United States v. Hines ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES, Appellant
v.
Shawn M. HINES, Sergeant
U.S. Army, Appellee
No. 13-5010
Crim. App. No. 20120024
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued November 18, 2013
Decided February 24, 2014
RYAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BAKER,
C.J., and ERDMANN, STUCKY, and OHLSON, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain T. Campbell Warner (argued); Colonel
John P. Carrell, Lieutenant Colonel James L. Varley, and Major
Catherine L. Brantley (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Robert N. Michaels (argued); Colonel
Kevin Boyle, Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan F. Potter, and Major
Jacob D. Bashore (on brief).
Military Judge: Timothy Grammel
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Hines, 13-5010/AR
Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Consistent with his pleas, a military judge sitting as a
general court-martial convicted Appellee of two specifications
of making a false official statement, in violation of Article
107, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 907(2012), two specifications of larceny of military property of a
value more than $500.00, in violation of Article 121, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 921 (2012), and one specification of wrongful
appropriation of military property of a value more than $500.00,
also in violation of Article 121, UCMJ. The adjudged sentence
provided for confinement for a period of three months,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to E-1, and a
bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority approved the
adjudged sentence, except for the forfeitures, and ordered all
but the bad-conduct discharge executed.
The values alleged for the three Article 121, UCMJ,
offenses were based on aggregating amounts wrongfully taken over
a period of months at three separate locations. Before the
United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA), Appellee
argued that the military judge erred by accepting his pleas to
larceny and wrongful appropriation of military property of a
value over $500.00 when he providently pled only to a value of
less than $500.00. On May 24, 2013, the ACCA agreed, holding
that theft of Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) and Family
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Separation Allowance (FSA) occurring over multiple months
“amounts to a separate larceny each month the money is
received,” because the receipt of funds did not occur at the
“same time and place.” United States v. Hines, No. ACM
20120024, slip op. at 3 (A. Ct. Crim. App. May 24, 2013)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the
alternative, it held that the pleas were improvident because the
military judge failed to resolve a matter raised during the
providence inquiry, which was inconsistent with the pleas. The
ACCA thus affirmed findings only to larceny and wrongful
appropriation of military property of a value less than $500.00,
in addition to the Article 107, UCMJ, charge and specifications.
Id. It nonetheless affirmed the sentence, citing United States
v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1986). Id. at 3–4.
On August 5, 2013, on certification under Article 67(a)(2),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(2) (2012), the Judge Advocate General
of the Army (TJAG) asked this Court to consider the following
questions:
I. WHETHER THE ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED WHEN
IT HELD THAT APPELLEE’S PLEAS TO SPECIFICATIONS 1, 2,
AND 3 OF CHARGE II WERE IMPROVIDENT BECAUSE THEFT OF
BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR HOUSING AND FAMILY SEPARATION
ALLOWANCE OCCURRING OVER MULTIPLE MONTHS “AMOUNTS TO A
SEPARATE LARCENY EACH MONTH THE MONEY IS RECEIVED.”
II. WHETHER THE ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED WHEN
IT HELD THAT APPELLEE’S PLEAS TO SPECIFICATIONS 1 AND
3 OF CHARGE II WERE IMPROVIDENT BECAUSE THE MILITARY
JUDGE “NEVER SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED THE INCONSISTENCY
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United States v. Hines, 13-5010/AR
BETWEEN [APPELLEE’S] PLEAS TO THE ENTIRE AMOUNT [OF
BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR HOUSING] IN LIGHT OF HIS APPARENT
ENTITLEMENT TO A LESSER AMOUNT.”
We answer both certified questions in the affirmative. As
a threshold matter, we expressly adopt the reasoning and holding
of United States v. Billingslea, 603 F.2d 515, 520 (5th Cir.
1979): “[T]he formulation of a plan or scheme or the setting up
of a mechanism which, when put into operation, will result in
the taking or diversion of sums of money on a recurring basis,
will produce but one crime.” Thus, under the circumstances of
this case, each specification properly aggregated money
wrongfully obtained on a recurring basis and alleged a larceny
of military property of a value greater than $500.00.
Moreover, we disagree that the military judge “never
satisfactorily resolved the inconsistency between [Appellee’s]
pleas to the entire amount in light of his apparent entitlement
to a lesser amount.” Hines, No. ACM 20120024, slip op. at 3.
To the extent any inconsistency was interjected into the
providence inquiry, it was definitively resolved when Appellee
noted he had not satisfied any condition precedent to obtain BAH
without dependents (BAH-WITHOUT), and was not entitled to any
BAH.
