State Ex Rel. Data Trace Information Services, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga County Fiscal Officer , 131 Ohio St. 3d 255 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State ex rel. Data Trace Information Servs., L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Fiscal Officer,
    
    131 Ohio St.3d 255
    , 
    2012-Ohio-753
    .]
    THE STATE EX REL. DATA TRACE INFORMATION SERVICES, L.L.C. ET AL. v.
    CUYAHOGA COUNTY FISCAL OFFICER.
    [Cite as State ex rel. Data Trace Information Servs., L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty.
    Fiscal Officer, 
    131 Ohio St.3d 255
    , 
    2012-Ohio-753
    .]
    Public records—County recorders’ real estate records constitute public records—
    R.C. 149.011(G)—Electronic copies to be provided at cost—R.C.
    149.43(B)—Statutory fee of $2 per photocopied page inapplicable to
    electronic copies—R.C. 9.01 and 317.32(I).
    (No. 2010-2029—Submitted January 3, 2012—Decided February 29, 2012.)
    IN MANDAMUS.
    __________________
    Per Curiam.
    {¶ 1} This is an action for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, the
    Cuyahoga County fiscal officer, to provide to relators, private companies that
    store and index electronic images of records and information taken from the
    records that county recorders have recorded and officials representing those
    companies, copies of electronic images of all documents recorded in the
    Cuyahoga County Recorder’s Office in the months of July and August 2010 on
    compact discs, to provide those copies based on their actual cost rather than $2
    per electronic image of each page, and to amend the office’s public-records policy
    to comply with the law.         Because the requested electronic images constitute
    records subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act and relators are
    entitled to copies of those electronic records at actual cost rather than at the higher
    statutory charge for photocopying documents, we grant the writ to compel the
    fiscal officer to provide the requested electronic copies at actual cost. Insofar as
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    the current public-records policy of the recorder’s office does not controvert this
    result, however, we deny the writ insofar as it seeks to amend the policy.
    Facts
    {¶ 2} Relators Data Trace Information Services, L.L.C. and Property
    Insight, L.L.C. are limited-liability companies that were created by separate title-
    insurance companies. Data Trace and Property Insight store and organize digital
    images of and information taken from deeds, mortgages, liens, leases, releases,
    and other public records that county recorders’ offices record. Their clients are
    companies that evaluate and insure the quality of title to land.
    {¶ 3} From 1997 until mid-1998, Patrick O’Malley served as the
    Cuyahoga County recorder. During O’Malley’s tenure as county recorder, the
    office changed from a paper-based system of managing recorded instruments to a
    computer-based system. By 1999, the recorder’s office recorded deeds and other
    instruments by electronically scanning the originals to create digital images of
    them and storing those images in the office’s computer system.
    {¶ 4} The office procedure is as follows. Persons desiring to file a deed,
    mortgage, or other instrument with the county recorder tender the instrument and
    the applicable recording fee to one of the cashiers in the recorder’s office. The
    recorder’s office assigns an automated file number to the instrument that shows
    the date the county recorded the instrument and the sequence in which the
    instrument is recorded that day. An adhesive label listing the file number and the
    time of filing is attached to the document, the person’s name and telephone
    number are obtained in case any problem with the document arises, the document
    is scanned into the recorder’s computer system with a digital scanner, and the
    original paper document is returned to the person tendering it.
    {¶ 5} The recorder’s office makes a backup copy of the digital images of
    all the instruments recorded every single day on a compact disc. These backup
    copies are referred to as master CDs. Using the information that appears on the
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    January Term, 2012
    electronically recorded instruments, the recorder’s office also enters certain
    information into the computer system that results in the office’s grantor-grantee
    index.
    {¶ 6} Beginning in 1999, the recorder’s office copied the master CDs
    onto several blank CDs and provided the CDs for a fee of $50 to various
    companies, including Data Trace and Property Insight. Those companies also
    paid a fee of $5,000 each year for regularly updated copies of the recorder’s
    office’s grantor-grantee index.
    {¶ 7} Neither Data Trace nor Property Insight evaluates the quality of
    title to land.   Instead, they provide access to their databases and searching
    capabilities, which are more detailed and comprehensive than Cuyahoga County’s
    database and search options.
    {¶ 8} In July 2008, Lillian Greene became Cuyahoga County recorder.
