Robertson v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center , 117 Idaho 979 ( 1990 )

JOHNSON, Justice.

This is a slip and fall case in which an invitee was injured in a parking lot where snow and ice had accumulated. Summary judgment was granted dismissing the complaint on the basis of the open and obvious danger doctrine. We hold that the open and obvious danger doctrine should not have been applied to this case and that the natural accumulation rule is not consistent with the comparative negligence law of this state.

I.

THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.

In November 1985, Deborah Robertson slipped and fell in the snow-covered parking lot of the Magic Valley Regional Medical Center (Magic Valley) and sustained knee and back injuries. In September 1986, Robertson sued Magic Valley for neglecting its duty of due care by not clearing the parking lot of snow and ice.

On December 1, 1988, the trial court granted Magic Valley’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Robertson knew of the snowy condition when she entered the parking lot and should have been aware that the parking lot could have been icy as well. The trial court stated: “The law in Idaho is clear that if an invitee knows of a dangerous condition, or with the exercise of ordinary care he should have known of the condition, a landowner is not liable for any injuries to the invitee arising from the dangerous conditions.” This principle of law is commonly called the open and obvious danger doctrine. In support of its ruling, the trial court cited our decision in Bates v. Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center, 114 Idaho 252, 755 P.2d 1290 (1988).

On January 17, 1989, we issued our opinion in Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989), abolishing the open and obvious danger doctrine in this state. The next day Robertson filed this appeal.

II.

HARRISON v. TAYLOR APPLIES TO THIS CASE.

Robertson asserts that Harrison v. Taylor should be applied to this case. We agree.

Recently, we have held that Harrison is to be applied retroactively. Baker v. Shavers, Inc., 117 Idaho 696, 791 P.2d 1275 (1990). In addition to the rationale stated there for the retroactive application of Harrison, we offer a further explanation here.

The underpinning of Harrison v. Taylor was “the legislative mandate that comparative negligence shall apply in all negligence actions. I.C. § 6-801.” 115 Idaho at 591, 768 P.2d at 1324. We held that the open and obvious doctrine was inconsistent with comparative negligence.

I.C. § 6-801 was enacted by our legislature in 1971. Since we premised our decision in Harrison on the conflict between the statute and the doctrine, we can only conclude that the doctrine was open to attack on this grounds when the statute became effective in 1971.

Our decision in Harrison v. Taylor overturned the prior decisions of this Court such as Bates in which the open and obvious danger doctrine had been applied. In none of these prior decisions had we ruled on how the enactment of comparative negligence affected the liability of the doctrine. Our decision in Harrison was not a change in our view of the effect of I.C. § 6-801 on the doctrine, it was merely the first time we had specifically addressed the question. Therefore, there is no reason to consider applying Harrison only prospectively or in a modified prospective fashion. Cf. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 (1977); Bergman v. Henry, 115 Idaho 259, 766 P.2d 729 (1988).

The record in Bates does not indicate that the injured invitee in that case challenged the open and obvious danger doctrine on the basis of I.C. § 6-801. The challenge there was on a common law basis.

As noted in Harrison v. Taylor, our Court of Appeals in its opinion in Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 656-57, 671 P.2d 1112, 1119-20 (Ct.App.1983), pointed out the inconsistency between the open and obvious danger doctrine and comparative negligence. 115 Idaho at 592, 768 P.2d at 1325. On review of Keller by this Court, we reached the same disposition of the appeal, but did not mention this aspect of the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 (1984).

Recently, we have applied Harrison v. Taylor retroactively. Arrington v. Arrington Bros. Constr. Inc., 116 Idaho 887, 781 P.2d 224 (1989). In Arrington, the injury at issue occurred before the injury in Harrison. The application of Harrison to the facts in Arrington is consistent with the rationale of Harrison that it was the enactment of comparative negligence in 1971 that made the open and obvious danger doctrine vulnerable.

For these reasons, and because of our decision in Baker, we apply Harrison v. Taylor to this case.

III.

THE NATURAL ACCUMULATION RULE IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH I.C. § 6-801 AND HARRISON v. TAYLOR.

Magic Valley asserts that Harrison v. Taylor should be read narrowly to abolish the open and obvious danger doctrine only as to human-created conditions and not as to natural accumulations, such as ice and snow. We are unable to read Harrison this narrowly.

The natural accumulation rule was discussed in Harrison. 115 Idaho at 594-95, 768 P.2d at 1327-28. While the discussion there was dicta, since the condition at issue was a defect in a sidewalk, not a natural accumulation, the rationale of the decision in Harrison is not consistent with the creation of an exception to the comparative negligence rule.

As it existed at the time of Robertson’s accident, I.C. § 6-801 provided that “[contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence____” If this statute applies to actions for negligence relating to human-created hazards, as Harrison says it does, we are not able to discern how we could construe the statute to allow an exemption for negligence as to natural accumulations. To do so would require us to construe the statute as allowing us to apply comparative negligence in some cases but not in others. As we read the statute, it does not allow us to do that. The statute speaks categorically about actions for negligence.

This is not to say that we believe that Magic Valley was negligent. That question must be addressed at the trial of this case, or on appropriate motions before trial.

IV.

CONCLUSION.

We vacate the summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court.

We award costs but no attorney fees to the appellant.

BISTLINE, BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.