United States v. Gutierrez , 2014 CAAF LEXIS 271 ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Jesus GUTIERREZ Jr., Private First Class
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 14-0009
Crim. App. No. 20120104
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued January 14, 2014
Decided March 20, 2014
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BAKER,
C.J., and STUCKY, RYAN, and OHLSON, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Brian D. Andes (argued); Colonel Kevin
M. Boyle, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Kageleiry Jr., and Major
Vincent T. Shuler (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain T. Campbell Warner (argued); Colonel John
P. Carrell, Lieutenant Colonel James L. Varley, and Major
Catherine L. Brantley (on brief).
Military Judge: Christopher Fredrikson
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. Gutierrez, No. 14-0009/AR
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
An enlisted panel sitting as a general court-martial found
Private First Class Jesus Gutierrez Jr. guilty of stalking in
violation of Article 120a, and not guilty of rape in violation
of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10
U.S.C. §§ 920, 920a (2012). The convening authority approved
the adjudged sentence of reduction to the grade of E-1,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, confinement for twelve
months and a bad-conduct discharge. The United States Army
Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) affirmed the findings and
sentence. United States v. Gutierrez, No. ARMY 20120104 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. July 8, 2013). At trial, the government relied on
the evidence supporting the rape charge to also support the
“course of conduct” element required for a conviction under the
stalking offense. We granted review to determine whether the
evidence of stalking was legally sufficient where the panel
acquitted Gutierrez of the rape offense.1 We hold that the
evidence was legally sufficient and therefore affirm the
decision of the CCA.
1
We granted the following issue:
Whether the evidence of stalking was legally
sufficient where Appellant was acquitted of rape and
the prosecution relied on the evidence of rape to
prove stalking.
United States v. Gutierrez, 73 M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. 2013) (order
granting review).
2
United States v. Gutierrez, No. 14-0009/AR
Background
While stationed in Germany, Gutierrez and his wife met AM,
a German national. AM became good friends with Mrs. Gutierrez
but did not have much to do with Gutierrez and testified she had
only encountered him a few times. When AM informed Mrs.
Gutierrez that she had difficulty getting packages she had
ordered on the Internet delivered to her German address, Mrs.
Gutierrez offered to let her use the Gutierrez’s Army Post
Office (APO) address.
After having an initial package delivered to the
Gutierrez’s APO address, AM forgot to change the Internet
delivery address back to her home address and as a result, a
number of additional packages were sent to the Gutierrez’s home.
Around that time the friendship between AM and Mrs. Gutierrez
deteriorated and although AM was able to receive most of her
packages, she had difficulty in getting the final three. It
reached a point where AM threatened to contact the military
police if she did not receive the packages. Finally, Gutierrez
called AM and informed her that he would deliver the packages to
her.
Mrs. Gutierrez testified that Gutierrez had an Alcoholics
Anonymous meeting on the evening of August 10, 2010, and after
the meeting he left their home to deliver the packages to AM.
Mrs. Gutierrez further testified that while it took between
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fifteen and twenty minutes to walk from their home to AM’s home,
Gutierrez was gone between sixty and ninety minutes.
AM testified as to what happened when Gutierrez arrived at
her home that evening: he pushed his way into her apartment,
dropped her packages on the floor and told her that he “needed a
hug”; Gutierrez started kissing her neck despite her protests;
Gutierrez then began pulling on her shorts, repeatedly saying “I
want it” and “just one time”; Gutierrez then pushed her onto the
bed, pulled her shorts down and penetrated her vagina with his
penis in spite of her attempts to push him away; after the
intercourse, Gutierrez told AM “I’ll call you,” and left her
apartment.
Gutierrez called AM the next day but AM did not answer her
phone. Gutierrez then began a pattern of calling AM and sending
her text and Facebook messages. AM blocked Gutierrez on her
Facebook page, but he was able to contact her by using another
person’s account. AM avoided Gutierrez’s phone calls and when
she did respond to his text messages, her responses were
essentially: “leave me alone.”
A few weeks later, sometime in August or September,
Gutierrez arrived uninvited at AM’s apartment building around
2:00 a.m. AM testified that upon his arrival the phone calls
and text messaging increased and Gutierrez started ringing her
doorbell. AM testified that Gutierrez kept his finger on the
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United States v. Gutierrez, No. 14-0009/AR
doorbell for about an hour, ringing it constantly. During this
time he awakened AM’s nine-year-old daughter. AM told him to
leave, threatening to call the police or his wife. Gutierrez
eventually left.
In the early morning hours of October 2, 2010, Gutierrez
again called and messaged AM multiple times.2 AM testified that
because of the calls and texts she was afraid he would come over
to her house again. AM told him to stop calling. Gutierrez
later arrived at AM’s apartment building and again began ringing
her doorbell from outside the building. Gutierrez gained
unauthorized entrance to the building and began kicking AM’s
apartment door. AM and her nine-year-old daughter were
“freaking out” and AM called a friend, Staff Sergeant (SSgt) DR.
