Richardson v. Green , 1987 D.C. App. LEXIS 384 ( 1987 )

PRYOR, Chief Judge:

This is an appeal from the trial court’s ruling in favor of appellee Robert J. Green in a contract action by appellant for recovery of legal fees he charged for his attempt to non-judicially dispose of the estate of Lucille Green, appellee’s mother. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court was correct in holding that the provisions of the District of Columbia Probate Reform Act of 1980 (D.C.Code §§ 20-101 et seq. (1981)) and, in particular, D.C.Code § 20-105 (1981) and D.C.Code § 19-301 (1981), cannot be interpreted so as to allow for the non-judicial disposition of an estate that comprises more property than contemplated by the express exception in D.C. Code § 20-357 (1981).

Appellant, an attorney, was hired by the family of Lucille Green, who died intestate on September 10, 1981,¹ to facilitate the disposition of her estate. He prepared a trust deed that purportedly transferred the heirs’ (grantors’) interests in the estate to Robert J. Green as trustee (grantee). No personal representative was appointed, and the trust deed was never executed. When the family refused to pay their bill for legal services, appellant brought suit. Appellee claimed that the Probate Reform Act of 1980, and specifically D.C.Code § 20-105 (1981), operates to vest legal title to all a decedent’s property in the personal representative, and, therefore, appointment of a personal representative is a prerequisite to probate and distribution and precludes the possibility of non-judicial distribution. Appellant, in essence, argues that D.C.Code § 20-105 constitutes an instruction about what to do when a personal representative is appointed, but when, as here, no personal representative is appointed, non-judicial dispositions are still viable, as they were at common law.

The trial court correctly classified this issue as one of first impression, and following extensive analysis, concluded that “the plain language of § 20-105, the legislative history, the statutory scheme and construction, and Maryland law all point to the conclusion that any action respecting a decedent’s property requires the appointment of a personal representative ... and that nonjudicial dispositions are abolished.” Memorandum Opinion, Appendix A, post at 437. The court then found that “because the purpose of the contract was to nonjudicially dispose of the decedent’s estate which is not legally possible based on D.C.Code § 20-105, the contract is null and void, and the defendant is under no duty to pay the legal service fees.” Id. at 21.

This case is not simply a case of statutory interpretation. It also raises a more general question: what does it take for a statute, here the Probate Reform Act, to abolish a common law doctrine. In a similarly structured case, this court held that “no statute is to be construed as altering the common law further than its words import. It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly express.” Martin v. Johnson, 512 A.2d 1017, 1021 (D.C.1986), citing Dell v. Department of Employment Services, 499 A.2d 102, 107 (D.C.1985) (quoting Shaw v. Merchants’ National Bank, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 557, 565, 25 L.Ed. 892 (1879)). We agree with the trial court that the Probate Reform Act can be read as fairly expressing legislative intent to abolish the common law doctrine allowing non-judicial disposition of a decedent’s estate.

Appellant also argues that construction of D.C.Code § 20-105 should be in light of other provisions dealing with decedents’ property, especially D.C.Code § 19-301 (1981). Our further review of the legislative history reveals that the Council of the District of Columbia consciously decided to repeal the common law procedures permitting private disposition of real property and to require the appointment of a personal representative where D.C.Code § 19-301 had previously operated outside of probate. That history not only reveals the care and thoroughness with which the new probate law was developed; it states that real property is to be included “in the probate estate for the first time.” See Report of the Committee on the Judiciary on Bill 3-91 at 51 (March 12, 1980). Contrary to appellant’s contention, this demonstrates that a clear policy decision was made by the Council. Accordingly, the failure to repeal § 19-301, an action apparently deemed unnecessary, see id. at 83, does not support appellant’s position.

In arriving at its various conclusions, the trial court issued a well-reasoned, comprehensive memorandum opinion which we find to be fully dispositive of this matter on appeal, and which we adopt. {See Appendix A.)

Affirmed.

1 . The Probate Reform Act applies to this estate because Mrs. Green passed away after the effective date of the statute, January 1, 1981. D.C. Code § 20-109 (1981).