People v. Barghouti , 2013 IL App (1st) 112373 ( 2014 )

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
People v. Barghouti, 2013 IL App (1st) 112373Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption JAMAL BARGHOUTI, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, Third Division
Docket No. 1-11-2373
Filed December 20, 2013
Rehearing denied January 23, 2014
Held The dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition as frivolous was
(Note: This syllabus reversed and the cause was remanded for second-stage proceedings,
constitutes no part of the since the appellate court did not exceed its authority by requesting
opinion of the court but briefing on the overlooked issue of whether defense counsel was
has been prepared by the ineffective in failing to advise defendant of the sentences available if
Reporter of Decisions defendant rejected the State’s offer in exchange for a guilty plea and
for the convenience of defendant adequately alleged ineffective assistance of counsel during
the reader.) plea negotiations.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 02-CR-23680; the
Review Hon. Stanley Sacks, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Robert Hirschhorn, all of
Appeal State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Mary P. Needham, and Hareena Meghani Wakely, Assistant State’s
Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Hyman specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice Mason specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This case involves the proper role of the appellate court on de novo review of the trial
court’s order dismissing a postconviction petition. The trial court found Jamal Barghouti guilty
of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping. Jamal filed a postconviction
petition in which he alleged that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. The trial
court dismissed the petition as frivolous. In reviewing the trial record and the postconviction
petition, this court encountered an obvious error by the trial court that defense counsel failed to
brief in the initial brief on appeal. We asked the parties to brief the issue. Their briefs did not
change the conclusion that the trial court committed an obvious error and that the
postconviction petition stated the gist of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. We find
that Jamal adequately alleged that he would have accepted a plea bargain the prosecution
offered if his attorney had informed him accurately about the range of sentences he faced if the
trial court found him guilty as charged. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the
postconviction petition and remand to advance the petition to the second stage of
postconviction proceedings.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 K.M. first met Jamal in July 2002. On August 17, 2002, K.M. went to a picnic with Jamal.
Around 11 p.m. that evening, Marcelle Garcia heard a female voice, screaming “stop,” coming
from a truck parked in an alley near Garcia’s home. Garcia called 911. The police officers who
responded to the call arrived a few minutes later and also heard K.M. screaming “stop.” The
officers saw Jamal, shirtless, get out of the truck while pulling up his shorts, with his brother,
Eiad Barghouti, nearby. Jose Garcia, also shirtless, got out of the driver’s side of the truck. The
officers saw K.M. in the truck, naked, crying hysterically. She told the officers the three men
-2-
raped her. Doctors at a nearby hospital found semen in K.M.’s vagina. Prosecutors charged
Garcia, Jamal, and Eiad with aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping.
¶4 Jamal and Eiad chose a joint bench trial. Jamal testified that after the picnic ended, K.M.
agreed to go with him to another party. They decided to take Garcia’s truck, with Eiad and
Garcia, to get there. Jamal had consensual sexual contact with K.M., and then he got out of the
truck. When he returned, he saw Garcia kissing K.M. He walked away. He heard K.M. scream
“stop,” and then he returned to the truck, just before police arrived. Eiad corroborated Jamal’s
testimony.
¶5 K.M. testified that on the way back home from the picnic, Jamal forcibly removed her
clothes and had intercourse with her against her will. Eiad performed oral sex on her as she
continued screaming. Garcia had intercourse with her while Eiad held her down, and then Eiad
had intercourse with her shortly before police arrived. An officer testified that when he
approached the truck, he saw Eiad on top of K.M.
¶6 The trial court found Jamal and Eiad guilty as charged. The court sentenced Eiad to 45
years in prison and Jamal to 35 years in prison. The appellate court affirmed the convictions
and sentences on the direct appeal. People v. Barghouti, Nos. 1-06-3448, 1-06-3465 cons.
(June 9, 2009) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶7 On April 29, 2011, Jamal filed a postconviction petition, claiming that he received
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and that the State withheld exculpatory
evidence. Jamal alleged that his trial attorney failed to interview witnesses Jamal identified
who would have cast doubt on K.M.’s credibility.
¶8 Jamal also alleged:
“trial counsel *** failed to advise petitioner that if he denied the 12 year plea bargain
that the State offered both petitioners, they would be facing the possibility of a prison
term of 6 to 60 years if found guilty.
***
Defense counsel *** erroneously advised petitioner and his father that, if
convicted, petitioner would be eligible for probation since he did not have a criminal
record and Eiad, co-petitioner, would only rec[ei]ve 8 to 10 years. Due to this
erroneous advice petitioner rejected the State plea offer ***.
***
If the defendant was aware of the minimum and maximum sentencing range of 6 to
60 years and defendant was not erroneously advised that he would only get probation
since he had no criminal record[,] Petitioner would have *** accepted the plea offer of
12 years that the prosecutor offered him.”
¶9 Jamal’s affidavit, and the affidavit of Jamal’s father, echo the allegations of the petition.