The decision of the ACCA is reversed.
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United States v. Hines, 13-5010/AR
I. FACTS
On May 27, 2008, Appellee was stationed at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, when his divorce became final. Before his
divorce, Appellee was receiving BAH at the with-dependent rate
(BAH-WITH) based on his status as a married active duty
servicemember. Although Appellee was obligated to submit
paperwork to finance to alert them to this change in status, he
failed to do so. If he had, he would have stopped receiving
BAH-WITH entitlements immediately. Instead, Appellee collected
BAH-WITH at the Fort Bragg rate from May 27, 2008, until October
19, 2010, when he executed Permanent Change of Station (PCS)
orders. During this time, Appellee received $30,623.27 in BAH-
WITH through monthly payments, each of which exceeded $500.00.
While still at Fort Bragg, Appellee deployed to Afghanistan
in April 2009. Upon arrival in Afghanistan, Appellee completed
DD Form 1561, “Statement to Substantiate Payment of Family
Separation Allowance,” on which he affirmatively certified that
he was not divorced or legally separated from his spouse. As a
result, from April 21, 2009, until June 8, 2010, Appellee
received $3,408.33 in FSA through monthly payments, each of
which was less than $500.00.
When Appellee returned from Afghanistan in June 2010, he
remained at Fort Bragg until October 19, 2010, when he executed
PCS orders to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. When he arrived there,
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United States v. Hines, 13-5010/AR
Appellee submitted two documents -- DA Form 5960, “Authorization
to Start, Stop, or Change Basic Allowance for Quarters,” and DD
Form 1351-2, “Travel Voucher.” On both documents he stated that
he was married. Because of these documents, Appellee received
BAH-WITH at the Fort Campbell rate totaling $5,328.00 through
monthly payments from October 19, 2010, until April 18, 2011,
each of which was greater than $500.00, with the exception of
the final prorated payment.1
In April 2011, Appellee’s ex-wife contacted officials at
Fort Campbell and reported that she had reason to believe he
continued to claim her as a dependent. The Government then
charged Appellee, as relevant to the certified issues, under
Charge II, with three separate larceny specifications of
military property of a value over $500.00, each occurring over
different periods of time, at the three locations referenced
above, in violation of Article 121, UCMJ. Each specification
alleged that SGT Hines “did . . . steal . . . entitlements,
military property, of a value of more than $500.00.”
1
The PCS benefits for Appellee’s nonexistent spouse appear not
to be included in the larceny offense specification for Fort
Campbell.
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United States v. Hines, 13-5010/AR
Appellee entered into a pretrial agreement to plead guilty
to all of the specifications as amended, as well as into a
stipulation of fact.2
During the providence inquiry, the military judge explained
to Appellee, inter alia, that in order to be guilty of all of
the Charge II offenses it must be true “that the property
[taken] was of a value of more than $500.[00].” In the course
of both having Appellee describe the facts supporting his guilty
pleas and discussing the stipulation of fact, the military judge
discussed the value of property that Appellee obtained and noted
that he “want[ed] to make sure that the stipulation of fact
[was] correct.” Appellee admitted to larceny and wrongful
appropriation of government property in an amount greater than
$500.00, and confirmed that the amounts of BAH and FSA he
wrongfully received were the total amounts listed in paragraphs
six, eight, and ten of the stipulation of fact.
Appellee also admitted that he was not entitled to receive
any BAH. At both Fort Bragg and Fort Campbell, single soldiers
without dependents are not entitled to BAH-WITHOUT unless they
seek and receive a “Certificate of Non-Availability” (CNA).
Appellee did not apply for a CNA at either location.
2
After discussing the specifications at a Rule for Courts-
Martial (R.C.M.) 802 conference, Charge II, Specification 3, was
amended without objection to reflect the lesser included offense
of wrongful appropriation.
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Referencing paragraph nine of the stipulation of fact, the
military judge asked Appellee whether it was correct that “if
you had gone through the channels and requested other
entitlements, like, to live off post and to get [the BAH-
WITHOUT] rate, then it’s likely that you would have . . . been
authorized to do that and obtain that.” Appellee answered the
question in the affirmative and went on to explain that he did
not go through any of the steps necessary to receive BAH-
WITHOUT, and therefore was not entitled to any BAH.
II. ACCA DECISION
On appeal, the ACCA held as a matter of law that charging
the offenses listed under Charge II “as continuing crimes,
aggregating the total amount of money” at each location was
improper and that “theft of BAH, under these circumstances,
amounts to a separate larceny each month the money is received.”
