Commonwealth v. Heberling , 451 Pa. Super. 119 ( 1996 )

EAKIN, Judge.

Stephanie Heberling appeals from the judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County (Reilly, J., presiding) following her conviction under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3361, driving vehicle at unsafe speed. Appellant argues, in essence, that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction under section 3361. Specifically, she argues the evidence is insufficient because the Commonwealth failed to prove any “prevailing conditions” or “hazards” that made her excessive speed unreasonable.

On July 9, 1994, a police officer saw appellant travelling “at an extreme rate of speed” in a 45 mile-per-hour zone. Appellant was nearing an intersection (approximately one-tenth of a mile down the road) and the crest of a hill (approximately two-to three-tenths of a mile ahead). Appellant was stopped before reaching either of these two points and was issued a citation charging a violation of section 3361. Weather conditions were clear and normal. No other traffic was affected nor were any pedestrians at risk.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Williams, 539 Pa. 61, 650 A.2d 420 (1994). Applying this standard of review, we find appellant’s insufficiency claim without merit.

Section 3361 of the Vehicle Code provides:

No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing, nor at a speed greater than will permit the driver to bring his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when approaching and going around curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway and when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3361¹ (emphasis added).

The language of section 3361 is clear and unambiguous. The basic tenet of statutory construction requires a court to construe the words of the statute according to their plain meaning. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326, 335, 446 A.2d 583, 587 (1982). When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, a court cannot disregard them under the pretext of pursuing the spirit of the statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c); Coretsky v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Butler Township, 520 Pa. 513, 555 A.2d 72 (1989).²

Section 3361 has two sentences that must be read together. The first sentence sets forth two general and alternate types of conduct that, when a person is driving, constitute a violation: (1) at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing; or (2) at a speed greater than will permit the driver to bring his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

The second sentence of section 3361 begins with the phrase “consistent with the foregoing ”³ and sets forth several specific examples of conditions and hazards that further define when the general conduct — unreasonable or imprudent speed — constitutes a violation. These situations include, but are not limited to, approaching a hill crest and approaching an intersection. These specifically enumerated situations are not the exclusive or sole situations that, together with inappropriate speed, might constitute violations, because there is a catchall category, i.e., “when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.”

There is no question that speeding alone does not constitute a violation of this section.⁴ There must be proof of speed that is unreasonable or imprudent under the circumstances (of which there must also be proof), which are the “conditions” and “actual and potential hazards then existing” of the roadway. These circumstances may include not only the amount of traffic, pedestrian travel and weather conditions, but also the nature of the roadway itself (e.g., whether four-lane, interstate, or rural; flat and wide, or narrow and winding over hilly terrain; smooth-surfaced, or full of potholes; clear, or under construction with abrupt lane shifts.) It is these circumstances under which one’s speed may be found sufficiently unreasonable and imprudent to constitute a violation of section 3361, even if the. driver has adhered to the posted speed limit.

We are guided in this plain reading of the statute by its precursor, section 1002, which read as follows:

(a) Any person driving a vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic surface, and width of the highway, and of any other restrictions or conditions then and there existing; and no person shall drive any vehicle, upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1002(a) (emphasis added). The legislature repealed this section and enacted section 3361 on June 17, 1976 (see footnote 1). The repealed statute did not delineate any specific situations that warranted caution; section 3361 enumerates some of them in its second sentence.

The legislature’s inclusion of some specific situations is little more than its common sense recognition that many driving situations require extra care. Approaching hills and intersections logically demand caution beyond mere adherence to a posted speed limit; proof of unreasonable speed coupled with either of these roadway conditions makes out a violation of section 3361.

We also are guided by our decision in Commonwealth v. Vishneski 380 Pa.Super. 495, 552 A.2d 297 (1989). We found that Vishneski’s speed on a limited access, three-lane highway was unreasonable and sustained his conviction under section 3361:

The trial record indicates that there was a truck traveling on Route 202 North at the same time appellant was traveling on the route. Appellant entered the highway from the Paoli Pike on-ramp and exited at the Route 322 exit. It is apparent from the record that appellant’s speed was unreasonable given the conditions of the highway. Appellant was traveling at 84.5 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zoned area where traffic must merge and exit while competing with the northbound flow of traffic. In addition, we note that appellant was entering and exiting the northbound highway at a high rate of speed within a distance of approximately one-tenth mile. The potential for hazards and conditions rendering traveling at a speed of 84.5 miles per hour unreasonable is clearly supported by the evidence.

