Nash v. Craigco, Inc. , 1978 Utah LEXIS 1431 ( 1978 )


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  • *779CROCKETT, Justice

    (Concurring with comments).

    I concur with the main opinion and with the reasoning and the authorities cited therein. But I add the following comments about the controversial issue as to whether there can be an award of punitive damages unless there is an award of compensatory damages.

    Correlated to the ideas expressed in the main opinion as to the purpose of punitive damages is the proposition that where a defendant has been guilty of such reprehensible conduct as to justify the imposition of punitive damages, I do not see how justice is served by permitting him to escape responding therefor, nor why a plaintiff so injured should be denied appropriate recovery, merely because the remedy for the wrong may be equitable rather than an award of compensatory damages.

    There is another aspect of the law of this state which gives support to the ruling of the main opinion. Our Constitution, Sec. 19 of Art. VIII, provides that “There shall be but one form of civil action, and law and equity may be administered in the same action.” Pursuant to that provision and the adjudications of this Court thereunder the trend of our law is and has been toward the abolition of distinctions between law and equity. This is particularly true since the adoption of our new Rules of Civil Procedure to the effect that the Court shall grant whatever relief the evidence shows a party is entitled to.1

    These are additional reasons why I am in agreement with the proposition that the question, whether there should be an award of punitive damages and the amount thereof should depend on the nature of the wrong and not upon an arbitrary, and what seems to me to be an artificial, barrier thereto because of the nomenclature of the cause of action.

    . See e. g., U.R.C.P. Rule 54(c).

Document Info

Docket Number: 15216

Citation Numbers: 585 P.2d 775, 1978 Utah LEXIS 1431

Judges: Ellett, Wilkins, Maughan, Hall

Filed Date: 10/2/1978

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/13/2024