United States v. Leconie Williams, IV , 740 F.3d 308 ( 2014 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4374
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LECONIE WILLIAMS, IV,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:09-cr-00443-PJM-1)
Argued: October 31, 2013 Decided: January 23, 2014
Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and Louise W.
FLANAGAN, United States District Judge for the Eastern District
of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Flanagan joined.
ARGUED: Mary Elizabeth Davis, DAVIS & DAVIS, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellant. Jonathan Allen Ophardt, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
WYNN, Circuit Judge:
Late one night in June 2009, a police officer saw a car
stopped in the middle of the road in a residential district.
The officer activated his vehicle lights and the car pulled over
to the side of the road. Thereafter, another officer joined in
approaching the car and saw the driver, Defendant Leconie
Williams, IV, remove something from his waistband and drop it
inside of the vehicle. That object turned out to be a gun which
led to Defendant’s conviction at a jury trial of a firearm
offense.
On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence discovered
during the stop should have been suppressed at trial because the
traffic offense for which he was cited did not apply to the road
on which he had stopped his car. Because another closely
related traffic law barred the conduct for which Defendant was
cited, we reject Defendant’s argument. We also reject
Defendant’s argument challenging the exclusion of 404(b)
evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
On June 12, 2009, at around 1:00 a.m., Major Joseph McCann,
a Prince George’s County police officer, was driving through a
residential area when he saw a vehicle stopped in the “middle of
the road.” J.A. 34, 41, 47. As McCann approached the vehicle,
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he saw a person who had been bent over into the driver’s side
window of the car stand up and walk away from the vehicle.
McCann observed the vehicle sitting still in the road for thirty
seconds to a minute. Defendant, the driver, waved for McCann to
drive past him. McCann remained behind Defendant, who began to
pull away. McCann then activated his lights, and Defendant
pulled over to the side of the road.
Sergeant Edward Finn arrived and pulled up behind McCann.
As the officers approached Defendant’s vehicle, Finn observed
Defendant remove an object from his pants and drop it with a
thud onto the floorboard. The officers removed the car’s three
occupants, conducted a search, and found a gun on the floorboard
by the driver’s seat.
During the process of handcuffing the three occupants of
the vehicle, Defendant stated “that’s mine, that’s my gun.”
J.A. 106. Finn cited Defendant for violating Section 21-1001(b)
of the Maryland Code’s Transportation Article, which prohibits
leaving a vehicle standing such that it obstructs traffic.1
1
That section provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, on any
highway outside of a business district or a
residential district, a person may not leave any
vehicle standing, without providing an unobstructed
width of the roadway opposite the standing vehicle for
the free passage of other vehicles.
Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-1001(b).
3
Ultimately, the government indicted Defendant on two
firearm charges: felon in possession of a firearm (Count One),
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of a
firearm with an altered serial number (Count Two), in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k). Before trial, Defendant moved to
suppress the gun, arguing that McCann lacked probable cause to
initiate the traffic stop. The district court denied the motion
because it found that McCann had a reasonable suspicion that
Defendant violated a different provision of the Maryland Code—
Section 21-1001(a) of the Transportation Article.2 The district
court also granted the government’s motion to exclude evidence
of alleged police misconduct by McCann and Finn.3
The case proceeded to a trial, at which the jury could not
reach a verdict on Count One and acquitted Defendant on Count
Two. A mistrial was granted on Count One. At the second trial,
on Defendant’s motion, the district court re-affirmed its
earlier decisions on the gun-suppression and police-misconduct
2
That provision states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, on any
highway outside of a business district or a
residential district, a person may not stop, park, or
leave standing on the roadway any vehicle, whether
attended or unattended, if it is practicable to stop,
park, or leave the vehicle standing off the roadway.
Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-1001(a).
3
Williams also moved to suppress his statements
acknowledging ownership of the gun. The district court denied
the motion, and Defendant has not challenged that ruling.
4
evidence issues. The jury found Defendant guilty on Count One,
and the district court sentenced Defendant to 120 months’
imprisonment.
Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues
that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
the gun recovered from the traffic stop. Second, he contends
that the district court erred by excluding evidence of earlier
alleged incidents of police misconduct. We address each in
turn.
II.
Defendant’s main argument on appeal is that the evidence
seized from the car as a result of the stop should have been
suppressed because McCann lacked probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to stop his car. We review factual findings regarding
the motion to suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de
novo. United States v. McBride, 676 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir.
2012).
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. “Because an automobile stop is a seizure of a
person, the stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement ‘that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the
5
circumstances.’” United States v. Wilson, 205 F.3d 720, 722–23
(4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 810 (1996)). “As a result, such a stop ‘must be
justified by probable cause or a reasonable suspicion, based on
specific and articulable facts, of unlawful conduct.’” Id. at
723 (quoting United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 729 (4th
Cir. 1993)).
