Edwards v. State , 2014 Ark. 87 ( 2014 )


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  •                                      Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 87
    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
    No.   CV-12-437
    STEPHEN EDWARDS                                   Opinion Delivered   February 20, 2014
    APPELLANT
    PRO SE MOTION FOR
    V.                                                RECONSIDERATION FROM
    REVERSAL OF AN APPEAL FROM
    THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT
    STATE OF ARKANSAS AND SEX                         COURT [NO. 60CV-11-669]
    OFFENDER SCREENING & RISK
    ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE                              HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER
    APPELLEES                    CHARLES PIAZZA, JUDGE
    MOTION TREATED AS PETITION
    FOR REHEARING AND DENIED.
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Stephen Edwards entered a guilty plea to second-degree sexual assault and, in
    conjunction with that judgment, was required to register as a sex offender under Arkansas Code
    Annotated section 12-12-905 (Repl. 2009). The Arkansas Department of Correction Sex
    Offender Screening & Risk Assessment Program (“SOSRA”) conducted a community
    notification risk assessment as required under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997,
    codified at Arkansas Code Annotated sections 12-12-901 to -923 (Repl. 2009) (the “Registration
    Act”), and assigned appellant a Community Notification Level 3. Appellant requested an
    administrative review, and the Sex Offender Assessment Committee (“Committee”) upheld the
    Level 3 assessment.
    Appellant then filed a petition in circuit court for judicial review of the final
    Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 87
    administrative order under the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).1 See Ark. Code
    Ann. § 12-12-922(b)(7)(A)(ii). The Committee moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of
    jurisdiction based on an untimely petition. The circuit court denied the Committee’s motion to
    dismiss, and it denied and dismissed the petition. When appellant lodged his appeal in this court,
    the Committee filed a cross-appeal of the denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
    We reversed on the cross-appeal. Edwards v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 434
    (per curiam). Appellant has
    filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, which we treat as a petition for rehearing of the
    decision reversing the circuit court’s order under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 2-3 (2013). See
    Burks v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 274
    (per curiam).
    In our decision reversing on cross-appeal, this court held that appellant did not establish
    that he had complied with the rules of procedure so as to file a timely petition and that the
    circuit court did not therefore have a basis to determine that the petition was timely. In his
    motion, appellant asserts that, as an incarcerated pro se litigant, he was not able to ensure that
    the papers he submitted to the circuit clerk prior to the filing deadline, including those that
    sought to proceed in forma pauperis, were acted on by the judge and filed within the applicable
    time limits. He contends that the circuit clerk, under our decisions in Meraz v. Crow, 
    2009 Ark. 369
    (per curiam) and White v. State, 
    373 Ark. 415
    , 
    284 S.W.3d 64
    (2008), was required to file-
    mark his petition for judicial review on the date that it was tendered and that the clerk’s failure
    to do so was clerical error.
    Meraz held that it was clerical error for a circuit clerk to delay filing a petition under
    1
    The Administrative Procedure Act is codified at Arkansas Code Annotated sections 25-
    15-201 to -218 (Repl. 2002 & Supp. 2007).
    2
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    2014 Ark. 87
    Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 while a motion to proceed as a pauper was pending,
    and this court’s analysis relied on a similar decision in White that concluded it was clerical error
    for the clerk to decline to file a notice of appeal on the denial of a Rule 37.1 petition. 
    2009 Ark. 369
    ; see also White, 
    373 Ark. 415
    , 
    284 S.W.3d 64
    . The holdings in Meraz and White, however, are
    inapplicable here. The decision in White was based in part on the reasoning that the clerk was
    required to file the appellant’s notice of appeal whether a fee was paid or not. White, 
    373 Ark. 415
    , 417, 
    284 S.W.3d 64
    , 65. As this court indicated in its original opinion on this matter, the
    clerk was not required to file a petition for review unless provided with the appropriate fee or
    a basis for a waiver of that fee, and there was no clerical error shown by appellant. Edwards,
    
    2013 Ark. 434
    , at 4.
    Because appellant did not demonstrate clerical error in the clerk’s marking the petition
    for review as filed on the date that the order granting appellant’s request to proceed as a pauper
    was entered, this court did not err in determining that there was no clerical error shown. Under
    Rule 2-3(g), this court grants a request for rehearing or reconsideration only if the appellant calls
    attention to specific errors of law or fact in the opinion. Burks v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 274
    (per
    curiam); MacKool v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 341
    (per curiam); McArty v. Hobbs, 
    2012 Ark. 306
    (per
    curiam). Appellant contends that he had no control over when the documents were forwarded
    from the judge to the clerk for filing because of his incarceration, but it is well settled that all
    litigants, including those who proceed pro se, must bear the responsibility of conforming to the
    rules of procedure. Bannister v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 412
    (per curiam) (Even an incarcerated
    petitioner, who may bear certain burdens that challenge his or her ability to do so, must abide
    3
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    2014 Ark. 87
    by the procedural rules.). Because appellant failed to demonstrate any error of fact or law
    contained in this court’s opinion, his motion for rehearing is denied. See MacKool, 
    2013 Ark. 341
    .
    Motion treated as petition for rehearing and denied.
    Stephen Edwards, pro se appellant.
    Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Amy L. Ford, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
    4