Hines, No. ACM 20120024, slip op. at 2–3.
The ACCA went on to conclude that Appellee “would have been
entitled to the [BAH-WITHOUT] rate” at both Fort Campbell and
Fort Bragg. Id. at 3. As such, “[d]uring the providence
inquiry [Appellee] repeatedly stated that he understood that he
was not entitled to BAH-WITH in a fashion expressing the
understanding that he was entitled to [the BAH-WITHOUT] rate.”
Id. Therefore, the ACCA held that “[Appellee] never
satisfactorily admitted to a single larceny in an amount over
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$500.00 and only providently admitted to a series of separate
larcenies each in an amount less than $500.00.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
The question whether wrongful receipt of money on a
recurring basis constitutes one crime for the total amount, or
multiple offenses for the amount received in each instance, is a
question of law, which we review de novo. United States v.
Watson, 71 M.J. 54, 56 (C.A.A.F. 2012). We disagree with the
ACCA’s conclusion that there could not be a “continuing larceny
of an aggregated amount” solely because the monthly amounts were
not taken “at substantially the same time and place.” Hines,
No. ACM 20120024, slip op. at 3 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The weight of authority is precisely to the
contrary.
While the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV,
para. 46.c.(1)(h)(ii) (2008 ed.) (MCM) notes that multiple
article larceny is to be charged as a single larceny “[w]hen a
larceny of several articles is committed at substantially the
same time and place,” and the “articles belong to different
persons,” this is merely one, and not the only, situation where
a single charge is proper. That amounts were wrongfully
received on a recurring basis at different times and places
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raises the question whether there was one crime or several
crimes -- it does not end the inquiry.
Instead, whether there were separate offenses each month or
a single offense aggregating all months, turns on the specific
factual circumstances of each case. And that inquiry focuses on
the actor “at or near the starting point of the illegal
activity.” See Billingslea, 603 F.2d at 520. Facts important
to this analysis include “the state of mind or intent of the
actor prior to and simultaneously with the first taking,” and
also, “evidence of acts done by the accused, either in
preparation for the several takings or as [an] integral part of
the first taking, which facilitate the subsequent takings or in
some way aid the defendant in accomplishing them.” Id.Considering these factors, we agree that “the formulation
of a plan or scheme or the setting up of a mechanism which, when
put into operation, will result in the taking or diversion of
sums of money on a recurring basis, will produce but one crime.”
Id.; accord United States v. Bolden, 28 M.J. 127, 129 (C.M.A.
1989) (accepting the “theory of [the accused’s] criminal
liability” where the government charged the accused in the
aggregate for “intentionally overstat[ing] the rent he was
paying” to “receive[] each month an allowance greater than he
was entitled to”). “Conversely, if all that can be attributed
to the accused is an original intent to purloin and the evidence
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merely shows that this intent was acted on from time to time,
the nature of the acts must be measured by the separate
takings.”3 Billingslea, 603 F.2d at 520. This approach is
consistent with the approach of other federal courts, which have
also adopted the Billingslea framework. See, e.g., United
States v. Parisien, 413 F.3d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Smith, 373 F.3d 561, 563–64, 568 (4th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Papia, 910 F.2d 1357, 1364–65 (7th Cir. 1990).4
Applying the Billingslea framework to the facts of this
case, we have no trouble concluding that there were two acts of
larceny, and one of wrongful appropriation, each for military
property of a value over $500.00 -- which is what the Government
charged, and what Appellee pleaded guilty to. Appellee’s
3
The authority Appellee cites to suggest that aggregation is
improper is inapposite as all the cases are examples of
situations where the acts must be measured by the separate
takings: each of those cases presents a situation where takings
occurred not merely at different times and places, but also
required distinct and separate acts to effectuate each crime.
See United States v. Mincey, 42 M.J. 376, 377 (C.A.A.F. 1995)
(involving multiple specifications of uttering bad checks);
United States v. Poole, 24 M.J. 539, 541 (C.M.A. 1987)
(involving multiple specifications of uttering bad checks);
United States v. Davis, 16 C.M.A. 207, 208, 36 C.M.R. 363, 364
(1966) (involving representations “on each of several separate
occasions, to different finance officers in different places,
that he was serving” in a higher grade).
4
The Billingslea framework for analysis is better adapted to the
particular circumstances of each case than the more narrow
three-part test developed by the United States Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals in United States v. Lepresti, 52 M.J.
644, 653 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1999).