Vishneski, 380 Pa.Super. at 503-04, 552 A.2d at 301 (emphasis added). Weather was not a factor. Clearly, we examined such “conditions” and “hazards” as the congested traffic and Vishneski’s excessive speed, as well as the nature of the roadway, the exit- and on-ramp design of a limited access highway.

Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Strausser, 18 Pa. D. & C.4th 517 (1993) and Commonwealth v. Walker, 5 Pa. D. & C.4th 631 (1990) to support her case. The Strausser court relied on Walker because of a similarity in fact patterns⁵ and stated:

The sole basis for issuance of the citation was the defendant’s act of traveling 41 mph in a posted 25-mph zone. There was no testimony regarding other traffic, pedestrians or children present, and the day was dry and clear. Under the language of section 3361 of the Motor Vehicle Code, simply proving a defendant was speeding is not sufficient for a conviction for failure to drive at a safe speed.

The Commonwealth must show that the prevailing conditions, and/or the existence of actual or potential hazards rendered the defendant’s rate of travel unreasonable and imprudent at that particular place and time.

Id. at 521-22. The Commonwealth presented no “conditions” or “potential hazards” at all that, coupled with Strausser’s excessive speed, could sustain a conviction under section 3361.

While there are few appellate decisions interpreting section 3361, we sustained a conviction under this section in Commonwealth v. Monosky, 360 Pa.Super. 481, 520 A.2d 1192 (1987), in addition to Vishneski discussed above. Monosky was driving through a residential area at approximately 50 mph in a 25 mph zone. The weather was foggy and wet. We held in Monosky:

The applicable provision of the Motor Vehicle Code here involved, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361, states that a vehicle shall not be driven in excess of a speed greater than is reasonably prudent under conditions and potential hazards existing at that time. As the record here discloses, hazards and conditions were readily apparent. The area was residential, and the day was foggy and wet. We conclude that appellant’s driving at a speed in excess of the posted limit was greater than was reasonable and prudent given the prevailing conditions and potential hazards.

Id. at 485, 520 A.2d at 1194 (emphasis added). We found that weather conditions and driving on a roadway in a residential area were “hazards and conditions” that, coupled with Mono-sky’s excessive speed, sustained a conviction under section 3361.

In the instant case the trial court found that appellant was approaching an intersection and a hill crest at an extreme rate of speed:

In dismissing the Defendant’s appeal, this Court notes that the statute requires the operator to have regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing. The statute requires the operator to drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching ... an intersection ... when approaching a hill crest ... the Court found as a fact in the instant case that the defendant was travelling at an extreme rate of speed while approaching an intersection and hill crest and determined under the requirements of the statute that the Commonwealth has met its burden.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/27/95, at 9 (emphasis in original). “Approaching a hill crest” and “approaching ... an intersection” are “conditions” specifically enumerated in the statute that require a driver to proceed at a safe and appropriate speed. When appellant drove at an excessive speed under these conditions, she violated section 3361.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DEL SOLE, J., files a dissenting opinion.

1 . Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, No. 81. § 1. effective July 1, 1977.

2 . It is only when a statute is unclear that a court may embark upon the task of ascertaining the intent of the legislature by reviewing the necessity of the act, the object to be attained, the circumstances under which it was enacted and the mischief to be remedied. Coretsky, 520 Pa. at 517-18, 555 A.2d at 74 (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921 (c)).

3 . The second sentence does not begin with the phrase "in addition to,” "separate and apart from,” "alternatively,” or any other phrase suggesting additional or different standards that the Commonwealth must prove to support a conviction.

4 . Section 3362 of the Vehicle Code specifically addresses speeding violations.

5 . Strausser was simply speeding, and there was no evidence of conditions or hazards to support his conviction. Walker, however, traveled through an intersection at an excessive speed. In finding only that Walker exceeded the speed limit, the Walker court ignored the situations delineated in the second sentence of section 3361, which clearly requires approaching and crossing an intersection "at a safe and appropriate speed.”