Weiss v. New Jersey Transit , 128 N.J. 376 ( 1992 )

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

O’HERN, J.

Once again we are required to resolve the proper relationship between the liability and immunity provisions of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to :12-3. The facts of this case are set forth in the reported decision of the Appellate Division. 245 NJ.Super. 265, 584 A2d 1359 (1991). We recite only those essential to our decision.

But eleven days before the traffic light at a notoriously dangerous railroad crossing became operational, plaintiffs decedent lost her life when a train struck her car as it crossed the tracks. Her survivors sued, claiming that the dangerous condition of the property under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, the failure to provide emergency warning signals under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4, and defendants’ failure to act reasonably when undertaking to cure a known danger had caused her fatal injury. The public bodies defended by relying on the legislative grant of immunity for failure to place a traffic signal under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 and plan or design immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-6. The Law Division agreed with the public bodies and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.

On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 did not apply because the true cause of the dangerous condition was not the absence of the traffic light but rather the independent negligence of the public bodies in delaying the implementation of a plan to install the traffic signal. The panel found that the design and plan immunity did not apply to this case because that immunity applied to the original plan or design, not the plan for the improvement. 245 N.J.Super. at 273, 584 A 2d 1359. The Appellate Division emphasized what it described as a “tortuous [eight-year] history of bureaucratic red-tape.” 245 NJ.Super. at 270, 584 A 2d 1359. The argument has a powerful logic. Surely were it not for the delay, Elizabeth Ann Weiss would not have tragically died at this grade crossing. But the argument has the same logic as many other claimed exceptions to the Act's immunity provisions.

To state the principles applicable to such an action is easy. See Rochinsky v. State, 110 N.J. 399, 541 A.2d 1029 (1988). The Court is frequently divided when it comes to their application because to pin down the concept of causation in law is so difficult. See, e.g., Troth v. State, 117 N.J. 258, 566 A.2d 515 (1989) (did the legislative immunity with respect to the maintenance of natural lands take precedence over the statutory liability for a defective condition of a man-made dam?); Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 497 A.2d 183 (1985) (did the legislative immunity for establishing a speed limit take precedence over a negligent failure to warn of dangerous curve in the road?). At first glance, the cases might appear to be inconsistent, allowing a cause of action in Troth, but not in Kolitch or Rochinsky. In fact, each case involves a search for a unifying principle — to identify the cause of the accident, e.g., in Troth, was it the flowing waters or the artificial structure that caused the injury, and to ask if that identified cause or condition is one that the Legislature intended to immunize.

It is appealing to think that the true cause of this accident was the bureaucratic delay and not the absence of a traffic signal. Had the light been operational eleven days earlier, Elizabeth Ann Weiss almost certainly would be with us today. But the injured motorist in Pico v. State, 116 N.J. 55, 560 A.2d 1193 (1989), would not have been injured either had State employees sanded the roadway five minutes before she was struck by a skidding car. That failure also could be considered bureaucratic delay. If the immunities granted under the Act were found to be inapplicable because of a delay in effectuating the governmental actions involved, there would be little left to the immunities granted by the Act. In the context of other immunities, courts have recognized that the liability provisions of the Act will not take precedence over specifically granted immunities.

For example, in Henschke v. Borough of Clayton, 251 N.J.Super. 393, 598 A.2d 526 (App.Div.1991), municipal police officers negligently failed to investigate the theft of articles from plaintiffs home and “whitewashed” the matter, causing the loss of his personal effects. Id. at 397, 598 A.2d 526. However, the court found that the negligence of the police officers established under N.J.S.A. 59:2-2 and -3 did not diminish the legislative immunity granted to the municipality “for failure to provide police protection,” under N.J.S.A. 59:5-4. Id. at 400, 598 A. 2d 526. See also Lee v. Doe, 232 N.J.Super. 569, 581, 557 A.2d 1045 (App.Div.1989) (police officers who failed to respond to claims of wrongdoing by plaintiff who was subsequently shot by wrongdoer were immune from liability under N.J.S.A. 59:5-5); Wuethrich v. Delia, 155 N.J.Super. 324, 326, 382 A.2d 929 (App.Div.) (general provision for vicarious liability of public entity for negligent acts of employee did not diminish “explicit grant of immunity contained in N.J.S.A. 59:5-4 and N.J.S.A. 59:5-5” with respect to failure to provide public protection or failure to make arrest), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 486, 391 A.2d 500 (1978) (Wuethrich II).¹

