People v. Wiley ( 1995 )


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  • JUSTICE HARRISON,

    concurring in part and dissenting in part:

    I agree that we should affirm Wiley’s murder convictions. I dissent because I would reverse Wiley’s convictions for armed robbery and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

    Under our form of jurisprudence, the State must prove the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although circumstantial evidence may sometimes suffice to meet that burden, a conviction cannot be founded upon speculation or conjecture. (See People v. Burnside (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 453, 458.) Such a result is unconstitutional. A conviction based on a record lacking any relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged violates due process. (Vachon v. New Hampshire (1974), 414 U.S. 478, 480, 38 L. Ed. 2d 666, 669, 94 S. Ct. 664, 665.) That is the case with respect to Wiley’s convictions for armed robbery.

    Contrary to what the majority may say, no rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Wiley took property from any of the victims. The only thing we can tell with certainty from this record is that the apartment was thoroughly searched, a purse was emptied, and coins were left at the scene. From these facts the majority deduces that additional money must have been found and taken, presumably some or all of the $5,000 in cash Wiley had left with one of the victims. That, however, does not follow at all. It is at least equally possible that the search was unsuccessful. The victim, after all, had claimed that she no longer had the $5,000 and that Wiley would have to wait for it. The ransacked appearance of the apartment may have resulted simply because Wiley and Battles had to look everywhere before realizing that the victim was telling the truth and that the cash was, in fact, gone.

    As for the loose coins, pocket change reveals nothing. Not everyone is fortunate enough to be able to keep paper currency in the house, and there is nothing about loose coins that suggests that dollar bills must also have been present. To the contrary, the coins could have been there precisely because the bills had all been spent and they were all that was left.

    The most one can say of the evidence is that it is inconclusive. That something was actually taken is not foreclosed by this evidence, but it is not established by it either. Because there is no principled basis for the jury to decide as it did, the convictions for armed robbery should be reversed. Because those convictions were the sole predicate for Wiley’s death sentence, the sentence of death should, in turn, be vacated, and the cause should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

Document Info

Docket Number: 71320

Judges: McMorrow, Harrison

Filed Date: 3/30/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024