People v. Quicke ( 1969 )

PETERS, J.

T concur with the reversal of the death penalty, but T am of the opinion that the judgment of guilt should also be reversed.

The majority admit that the second and third confessions were introduced into evidence in violation of the rules laid down in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], and People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], but hold such admission was not prejudicial because the first confession was properly admitted. I disagree with the holding that the first confession was admissible, and this necessarily decides that the erroneous admission of the second and third confessions was prejudicial.

The first confession was not admissible. "When secured, as held by the majority, the accusatory stage had been reached, and the defendant was handcuffed and in custody. It was not spontaneously or voluntarily made. It was given in response to the prompting of the officers, as the statement of facts given in the majority opinion illustrates. Under well settled principles it was inadmissible.

The erroneous admission of the second and third confessions which is held nonprejudicial on the authority of People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal.2d 319 [46 Cal.Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555] and People v. Cotter, 63 Cal.2d 386 [46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 862], was in fact prejudicial. In my opinion these two cases were wrongly decided, but even if correctly decided, since the first confession was inadmissible, they are not applicable. Even if the first confession were admissible this court should not say, as a matter of law, that the erroneous admission of the much more detailed second and third confessions was not prejudicial. This court cannot say, as a matter of law, that the wrongful admission of the last two 'Confessions could not reasonably have affected at least one juror. The court is neither omnipotent nor omniscient.

I would reverse both the guilt and penalty judgments.