Davis v. The City of Country Club Hills ( 2013 )

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
Davis v. City of Country Club Hills, 2013 IL App (1st) 123634
Appellate Court ANTHONY DAVIS, JOHN EDWARDS, CYNTHIA SINGLETON,
Caption VINCENT LOCKETT, LEON WILLIAMS, TYRONE HUTSON,
STEVEN BURRIS, and FRANK MARTIN, in Their Official Capacities
as Aldermen of the City of Country Club Hills, and OSCAR MCNEAL
and CHESTER MILLER, as Individuals, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE
CITY OF COUNTRY CLUB HILLS, DEBORAH M. MCILVAIN, in
Her Official Capacity as Clerk of the City of Country Club Hills, and
DAVID ORR, in His Official Capacity as the Cook County Clerk,
Defendants-Appellees.
District & No. First District, Third Division
Docket No. 1-12-3634
Filed September 30, 2013
Held Plaintiffs’ appeal from the denial of their petition to preliminarily enjoin
(Note: This syllabus the results of a referendum to reduce the number of aldermen in
constitutes no part of defendant city from 10 to 5 was dismissed as moot, since the public-
the opinion of the court interest exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply where an
but has been prepared authoritative determination of the underlying issues in the case would not
by the Reporter of be provided by an opinion from the appellate court on the trial court’s
Decisions for the denial of the preliminary relief plaintiffs sought.
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-COEL-25; the
Review Hon. Maureen Ward Kirby, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Appeal dismissed.
Counsel on Keri-Lyn J. Krafthefer, of Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni &
Appeal Krafthefer, P.C., of Chicago, for appellants.
John B. Murphey, of Rosenthal, Murphey, Coblentz & Donahue, of
Chicago, for appellees.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Pucinski and Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This interlocutory appeal challenges the trial court’s denial of a petition to preliminarily
enjoin the results of a referendum reducing to five the number of aldermen in the City of
Country Club Hills. A majority of eligible voters approved the referendum at the November
6, 2012, general election, and in April 2013, the voters elected five aldermen, who then took
office.
¶2 The only issue the trial court determined was the request for preliminary relief. That issue
is now moot, and the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine does not warrant our
exercise of review.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 The City of Country Club Hills’ city council consisted of 10 aldermen, with 2
representing each of the City’s five wards. Qualified voters petitioned to place a referendum
on the ballot for the 2012 general election seeking to reduce the number of elected aldermen
to five, with one alderman representing each ward. The petition requested that the following
proposition be placed on the ballot:
“SHALL THE CITY OF COUNTRY CLUB HILLS RESTRICT YES [ ]
NUMBER OF ALDERMEN TO 5, WITH ONE ALDERMAN NO [ ]
REPRESENTING EACH WARD?
All existing aldermanic terms shall expire as of the date of the next regular aldermanic
election, at which time a full complement of aldermen shall be elected for the full term.”
¶5 This language was taken from section 3.1-20-20(a) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65
ILCS 5/3.1-20-20(a) (West 2008)). After the time for filing objections closed, the city clerk
submitted a written certification of the ballot proposal to the county clerk. The referendum
question as certified by the city clerk included the question as to whether the number of
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aldermen should be reduced to five, but omitted the informational language regarding the
expiration of current aldermanic terms. The referendum passed with 58.44% of the vote.
¶6 About three weeks later, on November 26, 2012, plaintiffs, which included nine aldermen
in their official capacities, as well as two proponents of the referendum, filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief. They alleged the city clerk exceeded
her authority by failing to include all of the requested petition language on the ballot,
rendering the referendum election void. That same day, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion
for a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction seeking to stop the county clerk from
certifying the election results the following day. At an emergency hearing on the plaintiffs’
motion, the county clerk’s office stated that if the trial court issued an injunction in plaintiffs’
favor, it would revoke its November 27, 2012, certification. The plaintiffs then withdrew
their request for a temporary restraining order and proceeded on their request for preliminary
injunctive relief.
¶7 A hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction was held on December
7, 2012. Plaintiffs argued that the city clerk had a duty to certify or reject the proposition as
requested in the petition and did not have discretion to alter the language of the petition by
omitting the informational language on the ballot. The trial judge denied the plaintiffs’
motion, finding plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm because the aldermen still had time
to file as independent candidates. The trial judge also concluded that plaintiffs failed to
establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying action, noting that
the city clerk complied with the Municipal Code by placing the question on the ballot
without the informational language and the plaintiffs had time to file objections to the
proposition before it was certified. The trial court expressed doubt as to the appropriateness
of ignoring the will of the 58% of Country Club Hills citizens who approved the proposition.
