Christine S. Angell v. Renald C. Hallee , 2014 Me. LEXIS 79 ( 2014 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2014 ME 72
Docket: Cum-13-347
Argued: April 8, 2014
Decided: May 29, 2014
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
CHRISTINE S. ANGELL
v.
RENALD C. HALLEE
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] This appeal, the second in these proceedings, requires us to determine
whether the statute of limitations was tolled as a result of the defendant’s move to
Massachusetts during the applicable time frame. See Angell v. Hallee, 2012 ME
10, ¶¶ 9, 13, 36 A.3d 922; see also 14 M.R.S. § 866 (2013). 1 Specifically,
Christine S. Angell appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior
Court (Cumberland County, Cole, J.) in favor of Renald C. Hallee on Angell’s
complaint asserting multiple intentional torts based on allegations that, in the early
1970s, Hallee sexually assaulted her when she was a child and he was a Roman
Catholic pastor in Bangor. We affirm the entry of summary judgment.
1
In relevant part, 14 M.R.S. § 866 (2013) provides, “If a person is absent from and resides out of the
State, after a cause of action has accrued against him, the time of his absence from the State shall not be
taken as a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.” This statute was in place
throughout the time period at issue here.
2
I. SUMMARY
[¶2] The statute that tolls the statute of limitations as to certain out-of-state
defendants will not toll the limitations period for any time during which Hallee was
amenable to service. Angell, 2012 ME 10, ¶¶ 9, 13, 36 A.3d 922. For Hallee to
have been amenable to service, (1) the law must have authorized service on him as
an out-of-state defendant, see 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (1980) (Maine’s long-arm
statute),2 and (2) Angell must have been able, “through reasonable effort,” to find
and serve Hallee, a Massachusetts resident, “by any means other than publication,”
Angell, 2012 ME 10, ¶ 9, 36 A.3d 922. We conclude that the record presented on
summary judgment demonstrates, without factual dispute, that Hallee was
amenable to service within the two-year limitations period applicable in this case
because he could have been served pursuant to Maine’s long-arm statute and
Angell could, through reasonable efforts, have located and served him.
Accordingly, we agree with the Superior Court that the statute of limitations
expired before Angell filed her complaint. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 753 (1965);3 Angell,
2012 ME 10, ¶¶ 9, 13, 36 A.3d 922.
2
Title 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (1980) was in place during the two years following Angell’s eighteenth
birthday. It has since been amended in part. See P.L. 1995, ch. 694, § D-14 (effective Oct. 1, 1997)
(codified at 14 M.R.S. § 704-A(2)(E) (2013)).
3
The statute provided, “Actions for assault and battery, and for false imprisonment, slander, libel and
malpractice of physicians and all others engaged in the healing art shall be commenced within 2 years
after the cause of action accrues.” 14 M.R.S.A. § 753 (1965). It was subsequently amended, but that
3
II. BACKGROUND
[¶3] Angell, who was born in 1961, alleges that Hallee’s tortious conduct
occurred between 1970 and 1973, when she was between eight and eleven years
old and a parishioner of the Bangor church where Hallee served as a pastor.
Angell turned eighteen on November 16, 1979.
[¶4] On March 25, 2010—more than thirty years after she turned
eighteen—Angell filed her complaint against Hallee seeking damages, including
punitive damages, based on claims of negligence, sexual assault and battery,
invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction
of emotional distress, clergy malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud.
Angell also sought damages, including punitive damages, from the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Portland (the Diocese) for fraudulent concealment, but these
claims were later dismissed with prejudice by stipulation. Angell, 2012 ME 10,
¶¶ 2, 4, 36 A.3d 922.
[¶5] At the time when Angell alleges that Hallee committed the torts, and
throughout the two years following her eighteenth birthday, the generally
applicable two-year statute of limitations for assault and battery governed the
asserted causes of action. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 753; Angell, 2012 ME 10, ¶ 6, 36
amendment did not take effect until years after the period of time that determines the outcome of this
appeal. See P.L. 1985, ch. 804, § 1 (effective Aug. 1, 1988) (codified at 14 M.R.S. § 753 (2013)).