In Bombace v. City of Newark, 125 N.J. 361, 593 A.2d 335 (1991), we followed that approach of recognizing the precedence of specific immunity provisions. There we held that the ordinary negligence of a municipal official in terminating a legal proceeding to prosecute housing violations did not diminish the explicit grant of immunity contained in the Act for failure to enforce the law. Id. at 373-74, 593 A.2d 335. That approach is consistent with the principle of Rochinsky, supra, 110 N.J. 399, 541 A. 2d 1029 that “when one of the Act’s provisions establishes liability, that liability is ordinarily negated if the public entity possesses a corresponding immunity.” Id. at 408, 541 A. 2d 1029. There, this Court reaffirmed that N.J.S.A. 59:2-l(b) “ ‘is intended to insure that any immunity provisions provided in the act or by common law will prevail over the liability provisions.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Report of the Attorney General’s Task Force on Sovereign Immunity, cmt. on N.J.S.A. 59:2-1 (1972) (Task Force Comment)). Thus, even were we to believe that a cause of action might otherwise be stated for “administrative inaction” that is not “of a legislative or judicial nature,” N.J.S.A. 59:2-3, the explicit grant of immunity for failure to provide traffic signals under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, “will prevail over the liability provisions.” N.J.S.A. 59:2-1 Task Force Comment.

Were there any other triable issue of independent negligence — for example, had the underbrush that obscured visibility at the crossing been on defendants’ property and subject to their maintenance, or had there been any other condition of the property that caused the dangerous condition to exist, e.g., a pothole of long duration, an oil spill on the roadway, or a broken traffic light, Bergen v. Koppenal, 52 N.J. 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968), the complaint might have stated a cause of action. Rochinsky, supra, 110 N.J. at 416, 541 A.2d 1029 (weather immunity did not include “artificial creation of a snow bank that makes a highway impassable”).

Plaintiff argues that the Tort Claims Act is meant to insulate only high-level policy decisions of government because only judicial review of such decisions implicates the separation-of-powers doctrine. See Costa v. Josey, 83 N.J. 49, 55-56, 415 A.2d 337 (1980) (citing Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 106, 110, 219 A.2d 512 (1966), in which Chief Justice Weintraub admonished “[a]s to such matters [governmental policy decisions], the question is whether a judge or jury could review the policy or political decisions involved without in effect taking over the responsibility and power of those other branches”). The plaintiff would have us divide the decision-making and implementation processes in assessing the traffic-signal immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5. However, the Task Force Comment to N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 refers to the analysis of this Court in Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649 (1966). There the Court suggested that a public entity would be immune from liability whether the entity decided to eliminate the traffic light permanently or simply was delayed in reinstalling the light. Id. at 87, 222 A.2d 649.

The failure to send out the road sanders in Pico, supra, 116 N.J. 55, 560 A 2d 1193, might also have been classified as a low-level administrative decision rather than a “political decision,” but we found that the express immunity for weather conditions prevailed over the negligent delay in dispatching the sanders. We have been adjured by the framers of the Tort Claims Act that we should approach these cases from the perspective that immunity is the dominant theme of the Act.

In the absence of a comprehensive statute the New Jersey Supreme Court ha[d] developed the analytical approach that courts “ought not to be ... asking why immunity should not apply in a given situation but rather ... asking whether there is any reason why it should apply.” B.W. King, Inc. v. West New York, 49 N.J. 318, 325, 230 A.2d 133 (1967). This approach is no longer necessary in light of this comprehensive Tort Claims Act. Rather the approach should be whether an immunity applies and if not, skould liability attach. It is hoped that in utilizing this approach the courts will exercise restraint in the acceptance of novel causes of action against public entities. [N.J.S.A. 59:2-1 Task Force Comment.]

In this case, because an immunity applies, liability does not attach.

