Estate of Garza v. McAllen Independent School District ( 1981 )

KEITH, Justice.

Plaintiffs below, on behalf of Wally Garza, Deceased, and his brother Eugenio Garza, Jr., appeal from judgment sustaining defendant’s plea in bar and granting summary judgment that plaintiffs take nothing by their suit. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts of this case are not in dispute. On May 17, Í978, Wally and Eugenio Garza, both high school students, boarded the school bus and took seats in the rear as usual. At a subsequent stop, several other high school students and Mark Trevino, who was not a student at that time, boarded the bus and also went to the rear. When the bus arrived at Travis Junior High School, a school of the McAllen Independent School District (“McAllen ISD”), some of the students attempted to exit through the rear door of the bus but were prevented from doing so by Eugenio Garza. A fight ensued, and one of the boys pulled a chain from his pocket and began striking Eugenio Garza with it. At some time during the fight, Mark Trevino pulled out a knife, which he had brought aboard the bus concealed under his shirt, and stabbed Wally Garza in the chest. Wally Garza died within minutes, and Eugenio suffered personal injuries and witnessed the death of his brother.

Plaintiffs alleged that McAllen ISD and its employees negligently failed to provide safe transportation for and effective control of the students riding the school bus. Defendant responded by plea in bar that the sovereign immunity protection of McAllen ISD was not waived by the provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19 (1970 & Supp. 1980-1981) (hereinafter cited as Act, with appropriate section number).

The parties discuss waiver of immunity in the various sections of the Act; but, Section 19A expressly provides that the Act shall not apply to school districts “except as to motor vehicles.” Waiver of governmental immunity, as to school districts, has been accomplished only for injuries and damages arising from the use of motor vehicles. Section 8.

In Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6687b, Sec. 1, (a) and (b) (1977), the legislature defined the words “vehicle”¹ and “motor vehicle”.² Our Supreme Court has approved, in a case arising under the Act, the ordinary dictionary term of “use”. See Beggs v. Texas Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 496 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1973, writ ref’d). This is the language used in Beggs:

“[The dictionary] defines the word ‘use’ as meaning ‘to put or bring into action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose.’ ” (496 S.W.2d at 254)

See also, James Stewart & Co. v. Mobley, 282 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1955, writ ref’d); Person v. Latham, 582 S.W.2d 246, 248-249 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

Only if our plaintiffs’ claims are shown to have been caused by the use of the motor vehicle can plaintiffs overcome the defense of governmental immunity. The fact that the school bus is a motor vehicle as defined in the Act is not the issue. The question in issue may be stated thus:

Do the facts set out in our record give rise to a claim for damages “proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any officer or employee ... arising from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle”? (Act, Sec. 3.)

For the reasons now to be stated, we answer our question in the negative.

The defendant school district, relying upon Jackson v. City of Corpus Christi, 484 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.), argues:

“[T]he allegations of negligence are related to the direction, control and supervision of students rather than the negligent use of the motor vehicle itself. While it is true that the unfortunate event took place on a motor vehicle, it was not through the motor vehicle’s use or operation of the motor vehicle itself that the incident occurred.”

We agree with the argument. In Jackson, supra, the claim was based in part on the theory that the policemen negligently failed to direct traffic around the stalled vehicle and to have it removed from the roadway. The Court reasoned that the failure of the officers to direct the traffic around the stalled vehicle did “not involve the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle in its common and ordinary sense.” (484 S.W.2d at 809)

In the case at bar, plaintiffs seek to hold the district liable because the bus driver and the school officials failed to enforce regulations governing the use of school buses by non-students and in failing “to control and discipline the behavior of the bus occupants.”

In this case, just as in Jackson, supra, the injury arose out of the failure to control and supervise the public, and not from the operation or use of a motor vehicle. In each case, the presence of the motor vehicle did not cause the injury.

A similar claim was considered by the court in Brantley v. City of Dallas, 545 S.W.2d 284, 286-287 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1976, writ ref’d n. r. e.), where plaintiff was denied emergency ambulance service by city employees. The Court affirmed the summary judgment for the city, saying:

“Taking the words ‘use’ and ‘operation’ in their common and ordinary meaning, an allegation that injuries resulted because a technician refused to transport plaintiff in an ambulance is not equivalent to an allegation that plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by negligence arising from the use or operation of a motor vehicle.”

See also, Westbrook v. City of Edna, 552 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n. r. e.).

We have given careful consideration to plaintiffs’ contentions but, making application of the authorities set out herein, we are unwilling to believe that the legislature, with the strictures imposed under Section 19A, intended to expose school districts to unlimited liability for stabbings on school buses while denying such claims for stabbings on the school grounds. See and compare the language used in Beggs, supra (496 S.W.2d at 254). In Beggs, as here, there was an error in judgment on the part of the employee, but sovereign immunity had not been waived.

The school district used a motor vehicle to transport Wally Garza to school. Mark Trevino used a knife to kill Wally Garza. Trevino’s knife and not the use of the bus was the cause of plaintiffs’ damage.

The trial court, under the undisputed record in this cause, acted properly in entering the summary judgment for the defendant; the judgment is AFFIRMED.

1 . (a) — “ ‘Vehicle’ means every device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.”

2 . (b) — “ ‘Motor Vehicle’ means every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails.”