Rayford v. Hobbs ( 2014 )


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  •                                        Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 244
    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
    No.   CV-12-609
    LARRY RAYFORD                                       Opinion Delivered   May 22, 2014
    APPELLANT
    PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE
    V.                                                  LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
    [NO. 40CV-12-22]
    RAY HOBBS, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS                       HONORABLE JODI RAINES DENNIS,
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION                            JUDGE
    APPELLEE
    AFFIRMED.
    PER CURIAM
    In 1994, appellant Larry Rayford was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and
    sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. This court affirmed. Rayford v. State, 
    326 Ark. 656
    , 
    934 S.W.2d 496
    (1996). Subsequently, appellant sought postconviction relief without
    success under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (1994), in error-coram-nobis
    proceedings, and in a previous habeas-corpus proceeding. See Rayford v. State, CR-96-428 (Ark.
    Feb. 14, 2008) (unpublished per curiam); Rayford v. State, CR-07-651 (Ark. Nov. 8, 2007)
    (unpublished per curiam); Rayford v. State, CV-04-1171 (Ark. June 23, 2005) (unpublished per
    curiam) (original docket no. 04-1171); Rayford v. State, CR-96-428 (Ark. Mar. 4, 2004)
    (unpublished per curiam); Rayford v. State, CR-98-1322 (Ark. May 18, 2000) (unpublished per
    curiam).
    On March 26, 2012, appellant filed in the Lincoln County Circuit Court, the county in
    which he is incarcerated, a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus.1 In the petition, appellant
    1
    As of the date of this opinion, appellant remains incarcerated in Lincoln County.
    Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 244
    argued that the original judgment-and-commitment order is void such that he is entitled to
    release because the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) would not “admit” the order
    until it was amended to show the convicted crime of capital murder as a Class Y felony instead
    of an unclassified felony. He further contended that the trial court did not have the authority
    after trial to amend the judgment-and-commitment order to reflect that the convicted offense
    of capital murder was a Class Y felony instead of an unclassified felony as stated in the original
    order. The circuit court denied the petition, and appellant has lodged an appeal of the order in
    this court.
    The burden is on the petitioner in a habeas-corpus petition to establish that the trial court
    lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment was invalid on its face; otherwise, there is no basis
    for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue. Britt v. State, 
    2014 Ark. 134
    (per curiam);
    Culbertson v. State, 
    2012 Ark. 112
    (per curiam). Under our statute, a petitioner who does not
    allege actual innocence and proceed under Act 1780 of 2001 Acts of Arkansas must additionally
    make a showing by affidavit or other evidence of probable cause to believe that he is illegally
    detained. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2006); Darrough v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 28
    (per
    curiam). A circuit court’s denial of habeas relief will not be reversed unless the court’s findings
    are clearly erroneous. Justus v. Hobbs, 
    2013 Ark. 149
    (per curiam).
    On January 21, 1994, the judgment-and-commitment order was entered reflecting that
    appellant had been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without
    parole. The offense was listed as an unclassified felony. Subsequently, at the conclusion of a
    hearing on an unrelated posttrial motion, the prosecuting attorney informed the trial court that
    2
    Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 244
    the ADC had contacted him to inquire about amending the judgment-and-commitment order
    to classify the capital-murder conviction as a Class Y felony. According to the prosecutor, the
    ADC informed him that its computer would not accept the order with the convicted offense
    listed as an unclassified felony. While stating that capital murder is not a Class Y felony, the trial
    court agreed to enter an amended order in light of the record-keeping requirements of the ADC.
    On February 17, 1994, an amended judgment-and-commitment order was entered reflecting that
    the convicted offense of capital murder was a Class Y felony.
    Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court did not have jurisdiction after trial to enter
    the amended order. He further argues that the original judgment is void such that he is entitled
    to release because the order showed the convicted offense as an unclassified felony resulting in
    the refusal of the ADC to “admit” the order. He contends that the amendment is more than
    a correction of a clerical error, and he raises the argument for the first time on appeal that he was
    entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the entering of the amended order.2
    Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-101(c) (Supp. 1991), in effect on the date that
    appellant committed the offense, provided, in pertinent part, “Capital murder is punishable by
    death or life imprisonment without parole . . . . For all purposes other than disposition . . .,
    capital murder is a Class Y felony.” As reflected in the original judgment-and-commitment
    order, appellant was found guilty of capital murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment
    2
    Because arguments raised for the first time on appeal could not have been considered
    by the trial court, they will not be addressed by this court. Williams v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 375
    (per
    curiam). Issues raised for the first time on appeal are not grounds to reverse a trial court’s order.
    
    Id. Accordingly, we
    do not consider any argument raised by appellant for the first time on
    appeal.
    3
    Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 244
    without parole in accordance with section 5-10-101(c). Because capital murder is not a Class Y
    felony for the purpose of disposition, the original order listed the offense as an unclassified
    felony. The order was subsequently amended in light of the administrative needs of the ADC.
    Based on the classification of capital murder as a Class Y felony for purposes other than
    disposition, the amendment was not in error.
    Appellant fails to demonstrate that amending the order to classify capital murder as a
    Class Y felony was more than a clerical change. With respect to clerical errors, this court has
    repeatedly recognized that clerical errors in judgments are subject to correction at any time.
    Misenheimer v. Hobbs, 
    2012 Ark. 343
    (per curiam); Smith v. State, 
    2011 Ark. 333
    (per curiam) (“[A]
    circuit court has jurisdiction to amend a judgment and commitment order to correct a clerical
    error.”). Moreover, clerical errors do not prevent enforcement of a judgment-and-commitment
    order. Burgie v. Norris, 
    2010 Ark. 267
    (per curiam). It is well settled that clerical errors do not
    entitle a petitioner to relief in a habeas-corpus proceeding. Reed v. Hobbs, 
    2012 Ark. 61
    (per
    curiam). Accordingly, the order of conviction is enforceable, and the trial court had jurisdiction
    to amend the order.
    Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in
    controversy. Jones v. State, 
    2014 Ark. 67
    (per curiam); Williams v. Norris, 
    2012 Ark. 30
    (per
    curiam). A circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and determine cases involving
    violations of criminal statutes. Williams, 
    2012 Ark. 30
    . It is true that we will treat void or illegal
    sentences similarly to the way that we treat problems of subject-matter jurisdiction. Friend v.
    State, 
    364 Ark. 315
    , 
    219 S.W.3d 123
    (2005) (per curiam) (citing Taylor v. State, 
    354 Ark. 450
    , 125
    4
    Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 244
    S.W.3d 174 (2003)). Detention for an illegal period of time is what a writ of habeas corpus is
    designed to correct. Misenheimer, 
    2012 Ark. 343
    . However, a habeas-corpus proceeding does not
    afford a prisoner an opportunity to retry his case, and, again, it is not a substitute for direct
    appeal or postconviction relief. Meny v. Norris, 
    340 Ark. 418
    , 
    13 S.W.3d 143
    (2000) (per curiam).
    When a petitioner in a habeas proceeding failed to raise a claim within the purview of a habeas
    action, the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a basis for a writ of habeas
    corpus to issue. Jones, 
    2014 Ark. 67
    . Appellant fell far short of meeting that burden, and the
    circuit court did not err in denying the petition.
    Affirmed.
    Larry Rayford, pro se appellant.
    Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CV-12-609

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 5/22/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016