4
A.3d 922. The limitations period was tolled until Angell’s eighteenth birthday,
November 16, 1979. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 853 (1980) (incorporating a 1977
amendment);4 Angell, 2012 ME 10, ¶ 6, 36 A.3d 922. Therefore, the statute of
limitations expired two years later, on November 16, 1981, see 14 M.R.S.A. § 753,
unless the statute of limitations was further tolled because Hallee resided outside of
Maine and was not amenable to service, see 14 M.R.S. § 866. See Angell, 2012
ME 10, ¶¶ 6, 9, 36 A.3d 922.5
[¶6] Although the Legislature enacted amendments to lengthen the statute
of limitations after the two-year period following Angell’s birthday,6 for her to take
advantage of those lengthened statutes of limitations, tolling would be required
both during the two-year period after she turned eighteen and during the additional
4
The statute provided, in relevant part, “If a person entitled to bring any of the actions under sections
752 to 754 . . . is a minor . . . when the cause of action accrues, the action may be brought within the times
limited herein after the disability is removed.” 14 M.R.S.A. § 853 (1980). The amendment to the statute
that took effect in 1977, during the tolling period for Angell’s minority, did not modify the relevant
language quoted here. See P.L. 1977, ch. 492, § 2 (effective Oct. 24, 1977) (codified at 14 M.R.S.A.
§ 853 (1980)); see also 14 M.R.S.A. § 853 (1965).
5
The separate statute now in effect that provides that there is no time limitation on actions based on
sexual acts toward minors did not take effect until 2000. See P.L. 1999, ch. 639, § 1 (effective Aug. 11,
2000) (codified at 14 M.R.S. § 752-C (2013)); Angell v. Hallee, 2012 ME 10, ¶ 6, 36 A.3d 922.
6
We provided the history of the legislative changes in our earlier decision in this case:
P.L. 1985, ch. 343, § 1 (effective Sept. 19, 1985) (enacting a six-year limitations period
on claims based on sexual acts toward minors); P.L. 1989, ch. 292 (effective Sept. 30,
1989) (adding a three-year discovery period); P.L. 1991, ch. 551, § 1 (effective Oct. 9,
1991) (extending the limitations period to twelve years and the discovery period to six
years for claims not barred by the previous statute of limitations); P.L. 1999, ch. 639, § 1
(effective Aug. 11, 2000) (eliminating the limitations period altogether for claims not
barred by the previous statute of limitations).
Angell, 2012 ME 10, ¶ 7, 36 A.3d 922.
5
time that passed before each new legislative change. See Angell, 2012 ME 10, ¶ 7,
36 A.3d 922; Dobson v. Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., 415 A.2d 814, 816-17 (Me.
1980) (holding that legislation lengthening a statute of limitations “does not have
the effect of changing the legal significance of prior events or acts” and is not
impermissible retroactive legislation); see also Morrissette v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 2003 ME 138, ¶ 15, 837 A.2d 123 (noting that changes in a statute of
limitations may extend the limitation period but cannot “revive cases in which the
statute of limitations has expired”). Angell argues that the limitations period was
tolled beyond the two years following her eighteenth birthday because Hallee was
residing outside of Maine beginning before she turned eighteen and throughout the
next thirty years.
[¶7] Hallee initially moved for judgment on the pleadings, M.R.
Civ. P. 12(c), arguing that Angell’s complaint was time-barred. See Angell, 2012
ME 10, ¶ 3, 36 A.3d 922. The Superior Court granted Hallee’s motion and entered
judgment for Hallee on the pleadings. Id. ¶ 4.
[¶8] On appeal, we vacated the court’s judgment and remanded for further
proceedings. Id. ¶ 13. We held that the tolling issue relating to Hallee’s residence
outside of Maine could not be decided through a motion for judgment on the
pleadings because certain factual determinations were required. Id. Specifically,
we held that, to prevail on a statute-of-limitations defense when tolling has been
6
asserted pursuant to section 866, an out-of-state defendant has the burden to show
that the limitations period was not tolled because the defendant was “amenable to
service” during the limitations period. Id. ¶ 9 (quotation marks omitted); see id.
¶ 10. A defendant is considered to have been “amenable to service” if, throughout
the limitations period, the law authorized service of the defendant in the
defendant’s state of residence and the plaintiff could, “through reasonable effort,”
have found and served the defendant by any means other than publication. Id. ¶ 9
(quotation marks omitted). Because Hallee could not, through a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, meet the evidentiary burden of establishing his
statute-of-limitations defense by demonstrating the inapplicability of section 866,
we vacated the entry of judgment on the pleadings and remanded for further
proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 13.
[¶9] On remand, Hallee moved for summary judgment, and the parties
provided statements of material facts in support of and in opposition to summary
judgment, supported by affidavits and evidence authenticated by those affidavits.
