People v. Cofield ( 1976 )

Lane, J.

Willie Cofield pleaded guilty to possession of a weapon as a felony after the denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence. He was sentenced to a five-year term of probation. On this appeal, review is sought of the correctness of the denial of that motion.

The testimony at the hearing came solely from the mouth of a Patrolman Kelly who, on the date in question (July 3, 1974), was assigned to direct traffic at the intersection of 12th Avenue and 42nd Street. At about 1:45 p.m. on that day, three or four people at the northwest corner of the intersection signaled to him and stated that there was a young woman being assaulted at the entrance to the garage housed in the same building as the Sheraton Motor Inn. Kelly approached the garage and saw a woman lying on the floor "crying and screaming” who said to him, "He’s got a gun.” Upon further inquiry she stated, "He’s going out the garage in the car.” The only car then leaving the premises was that driven by the defendant. The officer stopped the defendant, told him he was under arrest, and ordered him out of the car. The defendant was then frisked and no gun was found on his person. By then, a radio motor patrol car drove up and the two additional patrolmen watched the defendant while Officer Kelly searched the car. On the back seat of the car was an open black satchel and inside it was visible an open brown paper bag. In the brown bag was a loaded "357 Magnum” and an extra shell.

Officer Kelly, arriving on the scene after being told of an assault by passersby and seeing a woman crying on the floor, was justified in concluding that an assault had taken place, and furthermore that the person pointed out by the woman was the perpetrator.

The dynamics of this police-citizen encounter (i.e., relation of an assault coupled with the officer’s own personal observations) clearly warranted the arrest and immediate frisk of the defendant (cf. People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 225). The search of the automobile was permissible not only as an adjunct and incident of the arrest (see, e.g., People v Weintraub, 35 NY2d 351, 353) but also because the "maximum intrusion”—detention of the individual—had already taken place (People v Perel, 34 NY2d 462, 467). Clearly, when the weapon was not found on the person of the defendant, the next logical place to look for it would be in the automobile, the place where the defendant had been immediately before the arrest (People v Fitzpatrick, 32 NY2d 499, 507).

To require the police under the circumstances presented in the case at bar first to take the vehicle to the stationhouse would result in expending additional enforcement time and energy without any compensating protection to the defendant (People v Kreichman, 37 NY2d 693, 700).

"In short, the law of search and seizure has not become so recondite that it condemns necessarily prompt reasonable conduct in effecting the interests of public safety in crimes involving murder, assaults, deadly weapons, and the like.” (People v Singleteary, 35 NY2d 528, 533.)

Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Shea, J.), rendered April 17, 1975, convicting the defendant upon a plea of guilty of the crime of possession of a weapon as a felony, after denying a motion to suppress physical evidence, should be affirmed.