State of Maine v. Julia Peck , 2014 Me. LEXIS 82 ( 2014 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2014 ME 74
Docket: Fra-12-490
Argued: April 9, 2014
Decided: June 10, 2014
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
JULIA PECK
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] Julia Peck appeals from a judgment entered in the District Court
(Franklin County, Carlson, J.) after a bench trial finding that Peck committed the
civil violation of cruelty to animals, see 7 M.R.S. §§ 4011(1)(E), 4016(1) (2013);
prohibiting Peck from owning, possessing, or having on her premises any animals
except two spayed or neutered cats, see id. § 4016(1)(C); requiring Peck to pay a
fine of $500 plus surcharges, see id. § 4016(1)(A), and $18,000 in restitution to the
State, see id. § 4016(1)(B); 14 M.R.S. §§ 3141(1), (4), 5602 (2013); and requiring
her to post a bond of $6,400 to support during the appeal process the cats that were
seized from her home by the State, see 17 M.R.S. § 1021(6)(D) (2013). Peck
contends that the court abused its discretion in quashing a subpoena that would
have compelled one of her witnesses to testify; that the cruelty-to-animals statute is
unconstitutionally vague, see 7 M.R.S. § 4011(1)(E); and that the record contains
2
insufficient evidence to sustain a finding of cruelty to animals and to support the
court’s restitution order. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] On March 22, 2012, the State charged Peck with one count of the civil
violation of cruelty to animals. See id. §§ 4011(1)(E), 4016(1). Although the facts
would have permitted the State to charge Peck with numerous counts of cruelty to
animals, the prosecutor reached an agreement with Peck whereby only one charge
would be filed, but evidence regarding the twenty-six cats seized by the State
would be admissible. The agreement represents a compassionate exercise of
prosecutorial discretion because it exposed Peck to only one mandatory fine of
$500 while enabling the court to address each incident of alleged cruelty to
animals. See id. §§ 4011(1)(E), 4016(1)(A). Had Peck been charged with and
found to have committed the number of counts of cruelty to animals commensurate
with the number of cats the State seized, the mandatory minimum fine would have
totaled $25,500, rather than $500. See id. § 4016(1)(A).1
[¶3] The court held a three-day bench trial in which Peck was unrepresented
by counsel. The State presented evidence of its substantial efforts to assist Peck
and her eventual decision to cease cooperating with the State. From the extensive
1
For the first civil offense, the court must impose a mandatory fine of not less than $500, and for the
second and subsequent offenses a fine of not less than $1,000 is mandated. 7 M.R.S. § 4016(1)(A)
(2013).
3
and detailed evidence regarding the very poor health of the twenty-six cats and
kittens seized from Peck, the court made the following findings of fact, which are
fully supported by the record.
[¶4] In July 2011, local officials became aware that Peck was keeping a
substantial number of cats at her home. Peck was unable to keep up with the
outbreak of illnesses and infections among the cats, and only took her cats to a
veterinarian when they were very ill or near death. Although State and local
officials attempted to help Peck reduce her cat population over a period of months,
the State ultimately seized twenty-six of the cats. Each of the seized cats suffered
from one or more medical problems such as mycoplasma, toxoplasmosis,
tapeworm, ringworm, an upper respiratory disease, conjunctivitis, fleas, and ear
infections; some were so ill that they bore stillborn litters. The State spent
approximately $36,800 to treat, house, and care for the cats.
[¶5] On September 4, 2012—one day before the final day of trial—one of
Peck’s witnesses, a doctor of veterinary medicine, sent a letter to the court asking
to be excused from testifying. The court treated the witness’s request as a motion
to quash Peck’s subpoena to testify. In his request, the witness stated that he
received Peck’s subpoena on Sunday, September 2, 2012, leaving him “one
business day” to prepare and clear his schedule. He asserted that complying with
Peck’s subpoena on such short notice would cause him to cancel meetings with
4
“twenty-five to thirty clients,” inconveniencing each client, impoverishing his
business, and costing him “an inestimable amount of goodwill”; and that
complying with Peck’s subpoena would cause him to miss a lunchtime retirement
party for his employee of twenty years.2 The court quashed Peck’s subpoena on
September 5, 2012, the last day of trial.
[¶6] The court made oral findings of fact, stating that Peck “committed
cruelty to animals based upon a failure to supply these . . . 26 cats that were seized
by the State on January 11th, 2012, [with] necessary medical attention,” and
imposed a single fine of $500.3 See 7 M.R.S. § 4016(1)(A). The court also orally
ordered that Peck post a bond of $6,400 with the court to support the cats while her
appeal to us was pending. See 17 M.R.S. § 1021(6)(D). On September 6, 2012,
the court issued a written judgment limiting the number of animals that Peck may
own, possess, or have on her premises to two spayed or neutered cats and ordering
restitution of $18,000—approximately half of the sum the State spent to house and
care for the cats—to be paid in monthly installments of $100.4 See 7 M.R.S.
