United States v. Payne ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Robert M. PAYNE, Staff Sergeant
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 13-0345
Crim. App. No. 37594
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 8, 2013
Decided January 6, 2014
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BAKER,
C.J., STUCKY and RYAN, JJ., and EFFRON, S.J., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Nicholas D. Carter (argued).
For Appellee: Captain Thomas J. Alford (argued); Colonel Don
Christensen and Gerald R. Bruce, Esq. (on brief).
Military Judges: Katherine E. Oler and Dawn R. Eflein
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
Contrary to his pleas, Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Robert Payne
was convicted by a general court-martial with members of one
specification of attempting to communicate indecent language to
a child under the age of sixteen, one specification of
attempting to transfer obscene material to a minor, and one
specification of attempting to persuade a minor to create child
pornography, all in violation of Article 80, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 880 (2006). He was also
convicted of three specifications of failure to obey a lawful
general regulation by misusing his Government computer in
committing the above-mentioned offenses, in violation of Article
92, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2006). Payne was sentenced to three
years of confinement, a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of
all pay and allowances, and reduction to the lowest enlisted
grade. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence
except for the forfeitures, and the United States Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) affirmed the findings and the
sentence in an unpublished opinion. United States v. Payne, No.
ACM 37594, 2013 CCA LEXIS 18, at *38, 2013 WL 375777 at *18.
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2013) (unpublished).
Both Article 51(c) UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 851(c) (2006), and
Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 920(e)(1), require a military
judge to instruct the members on the elements of each offense
2
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
charged. We granted review to determine whether the military
judge properly instructed the members on the elements of Charge
I, Specification 4, which alleged an attempt to persuade a minor
to create child pornography in violation of Article 134, UCMJ
clauses 1 and 2.1 We conclude that she did not properly instruct
the members as to Specification 4, but that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirm the
CCA.
Background
SSgt Payne engaged in a series of sexually explicit
Internet chats and phone calls with an undercover civilian
sheriff’s deputy who Payne believed to be a fourteen-year-old
girl named “Marley.” The communications took place over a
period of about a month and a half. As a part of those chats,
Payne repeatedly asked “Marley” to send him pictures of herself.
Some of these requests were for “nude” pictures, while others
were more general. Payne also promised nude pictures of himself
in exchange for nude pictures of “Marley.” While Payne sent
“Marley” nude pictures of himself, as well as a video of himself
1
Specifically, we granted review of the following issue:
Whether the military judge improperly instructed the
members of the elements for creation of child
pornography.
United States v. Payne, 72 M.J. 407 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (order
granting review).
3
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
masturbating, “Marley” did not respond in kind. Eventually,
Payne traveled from Philadelphia to upstate New York to meet
“Marley,” where he was arrested by local law enforcement
authorities.
At trial, Payne’s defense to the Charge I specifications
focused almost exclusively on the defense of entrapment. While
the defense did not contest his underlying conduct, Payne did
object to the military judge’s proposed instructions on the
Charge I offenses. He argued that:
[F]or all four specifications under Charge I, we
object to your instructions because we do not believe
that the government in its pleadings identified the
offenses to which you are listing elements. We
believe that based on what trial counsel stated when
she read the identity of the elements to us and later
to the members in their initial discussion about these
findings instructions as you’ve memorialized on the
record, and even at present, we believe that these
elements are not necessarily a fair parsing of what
was pled in each of the four specifications in Charge
I.
As I said in the 802 conference, our challenge is
this, we have a duty to candor towards a tribunal and
to identify any errors and give you a forthright
answer, but we also have a competing duty to Staff
Sergeant Payne and not to assist the government or
even the bench in perfecting elements in charges
against him if we think that there’s, perhaps, a right
way to do this. And therefore, we simply say that we
don’t believe that the court has been able, due to the
nature of the pleadings, to properly identify if these
are offenses and if so, what those elements would be.
The military judge did not specifically rule on the objection
and she gave the members her proposed instructions concerning
4
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
Charge I. As to Specification 4, the military judge described
the specification as “the offense of soliciting a minor to
create child pornography” and subsequently provided the
following instruction:
First, that, within the continental United States, on
divers occasions from on or about 1 June 2008 to on or
about 1 August 2008, the accused attempted to
persuade, induce, entice, or coerce “Marley,” someone
he believed was a female 14 years of age, to commit
the offense of creating child pornography by
requesting that she send nude photos of herself to the
accused;
Second, that the accused intended that the person
he thought was “Marley” actually produce one or more
visual depictions of her nude body to send to him
electronically or through the mail;
Third, that, under the circumstances, the conduct
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces.
