Young v. Hoke , 1986 Ind. App. LEXIS 2659 ( 1986 )

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Plaintiffs-appellants Terry and Rebecca Young (Youngs) appeal the trial court's decision granting defendant-appellee Leona Hoke's (Hoke) motion for summary judgment.

The facts relevant to this appeal disclose that the Youngs brought an action against Hoke and Chrysler Corporation for personal injuries and property damage occasioned by a vehicular accident between Rebecca Young and Hoke which occurred on December 18, 1981. The complaint alleged negligence by Hoke in the operation of her vehicle. Against Chrysler, the Youngs alleged that a defective shoulder restraint in the Youngs' vehicle failed; thereby causing Rebecca Young personal injuries.

On July 27, 1984, the Youngs executed a release of all claims against Chrysler. The Youngs filed a motion to dismiss as to Chrysler on August 2, 1984. In May 1985, Hoke moved for summary judgment on the basis that the release executed by the Youngs served as a release of all claims against Hoke as well. The trial court granted Hoke's motion for summary judgment in July 1985. This appeal ensued.

As restated and consolidated, the sole issue raised by the Youngs on appeal is whether Hoke and Chrysler were joint tort-feasors so that a release in favor of Chrysler constituted a release of claims against Hoke.

The general rule, in Indiana, is that "the unqualified release of one joint tort-feasor, absent fraud or mistake, acts to release all joint tort-feasors." Cooper v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc. (1979), 271 Ind. 63, 64, 390 N.E.2d 155, 157. Such may not be the case where independent and successive tort-feasors are involved. Wecker v. Kilmer (1973), 260 Ind. 198, 294 N.E.2d 132 (release of claim against auto driver was not necessarily release of claim against doctor for negligent performance of medical services after the accident).

The Youngs attempt to characterize Hoke and Chrysler as independent and successive tort-feasors, rather than joint tort-feasors. Joint liability may be created when the acts of various tort-feasors through cooperation or in concert accomplish a particular wrong. See, Sourbier v. Brown (1919), 188 Ind. 554, 567-568, 123 N.E. 802, 806. Additionally, joint liability may be premised upon independent acts which combine to produce a single injury.

See, Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Gossett (1909), 172 Ind. 525, 535, 87 N.E. 723, 728;

Sanders v. Cole Mun. Finance (1986), Ind.App., 489 N.E.2d 117.

In the present case the alleged acts of Hoke and Chrysler combined to cause the injury which the Youngs sustained. Absent the collision, allegedly caused by Hoke's negligence, the alleged negligence by Chrysler would not have caused any injury to the Youngs. The determination that Hoke and Chrysler were joint tort-fea-sors triggers operation of the principles set out in Cooper, supra. Consequently, the trial court's award of summary judgment for Hoke must be sustained.¹

Affirmed.

STATON, P.J., concurs with opinion; GARRARD, J., dissents with opinion.

1 . The Youngs also raise a contention that the release in favor of Chrysler was regarding personal injuries only; thus, Hoke remains liable on a claim for property damages. Because the release made no such delineation of claims, this Court may not address the argument.