SSgt DR testified that when AM called him she was in tears, and
was emotional and stressed as if “she was in fear.” SSgt DR
testified that AM told him someone was trying to break into her
house. He further testified that in the background he could
hear the doorbell ringing, her cell phone ringing and “banging
on the door.” SSgt DR testified that AM told him “she was
afraid for her daughter and herself” and that “if this person
came in she was afraid of what her daughter might see happen, or
2
None of the messages sent by Gutierrez during this period of
time contained overt threats, but were repeated requests for AM
to talk with him.
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United States v. Gutierrez, No. 14-0009/AR
something happen to her daughter.” SSgt DR called the military
police and stayed on the phone until they arrived.
When the military police arrived they saw Gutierrez
“pulling on the door, buzzing the doorbell” and “yelling
something into the buzz system.” After Gutierrez was detained
by the military police and brought to AM’s door for
identification he lunged toward AM saying, “let me in” and then
began blowing kisses, licking his lips and making sexual
gestures with his tongue. When the police responded to AM’s
apartment that night, AM also reported the August 10 sexual
assault. AM was taken to the military police station to make a
statement and during her interview Gutierrez continued to call
her cell phone. The special agent who had interviewed AM
testified that AM’s phone rang enough times to distract him.
Following the investigation, Gutierrez was charged with rape
under Article 120, UCMJ, and stalking under Article 120a, UCMJ.
Arguments of the Parties
Gutierrez argues that since the government relied upon the
evidence underlying the rape allegation as evidence of a “course
of conduct” required to establish the offense of stalking, the
panel’s acquittal on that charge removed that incident as a
possible basis for establishing a “course of conduct.” Although
Gutierrez concedes that his conduct on October 2, 2010, may have
constituted stalking conduct, he argues that this single October
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United States v. Gutierrez, No. 14-0009/AR
2 incident was the only possible incident of stalking conduct.
Since a “course of conduct” under Article 120a, UCMJ, requires
two or more occasions of stalking conduct, he argues that the
evidence was legally insufficient to establish a “course of
conduct.” Gutierrez further asserts that without the context of
his initial August 10 visit to AM’s home culminating in rape, a
panel could not have found that the subsequent nonthreatening
phone calls, text messages and visits would have induced fear of
bodily harm in a reasonable person. Gutierrez goes on to argue
that without the August 10 visit, the evidence failed to
establish that he had knowledge or should have had knowledge
that AM would be placed in reasonable fear of bodily harm.
Other than the October 2 incident, Gutierrez argues that he was
never violent or threatening toward AM, and since she had not
involved the police prior to that time, it was impossible for
him to know that he was causing her to fear bodily harm.
Although Gutierrez did not challenge his conviction on the
grounds of an “inconsistent verdict,” the government initially
argues that “[a]n inconsistent verdict, standing alone, is not a
basis for relief,” citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390,
391-92 (1932); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64 (1984);
and United States v. Jackson, 7 C.M.A. 67, 71, 21 C.M.R. 193,
197 (1956). The government goes on to argue that based on all
the evidence adduced at trial, a reasonable factfinder drawing
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United States v. Gutierrez, No. 14-0009/AR
all reasonable inferences in the government’s favor could have
found each element of stalking beyond a reasonable doubt.
While the government relies on all of the evidence adduced
at trial, including the phone calls and text messages, it places
particular emphasis on three incidents where Gutierrez’s conduct
could be construed as causing fear of bodily harm: (1) the
August 10, 2010, conduct underlying the rape charge; (2) the
incident in August or September 2010, where Gutierrez arrived at
AM’s apartment in the early morning hours; and (3) Gutierrez’s
October 2, 2010, visit to AM’s apartment. The government argues
that this evidence, taken as a whole, demonstrates that a
reasonable factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Gutierrez’s conduct was repeated and impliedly threatening,
caused AM reasonable fear, and that Gutierrez did know or should
have known that his conduct would place AM in reasonable fear.
Discussion
“This Court reviews questions of legal sufficiency de novo.
The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Bennitt, 72 M.J. 266, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (citations and
internal quotations omitted). In performing our legal review we
are not limited to appellant’s narrow view of the record.
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United States v. Gutierrez, No. 14-0009/AR
United States v. Cauley, 45 M.J. 353, 356 (C.A.A.F. 1996)
(citing United States v. McGinty, 38 M.J. 131, 132 (C.M.A.
1993)). Further, “the appellate question is not whether the
evidence is better read one way or the other, but whether under
Jackson [v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)], a reasonable
factfinder reading the evidence one way could have found all the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Oliver, 70 M.J. 64, 68 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
The elements of the offense of stalking under Article 120a,
UCMJ, are:
(1) That the accused wrongfully engaged in a course
of conduct directed at a specific person that would
cause a reasonable person to fear death or bodily harm
[including sexual assault]3 to himself or herself or a
member of his or her immediate family;
(2) That the accused had knowledge, or should have
had knowledge, that the specific person would be
placed in reasonable fear of death or bodily harm to
himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate
family; and
(3) That the accused’s acts induced reasonable fear
in the specific person of death or bodily harm to
himself or herself or to a member of his or her
immediate family.