See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h). Viewed in the light most favorable to Angell, the materials
submitted establish the following facts concerning whether Hallee established that
he was amenable to service, that is, that (1) Maine’s long-arm statute authorized
service on him, and (2) Angell could, through reasonable effort, have found and
served him by means other than publication during the two-year limitations period
7
that began on November 16, 1979, and expired on November 16, 1981.7 See
Angell, 2012 ME 10, ¶¶ 9-10, 36 A.3d 922.
[¶10] Hallee served as an assistant pastor in Bangor in the early 1970s,
when Angell alleges the sexual assaults occurred. While Angell was still a child,
Angell’s father received information that Hallee had committed sexual acts against
her. He made efforts to locate Hallee through the Bangor church in 1971 or 1972,
but he was unable to obtain information about Hallee’s location. The only efforts
to search for Hallee that Angell personally undertook were by asking others in the
parish in Bangor where he had gone and searching for him on the Internet after she
gained Internet access in 1998 or 1999. She did not know his full name or its
proper spelling until after commencing the present litigation.
[¶11] After serving as an assistant pastor in Bangor, Hallee was transferred
by the Diocese in September 1973 to serve at a church in Fort Kent. The Diocese
announced Hallee’s move to Fort Kent in a news release. Both the St. John Valley
Times and the Bangor Daily News reported on the transfer and identified Hallee.
The Bangor Daily News included a photograph in its story.
[¶12] Hallee took a leave of absence from the church in March 1977 and
briefly resided in his parents’ home in Waterville. In 1977, Hallee moved to
7
Because we ultimately conclude that the statute of limitations expired on November 16, 1981, any
events that occurred after that date are not material to our analysis of this appeal. See Morrissette v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 2003 ME 138, ¶ 15, 837 A.2d 123.
8
Massachusetts, where he has lived ever since. He was residing in Somerville on
November 16, 1979, when Angell turned eighteen. He was working for the
Lexington Public Schools at that time, and he continued to work there through
January 2007. His name and address were listed in a publicly available list of
residents maintained by the City of Somerville. Hallee moved from Somerville to
North Reading in March 1983.
[¶13] The Diocese communicated with Hallee by mail at various times after
he left the ministry in Fort Kent, including when he lived in Somerville. In 1980,
while the two-year statute of limitations was running, two separate individuals in
the Diocese sent mail to Hallee in Somerville. There is also evidence in the record
that a priest from Fort Kent informed the Bishop of Portland of Hallee’s
Somerville address in a September 1981 letter. Some of Hallee’s friends and
family in Maine, including his sister, also knew where he lived, though Angell did
not personally know any of those people.
[¶14] According to the current Chancellor for the Diocese, who has worked
in the Chancery Office in one capacity or another since 1974, the Diocese has
never had difficulty obtaining Hallee’s current address when it has needed it. The
Chancellor knows of only one inquiry made of the Diocese about Hallee’s
whereabouts for purposes of service of process—the inquiry made by Angell’s
9
counsel in 2009. The Chancellor forwarded that inquiry to Diocesan counsel, who
“answered it by letter dated May 28, 2009.”
[¶15] On this record, the court entered summary judgment in favor of
Hallee. Angell has appealed to us.
III. DISCUSSION
[¶16] “Summary judgment is properly granted if the record reflects that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Doe v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 26, 2014 ME 11, ¶ 13, 86 A.3d 600
(quotation marks omitted); see M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review de novo whether,
on a motion for summary judgment, a dispute of material facts exists and whether
the entry of a summary judgment was proper as a matter of law. Estate of Lewis v.
Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 ME 34, ¶ 10, 87 A.3d 732. For purposes of this
review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Angell as the party
against whom judgment has been entered. See id.
[¶17] “A fact is material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the
suit,” and a genuine issue of material fact exists when a fact-finder “must choose
between competing versions of the truth,” even if one party’s version appears more
credible or persuasive. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party is
given “the full benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the facts
10
presented.” Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 9, 784 A.2d 18 (quotation marks
omitted).
[¶18] As the party raising the affirmative defense of the statute of
limitations, see M.R. Civ. P. 8(c), Hallee bears the burden of establishing that,
although he resided outside of Maine, he was amenable to service because Maine’s
long-arm statute permitted service of the complaint in Massachusetts and “the
plaintiff could, through reasonable effort,” have found and served him “by any
means other than publication” before November 16, 1981. Angell, 2012 ME 10,
¶¶ 9-10, 36 A.3d 922.
[¶19] There is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether, if
Hallee could have been located, Maine’s long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A,
authorized service in Massachusetts. See Angell, 2012 ME 10, ¶¶ 9, 13, 36 A.3d
922. The long-arm statute in place throughout the two-year limitation period
following Angell’s eighteenth birthday authorized the service of process on an
individual residing in another state if the complaint arose from the individual’s
commission of a tortious act in Maine. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A(2)(B), (3).8
8
In relevant part, the statute provided,
2. Causes of action. Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State,
who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated in this
section, thereby submits such person . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to
any cause of action arising from the doing of any such acts:
....
11
[¶20] The question then is whether Hallee has satisfied his burden to
demonstrate, without any disputes of material fact, that Angell, through reasonable
effort, could have found and served him by any means other than publication. See
Angell, 2012 ME 10, ¶¶ 9-10, 36 A.3d 922; see also Patten v. Milam, 480 A.2d
774, 777 (Me. 1984) (holding that a court determines whether a defendant is
“amenable to service” pursuant to a long-arm statute based on whether the
defendant’s whereabouts are “known or reasonably could have been known to [the]
plaintiff”). To answer this question, we must first determine whether the factual
record, viewed in the light most favorable to Angell, demonstrates any disputes of
material fact.
[¶21] We conclude that the material facts are not in dispute. In essence,
Angell asserts that she did not know where Hallee was, which Hallee does not
dispute. Angell concedes that she made no effort to find Hallee during the two
years following her eighteenth birthday. Hallee does not dispute that he was living
B. Doing or causing a tortious act to be done, or causing the consequences of a
tortious act to occur within this State;
....
3. Personal service. Service of process upon any person who is subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this State, as provided in this section, may be made by
personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, with the same
force and effect as though summons had been personally served within this State.
14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A.
12
outside of Maine, but he asserts unopposed facts demonstrating that he was living
an open life working in a public school and could readily have been served had
Angell located him.
[¶22] Based on these undisputed facts, the question reduces to this: on the
record presented, applying an objective standard, has Hallee demonstrated that
Angell could have located him through reasonable effort, using the sources of
information identified in the summary judgment proceedings. We conclude on this
record that, although she did not attempt do so, Angell could have obtained
information about Hallee’s whereabouts through reasonable effort. Even though
Angell did not know Hallee’s full name, she knew where and when he had been a
priest. A news release from the Diocese announced Hallee’s move to Fort Kent.
Two local newspapers reported on this transfer, identifying Hallee by name, and
one of them also included a photograph of Hallee. The Diocese knew where
Hallee was and kept up with his residences even after he left the church. Hallee
communicated by letters with the Diocese, and the Diocese was either aware of his
location or able to obtain information about his location during the two years after
Angell turned eighteen. Hallee’s sister was still in Maine and always knew where
he could be located. In Massachusetts, Hallee’s name appeared in the Somerville
list of residents in both 1980 and 1981, and he was working for a public school
system.
13
[¶23] We are not persuaded by Angell’s argument that, had she tried to
locate Hallee, the Diocese would not have cooperated with her. Even if the
Diocese had not been cooperative initially, Angell could have filed her claims
against the Diocese and Hallee within the two-year limitation period following her
eighteenth birthday and, through discovery, obtained information about Hallee’s
location for purposes of serving him with process. This reasonable effort would
certainly have yielded the information necessary to serve Hallee through a means
other than publication.
[¶24] On the record presented on summary judgment, Hallee has
established, without dispute of material facts, that he was amenable to service
because he was subject to service under a long-arm extension of personal
jurisdiction, see 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A, and could, through reasonable effort, have
been found and served by means other than publication, see Angell, 2012 ME 10,
¶¶ 9-10, 36 A.3d 922, during the two-year period following Angell’s eighteenth
birthday. Accordingly, the limitation period expired before any amendments that
lengthened the statute of limitations became effective, and Angell failed to
commence her lawsuit in a timely manner. See Morrissette, 2003 ME 138, ¶ 15,
837 A.2d 123. The court appropriately entered summary judgment in favor of
Hallee.
14
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Sumner H. Lipman, Esq., and James T. Lawley, Esq., Lipman
& Katz, P.A., Augusta, for appellant Christine S. Angell
Russell B. Pierce, Jr., Esq., Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC,
Portland, for appellee Renald C. Hallee
At oral argument:
James T. Lawley, Esq., for appellant Christine S. Angell
Russell B. Pierce, Jr., Esq., for appellee Renald C. Hallee
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2010-132
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY