Airs Aromatics, LLC v. Opinion Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Management, Inc. , 744 F.3d 595 ( 2014 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    AIRS AROMATICS, LLC, a Delaware                   No. 12-55276
    Limited Liability Company with its
    principal place of business in                      D.C. No.
    Wilmington, DE,                                  2:11-cv-04718-
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               R-JC
    v.
    OPINION
    VICTORIA’S SECRET STORES BRAND
    MANAGEMENT, INC., a Delaware
    Corporation with its principal place
    of business in Reynoldsburg, OH,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 11, 2014*
    Pasadena, California
    Filed February 28, 2014
    Before: Jerome Farris, N. Randy Smith,
    and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Farris
    *
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2          AIRS AROMATICS V. VICTORIA’S SECRET
    SUMMARY**
    Lanham Act
    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a
    trademark cancellation claim under § 37 of the Lanham Act.
    The panel held that the trademark cancellation claim
    would not provide an independent basis for subject matter
    jurisdiction standing alone. The panel also held that the
    plaintiff failed to state a claim for trademark infringement
    because it failed sufficiently to allege continuous usage of the
    mark.
    COUNSEL
    John Derrick, Law Office of John Derrick, Santa Barbara,
    California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Diana Torres, Michael Shipley, and David Klein, Kirkland &
    Ellis LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    AIRS AROMATICS V. VICTORIA’S SECRET                 3
    OPINION
    FARRIS, Circuit Judge:
    I
    Airs Aromatics, a purported owner of an ANGEL
    DREAMS trademark, filed a lawsuit against Victoria’s
    Secret alleging breach of contract claims and requesting
    cancellation of Victoria’s Secret’s registered DREAM
    ANGELS trademark. The district court entered an order
    dismissing the complaint for failure to allege actual breaches
    of the contract and lack of standing for the cancellation claim.
    Airs Aromatics appealed only the dismissal of the
    cancellation claim.
    Airs International began using the trademark ANGEL
    DREAMS in connection with the sale of perfume and
    personal care products in 1991. In 1999, Airs International
    entered into a mutual consent-to-use agreement with
    Victoria’s Secret. The agreement allowed Victoria’s Secret to
    use the trademark DREAM ANGELS in connection with the
    marketing of various personal care products. As part of that
    agreement, Victoria’s Secret paid Airs International $25,000
    per year. The agreement was renewable yearly, at the election
    of Victoria’s Secret.
    In 2000, while the consent-to-use agreement with
    Victoria’s Secret was still in effect, Stephen Marcus, the
    principal of Airs International, assigned the Airs family of
    4         AIRS AROMATICS V. VICTORIA’S SECRET
    trademarks, which included ANGEL DREAMS,1 to Mine
    Hakim. In May 2002, the California Secretary of State’s
    office suspended Airs International’s corporate status.
    Litigation over the ownership of these marks ensued between
    Marcus, Hakim, and their agents and purported transferees of
    the family of marks. Airs International was not a party to that
    litigation. Because the district court determined the transfers
    were made to defraud creditors, it enjoined all parties to the
    litigation, including Marcus and Hakim, from asserting any
    rights superior to any other parties’ use of rights in the Airs
    family of trademarks. The court also ordered cancellation of
    any registered marks covering the Airs family of marks in any
    of the parties’ names. This court affirmed the district court’s
    order and stated that Airs International had a senior claim to
    the marks. Airs Fragrance Products, Inc. v. Clover Gifts, Inc.,
    395 F. App’x 482, 485 (9th Cir. 2010).
    During the litigation, Victoria’s Secret made its
    contractual payments into an escrow account. In 2008,
    Victoria’s Secret ceased making payments and withdrew the
    funds from the escrow account. In late 2007, Victoria’s Secret
    applied for trademark registration for eight DREAM
    ANGELS marks; the trademark office granted the
    registrations.
    In 2011, Marcus revived Airs International and attempted
    to transfer all of its common law rights in the ANGEL
    DREAMS mark to the newly formed Airs Aromatics, LLC.
    1
    The Airs family of trademarks included ANGEL DREAMS, AIRS,
    AIRSWORLD, AFRICAN WIND, ATMOSPHERE, DRAGON CLOUD,
    OCEAN, RAIN MUSK, WHITE LACE, RUSSIAN AMBER, STAR
    SANDLEWOOD, JASMINE ITALIAN, BLACK OPIUM, KASHMIR,
    PATCHOULI, FRENCH VANILLA, CHINA MOON, and RAIN.
    AIRS AROMATICS V. VICTORIA’S SECRET                5
    Marcus is the sole member of Airs Aromatics. On June 2,
    2011, Airs Aromatics filed a complaint against Victoria’s
    Secret that alleged Victoria’s Secret had breached the
    consent-to-use agreement and the associated implied
    covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Airs Aromatics
    sought a declaratory judgment, finding that Victoria’s Secret
    had breached the consent-to-use agreement and cancelling the
    trademark registrations based on a likelihood of confusion.
    Victoria’s Secret moved to dismiss the first amended
    complaint on a variety of grounds, including Airs Aromatics’
    failure to sufficiently plead the continuous usage of the
    ANGEL DREAMS mark that would establish its common
    law ownership.
    On November 28, 2011, the district court granted the
    motion orally on the record after a hearing. The district court
    held that Airs Aromatics lacked standing to pursue its
    trademark cancellation claim as it had not adequately alleged
    non-abandonment of its ANGEL DREAMS trademark. The
    district court also dismissed the claims based on the consent-
    to-use agreement after determining that the alleged breaches
    of the consent-to-use agreement did not breach the actual
    terms. The district court subsequently entered a written order
    dismissing the case with prejudice. Airs Aromatics appealed
    the dismissal of its claim for cancellation of trademarks or,
    alternatively, that it was dismissed with prejudice.
    We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a
    complaint. Wood v. City of San Diego, 
    678 F.3d 1075
    , 1080
    (9th Cir. 2012). We review for abuse of discretion the district
    court’s denial of leave to amend a complaint. Gordon v. City
    of Oakland, 
    627 F.3d 1092
    , 1094 (9th Cir. 2010).
    6         AIRS AROMATICS V. VICTORIA’S SECRET
    II
    Because Airs Aromatics has appealed only the dismissal
    of its trademark cancellation claim, the first question we must
    decide is whether that claim would provide an independent
    basis for subject-matter jurisdiction on remand standing
    alone. We conclude that it would not.
    Section 37 of the Lanham Act, 
    15 U.S.C. § 1119
    , gives
    district courts the power to order the cancellation of a
    trademark registration “in any action involving a registered
    mark.” In dictum, we have previously given contrasting
    interpretations of whether this section provides an
    independent basis of jurisdiction for cancellation claims. In
    Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., we did not
    dismiss a declaratory relief claim of non-infringement as
    moot based on the defendant’s offer of a covenant not to sue.
    