The military judge also instructed the members that they must
find that “the accused’s statements constituted a serious
request that the offense be committed.” In addition, she
instructed that “‘[c]hild pornography’ means any visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” and
that “‘[s]exually explicit conduct’ includes masturbation or
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
person,” and also properly defined the term “lascivious
exhibition.” Following these definitions, the military judge
instructed the members that to convict on this specification,
5
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
the panel must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Payne
“specifically intended that ‘Marley’ produce visual depictions
of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”
The members convicted Payne of Specifications 2, 3, and 4
under Charge I. Before the CCA, in regard to Specification 4,
Payne argued that the military judge erred by failing to
properly instruct the members on the elements of attempt.
Payne, 2013 CCA LEXIS 18, at *14, 2013 WL 375777 at *5. While
the CCA concluded that the instructions given by the military
judge “lacked some specificity,” it ultimately held that “they
included all the required elements and adequately instructed the
members to find the necessary predicate facts beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. at *21, 2013 WL 375777, at *7.
Before this court, Payne renews his argument that the
military judge erred by omitting the elements of attempt when
instructing on Specification 4. The government concedes that
“the military judge did not read the statutory elements of
Article 80 [Attempts]” but argues that for this “unique charge
of attempting to entice a minor to create child pornography, the
military judge was permitted to, and appropriately did, tailor
her instructions to cover . . . the required elements . . . .”
The government further argues that “[t]he combination of an
attempt offense, a federal crime, and the UCMJ article applying
that federal crime to the military simply cannot be overlooked
6
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
when determining what instructions the military judge needed to
provide the members.”2
Discussion
Standard of Review and Preservation of Error
The question of whether the members were properly
instructed is a question of law and thus review is de novo.
United States v. Maynulet, 68 M.J. 374, 376 (C.A.A.F. 2010)
(citations omitted). Where there is no objection to an
instruction at trial, we review for plain error. United States
v. Tunstall, 72 M.J. 191, 193 (C.A.A.F. 2013); see also R.C.M.
920(f). As Payne did offer a general objection to all of the
military judge’s proposed Charge I instructions, we must
determine whether that objection adequately preserved the error
he now raises on appeal.
We have had occasion to address the adequacy of evidentiary
objections and have held that the law “does not require the
moving party to present every argument in support of an
objection, but does require argument sufficient to make the
military judge aware of the specific ground for objection, ‘if
2
Contrary to both parties’ positions, Specification 4 does not
allege an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) as incorporated by
clause three of Article 134, UCMJ. See Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States pt. IV, para. 60.c.(6)(b) (2012 ed.)
(MCM) (“When alleging a clause 3 violation, each element of the
federal or assimilated statute must be alleged expressly or by
necessary implication. In addition, the federal or assimilated
statute should be identified.”).
7
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
the specific ground was not apparent from the context.’” United
States v. Datz, 61 M.J. 37, 42 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (quoting Military
Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 103(a)(1)). We have not, however,
addressed the specificity required to preserve an error in the
context of an objection to proposed instructions. R.C.M. 920
deals with “Instructions on Findings” and subsection (f)
specifically addresses waiver of an objection under that
section.3 The Analysis to R.C.M. 920(f) notes that this
subsection was based on the last two sentences of Fed. R. Crim.
P. 30, “Jury Instructions.” MCM, Analysis of the Rules for
Courts-Martial app. 21 at A21-70.4 At the time R.C.M. 920(f) was
adopted, the last two sentences of Fed. R. Crim. P. 30 provided:5
No party may assign as error any portion of the charge
or omission therefrom unless [that party] objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which [that
party objects] and the grounds of [the] objection.
Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out
3
The text of R.C.M. 920(f) states that “Failure to object to an
instruction or to omission of an instruction before the members
close to deliberate constitutes waiver of the objection in the
absence of plain error.”
4
The Analysis of the Rules for Courts-Martial notes that there
were four basic goals for the 1984 revision to the MCM, the
first of which “was to conform to federal practice to the extent
possible, except where the Uniform Code of Military Justice
requires otherwise or where specific military requirements
render such conformity impracticable.” MCM, Analysis of the
Rules for Courts-Martial app. 21 at A21-1; see also Article 36,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006).
5
R.C.M. 920(f) was enacted with initial adoption of the Rules
for Courts-Martial in 1984. At that time the version of Fed. R.
Crim. P. 30 adopted in 1944 (as amended in 1966) was in effect.
8
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
of the hearing of the jury and, on request of any
party, out of the presence of the jury.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 30, 18 U.S.C. app. at 622 (1982) (emphasis
added). Given the similarity of purpose between R.C.M. 920(f)
and M.R.E. 103(a)(1), as well as the requirements of Fed. R.
Crim. P. 30, we see no reason not to require the same level of
specificity for objections to instructions as we do for
evidentiary objections.
Payne’s defense counsel objected to all of the military
judge’s instructions to Charge I on the grounds that “the
government in its pleadings [did not] identif[y] the offenses to
which [the military judge was] listing elements.” However,
defense counsel did not identify which specification or
specifications he was referring to or which elements he felt the
military judge should have instructed on because he did not want
“to assist the government or even the bench in perfecting
elements in charges against [Payne].” (Emphasis added.) In
taking this position, it appears that defense counsel was trying
to preserve any instructional error for appeal while
simultaneously refusing to assist the military judge in
correcting any alleged instructional error at the trial level.6
6
“The purpose of [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 30 is to alert the district
court to potential problems in jury instructions and thereby
avert any error in the first place.” United States v. O’Neill,
116 F.3d 245, 247 (7th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
9
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
Under these circumstances we believe that the issue is most
appropriately treated as waived in absence of plain error. See
United States v. Zapata, 546 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir. 2008).7
“Under a plain error analysis, the accused ‘has the burden of
demonstrating that: (1) there was error; (2) the error was
plain or obvious; and (3) the error materially prejudiced a
substantial right of the accused.’” Tunstall, 72 M.J. at 193-94
(quoting United States v. Girouard, 70 M.J. 5, 11 (C.A.A.F.
2011)).
Elements of Charge I, Specification 4
We next turn to the elements of the charged offense.
Charge I alleged violations of Article 80 (Attempts) and
Specification 4 specifically alleged that Payne:
[Did] wrongfully and knowingly attempt to persuade,
induce, entice, . . . or coerce “Marley,” someone he
believed was a female 14 years of age, who was, in
fact, Lillian Vedder, an Ulster County New York
Sheriff’s Office undercover detective, to create child
pornography by requesting that “Marley” send nude
photos of herself to the said STAFF SERGEANT ROBERT M.
PAYNE, which conduct was prejudicial to good order and
discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces.
There are four elements of attempt: (1) that the accused
did a certain overt act; (2) that the act was done with the
specific intent to commit a certain offense under the code; (3)
7
“[W]e have held that a generalized objection to an instruction
is insufficient to preserve a specific objection on appeal.”
Zapata, 546 F.3d at 1190; United States v. Bornfield, 184 F.3d
1144, 1146 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999).
10
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
that the act amounted to more than mere preparation; and (4)
that the act apparently tended to effect the commission of the
intended offense. MCM pt. IV, para. 4.b. Although this
specification is not a model of clarity, we find that it alleged
all of the elements of attempt and it provided Payne with notice
that he was charged with an attempt to commit an Article 134,
UCMJ, offense. The offense charged was the persuasion of a
minor to create child pornography, which was alleged to be both
prejudicial to good order and discipline and service
discrediting.
The Military Judge’s Instructions
A military judge has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the
elements of every offense. R.C.M. 920(e)(1); Article 51(c),
UCMJ. Having held that the alleged instructional error was not
preserved at trial and having identified the elements of
Specification 4, we must now examine whether the military
judge’s instructions on those elements amounted to plain error.
While Payne argues that the military judge failed to
instruct on any of the elements of attempt, we are satisfied
that the instructions adequately covered the first two elements
of attempt.8 The third element of attempt requires “[t]hat the
8
The first element of attempt is that “the accused did a certain
overt act.” MCM pt. IV, para. 4.b.(1). This element was
covered by the military judge’s instruction that the members
must find that Payne “attempted to persuade . . . ‘Marley,’
11
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
act amounted to more than mere preparation[.]” MCM pt. IV,
para. 4.b.(3). We have interpreted this element as requiring
that the accused take a “substantial step” toward commission of
the crime. United States v. Jones, 37 M.J. 459, 461 (C.M.A.
1993) (citing Article 80, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 880; United States
v. Schoof, 37 M.J. 96, 102 (C.M.A. 1993)).
Despite the fact that the military judge did not instruct
on the “substantial step” requirement, the government argues
that the members were adequately informed of the third element
when the military judge instructed that the members needed to
find that “the accused’s statements constituted a serious
request that the offense be committed.” The government argues
that since the overt act in this attempt offense was the actual
request transmitted to the recipient, the “serious request”
referenced by the military judge constituted a “substantial
step” and the members were therefore aware that they needed to
find that “the act amounted to more than mere preparation.”
someone he believed was a female 14 years of age, to commit the
offense of creating child pornography, by requesting that she
send nude photos of herself to the accused.” The second element
of attempt is that “the act was done with the specific intent to
commit a certain offense under the code.” MCM pt. IV, para.