Thus, the county clerk’s November 27, 2012, certification remained in place.
¶8 On December 13, 2012, plaintiffs filed this interlocutory appeal asking us to reverse the
trial court’s order denying their motion for a preliminary injunction, void the results of the
November 6, 2012, referendum election, and order that the proposition with the explanatory
language be placed on the ballot for the April 9, 2013, consolidated election. Alternatively,
if the referendum election was found to be valid, plaintiffs asked the court to hold that their
aldermanic seats would not expire until the next aldermanic election in 2015. Plaintiffs did
not seek an expedited appeal until January 14, 2013, when they filed a motion to expedite
along with their initial brief in this case. That motion was denied by a different panel of this
court, and plaintiffs took no further steps to obtain an expedited ruling. The April 9, 2013
general election of the five aldermen proceeded and the Cook County clerk certified the
results on April 30, 2013.
¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 A case must remain a legal controversy from the time filed in the appellate court until the
moment of disposition. Although neither party challenged our jurisdiction, as the reviewing
court, we have a duty to consider jurisdiction sua sponte. The circumstances raised the
possibility of mootness, and so we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing
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mootness. See Emery v. Northeast Illinois Regional Transportation Co., 374 Ill. App. 3d
974, 977 (2007). “The existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate
jurisdiction, and courts of review will generally not decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot
questions.” In re Marriage of Nienhouse, 355 Ill. App. 3d 146, 149 (2004) (citing
Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 523 (2001)). “A case on appeal becomes moot
where the issues presented in the trial court no longer exist because events subsequent to the
filing of the appeal render it impossible for the reviewing court to grant the complaining
party effectual relief.” Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 28.
“This court will not review cases merely to establish a precedent or guide future litigation.”
Madison Park Bank v. Zagel, 91 Ill. 2d 231, 235 (1982). Even if the case is pending on
appeal when the events that render an issue moot occur, as a reviewing court, we generally
will not issue an advisory opinion. Bluthardt v. Breslin, 74 Ill. 2d 246, 250 (1979).
¶ 11 Where an election has already passed, a cause is moot. Jackson, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 36
(“It is well established under Illinois law that the conclusion of an election cycle normally
moots an election contest.”). An otherwise moot issue may be considered in rare cases
involving issues presenting “ ‘a question of great public interest.’ ” Circle Management, LLC
v. Olivier, 378 Ill. App. 3d 601, 607 (2007) (quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 257
(1989)). “The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine allows a court to reach the
merits of a case which would otherwise be moot if the question presented is of a public
nature, an authoritative resolution of the question is desirable for the purpose of guiding
public officers, and the question is likely to recur.” Jackson, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 44. Not only
is the exception construed narrowly, but all three elements must be present. In re India B.,
202 Ill. 2d 522, 543 (2002).
¶ 12 In Jackson, our supreme court held that the public-interest exception applied to a
challenge of a candidate’s eligibility for election to the Chicago city counsel, even though
the election had been held and another candidate had been in office for more than a year.
First, the court noted that the appeal raised a question of election law, which inherently is a
matter of public concern. The specific issue presented was likely to recur in future municipal
elections–whether a determination that a candidate for municipal office owes more property
tax than he or she had paid means that the candidate owes a debt to a municipality within the
meaning of section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(b) (West
2010)). Lastly, the court found that a ruling would aid election officials and lower courts in
promptly deciding similar disputes in the future, “thereby avoiding the uncertainty in the
electoral process which inevitably results when threshold eligibility issues cannot be fully
resolved before voters begin casting their ballots.” Jackson, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 44.
¶ 13 Plaintiffs urge this court to follow the holding in Jackson, and they argue that the public-
policy exception applies. But the Jackson decision is entirely distinguishable. There, the trial
and appellate courts addressed the merits of the objection in determining whether the
candidate’s name should be placed on the ballot. By contrast, the merits of plaintiffs’
underlying complaint have not been fully addressed by the trial court; namely, whether the
city clerk exceeded her authority rendering the election invalid. Instead, the trial court’s
consideration was limited to rejecting a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs having failed
to establish irreparable harm or a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Under the
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record before us, an opinion from this court on the trial court’s denial of preliminary relief
would not provide an authoritative determination of the issues at the heart of this case. See
Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 91 Ill. App. 3d 96, 97 (1980)
(holding that case would not be considered under public-interest exception where rulings by
appellate court would be evidentiary in nature and evidence presented in trial court was
incomplete). Therefore, the public-interest exception is not satisfied.
¶ 14 CONCLUSION
¶ 15 In the absence of a continuing legal controversy and finding no reason for the exception
to the mootness doctrine to apply, we dismiss this appeal.
¶ 16 Appeal dismissed.
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