GOONAN v. State , 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 388 ( 2011 )

OPINION

BILL MEIER, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

By information, the State charged Appellant Angela Goonan with possession of a dangerous drug. After a hearing on Goo-nan’s motion to suppress evidence found in her car, Goonan entered a plea agreement whereby she was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for one year. In three issues, Goonan complains that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress. We will affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

In the late evening of August 31, 2008, Corporal Craig Berry of the Keller Police Department stopped Goonan for speeding. As Berry approached Goonan’s car, he saw on the back floorboard a previously opened bottle of wine with its lid on. Berry asked Goonan for her license and insurance papers. Goonan provided her license but was unable to show proof of insurance. As Berry talked to Goonan, he further observed that the wine bottle was roughly five-eighths full. According to Berry, he took Goonan’s license with him to his patrol car to run a computer check, which came back “clear.” At some point during the encounter, Berry said that he observed Goonan “making some furtive movements ... reaching over to her right side.” After running the computer check, Berry returned to the passenger side of Goonan’s car and talked with her. He discussed with Goonan that it was illegal to have an unsealed wine bottle in the passenger compartment of the vehicle and asked her “if there were any additional open containers in the vehicle.” Berry said that Goonan denied there were any other open containers. He further said that she had a worried look on her face and told him that he “could look in the vehicle and that she had already unlocked it for [him].” Berry searched Goonan’s vehicle.

By Berry’s account, while searching the vehicle, he opened the center console and observed a pill bottle that contained the name of someone other than Goonan on the prescription label. He also said that the bottle label seemed odd because the prescription date was several years old— the fill date was April 2000 — and the bottle label indicated that there were no authorized refills remaining on the prescription. Berry opened the pill bottle and observed that there were forty-eight pills within it— the prescription was written for sixty. Berry testified he believed that he was legally in Goonan’s car because he had her consent and that he was legally allowed to seize the pill bottle because he had observed it while conducting the search.

Goonan testified that Berry had stopped her for speeding and that she did not provide proof of insurance. She explained that her movements toward the console were her efforts to look for her insurance papers while Berry was in his patrol car. She said that as she was digging through papers in her console, she saw the pill bottle for the first time. According to Goonan, the pill bottle was at the bottom of the console, under numerous papers, and she “didn’t think anything of it.” Goo-nan said that Berry accused her of attempting to hide the pill bottle under the other things in the console because the pill bottle was “buried at the bottom.” The trial court denied Goonan’s motion to suppress. This appeal followed.

III.DISCUSSION

In three issues, Goonan complains that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress in violation of her federal and state constitutional rights and in violation of article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Tex. Const, art. I, § 9; Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23 (Vernon 2005). Goonan does not contest whether Berry had her consent to search her vehicle, nor does she complain that Berry seized the pill bottle. Goonan’s complaint is that Berry was not justified in opening the pill bottle because it contained “innocuous materials.” We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.2000), modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court’s determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of audibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108-09 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court’s rulings on those questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652-53.

Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those fact findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818-19. We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id. at 818.

When the record is silent on the reasons for the trial court’s ruling, or when there are no explicit fact findings and neither party timely requested findings and conclusions from the trial court, we imply the necessary fact findings that would support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those findings. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex.Crim.App.2008); see Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless the implied fact findings supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 819.

We must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974, 124 S.Ct. 1883, 158 L.Ed.2d 469 (2004).

2. Plain-View Doctrine

The plain-view doctrine involves no invasion of privacy. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1541, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983); Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). Thus, if an item is in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure involves any invasion of privacy. Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 541. The rationale of the plain-view doctrine is that if contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 3324, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983). An object is seized in plain view if three requirements are met. Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex.Crim.App.2009). First, law enforcement officials must lawfully be where the object can be “plainly viewed.” Id. (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)). Second, the “incriminating character” of the object in plain view must be “immediately apparent” to the officials. Keehn, 279 S.W.3d at 334. Third, the officials must have the right to access the object. Id. The second prong, the immediacy requirement, requires only a showing of probable cause that the item discovered is incriminating evidence; actual knowledge of the incriminating evidence is not required. Joseph v. State, 807 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (citing Horton, 496 U.S., at 136, 110 S.Ct. at 2308). “Probable cause merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief ... that certain items may be contraband.” Miller v. State, 686 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no pet.). An officer may rely on training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions as to the nature of the item seen. Nichols v. State, 886 S.W.2d 324, 325-26 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd).

In this case, Berry testified that he lawfully searched inside Goonan’s console because she had consented to his search of her vehicle. Goonan does not contest this fact. Thus the first and third prongs of the plain-view doctrine are easily satisfied. Berry also said that the incriminating nature of the contents of the pill bottle was obvious to him because the label was made out to someone other than Goo-nan, the prescription was rather old and did not allow for refills, and he found the pill bottle in the car’s console where Goo-nan had made furtive movements earlier. We conclude that the facts available to Berry would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the pill bottle contained contraband and that his search of it was justified.

Goonan argues that the “general rule” is that “[individuals can manifest legitimate expectations of privacy by placing items in closed, opaque containers that conceal their contents from plain view.” United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir.1992). We agree that this is a well-founded general rule, but the Villarreal court acknowledged that its reasoning did not apply in the context of an automobile when, as here, the officer possesses probable cause that such a container contains contraband. See id,, at 774. Furthermore, the Villarreal court held that the container at issue in that case was not incriminating in nature; therefore, the plain-view doctrine did not apply. Id. at 776. But we hold that the container’s incriminating nature in this case was readily apparent to Berry. Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Goonan’s motion to suppress. We overrule Goo-nan’s three issues.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled all three of Goonan’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

DAUPHINOT, J. filed a concurring opinion.