    223 F.3d 1082
    , 1085 (9th Cir. 2000). We noted that even
    dismissal of the declaratory relief claim would “not have
    mooted [the] separate request for cancellation of [the
    trademarks] [as] [t]he trademark cancellation count is
    separate from the declaratory judgment count in the
    complaint and does not appear to be obviously meritless.” 
    Id.
    This interpretation was criticized by the Second Circuit,
    which stated that “the Ninth Circuit in Bancroft failed to
    consider the language in § 1119 that renders that section
    remedial, not jurisdictional. Accordingly, we find its opinion
    unpersuasive.” Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 
    663 F.3d 89
    , 99
    (2d Cir. 2011) cert. granted on other grounds, 
    133 S. Ct. 24
    (2012) and aff’d, 
    133 S. Ct. 721
     (2013).
    In a subsequent case, Tillamook Country Smoker, Inc. v.
    Tillamook Cnty. Creamery Ass’n, we denied a counterclaim
    for trademark infringement due to laches. 
    465 F.3d 1102
    ,
    AIRS AROMATICS V. VICTORIA’S SECRET                7
    1111 (9th Cir. 2006). Cancellation of a trademark registration
    was sought as part of the counterclaim. 
    Id.
     As a prelude to
    evaluating the claim, we stated that “Section 37 of the
    Lanham Act, 
    15 U.S.C. § 1119
    , permits district courts to
    resolve these subsidiary registration disputes when joined
    with an infringement claim.” 
    Id.
    The plain language of Section 37 states that cancellation
    is available in “any action involving a registered mark.”
    