    In September 2009, Greene notified Data Trace and Property Insight that she was
    increasing the $5,000 annual fee for the updated grantor-grantee index to $7,500
    as a result of the “recent county budget crisis” but that the $50 fee for single CDs
    of the office’s daily recordings would remain the same. In the spring of 2010, the
    recorder’s office notified Data Trace and Property Insight that it would no longer
    be providing CD copies of its daily digital images from its master CDs. Instead,
    the recorder’s office advised the companies that it would give them only paper
    printouts of the digital copies of the recorded instruments at a fee of $2 per page.
    The recorder’s office purchases blank CDs for use in its routine course of
    business at a rate of $31.81 for 100 discs.
    {¶ 9} On October 5, 2010, Data Trace and Property Insight sent letters to
    the Cuyahoga County recorder requesting that Greene provide CDs containing
    electronic copies of all documents publicly recorded in her office in July and
    August 2010. The letters were sent on their behalf by relator Michael Stutzman,
    the operations manager of Data Trace, and relator Michael Carsella, the vice
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    president of Midwest operations of Property Insight. The companies objected to
    the recorder’s recently adopted policy or practice of imposing a charge for all
    copies of recorded documents, whether images or paper, of $2 per page or image,
    and requested that the recorder amend her policy of charging more than the actual
    cost of copying the electronic images of the recorded documents onto CD. The
    then existing public-records policy adopted by the recorder’s office included a
    section that provided that “[t]he charge for downloaded computer files to a
    compact disc is $1.00 per disc.”
    {¶ 10} After three weeks without a response from the recorder, Data
    Trace and Property Insight filed a public-records mandamus action against the
    Cuyahoga County recorder in this court in case No. 2010-1823. By letters dated
    November 16, 2010, the recorder’s office finally responded to the companies’
    October 5, 2010 requests by specifying that it would provide the requested
    materials upon payment of the statutory fees required by R.C. 317.32. The
    recorder then moved to dismiss case No. 2010-1823 because the companies had
    not registered to do business in Ohio. The companies filed an application to
    dismiss the case, which we granted on November 30, 2010.             Data Trace
    Information Servs., L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Recorder, 
    127 Ohio St.3d 1439
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-5806
    , 
    937 N.E.2d 569
    .
    {¶ 11} Data Trace and Property Insight registered and paid the fees to do
    business in Ohio. On November 24, 2010, relators, Data Trace, Property Insight,
    Stutzman, and Carsella, filed this public-records mandamus case against the
    Cuyahoga County recorder.      On January 5, 2011, relators deposed Recorder
    Greene, who claimed that the recorder’s office’s public-records policy, which
    provided that the charge for downloaded computer files to compact disc was $1
    per disc, did not apply to the companies’ requests for the electronically recorded
    instruments because they were not public records.
    4
    January Term, 2012
    {¶ 12} After the deposition, around January 10, 2011, the recorder
    adopted a public-records policy that deleted the fee of $1 per compact disc for
    downloading computer files and replaced it with a policy that provides that the
    “cost for copies is $2.00 per page for recorded documents * * * and $.05 per page
    for all administrative or non-recorded documents,” with public-records requests
    pertaining “to any documents that document the organization, functions, policies,
    decisions, procedures and operations of the office, subject to certain exemptions
    under state and federal law.”
    {¶ 13} In January 2011, Cuyahoga County’s new charter form of
    government became effective. The Cuyahoga County Council adopted a public-
    records policy that specified that “[t]he charge for computer files downloaded to a
    compact disc shall be the actual cost, not to exceed $1.26 per disc.”
    {¶ 14} Under the charter, the Cuyahoga County fiscal officer “shall
    exercise all powers and perform all duties now or hereafter vested in or imposed
    by general law upon * * * county recorders.”          Article V, Section 5.02(1),
    Cuyahoga County Charter. Therefore, the Cuyahoga County fiscal officer is
    substituted for the Cuyahoga County recorder as the respondent in this case.
    S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.2 and Civ.R. 25(D)(1). Although there is no longer a county
    recorder, the recorder’s office still remains.       See http://recorder.cuyahoga
    county.us.
    {¶ 15} In February 2011, relators filed a motion for leave to file an
    amended complaint.      In their amended complaint, relators request a writ of
    mandamus to (1) compel the fiscal officer to provide the requested copies of
    recorded instruments on compact discs, (2) amend the policy and practice to allow
    for copying electronically stored recorded instruments onto CDs and to provide
    electronic copies to relators and other members of the public at cost, and (3)
    restore the policy limiting the fee charged for electronic copies of records to $1
    per CD with no per-page fee.
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 16} In March 2011, after relators became concerned that the county
    had misunderstood their request as asking the recorder’s office to create new
    records in a CD format, they sent the fiscal officer letters stating that the
    recorder’s office could comply with their October 5, 2010 requests by copying the
    master CDs for July and August 2010 onto blank CDs and charging them $1 per
    CD in accordance with former recorder Greene’s previous public-records policy.
    In response, the fiscal officer specified that the county agreed that Data Trace and
    Property Insight could have copies of the records they requested, so the only
    question was how much the companies must pay, and it was his view that they
    must pay the fee of $2 per page specified in the Revised Code.
    {¶ 17} In his answers to relators’ interrogatories, the fiscal officer stated
    that the total number of pages of instruments that the recorder’s office recorded
    in July and August 2010 was 104,282, and pursuant to R.C. 317.32(I), Data Trace
    and Property Insight would be charged $2 per page—a total of $208,564—for the
    requested copies.
    {¶ 18} In April 2011, we granted relators’ motion for leave to file an
    amended complaint, granted an alternative writ, and issued a schedule for the
    submission of evidence and briefs. 
    128 Ohio St.3d 1442
    , 
    2011-Ohio-1618
    , 
    944 N.E.2d 693
    . The parties have submitted evidence and briefs. In addition, the
    fiscal officer has filed a motion for oral argument, and the Reporters Committee
    for Freedom of the Press, Ohio Newspaper Association, and Ohio Land Title
    Association have filed amicus curiae briefs in support of relators.
    {¶ 19} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the
    merits and the motion for oral argument.
    Legal Analysis
    Oral Argument
    {¶ 20} The fiscal officer requests oral argument. “Oral argument is not
    required in an original action in this court; instead, oral argument is discretionary
    6
    January Term, 2012
    in these cases.” State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v.
    Cleveland, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 183
    , 
    2007-Ohio-3831
    , 
    870 N.E.2d 1174
    , ¶ 42.
    “Nevertheless, we have discretion to grant oral argument pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R.
    IX(2)(A) [now 9.2(A)], and in exercising this discretion, we consider whether the
    case involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues of law or fact, a
    substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among courts of appeals.” State ex
    rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 
    111 Ohio St.3d 118
    , 
    2006-Ohio-5339
    ,
    
    855 N.E.2d 444
    , ¶ 15.
    {¶ 21} First, the fiscal officer does not present any credible reason for oral
    argument. He merely states in conclusory fashion that oral argument “will assist
    this Court in resolving the important legal issues in this case.” See State ex rel.
    Lorain v. Stewart, 
    119 Ohio St.3d 222
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4062
    , 
    893 N.E.2d 184
    , ¶ 18.
    {¶ 22} Second, this case does not involve complex facts, a conflict
    between courts of appeals, or any constitutional issue.
    {¶ 23} Finally, the parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve this public-
    records mandamus case. State ex rel. Mahajan v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 
    127 Ohio St.3d 497
    , 
    2010-Ohio-5995
    , 
    940 N.E.2d 1280
    , ¶ 65.
    {¶ 24} Therefore, we deny the fiscal officer’s motion for oral argument.
    Mandamus in Public-Records Cases
    {¶ 25} “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with
    R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.” State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for
    Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 
    108 Ohio St.3d 288
    ,
    
    2006-Ohio-903
    , 
    843 N.E.2d 174
    , ¶ 6; R.C. 149.43(C)(1). “Relators in public-
    records mandamus cases need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the
    ordinary course of law.” State ex rel. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v.
    Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 
    128 Ohio St.3d 256
    , 
    2011-Ohio-625
    , 
    943 N.E.2d 553
    , ¶ 24.
    7
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 26} “The Public Records Act reflects the state’s policy that ‘open
    government serves the public interest and our democratic system.’ ” State ex rel.
    Glasgow v. Jones, 
    119 Ohio St.3d 391
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4788
    , 
    894 N.E.2d 686
    , ¶ 13,
    quoting State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 364
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1825
    , 
    848 N.E.2d 472
    , ¶ 20. “Consistent with this policy, we construe R.C. 149.43 liberally
    in favor of broad access and resolve any doubt in favor of disclosure of public
    records.” 
    Id.
    {¶ 27} The fiscal officer argues that relators are not entitled to the
    requested electronic copies of recorded documents at cost, because the documents
    are not records for purposes of the Public Records Act, and that R.C. 317.32(I),
    when read in pari materia with R.C. 9.01, requires the charge of $2 per page.
    Documents Recorded in County Recorder’s Office
    as Records Subject to R.C. 149.43
    {¶ 28} The fiscal officer first claims that relators are not entitled to the
    requested electronic copies of documents recorded in the county recorder’s office
    at cost because the documents, although otherwise publicly available, are not
    records subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43.
    {¶ 29} R.C. 149.43(A)(1) defines “[p]ublic record” for purposes of the
    Public Records Act as “records kept by any public office, including, but not
    limited to, * * * county [offices].”   R.C. 149.011(G) provides that for R.C.
    Chapter 149,
    “[r]ecords” includes any document, device, or item, regardless of
    physical form or characteristic, including an electronic record as
    defined in section 1306.01 of the Revised Code, created or
    received by or coming under the jurisdiction of any public office of
    the state or its political subdivisions, which serves to document the
    8
    January Term, 2012
    organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations,
    or other activities of the office.
    R.C. 1306.01(G) defines an “[e]lectronic record” as “a record created, generated,
    sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.”
    {¶ 30} In Kish v. Akron, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 162
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1244
    , 
    846 N.E.2d 811
    , at ¶ 20, we recognized the expansive scope of the R.C. 149.011(G)
    definition of “records”:
    We previously have held that the General Assembly’s use
    of “includes” in R.C. 149.011(G) as a preface to the definition of
    “records” is an indication of expansion rather than constriction,
    restriction, or limitation and that the statute’s use of the phrase
    “any document” is one encompassing all documents that fit within
    the statute’s definition, regardless of “form or characteristic.”
    State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Schweikert (1988), 
    38 Ohio St.3d 170
    , 172-173, 
    527 N.E.2d 1230
    . There can be no dispute that there
    is great breadth in the definition of “records” for the purposes here.
    Unless otherwise exempted or excepted, almost all documents
    memorializing the activities of a public office can satisfy the
    definition of “record.” State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing
    Co. v. Bond, 
    98 Ohio St.3d 146
    , 
    2002-Ohio-7117
    , 
    781 N.E.2d 180
    ,
    ¶ 13.
    {¶ 31} To establish that the electronically recorded documents are records
    for purposes of R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43, they must be (1) documents,
    devices, or items, including electronic records, (2) created or received by or
    coming under the jurisdiction of the recorder’s office, (3) that serve to document
    9
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other
    activities of the office. R.C. 149.011(G); see also State ex rel. Dispatch Printing
    Co. v. Johnson, 
    106 Ohio St.3d 160
    , 
    2005-Ohio-4384
    , 
    833 N.E.2d 274
    , ¶ 19.
    {¶ 32} Documents electronically recorded by the recorder’s office satisfy
    the first two requirements of the three-part definition of “records” under R.C.
    149.011(G) and 149.43. The documents are received by the recorder’s office, and
    electronic images of them are created by the recorder’s office when they are
    scanned into the office’s computer system.
    {¶ 33} The dispositive issue for this preliminary question is thus whether
    the electronically recorded instruments serve to document the organization,
    functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the
    recorder’s office.
    {¶ 34} The fiscal officer contends that documents recorded in a county
    recorder’s office are not records subject to R.C. 149.43, because they do not
    document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, operations, or other
    activities of the recorder’s office. Instead, according to the fiscal officer, they
    document the independent acts of third parties who present the instruments to the
    officer for recording.
    {¶ 35} The fiscal officer’s contention lacks merit. In general, a “county
    recorder is an elected public official charged with the performance of duties as
    prescribed by statute.” State ex rel. Preston v. Shaver, 
    172 Ohio St. 111
    , 114, 
    173 N.E.2d 758
     (1961).
    {¶ 36} Under R.C. 5301.25(A), “[a]ll deeds, land contracts * * *, and
    instruments of writing properly executed for the conveyance or encumbrance of
    lands, tenements, or hereditaments * * * shall be recorded in the office of the
    county recorder of the county in which the premises are situated.”         County
    recorders have various statutory duties, including keeping certain records (R.C.
    317.08), recording certified matter in reference to bankruptcy (R.C. 317.10),
    10
    January Term, 2012
    indorsing the date, precise time of presentation, and file number of deeds or other
    written instruments that are required or authorized by statute to be recorded and
    that are presented to the recorder for that purpose (R.C. 317.13), making and
    keeping up direct and reverse indexes of the names of parties to instruments
    received for record (R.C. 317.18), and keeping a daily register of deeds and
    mortgages (R.C. 317.19).
    {¶ 37} R.C. 317.13(B) authorizes county recorders, within their
    discretion, to “refuse to record an instrument of writing presented to the recorder
    for recording if the instrument is not required or authorized by the Revised Code
    to be recorded or the recorder has reasonable cause to believe the instrument is
    materially false or fraudulent.”    R.C. 317.112 and 317.114 set forth certain
    standards for instruments presented to county recorders for recording and impose
    various duties on recorders should those standards not be met.
    {¶ 38} The instruments that the county recorder’s office electronically
    records and places into the office’s computer system reflect the office’s
    compliance with its many statutory duties and its exercise of discretion over the
    recording process.     The electronic records thus manifestly document the
    organization, functions, policies, decisions, operations, or other activities of the
    recorder’s office. Without these recorded instruments, the recorder’s office could
    not perform its preeminent functions. In fact, the chief of staff of the recorder’s
    office acknowledged that providing copies of recorded instruments to the public is
    a primary function of the office.
    {¶ 39} The fiscal officer’s reliance on a Pennsylvania appellate court case
    to argue otherwise is unpersuasive.          Inkpen v. Roberts, 
    862 A.2d 700
    (Pa.Commw.2004). In Inkpen, the intermediate appellate court held that deeds
    and mortgages were not public records under the Pennsylvania Right-to-Know
    11
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    Act, but the definition of “public record” in that statute is significantly more
    limited than the definition of “records” in the Ohio Public Records Act.1
    {¶ 40} Notably, we are not addressing the issue of personally identifiable
    information in the requested electronically recorded instruments here. Compare
    Johnson, 
    106 Ohio St.3d 160
    , 
    2005-Ohio-4384
    , 
    833 N.E.2d 274
    , syllabus (home
    addresses of state employees are not records for purposes of R.C. 149.43); State
    ex rel. McCleary v. Roberts, 
    88 Ohio St.3d 365
    , 370, 
    725 N.E.2d 1144
     (2000)
    (personal information regarding children who used city’s recreational facilities
    was not “record” subject to R.C. 149.43); see R.C. 317.082 (requiring that
    preparers of documents to be recorded not include personal information in the
    documents).
    {¶ 41} Therefore, the written instruments electronically recorded by the
    recorder’s office are records under R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43, the Public
    Records Act. By so holding, we accord the applicable definition of “records” in
    R.C. 149.011(G) the breadth that the General Assembly intended and thereby
    further the essential purpose of Ohio’s Public Records Act—that the public be
    informed and be able to scrutinize and monitor the government’s work and
    decisions. See generally Kish, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 162
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1244
    , 
    846 N.E.2d 811
    , ¶ 15-20.
    Applicable Fee for Copies of Electronically Recorded Instruments
    {¶ 42} The fiscal officer next asserts that relators are required to pay $2
    per digital image of each page of the requested electronically recorded documents
    from July and August 2010, which would result in Data Trace and Property
    1. Title 65, Section 66.1 of the Pennsylvania Statutes defines a public record as “[a]ny account,
    voucher or contract dealing with the receipt or disbursement of funds by an agency or its
    acquisition, use or disposal of services or of supplies, materials, equipment or other property and
    any minute, order or decision by an agency fixing the personal or property rights, privileges,
    immunities, duties or obligations of any person or group of persons.”
    12
    January Term, 2012
    Insight paying $208,564 each for the 104,282 pages of recorded instruments
    requested.
    {¶ 43} In general, “R.C. 149.43(B)(1) provides that copies of public
    records shall be made available ‘at cost.’ ” State ex rel. Slagle v. Rogers, 
    103 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 
    2004-Ohio-4354
    , 
    814 N.E.2d 55
    , ¶ 5; R.C. 149.43(B)(1) (“upon
    request, a public office or person responsible for public records shall make copies
    of the requested public record available at cost”). This means actual cost and
    does not include labor costs for employee time to respond to the request and make
    the copies. See State ex rel. Warren Newspapers, Inc. v. Hutson, 
    70 Ohio St.3d 619
    , 625-626, 
    640 N.E.2d 174
     (1994), citing State ex rel. Bonnell v. Cleveland,
    8th Dist. No. 64854, 
    1993 WL 335426
     (Aug. 26, 1993) (court relied on stipulated
    evidence regarding actual per-page copying costs consisting of costs of toner,
    paper, and copying time).
    {¶ 44} Relators claim that the requested CDs containing copies of
    electronically recorded instruments from July and August 2010 would likely have
    an actual cost of no more than $1 per CD and that they should pay this fee under
    R.C. 149.43(B).
    {¶ 45} The fiscal officer counters that R.C. 317.32 controls the cost of the
    requested copies. Subsection (I) of R.C. 317.32 provides that the county recorder
    shall charge $2 per page for photocopying a recorded document:
    The county recorder shall charge and collect the following
    fees, to include base fees for the recorder’s services and housing
    trust fund fees * * *:
    ***
    (I) For photocopying a document, other than at the time of
    recording and indexing as provided for in division (A) of this
    section, a base fee of one dollar and a housing trust fund fee of one
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    dollar per page, size eight and one-half inches by fourteen inches,
    or fraction thereof.
    {¶ 46} In determining which statutory cost provision applies for the
    requested copies of electronically recorded documents, the fiscal officer claims
    that the more specific provision that applies to fees charged by county recorders
    for photocopying a recorded document—R.C. 317.32(I)—prevails over the more
    general public-records provision—R.C. 149.43(B)(1).
    {¶ 47} R.C. 1.51 provides:
    If a general provision conflicts with a special or local
    provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is
    given to both.         If the conflict between the provisions is
    irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an
    exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is
    the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general
    provision prevail.
    {¶ 48} “When two statutory provisions are alleged to be in conflict, R.C.
    1.51 requires us to construe them, where possible, to give effect to both.”
    (Emphasis sic.) Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 
    93 Ohio St.3d 231
    , 234, 
    754 N.E.2d 789
     (2001). “ ‘Only where the conflict is
    deemed irreconcilable does R.C. 1.51 mandate that one provision shall prevail
    over the other.’ ” (Emphasis sic.)      
    Id.,
     quoting United Tel. Co. of Ohio v.
    Limbach, 
    71 Ohio St.3d 369
    , 372, 
    643 N.E.2d 1129
     (1994).
    {¶ 49} In assessing whether there is a conflict between R.C. 317.32(I) and
    149.43(B)(1), we must determine the meaning of the word “photocopy” because
    the special fee provision in R.C. 317.32(I) applies only to “photocopying a
    14
    January Term, 2012
    document” that has been recorded in a county recorder’s office. “In order to
    understand a particular word used in a statute, a court is to read it in context and
    construe it according to the rules of grammar and common usage. R.C. 1.42. If,
    as here, a term is not defined in the statute, it should be accorded its plain and
    ordinary meaning.” Rhodes v. New Philadelphia, 
    129 Ohio St.3d 304
    , 2011-
    Ohio-3279, 
    951 N.E.2d 782
    , ¶ 17.
    {¶ 50} The plain and ordinary meaning of “photocopy” is “a negative or
    positive photographic reproduction of graphic matter (as a drawing or printing),”
    and the common definition of “photograph” is “a picture, image, or likeness
    obtained by photography.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1702
    (1986).
    {¶ 51} In addition, relators’ expert, Peter Shulman, an assistant professor
    of history at Case Western Reserve University, provided uncontroverted evidence
    that the modern meaning of photocopying emphasizes xerography—a process
    originally called electron photography. According to Professor Shulman, this
    process consists of the following five steps: (1) a special plate is charged with
    static electricity, (2) once the plate is charged, the document to be copied is placed
    above it, a light projects an image of the document onto the plate, and the charge
    drains away from the plate except in places where the ink on the document was
    projected, (3) a dry ink called toner is dusted over the selectively charged plate so
    that the toner forms an image of the document to be copied atop the charged plate,
    (4) a blank sheet of paper receives the duplicated image, and (5) the duplicated
    document is heated to fuse or melt the toner to the paper, creating a permanent
    copy, and the charged plate is wiped clean of the charge and residual toner.