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United States v. Hines, 13-5010/AR
wrongful receipt of BAH-WITH at Fort Bragg resulted from his
failure to apprise finance that he no longer had dependents, as
he acknowledged he was obligated to do. It was that failure to
act that provided the means by which Appellee received money to
which he was not entitled on a recurring basis of a total value
over $500.00, as charged in Specification 3.
Similarly, the record is clear that the sole reasons
Appellee received FSA and BAH-WITH of a value over $500.00 in
Specifications 1 and 2 were the affirmative acts of completing
military forms, which fraudulently stated he remained married to
his ex-wife. Appellee completed DD Form 1561 in Afghanistan,
asserting he was married, and knowing that he would receive FSA
during the course of his deployment based on the form. And
Appellee completed DA Form 5960, knowing and intending that he
would receive monthly BAH-WITH at Fort Campbell on a continuing
basis as a result. There is no question that submission of
these forms was the mechanism for “the taking or diversion of
sums of money on a recurring basis.” Billingslea, 603 F.2d at
520.
Under the circumstances of this case, aggregation of the
monthly amounts paid on a recurring basis into three
specifications alleging a value over $500.00, where there were
three distinct mechanisms by which money was wrongfully received
at three different locations, was appropriate. Accord R.C.M.
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307(c)(4) (“What is substantially one transaction should not be
made the basis for an unreasonable multiplication of charges
against one person.”).
B.
Appellee argues in the alternative, and the ACCA held, that
the providence inquiry and stipulation of fact set up a matter
inconsistent with his pleas that the military judge did not
satisfactorily resolve. We disagree.
“‘In determining whether a guilty plea is provident, the
military judge may consider the facts contained in the
stipulation [of fact] along with the inquiry of [Appellee] on
the record.’” United States v. Whitaker, 72 M.J. 292, 293
(C.A.A.F. 2013) (first alteration in original) (citation
omitted). “If an accused ‘sets up matter inconsistent with the
plea’ at any time during the proceeding, the military judge must
either resolve the apparent inconsistency or reject the plea.”
United States v. Goodman, 70 M.J. 396, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2011)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “This court
must find ‘a substantial conflict between the plea and the
accused’s statements or other evidence’ in order to set aside a
guilty plea. The ‘mere possibility’ of a conflict is not
sufficient.” Watson, 71 M.J. at 58 (citation omitted).
Appellee argues, consistent with the ACCA’s holding, that
the military judge abused his discretion because he “never
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satisfactorily resolved the inconsistency between [Appellee]’s
pleas to the entire amount [of BAH in an amount over $500.00] in
light of his apparent entitlement to a lesser amount.” Hines,
No. ACM 20120024, slip op. at 3. The assertion is that an
inconsistency was established during the providence inquiry with
respect to the value of the entitlements obtained at both Fort
Campbell and Fort Bragg since Appellee was theoretically
entitled to the BAH-WITHOUT rate, as opposed to not being
entitled to any BAH, and the monthly difference between BAH-WITH
and BAH-WITHOUT was less than $500.00.5 Id.
There is an obvious flaw with the reasoning behind this
portion of the ACCA opinion. While the discussion of
theoretical entitlement to BAH-WITHOUT contained in paragraph
nine of the stipulation of fact raised more questions than it
answered, the same stipulation of fact made very clear that the
condition precedent for being entitled to any BAH -- seeking and
receiving a CNA -- had not been fulfilled.
And while the ACCA opined that Appellee “repeatedly stated
that he understood that he was not entitled to BAH–WITH in a
fashion expressing the understanding that he was entitled to
[the BAH-WITHOUT] rate,” Hines, No. ACM 20120024, slip op. at 3,
5
In a sense this is irrelevant because the factual circumstances
of this case permitted aggregation of the monthly totals at each
location into a single specification. Once aggregated, even the
difference between BAH-WITH and BAH-WITHOUT would be well in
excess of $500.00.
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the record is precisely to the contrary. In the providence
inquiry, Appellee admitted that he was not entitled to any BAH.
Additionally, when asked to state the amount wrongfully taken at
both Fort Campbell and Fort Bragg, Appellee cited the entire
aggregate amount of BAH-WITH, rather than the difference between
the BAH-WITH and BAH-WITHOUT rate, and stated that each amount
was over $500.00.
To the extent that any inconsistency was raised by
paragraph nine of the stipulation of fact, it was fully resolved
by the military judge during the providence inquiry.
IV. DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is reversed and the record of trial is returned to the
Judge Advocate General of the Army for remand to the Court of
Criminal Appeals for further proceedings under Article 66, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 866 (2012).
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