Howard v. Lockhart , 300 Ark. 144 ( 1989 )

Per Curiam.

These cases are consolidated, inasmuch as they have common characteristics. All are civil in nature, all are governed by the rule announced in Virgin v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 92, 702 S.W.2d 9 (1986), and Glick v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 417, 706 S.W.2d 178 (1986), and all reflect the same defect.

Roosevelt Abernathy, acting pro se, petitions for the appointment of counsel to assist him in his appeal from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court and for permission to file a handwritten brief. Daniel Ray Howard and Elgie Sanders petition for permission to file handwritten briefs in their cases.

In Virgin v. Lockhart, supra, we pointed out that in criminal cases an accused has a constitutional right to counsel, but that there is no corresponding right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings or in civil actions. Dyer v. State, 258 Ark. 494, 527 S.W.2d 672 (1975); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1971); see Johnson v. Teasdale, 456 F. Supp. 1083 (W.D. Mo. 1978). Hence, in none of the proceedings filed here or in circuit court by these petitioners is there any constitutional right to the relief being sought. We have held, however, that if a petitioner is able to make a substantial showing that he is entitled to relief and that he or she cannot proceed without counsel, we will entertain such petition. We have adopted a similar policy with respect to handwritten briefs by pro se petitioners. Glick v. Lockhart, supra.

None of the petitioners has made any attempt to comply with the policies announced in Virgin and Glick. Of the three, only Roosevelt Abernathy’s petition contains an allegation touching on the merits, and that consists of nothing more than a conclusory allegation that the petition’s cause has merit. Conclusory assertions of merit, however artfully phrased, do not meet the requirements of Virgin and Glick. It is essential that such petitions set forth facts upon which the claim or cause is based in such a manner that it can be objectively determined by the court that there is substantial merit in the cause which petitioner seeks to further.

These petitioners having failed to make any showing of merit, their petitions are denied.