4016(1)(B)-(C); 14 M.R.S. § 3141(4) (authorizing courts to order installment
2
In what appears to be a typo, the witness stated that “Wednesday the 4th” was the employee’s last
day. September 4, 2012, the day the witness composed the request, was a Tuesday, such that the
Wednesday referred to in the letter, the day the witness was subpoenaed to testify, was most likely
September 5, 2012.
3
After applicable surcharges and assessments, the fine ultimately totaled $620.
4
If Peck makes a $100 payment every month, the entire debt of $18,000 will take fifteen years to
satisfy.
5
payments if “requiring the defendant to make immediate payment in full would
cause a severe and undue hardship for the defendant”). Peck timely appealed. See
14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2013); M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Quash
[¶7] Peck argues that the court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the
veterinary doctor’s motion to quash and failing to provide its reasons for quashing
Peck’s subpoena.5 “On timely motion, the court for which a subpoena was issued
shall quash or modify the subpoena if it[, inter alia,] fails to allow a reasonable
time for compliance [or] subjects a person to undue burden.” M.R. Civ. P.
45(c)(3)(A)(i), (iv). Despite the absence of Maine case law or a rule explicitly
authorizing a nonparty witness to move to quash a subpoena ad testificandum,
cf. State v. Grover, 387 A.2d 21, 21-22 (Me. 1978) (holding that a nonparty
witness has no right to appeal the denial of a motion to quash), the Advisory
Committee Note to M.R. Civ. P. 45 recognizes motions to quash as “the remedy
for nonparties,” M.R. Civ. P. 45 Advisory Committee Note to 2007 amend. “The
decision to quash a subpoena . . . rests in the discretion of the court.” State v.
Watson, 1999 ME 41, ¶ 5, 726 A.2d 214.
5
The court appropriately treated the witness’s letter as a motion to quash. See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)
(defining “motion” as “[a]n application to the court for an order” made orally or in writing).
6
[¶8] Given Peck’s late delivery of the subpoena and the assertions set forth
in the prospective witness’s motion to quash, the court did not abuse its discretion
in quashing Peck’s subpoena. See M.R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(i), (iv). Although it is
generally the best practice to allow the parties to be heard on the motion, Peck
presents no information on appeal demonstrating that a hearing would have
changed the outcome of the motion or the trial. See M.R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2); M.R.
Civ. P. 45(e) (providing that Rule 26(g) governs “[m]otions or objections
concerning subpoenas issued in discovery or pretrial proceedings”).
B. Void for Vagueness
[¶9] The cruelty-to-animals statute provides that “a person, including an
owner or the owner’s agent, is guilty of cruelty to animals if that person . . .
[d]eprives an animal that the person owns or possesses of . . . necessary medical
attention.” 7 M.R.S. § 4011(1)(E). The statute further provides that “[n]o person
owning or responsible for confining or impounding any animal may fail to supply
the animal with necessary medical attention when the animal is or has been
suffering from illness, injury, disease, excessive parasitism or malformed or
overgrown hoof.” Id. § 4014 (2013). Peck contends that section 4011 is void for
vagueness because it fails to define “necessary medical attention” in a manner that
enables people of common intelligence to easily discern its meaning.
7
[¶10] Although the void-for-vagueness doctrine is more commonly applied
in the criminal law context, the doctrine is also applied in those circumstances
where a person “must conform [her] conduct to a civil regulation.” Me. Real
Estate Comm’n v. Kelby, 360 A.2d 528, 531 (Me. 1976) (quotation marks omitted).
The due process clauses of the Maine and United States Constitutions require that a
statute “must provide reasonable and intelligible standards to guide the future
conduct of individuals and to allow the courts and enforcement officials to
effectuate the legislative intent in applying these laws.” Shapiro Bros. Shoe Co.,
Inc. v. Lewiston-Auburn Shoeworkers Protective Ass’n, 320 A.2d 247, 253 (Me.
1974); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A. “A statute may
be void for vagueness when people of common intelligence must guess at its
meaning.” State v. Witham, 2005 ME 79, ¶ 7, 876 A.2d 40. “In examining the
sufficiency of statutory language, [o]bjective quantification, mathematical
certainty, and absolute precision are not required.” Id. (alteration in original)
(quotation marks omitted).
[¶11] Maine’s cruelty-to-animals statute is not unconstitutionally vague.
