Hall v. General Motors Corp. , 229 Mich. App. 580 ( 1998 )

M. J. MatuzaK, J.

(concurring). I concur in the result reached by the majority because I believe that the result is mandated by Farrell v Ford Motor Co, 199 Mich App 81; 501 NW2d 567 (1993), and MCR 7.215(C)(2). I write separately to express my disagreement with the conclusion in the instant case and Farrell. I do not believe that North Carolina’s interests in a products liability case against a domestic automobile manufacturer somehow outweigh Michigan’s interests. Although General Motors has a distribution network in North Carolina, GM’s commercial relationship with that state is insignificant when compared to its enormous economic presence in Michigan and consequential effect on this state. I prefer the analysis presented in Mahne v Ford Motor Co, 900 F2d 83, 88-89 (CA 6, 1990), a factually similar case where the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that a Florida statute of repose would apply over Michigan law. GM’s headquarters and a significant part of its operations are located in Michigan, so applying this state’s law should not defeat defendant’s expectations. Mahne, at 88. Nor do I believe that North Carolina has any significant interest in having its statute of repose applied in this case. The automobile at issue was manufactured in Ohio and designed in Michigan. Instead of protecting a North Carolina manufacturer, the statute is being used to protect an out-of-state manufacturer for injuries sustained in North Carolina arising out of wrongs alleged to have been committed in Michigan or Ohio. Aside from the binding effect of Farrell there is no good reason to extend the benefits of the North Carolina statute of repose to defendant. Mahne, at 88.

Nor do I believe that the North Carolina statute of repose would apply under Michigan’s borrowing statute, MCL 600.5861; MSA 27A.5861. Michigan law recognizes the significant difference between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation. O’Brien v Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich 1, 15; 299 NW2d 336 (1980); Pendzsu v Beazer East, Inc, 219 Mich App 405, 410; 557 NW2d 127 (1996). The Legislature is presumed to intend the meaning plainly expressed by statutory language. Pendzsu, at 409. Section 5861 refers only to “statute [s] of limitations” rather than repose, and so should not be interpreted to import statutes of repose.