Modern Drop Forge Corp. v. Industrial Commission ( 1996 )

JUSTICE COLWELL,

dissenting in part:

I respectfully dissent in part because I believe the majority misconstrues the legislature’s intent with regard to the Commission’s authority to award compensation at a higher rate for a statutory amputation. I believe the Commission correctly found that it was within its authority to award the claimant PPD compensation at the rate of 662/s % of his average weekly wage, rather than the 60% rate espoused by the majority.

Construing sections 8(b)(2.1) and (b)(4) in accordance with paragraph (e), as the Commission did, I would find that section 8(b)(4), by its express terms, applies to amputations. Section 8(b)(2.1) applies to all other awards under paragraph (e) other than amputations and enuncleations. All of the remaining paragraphs to which section 8(b)(4) applies relate to death, permanent total disability and temporary total disability. Put another way, the only PPD claims covered by section 8(b)(4) are amputations and enuncleations. 820 ILCS 305/8(b)(4) (West 1992). Thus, my review of the provisions of the sections in question reveals that the Commission was correct in its reading of the statute.

Further, thé paragraphs and subparagraphs to which section 8(b)(2) apply are much broader than the portions to which section 8(b)(4) applies. As noted, section 8(b)(4) limits the increase in maximum weekly compensation to only instances of death, permanent or temporary total incapacity, amputation of a member and enucleation of an eye. 820 ILCS 305/8(b)(4) (West 1992). It does not apply to "all cases of serious and permanent disfigurement” and of "permanent partial disability” as does section 8(b)(2.1). 820 ILCS 305/8(b)(2.1) (West 1992). Thus, construing the statute as a whole and for its practical and liberal interpretation (see Vaught, 52 Ill. 2d at 165), I believe that the legislature clearly intended that only the most serious cases be afforded a higher maximum level of compensation. This does not negate the meaning of section 8(b)(2.1), because that section still applies to all other cases of serious and permanent disfigurement and permanent partial disability except cases of death, total incapacity, amputation or enucleation. Paragraph (e) allows PPD awards for loss of use other than amputations and enucleations, and those awards are still subject to the 60% limitation. Thus, I believe the Commission did not err in awarding the claimant benefits at the rate of 662/s% for his amputation. Thus, I dissent as to that portion of the majority’s opinion and concur in the remainder of the disposition.

RARICK, J., joins this dissent.