    15 U.S.C. § 1119
    . This language specifies that cancellation
    may only be sought if there is already an ongoing action that
    involves a registered mark; it does not indicate that a
    cancellation claim is available as an independent cause of
    action. Furthermore, each circuit to directly address this
    statutory language has held that it “creates a remedy for
    trademark infringement rather than an independent basis for
    federal jurisdiction.” Nike, 
    663 F.3d at 98
    ; see also Ditri v.
    Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 
    954 F.2d 869
    ,
    873 (3d Cir. 1992); Windsurfing Int’l Inc. v. AMF Inc.,
    
    828 F.2d 755
    , 758 (Fed. Cir. 1987). This interpretation also
    helps preserve the use of actions before the USPTO
    Trademark Board as the primary vehicle for cancellation. See
    McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:110
    (4th ed.).
    We therefore hold that Section 37 of the Lanham Act does
    not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
    Because Airs Aromatics has not appealed the dismissal of the
    only claims it brought that could support jurisdiction, the
    district court’s judgment dismissing this action with prejudice
    must be affirmed.
    8         AIRS AROMATICS V. VICTORIA’S SECRET
    III
    In its reply brief, Airs Aromatics argues that its
    cancellation claim was actually a poorly pleaded claim of
    trademark infringement. On its face, the original claim was
    titled as “Cancellation of Registered Trademarks” in the First
    Amended Complaint and its various allegations focus on the
    elements necessary for a cancellation claim. However, even
    if the original claim was a poorly pleaded trademark
    infringement claim, Airs Aromatics must still allege
    sufficient facts to support the legal claim in order to survive
    dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Shroyer v. New Cingular
    Wireless Servs., Inc., 
    622 F.3d 1035
    , 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). To
    establish a claim for trademark infringement, Airs Aromatics
    must allege facts to show “(1) that it has a protectible
    ownership interest in the mark; and (2) that the defendant’s
    use of the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion,
    thereby infringing upon [Airs Aromatics’] rights to the
    mark.” Dep’t of Parks & Recreation for State of California v.
    Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 
    448 F.3d 1118
    , 1124 (9th Cir. 2006).
    To establish a protectible ownership interest in a common
    law trademark, the owner must “establish not only that he or
    she used the mark before the mark was registered, but also
    that such use has continued to the present.” Watec Co., Ltd.
    v. Liu, 
    403 F.3d 645
    , 654 (9th Cir. 2005). Continuous usage
    requires sufficiently public usage as “to identify or
    distinguish the marked goods in an appropriate segment of
    the public mind as those of the adopter of the mark.”
    Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp.,
    
    174 F.3d 1036
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
    Therefore, Airs Aromatics must allege facts showing
    continuous usage of the ANGEL DREAMS mark. In its
    AIRS AROMATICS V. VICTORIA’S SECRET                  9
    complaint, Airs Aromatics neither alleged continuous usage
    by Airs International throughout the relevant period nor any
    attempt by Airs Aromatics to use the mark in commerce
    before it commenced the suit against Victoria’s Secret. In its
    opening brief, Airs Aromatics acknowledges that Airs
    International was not actively using the marks from 2004 to
    2011 but argues that the ongoing litigation constitutes
    sufficient attempts to continue usage.
    There is no case law to support the contention. Airs
    Aromatics has not adequately alleged that the litigation here
    is the kind of continuous, public usage of a trademark that
    serves to identify the marked goods to the public as those of
    the mark’s owner. See 
    id. at 1052
     (mention of mark in
    correspondence with lawyers was insufficient to constitute
    use). Airs Aromatics has not alleged sufficient facts to
    support a claim for trademark infringement.
    IV
    Airs Aromatics argues that the district court erred in not
    giving it leave to amend its complaint. A district court may
    dismiss a complaint without leave to amend if “amendment
    would be futile.” Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,
    
    656 F.3d 1002
    , 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). Airs Aromatics argues
    that leave to amend should be granted in order for it to more
    thoroughly allege facts that establish continuous usage of the
    ANGEL DREAMS trademark. Airs Aromatics, however, in
    its briefing before this court has stated that Airs International
    “was not actively using the marks” between 2004 and 2011
    and that its activity was “effectively on hold” during the
    period of litigation. Airs Aromatics has established that its
    allegations for continuous usage rest on the theory that
    litigation, rather than business activity, is sufficient. This
    10        AIRS AROMATICS V. VICTORIA’S SECRET
    type of non-public, non-commercial activity does not meet
    the established standard for continuous usage.
    A party cannot amend pleadings to “directly contradic[t]
    an earlier assertion made in the same proceeding.” Russell v.
    Rolfs, 
    893 F.2d 1033
    , 1037 (9th Cir. 1990). Given leave to
    amend, Airs Aromatics could not advance an alternative set
    of allegations about activities by Airs International during the
    period in dispute that would constitute continuous usage.
    Consequently, leave to amend would be futile.
    AFFIRMED.