Plaintiff also argued that the public entities are liable under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 for failure to provide “emergency” devices needed to warn of a dangerous condition harmful to the safe movement of traffic that would not be apparent to one using due care. We are unable to agree. That exception applies to conditions that are “sudden, unexpected [or] emergent.” Spin Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 136 N.J.Super. 520, 524, 347 A.2d 20 (Law Div.1975). Thus, in McGowan v. Borough of Eatontown, 151 N.J.Super. 440, 450, 376 A.2d 1327 (App.Div.1977), the unexpected presence of an artificially-induced icing condition warranted an emergency warning. In this case the danger was endemic, not emergent. All existing systems but for the traffic controls were operational, the cross-bucks were in place, red warning lights were flashing, road markings were in view, and the intersection was heavily traveled. Whatever flaws may have existed were not sudden, unexpected, or emergent. Even the “death trap” in Kolitck could not be regarded as an emergency that would necessitate the placement of warnings signals. 100 N.J. at 497, 497 A.2d 183.

Because the fundamental thesis of plaintiffs case is that the delay in implementing the policy-level decision of the Commissioner erases immunization for failure to post a traffic signal, we do not address the complex issue of whether partial plan and design immunity was afforded to certain defendants for features of the new plan that were subject to their control and in place. For example, New Jersey Transit Rail Operations (incorrectly denominated as New Jersey Rail Operations) asserts that all that it could do had been done, e.g., new cross-bucks and flashers were in place and operational, but that DOT and the municipality had exclusive control of the traffic signals. We believe it best to view the matter as the Appellate Division did — that this was not yet an operational plan. Thus, although we agree with our dissenting members that in order to avail itself of the plan or design immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-6, the public entity must demonstrate that the specific design or plan detail alleged to constitute the dangerous condition was itself the subject of prior approval or prior approved standards, see Thompson v. Newark Housing Authority, 108 N.J. 525, 534, 537, 531 A.2d 734 (1987) (no evidence that original plans addressed the issue of fire safety), the difference in this case is that the failure to provide the traffic light has been specifically immunized by N.J.S.A. 59:4-5.

On the issue of holding the public entity accountable for delay in effectuating the installation of the traffic signal, we take account of our analogous policy with respect to the effect of the passage of time on plan or design immunity. Thus, although we often look to California for guidance in interpreting our Tort Claims Act, see Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 331, 537 A.2d 652 (1988), we do not do so here. Under California law (as under New York’s common law), “the governmental entity may not, ostrich-like, hide its head in the blueprints, blithely ignoring the actual operation of the plan” and the developing dangerous condition of land. Baldwin v. State, 6 Cal.3d 424, 99 Cal.Rptr. 145, 151, 491 P.2d 1121, 1127 (1972) (citing Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 167 N.E.2d 63 (1960)). Whatever the merits of the analysis, for example, that “[n]o threat of undue interference with discretionary decision-making exists in this situation,” id., 99 Cal. Rptr. at 151, 491 P.2d at 1128, the Baldwin approach of legal accountability for delay in responding to changed circumstances affecting a plan or design “has been specifically rejected as unrealistic and inconsistent with the thesis of discretionary immunity.” N.J.S.A. 59:4-6 Task Force Comment. “It is intended that the plan or design immunity provided in this section be perpetual.” Ibid. One can debate the wisdom of the legislative policy choice; one cannot readily discount its implications when we consider imposing legal accountability for delay in the initial effectuation of governmental policy choices.

In speaking of the weather immunity in Horan v. State, 212 N.J.Super. 132, 514 A.2d 78 (App.Div.1986), Judge Fritz concluded his opinion with this simple yet precise summary: “[W]hen weather is the true culprit, government is immune.” Id. at 136, 514 A.2d 78. So too here. When the absence of a traffic signal or the design of the crossing is the true culprit, government is immune. The tragic circumstances of this case that so strongly counsel the departure from the provisions of the Act may commend a legislative response. In the absence of such a response, we cannot find a cause of action stated under the Tort Claims Act.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the judgment of the Law Division is reinstated.

1 But see Shore v. Housing Auth. of Harrison, 208 N.J.Super. 348, 352-53, 506 A.2d 16 (App.Div.1986) (court refused to accept defendant’s argument that “ ‘goofing off while on the job is tantamount to failure to provide sufficient police protection in the terms of N.J.S.A. 59:5-4”).