Ingemunson v. Hedges ( 1990 )

JUSTICE MILLER,

specially concurring:

I agree with the majority that the Illinois Constitution does not prohibit the General Assembly from increasing the salaries of the State’s Attorneys during their terms of office. Because my construction of the Director’s argument is somewhat different from the majority’s understanding, however, I write separately to make clear the basis for my agreement with the court’s decision.

The Director’s argument is broader than the majority’s paraphrases suggest. Contrary to the majority’s view, the salary control provision found in the executive article of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, §21) is not the only constitutional provision relied on by the Director in his brief filed with this court; the Director would draw additional support from a similar provision appearing in the local government article of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §9(b)). Both provisions prohibit salary changes from taking effect during an officeholder’s current term of office. The Director argues that the two provisions reflect the framers’ views regarding the desirability of such a rule. The Director notes that his position is consistent with decisions under prior constitutional law (e.g., People v. Williams (1908), 232 Ill. 519), as well as with decisions characterizing the role of the State’s Attorneys for separation of powers purposes as executive in nature (e.g., People ex rel. Daley v. Suria (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 26; People ex rel. Daley v. Moran (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 41). The Director warns that the failure to apply the salary control provisions of the executive and local government articles to State’s Attorneys must mean that their salaries may be reduced, as well as increased, during their terms of office.

As the majority notes, the Illinois Constitution provides a variety of rules governing the compensation of different groups of public officials. The legislative, executive, and local government articles of the Illinois Constitution all contain provisions prohibiting changes in salaries from taking effect during the current terms of the persons subject to those restrictions. (See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §11 (“A member shall receive a salary and allowances as provided by law, but changes in the salary of a member shall not take effect during the term for which he has been elected”); art. V, §21 (“Officers of the Executive Branch shall be paid salaries established by law and shall receive no other compensation for their services. Changes in the salaries of these officers elected or appointed for stated terms shall not take effect during the stated terms”); art. VII, §9(b) (“An increase or decrease in the salary of an elected officer of any unit of local government shall not take effect during the term for which that officer is elected”).) A different rule applies to the salary of the auditor general, a position created under the finance article of the Constitution: the auditor general’s salary may be increased, but not decreased, during his term of office. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, §3(a) (“His compensation shall be established by law and shall not be diminished, but may be increased, to take effect during his term”).

Article VI, the judicial article of the Constitution, contains several provisions governing the compensation of officers of the judicial branch of State government. Section 14 provides, “Judges shall receive salaries provided by law which shall not be diminished to take effect during their terms of office.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §14.) Section 18 provides, “The salaries of clerks and other non-judicial officers shall be as provided by law.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 18(c).) Finally, section 19, concerning the officer of State’s Attorney, says, “His salary shall be provided by law.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §19.

The same canons of construction helpful in the interpretation of statutory language are also helpful in the interpretation of constitutional language. (See Johnson v. State Electoral Board (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 256, 258-59; Wolfson v. Avery (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 78, 94; Peabody v. Russel (1922), 301 Ill. 439, 443.) It is apparent from a reading of the relevant provisions that the framers of the current constitution chose to employ different measures with respect to the compensation of various groups of public officials. Changes in the salaries of officeholders subject to the compensation provisions of the legislative, executive, and local government articles of the Constitution may not take effect during an officeholder’s current term of office. Salaries of judges and of the auditor general may be increased, but not decreased, during an incumbent’s term. Finally, the provisions governing the compensation of clerks of court, of other nonjudicial officers, and of State’s Attorneys are silent on the matter of changes in their salaries.

It is evident that the framers did not intent to preclude the legislature from increasing the salaries of incumbent State’s Attorneys during their terms of office. There is no reason to apply to article VI, section 19, the separate compensation provisions found in other portions of the Constitution. Thus, it is of no moment here that the State’s Attorneys are classified, for other purposes, as members of the judicial branch or executive branch of State government. Finally, whether today’s decision means that the State’s Attorneys’ salaries may also be reduced during their terms of office, as the Director contends, is not at issue here.

JUSTICE CALVO joins in this special concurrence.