Probable cause exists where “the officer ‘had reasonably
trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent
[person] in believing that the petitioner had committed or was
committing an offense.’” United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d
583, 588 (4th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Beck
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). Crucially, this principle
holds true even for the most basic traffic offense: “‘When an
officer observes a traffic offense—however minor—he has probable
cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.’” Hassan El, 5 F.3d at
730 (quoting United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th
Cir. 1990)). Moreover, an officer who observes a traffic
offense may have probable cause even where he has additional
motives for the stop. “[I]f an officer has probable cause or a
reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, there is no intrusion
upon the Fourth Amendment. That is so regardless of the fact
that the officer would not have made the stop but for some hunch
or inarticulable suspicion of other criminal activity . . . .”
6
Id.; see also United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th
Cir. 2008) (“Observing a traffic violation provides sufficient
justification for a police officer to detain the offending
vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the traditional
incidents of a routine traffic stop.”).
Finally, a police officer’s inability to identify the
correct code section at the time of a stop does not undermine
valid probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a driver
violated a traffic law. In that regard, we agree with the Sixth
Circuit that
in order for traffic stop to be permissible under the
Fourth Amendment, a police officer must know or
reasonably believe that the driver of the car is doing
something that represents a violation of the law.
This is not to say that officers must be able to, at
the time of a stop, cite chapter and verse—or title
and section—of a particular statute or municipal code
in order to render the stop permissible.
United States v. Hughes, 606 F.3d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 2010).
This does not, however, give the government license to
“look for after-the-fact justifications for stops . . . .” Id.
Nor do we suggest that a police officer’s mistake of law can
support probable cause to conduct a stop when the underlying
conduct was not, in fact, illegal. See United States v.
McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases
and stating that “[w]e agree with the majority of circuits to
have considered the issue that a police officer’s mistake of law
7
cannot support probable cause to conduct a stop. Probable cause
only exists when an officer has a reasonable belief that a law
has been broken. . . . An officer cannot have a reasonable
belief that a violation of the law occurred when the acts to
which an officer points as supporting probable cause are not
prohibited by law.” (internal citation omitted)).
The facts in this matter show that McCann pulled Defendant
over because Defendant had stopped his car in the middle of the
road. Specifically, McCann saw Defendant’s vehicle positioned
in the middle of the road, observed that the car was stopped in
the road for at least thirty seconds, and saw Defendant’s
attempt to wave him past when he pulled up behind Defendant.
Defendant argues that McCann incorrectly identified that conduct
as illegal under Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-1001(b). It is
true that Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-1001(b) does not apply to
roadways in residential areas and the stop at issue here
undisputedly occurred in a residential area. Therefore § 21-
1001(b) could not be the basis for conducting a stop of
Defendant’s vehicle. Nonetheless, we uphold the trial court’s
determination in this matter because the conduct that McCann set
forth as a basis for the stop was plainly illegal under Maryland
law, albeit in a different section than the one in the traffic
citation. Specifically, the transportation section of the
Maryland code requires that “a vehicle that is stopped or parked
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on a two-way roadway shall be stopped or parked parallel to the
right hand curb or edge of the roadway, with its right hand
wheels within 12 inches of that curb or edge of the roadway.”
Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-1004(a). Under that section, “stop”
means “to halt even momentarily a vehicle, whether or not it is
occupied, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other
traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer
or a traffic control device.” Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 11-162.
Thus, the conduct relied upon by McCann supported the reasonable
suspicion to believe that Defendant had violated Section 21-
1004(a) by stopping his car in the middle of the road for at
least thirty seconds.4
It was precisely this conduct—conduct plainly illegal under
Maryland law—for which Defendant was cited. The traffic law
identified by Finn in the citation, Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-
1001(b), was inapplicable because that section does not apply to
roadways in residential areas. But because a closely related
provision of the Maryland Code, Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-
1004, barred the exact conduct that McCann observed: stopping a
vehicle in the middle of the road rather than next to the curb,
4
The government also made this Section 21-1004(a) argument
below, though the district court’s ruling focused on Section 21-
1001(a).
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we conclude that the district court did not err in denying
Defendant’s motion to suppress on that basis.
Defendant counters that even if the citation to the
incorrect code section did not render the stop unlawful, the
government failed to show that Defendant violated the applicable
traffic law. Specifically, Defendant contends that there was
insufficient evidence to show that he had stopped his car more
than twelve inches from the curb. But this argument does not
square with the record. McCann testified that Defendant’s
vehicle was stopped “in the middle of the road.” J.A. 34, 41,
47. And when McCann pulled up behind Defendant, Defendant
signaled to McCann to pass around him, further indicating that
Defendant was stopped in the travel lane rather than on the side
of the road by the curb.