MCM pt. IV, § 45a.b. (2012) (MCM).
Article 120a, UCMJ, defines a “course of conduct” as “a
repeated maintenance of visual or physical proximity to a
3
The statutory language of Article 120a, UCMJ, includes the
phrase “including sexual assault” but that phrase in not found
in the elements of stalking as set forth in the Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States. As the phrase is included in the
statute, we will consider it as part of the statutory elements.
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United States v. Gutierrez, No. 14-0009/AR
specific person”; or “a repeated conveyance of verbal threat[s],
written threats, or threats implied by conduct or a combination
of such threats, directed at or towards a specific person.”
Article 120a(b)(1)(A)-(B), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920a(b)(1)(A)-(B).
The term “repeated” is defined as “two or more occasions of such
conduct.” Id. at 10 U.S.C. § 920a(b)(2).
The August 10, 2010, Incident:
Although Gutierrez was acquitted of the rape specification,
the government is correct in noting that the panel could
independently consider the evidence supporting that incident
while deliberating on the stalking charge. See Powell, 469 U.S.
at 59-60;4 Jackson, 7 C.M.A. at 71, 21 C.M.R. at 197. Without
question the evidence before the panel as to the incident on
August 10, 2010, could have been found by the members to
establish that Gutierrez engaged in conduct directed at AM that
would cause a reasonable person to fear death or bodily harm,
4
“[A] criminal defendant already is afforded protection against
jury irrationality or error by the independent review of the
sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and
appellate courts. This review should not be confused with the
problems caused by inconsistent verdicts. Sufficiency-of-the
evidence review involves assessment by the courts of whether the
evidence adduced at trial could support any rational
determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This review
should be independent of the jury’s determination that evidence
on another count was insufficient. The Government must convince
the jury with its proof, and must also satisfy the courts that
given this proof the jury could rationally have reached a
verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not believe
that further safeguards against jury irrationality are
necessary.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 67 (citations omitted).
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United States v. Gutierrez, No. 14-0009/AR
including sexual assault. The evidence was also sufficient to
establish that Gutierrez either knew or should have known that
such conduct would place AM in reasonable fear of bodily harm or
sexual assault and the panel could also have concluded that
Gutierrez’s conduct induced reasonable fear in AM.
The August/September Incident:
In August or September 2010, Gutierrez arrived uninvited at
AM’s apartment building around 2:00 a.m. and started to ring her
doorbell while calling her phone and sending her text messages.
AM refused to let him in. The commotion awakened her nine-year-
old daughter and AM pleaded to be left alone, ultimately
threatening to call the police or his wife if he did not leave.
Despite AM’s demands, Gutierrez continuously rang the doorbell
for an hour. In light of the initial August 10 incident, the
panel could have concluded from this evidence that Gutierrez’s
conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily harm.
AM’s threats that she would call the police while the incident
was occurring provided sufficient evidence for the panel to
conclude that AM feared bodily harm and also that Gutierrez
either knew or should have known that his conduct would place AM
in reasonable fear.
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United States v. Gutierrez, No. 14-0009/AR
The October 2, 2010, Incident:
Around 2:00 a.m. on October 2, 2010, Gutierrez began
calling and text messaging AM. He then arrived uninvited at her
apartment building, rang her doorbell and continued to call and
text message her. After gaining unauthorized access to AM’s
apartment building, Gutierrez began kicking AM’s door. When the
military police arrived and detained Gutierrez he continued his
assertive behavior by lunging toward AM, demanding that she let
him in, blowing kisses, licking his lips and making sexual
gestures toward her. AM testified that Gutierrez’s behavior
caused her to fear for her daughter and for herself. Gutierrez
concedes that this incident constituted an occasion of stalking
conduct under Article 120a.
The Phone Calls and Messages:
Aside from the three discrete stalking incidents discussed
above, the record reflects that from August to October 2010,
Gutierrez repeatedly attempted to contact AM by telephone, text
messages and Facebook. AM made numerous demands that Gutierrez
cease contacting her and even blocked Gutierrez from her
Facebook page. Gutierrez, however, remained undeterred and
attempted to contact AM during the months of August and
September. Although the contents of these messages were not
overtly threatening when viewed in isolation, they were evidence
of repeated unwelcome conduct. When viewed in the context of
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United States v. Gutierrez, No. 14-0009/AR
Gutierrez’s earlier conduct, they constitute “a repeated
conveyance of . . . threats implied by conduct” as envisioned by
Article 120a(a)(b)(1)(B), which created a link among the three
discrete incidents of stalking conduct. The panel could have
independently considered these phone calls and messages when
determining whether a course of stalking conduct existed.
Conclusion
The offense of stalking contemplates consideration of
evidence which covers the entire course of alleged unlawful
conduct directed toward the victim. This record contains
evidence of repeated occasions of discrete stalking conduct, as
well as a pattern of repeated telephone calls and text messages
from which the jury could infer both objective and subjective
awareness of fear of bodily harm or sexual assault. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a
rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Gutierrez’s conduct constituted stalking as defined
by Article 120a, UCMJ.
Decision
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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