Jamal said:
“Attorneys Perry Grimaldi and Ezra Hemphill erroneously advised my father,
Jamal Barghouti Sr., Eiad Barghouti, and [me] that if we were found guilty, the most
Eiad, co-defendant, would get is 8 to 10 years in prison. Jamal Jr. would be eligible for
probation since he had no criminal record ***.
-3-
Both attorneys never advised us that we faced the possibility of a prison term of 6 to
60 years if we were found guilty and never told us about the extended sentencing
factors that could apply ***.
***
I, at the time [of plea bargaining], did not know that I faced 6 to 60 years in prison,
if I was found guilty of the counts with the extended terms in them and if I did know, I
would have taken the plea offer but would have tr[i]ed to negotiate a less amount of
time first.”
¶ 10 The trial court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit. Jamal filed a
notice of appeal, and the court appointed counsel to assist Jamal with the appeal. In the brief on
appeal, appellate counsel raised the issue of the State’s failure to disclose a witness who might
have affected K.M.’s credibility and the failure of defense counsel to interview and call
witnesses Jamal identified who might have cast further doubt on K.M.’s credibility. Counsel
for the postconviction appeal raised no issue concerning Jamal’s allegation that he rejected a
plea bargain based on erroneous advice from his trial counsel. This court asked the parties for
briefs concerning the allegations of erroneous advice concerning the plea bargain.
¶ 11 ANALYSIS
¶ 12 At this court’s prompting, counsel for the postconviction appeal asserted that Jamal did not
intend to waive his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by giving Jamal
erroneous advice concerning the plea bargain. The State responded that we had overstepped
our bounds when we requested briefing on an issue Jamal’s attorneys failed to raise in their
opening brief on appeal.
¶ 13 Because this case arises on appeal from the dismissal of a postconviction petition at the
first stage of postconviction proceedings, we review the dismissal de novo. People v. Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d 366, 387-88 (1998). At the first stage of proceedings, “a petition alleging ineffective
assistance may not be summarily dismissed if (i) it is arguable that counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (ii) it is arguable that the defendant was
prejudiced.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2009). We should affirm the dismissal “only
if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact. A petition which lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact is one which is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a
fanciful factual allegation.” Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16. Because we review the trial court’s
decision de novo, “the issue before us is limited solely to whether defendant’s ‘petition is
frivolous or is patently without merit.’ ” People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 247 (2001)
(quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998)). We should not affirm the dismissal of the
petition if the petition states the gist of a claim for a deprivation of constitutional rights.
Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244.
¶ 14 We note particularly that the Edwards court did not say that the court needed to decide
whether the parts of the postconviction petition argued on appeal state the gist of a
constitutional claim. Instead, this court must review the entire postconviction petition, in light
of the trial record, to determine whether it states the gist of a constitutional claim. The Hodges
-4-
court elaborated on the standard applicable when the postconviction petitioner has alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel. Nothing in Hodges limits the scope of review to those parts
of the postconviction petition argued on appeal.
¶ 15 Applying the directives of Edwards, Hodges, and Coleman, we reviewed the record of the
trial and the postconviction petition. In the petition, we encountered allegations not raised in
appellate counsel’s brief but which appeared to make the postconviction petition meritorious.
Jamal alleged that his counsel failed to inform him of the range of sentences available if he
rejected the State’s offer to recommend a 12-year sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. The
trial record did not contradict those allegations, which state the gist of a claim that trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance. Because “a reviewing court does not lack authority to address
unbriefed issues and may do so in the appropriate case, i.e., when a clear and obvious error
exists in the trial court proceedings” (People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 325 (2010)), we could
reverse the trial court’s judgment on the basis of those allegations. See Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at
17. We chose instead to request supplemental briefs to allow the parties to address the issue.
See People v. Williams, 239 Ill. 2d 119, 128 (2010); People v. Green, 225 Ill. 2d 612, 616
(2007); see also People v. Feyrer, 269 Ill. App. 3d 734, 739 (1994). We hold that we did not
overstep the proper bounds of an appellate court when, upon discovering that the trial court
committed an obvious error, we asked the parties to brief the issue.
¶ 16 In its supplemental brief, the State argues that, because Jamal did not obtain an affidavit
from his trial counsel, we must not accept as true Jamal’s allegation that his trial counsel failed
to inform him, at the time of plea bargaining, that he faced a sentence of 6 to 60 years in prison
if the trial court found him guilty as charged, and that he would have accepted the plea bargain
the prosecution offered if trial counsel had informed him of the range of sentences available.
The argument asks us to ignore the standards set in Edwards and Coleman. At the first stage of
proceedings, we must accept as true all facts alleged in the postconviction petition, unless the
record contradicts those allegations. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 385. Our supreme court also has
held that courts should excuse the absence of affidavits in which attorneys must confess their
errors, because the “difficulty or impossibility of obtaining such an affidavit is self-apparent.”
People v. Williams, 47 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (1970), quoted in People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 333-34
(2005). We find that the lack of an affidavit from Jamal’s trial counsel does not permit us to
ignore the allegations of his postconviction petition, supported by his affidavit and the affidavit
of his father.
