First Professional Leasing Co. v. Rappold ( 1974 )

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SMITH

dissenting:

I do not believe that the facts we have accord in personam jurisdiction to Illinois. We must remember we are talking about “due process” and the criterion laid down for us by the United States Supreme Court is that the nonresident defendant must have “certain minimum contacts” with the forum state. The “contacts” we have here, in my opinion, are below the minimum.

The majority opinion states that the contract sued on was “executed in Illinois.” This is true — if we are thinking about the law of contracts, and it is true too in a conflicts-of-law setting. But we are not thinking in those contexts. We are thinking about “minimum contacts” in a due process context, and in my opinion, this happenstance or circumstance is hardly an earth-shaking “contact.” It takes two to make a contract, so the signing in California is just as important from a “contact” viewpoint as in Illinois, no more no less. That the last signature was affixed in Illinois may have great significance in a conflicts-of-law setting in determining where the contract was “executed,” is to me, here, an immateriality. True, “defendant contacted” plaintiff in Illinois — by mail — and this is a “contact” in the sense that the Supreme Court used that word (though they used the plural) in a due process setting — but as I have said, it is hardly earth-shaking, and it is very much alone.

Unbeknownst to the defendant, the contract was pledged to a bank ip Illinois. I fail to see how this something plaintiff did in Illinois provides one more “contact” by á defendant in California with the forum state. Likewise, the remittal of payments from California to Illinois, while performance in a law-of-contracts context, can hardly be considered a “contact” in the sense in which the Supreme Court has defined it. What if the lease had been pledged in New York, or London — would that be a “contact” for the holder to assert jurisdiction there? Buyers of non-recourse commercial paper will find the majority opinion to their liking.

I am even more at a loss as to why the signing of an Illinois security agreement in California is a “contact.” It may be that one can agree to be bound by the law of Illinois in signing such an agreement, but in doing so, he is not subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Illinois. Rather, he is saying that the appropriate forum should apply the law of Illinois. In my opinion, courts of other states are as adept at applying our corpus as we are — though it may take a bit more time and study. And knowledge by defendant that plaintiff was an Illinois resident (which in fact he was) and knowledge that the contract was to be signed in Illinois (as it was), are not “contacts” in my opinion. Thus, while I might consider the arrival in Illinois of a contract from out of state to be a “contact,” I do not believe that knowledge qua knowledge of these facts is what the Supreme Court was talking about when it said “contacts.” Of course, if defendant had sued plaintiff in Illinois, jurisdiction is clearly here. Likewise, if plaintiff had sued in California. But that is not our case. The fact, too, that in the future the court here might be faced with a forum non conveniens problem doesn’t seem to me to argue for jurisdiction — nor does possible removal to district courts sitting in Illinois, and here to add poignancy to this supposed reason, at the very threshold, is the lack of the jurisdictional amount. Under International Shoe we have to find “minimum contacts” so that the due process demand for fairness is answered. I do not believe that the facts here supply that answer. Accordingly, I dissent.