or death ... is subject to this chapter. Wisconsin Stat. 655.007 provides that any patient or the patient's representative having a claim or any spouse, parent, minor sibling or child . . . having a derivative claim ... on account of malpractice is subject to this chapter." See also Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 50, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866, overruled in part by Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund and Compcare Health Servs. Ins. Corp., 2006 WI 91, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216.

¶ 36. Wisconsin Stat. ch. 655 does not, however, provide a comprehensive set of procedural rules for maintaining a medical malpractice claim. Storm v. Legion Ins. Co., 2003 WI 120, ¶ 34, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 665 N.W.2d 353. Wis. Stat. Ch. 655 does not exist in a procedural vacuum. Other procedures governing civil litigation apply to medical malpractice claims, unless they conflict with chapter 655. Id. For instance, chapter 655 does not contain a statute of limitations provision, but the three-year statute of limitations provided in § 893.55(l)(a) has been applied. See Ocasio v. Froedtert Mem'l Lutheran Hosp., 2001 WI App 264, 248 Wis. 2d 932, 637 N.W.2d 459. The five-year statute of repose in § 893.55(l)(b) also has been applied. See Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849; See also Halverson v. Tydrich, 156 Wis. 2d 202, 456 N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1990). The two-year statute of limitations for intentional torts pursuant to § 893.57 has also been applied. See Deborah S.S. v. Yogesh N.G., 175 Wis. 2d 436, 499 N.W.2d 272 (Ct. App. 1993). Courts also have applied statutes governing service of summons, Young v. Aurora Medical Center of Washington County, Inc., 2004 WI App 71, 272 Wis. 2d 300, 679 N.W.2d 549, and discretionary changes of venue, Hoffman v. Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, 196 Wis. 2d 505, 538 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1995).

¶ 37. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 provides a set of rules specifically for claims against governmental bodies and officers, agents, or employees, which broadly applies to all causes of action unless a further, more specific rule says otherwise. See DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 183, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994) (concluding that § 893.80 applies to "all actions") overruled in part by State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 597, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996) (stating that the all actions language of DNR v. City of Waukesha does not extend to open records and open meetings actions, where more specific provisions take precedence). This is in accordance with the canon of statutory construction providing that where a general statute and a specific statute apply to the same subject, the specific statute controls. State ex rel. Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, ¶ 19, 245 Wis. 2d 607, 629 N.W.2d 686.

¶ 38. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(lm) requires that, "[w]ith regard to a claim to recover damages for medical malpractice" against a political corporation, governmental subdivision or agency, within 180 days of discovery of the injury, the claimant must serve that governmental body with written notice pursuant to § 893.80(l)(a). This is a specific statute of limitations which applies in medical malpractice cases against enumerated types of governmental bodies, such as political corporations. The language of § 893.80(lm) explicitly anticipates the application of § 893.80 to medical malpractice claims against governmental bodies.

¶ 39. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(lm) applies to medical malpractice claims against governmental bodies that fall within the scope of § 893.80, such as the UWHCA. Chapter 655 does not contain any statute of limitations provision that conflicts with § 893.80. The generally exclusive nature of Chapter 655 does not prevent the application of § 893.80 in this case.

III

¶ 40. This case presented one issue: Is the UWHCA, as a statutorily-created, public body corporate and politic, a "political corporation" for the purposes of § 893.80? We hold that the UWHCA is a "political corporation" because of the power and structure provided by the legislature in Wis. Stat. ch. 233. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.

By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.

¶ 41. Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK took no part.

1 Patrick Keller, M.D.; Scott Dull, M.D.; Everett Hughes, M.D.; and Aaron Johnson, M.D. were medical employees of the University of Wisconsin Hospital & Clinics Authority at the time relevant to this case.

2 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80 provides the following in pertinent part:

Claims against governmental bodies or officers, agents or employees; notice of injury, limitation of damages and suits. (1) Except as provided in subs, (lg), (lm), (lp) and (8), no action may be brought or maintained against any volunteer fire company organized under ch. 213, political corporation, governmental subdivision or agency thereof nor against any officer, official, agent or employee of the corporation, subdivision or agency for acts done in their official capacity or in the course of their agency or employment upon a claim or cause of action unless:

(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the event giving rise to the claim, written notice of the circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, political corporation, governmental subdivision or agency and on the officer, official, agent or employee under s. 801.11. Failure to give the requisite notice shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice of the claim and the claimant shows to the satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency or to the defendant officer, official, agent or employee ....

(lm) With regard to a claim to recover damages for medical malpractice, the time period under sub. (1) (a) shall be 180 days after discovery of the injury or the date on which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the injury should have been discovered, rather than 120 days after the happening of the event giving rise to the claim.

All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version, unless otherwise stated.

3 Our holding that the UWHCA falls within the scope of § 893.80 means the circuit court properly dismissed Rouse's action with prejudice. Pursuant to Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938), which established that only dispositive issues need to be addressed on appeal, we do not address the other issue Rouse raised in his petition for review, which stated the following:

In light of Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440, if the University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority is entitled to governmental immunity, is the $50,000 damage cap in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) unconstitutional as applied to the UWHCA — a financially independent entity?

The dismissal of the action against the UWHCA results in a lack of "a factual basis on which a judicial declaration may be made to guide future conduct." See State ex. rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Cir. Ct. for La Crosse County, 115 Wis. 2d 220, 228-29, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983).

The dissent would address Rouse's other issue, and then some. Not only does the dissent delve into questions not even raised by the parties, it attempts to rewrite this very opinion. See dissent, ¶¶ 45 and 8544. Despite the dissent's characterizations of this opinion, it is the dissent. We hold that the UWHCA is a "political corporation" because of the power and structure provided by the legislature in Wis. Stat. ch. 233. Therefore, Wis. Stat. § 893.80 applies.