People v. Wilson ( 2010 )

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE,

specially concurring:

Our primary objective in construing a statute is to determine and effectuate the legislature’s intent. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96 (2001). This effort begins with an examination of the statutory language. Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262 (1998). If the statutory language is ambiguous, we may examine the legislative history. Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Teachers Insurance Co., 195 Ill. 2d 322 (2001). A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536 (1997).

The parties’ arguments, and the observations made in the order of this court, demonstrate that the disputed language from the resisting-a-peace-officer statute is ambiguous. While it is possible that the legislature intended the definite article (“the”) to signal an exclusive sort of proximate cause, it is also possible that the legislature intended no such exclusion — allowing more than the single most immediate or direct cause. Consequently, it is proper to look to the legislative history for guidance.

When the disputed language was being considered on the Senate floor, Senator Petka explained that “it raises the offense of resisting arrest to a Class 4 felony in circumstances where a peace officer suffers harm as a proximate result of the arrest.” 92d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 3, 2002, at 115 (statements of Senator Petka). Later, the following colloquy occurred:

“SENATOR CULLERTON:

Senator, for the purposes, I guess, of legislative intent, there’s an amendment that we put on the bill that says a person convicted for a violation of this Section whose violation was the proximate cause of an injury to a peace officer is guilty of a Class 4 felony. Could you describe how the — what the burden of proof would be, who it would be on and what is the burden of proof in order for the State to — to prove that Section?

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WATSON)

Senator Petka.

SENATOR PETKA:

First of all, thank you for — asking that question. The burden of proof will be on the State. It’ll be a burden of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. The — I envision a jury instruction which would hold that the individual to be found guilty of the offense must be found guilty beyond all reasonable doubt and must prove that the injury was proximately related to the action.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WATSON)

Further discussion. Senator Molaro?

SENATOR MOLARO:

Thank you, Mr. President. Would the sponsor yield for a question?

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WATSON)

Sponsor indicates he’ll yield, Senator Molaro.

SENATOR MOLARO:

For the crime of resisting arrest, where is that classified? Is that a Class A misdemeanor or is that a Class 1 felony, or what is resisting arrest?

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WATSON)

Senator Petka.

SENATOR PETKA:

Resisting arrest will remain a Class A misdemeanor, Senator. In those circumstances where a peace officer in effectuating an arrest is injured as a result of that arrest, such as situations where there’s a struggle for placing the handcuffs on or it’s just a struggle in apprehending the individual who is running, the peace officer suffers great bodily harm, under those circumstances, the — the charge can be upgraded to a felony.” 92d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 4, 2002, at 87-89 (statements of Senators Cullerton, Petka & Molaro).

This language indicates that the legislature did not attach exclusive significance to the definite article in the phrase “the proximate cause.” Rather, the legislature simply meant “proximate cause.” As Senator Petka (the sponsor) explained, the State must prove that the officer’s injury was “proximately related” to the defendant’s resistance or occurred “as a result” of making the arrest. Senator Petka explicitly used the phrase “a proximate result,” and the bill passed with his explanation.

In light of this meaning, the modified instruction at issue contained an accurate statement of the law. Accordingly, I would find no reversible error and I agree with the result of this court’s disposition.