4.b.(2). This element was covered by the military judge’s
instruction that Payne must have “intended that the person he
thought was ‘Marley’ actually produce one or more visual
depictions of her nude body to send him electronically or
through the mail.”
12
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
We do not agree that an instruction which requires a
“serious request that the offense be committed” is the
equivalent of an instruction that an accused must take a
substantial step toward the commission of the substantive
offense. The “serious request” instruction focused the finder
of fact upon Payne’s mental state at the time of the act in
question. By contrast, a “substantial step” instruction would
focus on the extent to which Payne actually acted in furtherance
of his attempted crime. See United States v. Winckelmann, 70
M.J. 403, 407 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (“[T]he substantial step must
unequivocally demonstrat[e] that the crime will take place
unless interrupted by independent circumstances.”) (second set
of brackets in original) (question marks and citation omitted).
The military judge’s instructions did not include the third
element of attempt -- an error which we find to be plain and
obvious.
With respect to the fourth element of attempt, “[t]hat the
act apparently tended to effect the commission of the intended
offense,” MCM pt. IV, para. 4.b.(4), the government merely
argues that the evidence on the element presented at trial was
legally sufficient to support that element. The government does
not point to any portion of the military judge’s instructions
which would cover the fourth element of attempt, and indeed
there are none. An element cannot be considered to be properly
13
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
instructed upon simply because legally sufficient evidence had
previously been admitted at trial. We therefore hold that the
military judge’s failure to instruct on the fourth element of
attempt also constituted plain and obvious error.
Prejudice
Having found plain and obvious error, Payne points us to
our holding in United States v. Mance, 26 M.J. 244 (C.M.A.
1988), and argues that failure to instruct on an element of an
offense is structural error which is per se prejudicial. In
Mance, we held that “when a judge omits entirely any instruction
on an element of the charged offense, this error may not be
tested for harmlessness because, thereby, the court members are
prevented from considering that element at all.” 26 M.J. at
255. As the military judge failed to instruct on two elements
of the charged offense, we agree that under the rationale of
Mance, Payne would appear to be entitled to relief.
However, since we decided Mance in 1988, the Supreme Court
addressed this issue in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8
(1999), and it held that the failure to instruct on an element
does not constitute structural error.9 Less than a month after
Neder was decided, this court issued United States v. Glover, 50
M.J. 476, 478 (C.A.A.F. 1999), which, while holding that there
9
In Neder, the Supreme Court reviewed under a “harmless error”
standard as Neder had objected at trial. 527 U.S. at 15.
14
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
was no plain error in the context of the military judge’s
instructions, cited but did not rely on Mance.
Other than Glover, we have since applied Neder rather than
Mance in examining instructional errors and have tested for
prejudice. See United States v. Upham, 66 M.J. 83, 86-87
(C.A.A.F. 2008). We have not cited or relied upon Mance to find
structural error resulting from the omission of an element from
instructions since Neder was decided. To alleviate further
confusion on this issue, today we overrule Mance to the extent
it conflicts with the holding in Neder that omission of an
instruction regarding an element may be tested for harmless
error.
We conclude that the omission of instructions on the third
and fourth elements of attempt did not materially prejudice
Payne’s substantial rights. Payne did not contest those
elements at trial as he relied primarily upon the defense of
entrapment. Furthermore, the evidence on those elements, which
includes the logs of the explicit chats between Payne and
“Marley,” was overwhelming. We are therefore satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the omitted elements were both
“uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that
15
United States v. Payne, No. 13-0345/AF
the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.”
Neder, 527 U.S. at 17.10
Decision
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is hereby affirmed.
10
Payne’s additional arguments, that the military judge failed
to define “create” in “creation of child pornography” and that
she improperly instructed the members that nude pictures
constituted child pornography, have no merit and we need not
address them in detail. “‘Words generally known and in
universal use do not need judicial definition.’” United States
v. Nelson, 53 M.J. 319, 321 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (quoting United
States v. Shepard, 1 C.M.A. 487, 492, 4 C.M.R. 79, 84 (1952)).
The word “create” -- as used in a specification for an attempted
general disorder under Article 134 -- is such a word. We are
also satisfied that the military judge properly instructed the
panel as to what constitutes child pornography. She defined
that term and then provided proper definitions of “sexually
explicit conduct” and “lascivious exhibition.” The military
judge concluded by instructing the members that “[u]nless you
are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the accused
specifically intended that ‘Marley’ produce visual depictions of
a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, as I have defined
that term for you, you may not convict the accused . . . .”
16