Britt v. State , 2014 Ark. 134 ( 2014 )


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  •                                     Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 134
    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
    No.   CV-13-665
    ANTONIO BRITT                                     Opinion Delivered   March 20, 2014
    APPELLANT
    PRO SE MOTIONS FOR
    V.                                                APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND
    FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE
    BRIEF [LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT
    STATE OF ARKANSAS                                 COURT, NO. 39CV-13-67]
    APPELLEE
    HONORABLE RICHARD L.
    PROCTOR, JUDGE
    APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS
    MOOT.
    PER CURIAM
    In 1996, appellant Antonio Britt was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder,
    attempted first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated robbery (merged with the murder
    convictions), and two counts of kidnapping. The date of the offenses was April 9, 1995. On
    appeal, this court reversed and remanded the case for retrial, holding that the trial court
    erroneously denied appellant’s motion to suppress two statements. Britt v. State, 
    334 Ark. 142
    ,
    
    974 S.W.2d 436
    (1998). On retrial in 2000, appellant was found guilty by a jury of first-degree
    murder, attempted first-degree murder, and two counts of kidnapping. Three terms of life
    imprisonment for first-degree murder and each count of kidnapping, plus an additional
    consecutive sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder, were
    imposed. This court affirmed. Britt v. State, 
    344 Ark. 13
    , 
    38 S.W.3d 363
    (2001).
    On May 23, 2013, appellant filed in the Lee County Circuit Court a pro se petition for
    Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 134
    writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his life sentence for first-degree murder was illegal because
    he was a juvenile when the crime was committed. The circuit court dismissed the petition,
    finding that the petition did not conform to pleading rules. Appellant lodged an appeal from
    that order in this court. Now before us are appellant’s motions for appointment of counsel and
    for extension of time to file his brief-in-chief.
    We dismiss the appeal, and the motions are moot as it is clear from the record that
    appellant could not prevail on appeal. An appeal of the denial of postconviction relief, including
    an appeal from an order that denied a petition for habeas corpus, will not be permitted to go
    forward when it is clear that the appeal is without merit. Glaze v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 458
    (per
    curiam).
    The burden is on the petitioner in a habeas-corpus petition to establish that the trial court
    lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment was invalid on its face; otherwise, there is no basis
    for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue. Culbertson v. State, 
    2012 Ark. 112
    (per
    curiam). Under our statute, a petitioner who does not allege actual innocence and proceed under
    Act 1780 of 2001 Acts of Arkansas must additionally make a showing by affidavit or other
    evidence of probable cause to believe that he is illegally detained. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-
    103(a)(1) (Repl. 2006); Darrough v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 28
    (per curiam). A circuit court’s denial of
    habeas relief will not be reversed unless the court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Justus v. Hobbs,
    
    2013 Ark. 149
    (per curiam).
    While appellant’s petition consisted primarily of quotes from various cases, and his
    argument lacked development, it appears that he was contending that he is entitled to habeas
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    2014 Ark. 134
    relief based on his sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree murder committed while he
    was a juvenile. In his petition, appellant quoted extensively from the United States Supreme
    Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 
    132 S. Ct. 2455
    (2012), in which the Court
    explicitly held that the Eighth Amendment’s protections against cruel and unusual punishment
    forbid a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
    homicide offenders.1 Miller is only applicable when a mandatory life sentence is imposed
    without the sentencer’s being able to “take into account how children are different, and how
    those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Murry v.
    Hobbs, 
    2013 Ark. 64
    (per curiam) (quoting Miller, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. at 2469). The Miller
    Court explained that it was not considering appellant’s “alternative argument that the Eighth
    Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those
    14 or younger.” 
    Id. (quoting Miller,
    __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. at 2469).
    On retrial, appellant was charged and convicted of first-degree murder pursuant to
    Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-102 (Repl. 1993). Murder in the first degree is a Class
    Y felony, which is punishable by “not less than ten (10) years and not more than forty (40) years,
    1
    In his petition, appellant also quoted Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    (2010), in which the
    Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment “forbids a State from imposing a life without
    parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide 
    offender.” 560 U.S. at 75
    . While appellant was
    sentenced to life imprisonment for a homicide offense as well as to life sentences for two counts
    of kidnapping, a nonhomicide offense, he stated in his petition that his argument was
    “concerned with the imposition of a term of imprisonment on offenders who kill.” Because
    appellant failed to raise an argument based on Graham below, any such argument could not be
    raised on appeal. See State v. Robinson, 
    2013 Ark. 425
    , __ S.W.3d __. Accordingly, we do not
    consider whether appellant’s life sentences for nonhomicide convictions violate the Supreme
    Court’s holding in Graham.
    3
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    or life.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1993).2 At trial, the jury was authorized to
    sentence appellant to any term within that range. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-104(c)(1) (Repl.
    1993). The only mandatory life sentence in Arkansas’s sentencing scheme at the time that
    appellant committed his crimes was for capital murder or treason. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-
    104(b) (“A defendant convicted of capital murder . . . or treason . . . shall be sentenced to death
    or life imprisonment without parole.”).
    In Murry, this court held that when, after deliberation, a jury imposed a juvenile
    offender’s life sentence for first-degree murder from a range of possible punishments, his life
    sentence was not mandatory and, thus, not illegal under Miller. 
    2013 Ark. 64
    . Based on our
    holding in Murry, we hold that appellant’s life sentence for first-degree murder was not
    mandatory such that this sentence was not illegal under Miller.3 Because it is clear that appellant
    could not prevail if his appeal were allowed to proceed, his appeal is dismissed, and the motions
    are moot.
    Appeal dismissed; motions moot.
    Antonio Britt, pro se appellant.
    No response.
    2
    A life sentence in Arkansas generally means life without the possibility of parole. Hobbs
    v. Turner, 
    2014 Ark. 19
    , __ S.W.3d __; see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-614(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 2013)
    (stating that inmates sentenced to life for offenses committed after January 1, 1994, are not
    eligible for transfer to community corrections unless the sentence is commuted to a term of
    years by executive clemency).
    3
    We also recognize that appellant did not append to the habeas petition a copy of the
    judgment of conviction being challenged or otherwise provide any substantiation of his claims.
    Thus, he failed to meet his burden of “showing by affidavit or other evidence [of] probable
    cause to believe” that he is illegally detained. See Jones v. State, 
    2014 Ark. 67
    (per curiam).
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    5