Rather, the statute expressly defines “necessary medical attention” as the attention
required “when the animal is or has been suffering from illness, injury, disease,
[or] excessive parasitism.” 7 M.R.S. § 4014. There is nothing about the statute
that would require a person of ordinary intelligence to guess at its meaning. See
8
Witham, 2005 ME 79, ¶ 7, 876 A.2d 40; see also State v. Malpher, 2008 ME 32,
¶¶ 17-19, 947 A.2d 484 (concluding that a statute that does not define the phrase
“cruelly treated” is not void for vagueness).
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶12] Peck argues that the fact that her cats were sick does not necessarily
mean that she deprived them of “necessary medical attention” and that, to the
contrary, she provided her cats with holistic medication and took them to a
veterinarian when they were sick. Peck also argues that there was insufficient
evidence in the record to support the court’s restitution order and that the court
should have ascertained her ability to pay in determining the amount of restitution
for which she was liable.
[¶13] “We review factual findings for clear error and the application of the
law to those facts de novo.” State v. Thomas, 2010 ME 116, ¶ 27, 8 A.3d 638. We
review the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to
determine whether the trier of fact could have found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, each element of the charge. See State v. Black, 2000 ME 211, ¶ 14, 763
A.2d 109; M.R. Civ. P. 80H(g).
1. Necessary Medical Care
[¶14] Contrary to Peck’s contention, the record supports the court’s finding
that Peck’s inability to keep up with the proliferation of her pets, which caused a
9
profusion of parasites and diseases to spread among the cats, constituted a failure
to provide the animals with “necessary medical care.” See State v. Weinschenk,
2005 ME 28, ¶ 8, 868 A.2d 200 (“Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only when
no competent evidence supporting the finding exists in the record.”); Rinehart v.
Schubel, 2002 ME 53, ¶ 9, 794 A.2d 73 (stating that a “court is not required to
believe the testimony of any particular witness, expert or otherwise” (quotation
marks omitted)). Specifically, the court heard evidence that several of Peck’s cats
died shortly after Peck brought them to a veterinarian; all twenty-six seized cats
had one or more medical problems; a respiratory disease was circulating among
Peck’s cats; Peck rebuffed the State’s efforts to help her reduce the number of cats;
against a veterinarian’s advice, Peck took one kitten back from a veterinarian early
in the State’s work with her and the kitten nearly died; and the cats improved in
health after receiving treatment.
2. Restitution Order
[¶15] The record taken as a whole reflects the parties’ agreement that, in
fashioning its restitution order, the court would consider the State’s cost regarding
all of the cats proven to have suffered cruelty while in Peck’s care. Peck did not
object to the court’s consideration of the costs of providing for all twenty-six cats
on this basis, and she recognized at the conclusion of the trial that significant
restitution would be ordered. Thus, contrary to Peck’s argument, the court did not
10
err in determining that the parties’ agreement in advance of trial anticipated that
the court would have the authority to consider the costs associated with all of the
cats in fashioning the restitution order.
[¶16] “[A] court may order a person adjudicated as having violated the laws
against cruelty to animals to pay the costs of the care, housing and veterinary
medical treatment for the animal.” 7 M.R.S. § 4016(1)(B). A court entering a
restitution order on a civil complaint must consider the offender’s “present and
future financial capacity.” See 17-A M.R.S. § 1325(1)(C) (2013); 14 M.R.S.
§ 5602 (“Title 17-A, chapter 54 applies to the determination, ordering, payment
and enforcement of an order of restitution.”). “[A]n offender who asserts a present
or future incapacity to pay restitution has the burden of proving the incapacity by a
preponderance of the evidence,” 17-A M.R.S. § 1325(4), and the court was not
required by statute to make explicit findings as to Peck’s financial resources before
ordering restitution payments, id. § 1325(1)(C).
[¶17] Peck did not meet her burden of demonstrating that she had no
capacity to pay restitution. See id. § 1325(4). In ordering Peck to pay restitution,
the court properly recognized Peck’s financial limitations and more than halved the
State’s requested amount of $36,800 to $18,000. See id. § 1325(1)(C). The court
further reduced the hardship of an immediate, lump sum payment by allowing the
payment to be made in monthly installments of $100. See id.; 14 M.R.S.
11
§ 3141(4). The court’s restitution order, which encompassed care, housing, and
treatment costs for all of the twenty-six seized cats, is both reasonable and
supported by the record. See 7 M.R.S. § 4016(1)(B); Weinschenk, 2005 ME 28,
¶ 8, 868 A.2d 200.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs and at oral argument:
Tawny L. Alvarez, Esq., Verrill Dana, LLP, Portland, for
appellant Julia Peck
Andrew S. Robinson, Dep. Dist. Atty., Franklin County District
Attorney’s Office, Farmington, for appellee State of Maine
Farmington District Court docket number VI-2012-98
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY