Pennsylvania State Police v. Grogan ( 2002 )

COLINS, Judge.

Herein we must consider the juxtaposition of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act (State Act),³ 18 Pa.C.S. § 6101, and the Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),⁴ on the civil rights of the citizens of our Commonwealth. We conclude that the position advanced by the Commonwealth, ie., that common pleas court cannot grant a Commonwealth citizen relief from the restrictions imposed by Section 922(g) of the Federal Gun Control Act,⁵ is without merit. Accordingly, we shall affirm the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).

Walter Grogan received a driving under the influence (DUI) conviction in 1964, an upgraded offense punishable by a fine and up to three years in prison. Thirty-five years later, in June of 1999, Grogan properly applied to purchase a firearm. In response to an instantaneous records check request,⁶ the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) denied Grogan’s application based on the language of Section 922(g) of the Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits any person convicted of a crime with an attending imprisonment term of more than one year from possessing a firearm. Pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S. § 6111.1(e), appeal of that denial by Grogan was confirmed by the PSP. Thereafter, Grogan appealed to the Office of the Attorney General, which assigned an ALJ for a hearing. The ALJ did not render a decision but left the record open to afford Grogan the opportunity to petition common pleas court for an exemption order under Section 6105(d) of the State Act, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(d). Grogan’s petition for exemption was granted, and the matter went back to the ALJ to consider Grogan’s petition to purchase a firearm.

Before the ALJ, the PSP requested that Grogan’s petition be denied arguing that a common pleas court exemption order was insufficient to restore Grogan’s civil rights, since only a full gubernatorial pardon could grant Grogan relief from a federal disability pertaining to firearm possession. The ALJ rejected that argument, concluding that the trial court’s exemption order relieved Grogan of the restrictions imposed by the State Act, and the restriction imposed by the Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 925, thereby rendering Gro-gan eligible under current law to transfer or carry a firearm.

On appeal to this Court,⁷ the PSP reasserts its contention that a state court cannot grant a Commonwealth citizen relief from the restrictions imposed by Section 922(g) of the Federal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921(g). We disagree.

As noted, Section 922(g) of the Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), prohibits any person who has been convicted of a crime with an attending imprisonment term of more than one year from possessing a firearm. Until 1986, federal law determined the effect of a state conviction, without regard to whether the state had expunged the conviction. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119-122, 103 S.Ct. 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983). But that has been modified by Section 921(a)(20) of the Federal Gun Control Act which provides in pertinent part:

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(emphasis added). Therefore, in determining whether a person has a disqualifying conviction, the federal courts must look to state law to determine what constitutes a conviction. Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 313, 118 S.Ct. 2007, 141 L.Ed.2d 303 (1998) (citing Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 114 S.Ct. 1669, 128 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994)); see United States v. Place, 561 F.2d 213 (10th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1000, 98 S.Ct. 643, 54 L.Ed.2d 496 (1977). Furthermore, the law of the state of conviction, not federal law, determines restoration of civil rights unless the state of conviction has not fully restored the right of its citizen to possess firearms, whereupon that citizen shall not be relieved of his federal firearms disability. Caron (stating that any limitation or restriction on a person’s right to possess firearms contained in a restoration which involves the “unless clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), renders the exemption provision of that Section invalid).

Sub judice, Grogan sought and obtained an unqualified exemption from the trial court pursuant to Section 6105 of the State Act, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. The exemption had the effect of relieving Grogan of both his state firearm disabilities and his federal firearm disabilities. Therefore, Grogan’s conviction does not constitute a disqualifying “conviction” under the Gun Control Act and the ALJ properly concluded that Grogan was eligible to possess, transfer, and carry a firearm as a result of the exemption granted by common pleas court.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the ALJ.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 18th day of January 2002, the order of the Administrative Law Judge in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.

3 . Uniform Firearms Act, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101 — 6162.

4 .18 U.S.C. § 922(g) provides, "It shall be unlawful for any person ... who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; ... to possess ... any firearm ... or to receive any firearm ... which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”

5 . 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).

6 . Pursuant to Section 6111 the State Act, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111, the retailer must request the PSP to check an applicant’s criminal history. The PSP then reviews its criminal history files to determine if an applicant is prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal or state law.

7 .Our scope of review is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, an error of law was committed or whether constitutional rights were violated. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Bellum v. Pennsylvania State Police, 762 A.2d 1145 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000).