The district court credited McCann’s testimony and found
that McCann had reasonable suspicion based on Defendant’s car
being in the middle of the road. Further, the district court
found that “[t]here was plenty of room, according to the
testimony even of the defendant’s investigator, that there would
have been room to stop on the side of the road for the defendant
at that night.” J.A. 182.
In sum, Defendant was cited for a traffic violation that
McCann witnessed and immediately identified as illegal. That
the traffic citation listed an incorrect, albeit closely
10
related, provision of Maryland’s traffic laws does not alter the
fact that, at the time McCann stopped Defendant, the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement that the stop “must be justified by
probable cause or a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and
articulable facts, of unlawful conduct” had been met. Hassan
El, 5 F.3d at 729. Further, Defendant has failed to show that
the district court clearly erred in finding that Defendant had
stopped his vehicle in the middle of the road—conduct that
constituted a violation of the applicable traffic law.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s
motion to suppress.
III.
Defendant next argues that the district court improperly
excluded evidence of prior police misconduct. Specifically,
Defendant sought to have admitted evidence of alleged police
misconduct by McCann and Finn. The district court excluded the
evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), a decision we
review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hodge, 354
F.3d 305, 312 (4th Cir. 2004). We “will not find a district
court ‘to have abused its discretion unless its decision to
admit evidence under Rule 404(b) was arbitrary and irrational.’”
United States v. Byers, 649 F.3d 197, 206 (4th Cir. 2011)
11
(quoting United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir.
2002)).
Rule 404(b) allows for the admission of evidence of other
crimes or wrongs for purposes such as “proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).5
We apply a four-factor test for determining the admissibility of
evidence under this rule:
(1) The evidence must be relevant to an issue, such as
an element of an offense, and must not be offered to
establish the general character of the defendant. In
this regard, the more similar the prior act is (in
terms of physical similarity or mental state) to the
act being proved, the more relevant it becomes. (2)
The act must be necessary in the sense that it is
probative of an essential claim or an element of the
offense. (3) The evidence must be reliable. And (4)
the evidence’s probative value must not be
substantially outweighed by confusion or unfair
prejudice in the sense that it tends to subordinate
reason to emotion in the factfinding process.
United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997). The
fourth factor reflects that the proffered 404(b) evidence must
satisfy Rule 403. Unfair prejudice exists “‘when there is a
genuine risk that the emotions of a jury will be excited to
5
Rule 404(b) was amended in December 2011, but this does
not change the analysis in this case. The district court’s
August 2011 decision granting the government’s motion in limine
to preclude evidence of police misconduct was properly made
under the old version of the rule. However, the district court
reaffirmed its own earlier decision in January 2012, before the
second jury trial. Thus, the appropriate rule for the appeal is
the current version of Rule 404(b).
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irrational behavior, and this risk is disproportionate to the
probative value of the offered evidence.’” Byers, 649 F.3d at
210 (quoting United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 319 (4th
Cir. 2008)). “[W]e defer to the district court’s Rule 403
balancing using these or other factors ‘unless it is an
arbitrary or irrational exercise of discretion.’” United States
v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir. 1995)).
In this case, Williams sought to admit documents from three
civil suits that alleged police misconduct against McCann and
Finn. The first suit involved allegations from 1999 that McCann
slapped a suspect in the back of the head, pushed his head into
a window multiple times, and threatened the suspect by telling
him that if he tried to run “we all have guns.” J.A. 213-14,
221-22. The suspect was also allegedly “choked” during his
interactions with McCann and another officer. J.A. 221. The
second suit involved McCann’s alleged role in coercing a
confession from another suspect, Corey Beale, in 1998. The
third suit involved excessive force allegations against Finn
dating back to 2000. The government moved to exclude all
evidence regarding the three civil lawsuits. Relying on Rule
403, the district court granted the government’s motion, holding
that the dated civil allegations of police misconduct were only
marginally relevant, would be confusing to the jury, and would
13
be time-consuming at trial. The district court later re-
affirmed this decision before the second trial for Count One.
Upon careful review, we cannot conclude that the district
court’s decision to exclude the evidence was either “arbitrary”
or “irrational.” Kelly, 510 F.3d at 437. First, the proffered
evidence, which included civil complaints and motions from
incidents dating back well over a decade ago, had minimal
probative value to Defendant’s criminal case. Further,
settlement materials Defendant sought to introduce may have
presented admissibility problems. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 408.
And the district court did not act irrationally in concluding
that these barely, if at all, probative materials likely would
have been confusing to the jury and time-consuming.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court
properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress and also did not
err in excluding the evidence of previous police misconduct
allegations against McCann and Finn.
AFFIRMED
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