¶ 17 Our supreme court, in People v. Curry, 178 Ill. 2d 509 (1997), said:
“A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to be reasonably informed with
respect to the direct consequences of accepting or rejecting a plea offer. [Citations.]
Concomitantly, a criminal defense attorney has the obligation to inform his or her
client about the maximum and minimum sentences that can be imposed for the offenses
with which the defendant is charged. [Citations.] In the case at bar, defense counsel did
not fulfill this obligation. ***
*** Based on the facts before us, we conclude that defense counsel’s performance
during plea negotiations was objectively unreasonable.” (Emphasis in original.) Curry,
178 Ill. 2d at 528-29.
-5-
¶ 18 Following Curry, we find that Jamal has adequately alleged facts showing that, arguably,
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during plea negotiations. Jamal also
adequately alleged that he arguably suffered prejudice because he would have accepted the
plea bargain if he had known the sentencing range applicable to the crimes charged. See Lafler
v. Cooper, 566 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012) (allegation that defendant would
have accepted plea bargain credible when sentence imposed greatly exceeded bargain offered,
and counsel failed to inform the defendant of sentencing range (citing Cooper v. Lafler, 376
F. App’x 563, 571-72 (6th Cir. 2010))). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and
remand for the appointment of counsel to assist Jamal with the second stage of postconviction
proceedings.
¶ 19 CONCLUSION
¶ 20 When this court, in reviewing the record on appeal de novo, encounters an obvious error by
the trial court, the court may address the issue even if the parties failed to brief the issue.
Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 325. The court does not overstep its bounds when it asks for briefing on
the overlooked issue, rather than resolving the issue without briefing. See Williams, 239 Ill. 2d
at 128. Jamal here adequately alleged that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
during plea negotiations, when counsel failed to inform him accurately of the potential
consequences of rejecting the bargain. Jamal also adequately alleged that he suffered prejudice
due to counsel’s error. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand to
advance the petition to the second stage of postconviction proceedings.
¶ 21 Reversed and remanded.
¶ 22 JUSTICE HYMAN, specially concurring.
¶ 23 As this court’s opinion lays out, the request for supplemental briefing falls well within our
authority. I write this special concurrence, however, to take issue with the repeated
characterization in the State’s supplemental brief that this court “stepped outside of its proper
role as a neutral arbiter.” The accusation stems from our asking the parties for supplemental
briefing on petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel involving the plea
bargain. Petitioner’s opening brief did not address the claim, even though he raised it in his
postconviction petition.
¶ 24 My experience on the bench has convinced me that judges, trial as well appellate, feel
acutely conscious of their proper role as neutral arbiters. Every day, in every case I handle, I
am reminded of that essential, central, and indispensable role entrusted to me and every
member of the judiciary–that of neutral arbiter. I have never known a judge who felt otherwise.
Whether denoted as neutrality or impartiality or independence, our legal system hinges on its
observance. Our adherence is inviolable.
¶ 25 This is not the first time I have seen a brief accuse a court of crossing the line which cannot
be crossed–the line of absolute neutrality. Recently this court issued an opinion involving an
especially egregious example. See Talamine v. Apartment Finders, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st)
-6-
121201. While the intemperate rhetoric employed here may not be as offensive as in Talamine,
the damage is the same–every gratuitous and petulant comment hurts the integrity of the
courts.
¶ 26 The State presents a cogent response, which does not benefit an iota from its distasteful
characterization. The throw-away line, which is made without citation to authority, should
have been deleted in the editing process as a matter of respect and decorum.
¶ 27 Of all those who might sling an arrow at the integrity of the court, the office of the State’s
Attorney would seem the least likely to do so. The office of State’s Attorney knows what it
means to uphold the law and the Constitution. And if we believe it means supplemental
briefing for clarification that does not equate with shedding our neutrality, irrespective of the
legal soundness of the request.
¶ 28 The words of Supreme Court Justice David Souter at his confirmation hearing summarize
for me, not only my role and the role of every other judge of the courts of this nation, but also
why we asked for the supplemental briefing:
“The first lesson, simple as it is, is that whatever court we’re in, whatever we are doing,
at the end of our task some human being is going to be affected. Some human life is
going to be changed by what we do. And so we had better use every power of our minds
and our hearts and our beings to get those rulings right.” The Nomination of David H.
Souter to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing
Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 51-52 (1991) (statement of David
Souter), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CHRG-SOUTER/pdf/
GPO-CHRG-SOUTER.pdf.
¶ 29 The supplemental briefing helped us get this ruling right.
¶ 30 JUSTICE MASON, specially concurring.
¶ 31 I specially concur in the judgment reversing and remanding petitioner’s postconviction
petition for second-stage proceedings. I do so because another panel of this division, on
allegations virtually identical to those raised by petitioner here regarding witnesses who a
codefendant claimed were not interviewed by defense counsel and whose testimony could
have cast doubt on the victim’s credibility, determined that first-stage dismissal was
inappropriate. People v. Barghouti, 2013 IL App (1st) 110584-U. I can conceive of no basis
why these codefendants should receive different treatment. I express no view on the remaining
issue.
-7-