    Photocopying relies on copying physical pages one at a time.
    {¶ 52} By contrast, copying electronic images of recorded documents
    onto a CD involves no photography or xerography and is done through stored
    15
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    computer memory, and the data is stored not in terms of “pages” but in terms of
    sequences of 1s and 0s. No paper is involved in the process.
    {¶ 53} Therefore, the plain meaning of “photocopying” does not
    encompass relators’ requests that the fiscal officer copy onto a CD electronically
    recorded instruments. There is no conflict, much less an irreconcilable one,
    between R.C. 317.32(I) and 149.43(B)(1) for the requested records. In cases in
    which photocopying physical pages of recorded documents is requested, a county
    recorder shall charge $2 per page. R.C. 317.32(I). In cases in which CDs
    containing electronically recorded documents are requested, the county recorder
    shall charge the actual cost of the copies. R.C. 149.43(B)(1). We reached a
    similar result in Slagle, 
    103 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 
    2004-Ohio-4354
    , 
    814 N.E.2d 55
    , in
    which we held that R.C. 2301.24 superseded the “at cost” provision of R.C.
    149.43(B)(1) for copies of transcripts of court proceedings, but not for audiotapes
    of those proceedings. By so construing these provisions, we give effect to both.
    {¶ 54} The fiscal officer next relies on R.C. 9.01 to equate electronically
    copying recorded documents with photocopying for purposes of charging relators
    $2 per digital image of each page under R.C. 317.32(I).
    {¶ 55} R.C. 9.01 provides:
    When any officer, office, court, commission, board,
    institution, department, agent, or employee of the state, of a
    county, or of any other political subdivision who is charged with
    the duty or authorized or required by law to record, preserve, keep,
    maintain, or file any record, document, plat, court file, paper, or
    instrument in writing, or to make or furnish copies of any of them,
    deems it necessary or advisable, when recording or making a copy
    or reproduction of any of them or of any such record, for the
    purpose of recording or copying, preserving, and protecting them,
    16
    January Term, 2012
    reducing space required for storage, or any similar purpose, to do
    so by means of any photostatic, photographic, miniature
    photographic, film, microfilm, or microphotographic process, or
    perforated tape, magnetic tape, other magnetic means, electronic
    data processing, machine readable means, or graphic or video
    display, or any combination of those processes, means, or displays,
    which correctly and accurately copies, records, or reproduces, or
    provides a medium of copying, recording, or reproducing, the
    original record, document, plat, court file, paper, or instrument in
    writing, such use of any of those processes, means, or displays for
    any such purpose is hereby authorized. Any such records, copies,
    or reproductions may be made in duplicate, and the duplicates shall
    be stored in different buildings. The film or paper used for a
    process shall comply with the minimum standards of quality
    approved for permanent photographic records by the national
    bureau of standards. All such records, copies, or reproductions
    shall carry a certificate of authenticity and completeness, on a form
    specified by the director of administrative services through the
    state records program.
    Any such officer, office, court, commission, board,
    institution, department, agent, or employee of the state, of a
    county, or of any other political subdivision may purchase or rent
    required equipment for any such photographic process and may
    enter into contracts with private concerns or other governmental
    agencies for the development of film and the making of
    reproductions of film as a part of any such photographic process.
    When so recorded, or copied or reproduced to reduce space
    required for storage or filing of such records, such photographs,
    17
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    microphotographs, microfilms, perforated tape, magnetic tape,
    other magnetic means, electronic data processing, machine
    readable means, graphic or video display, or combination of these
    processes, means, or displays, or films, or prints made therefrom,
    when properly identified by the officer by whom or under whose
    supervision they were made, or who has their custody, have the
    same effect at law as the original record or of a record made by
    any other legally authorized means, and may be offered in like
    manner and shall be received in evidence in any court where the
    original record, or record made by other legally authorized means,
    could have been so introduced and received. Certified or
    authenticated    copies      or   prints   of   such   photographs,
    microphotographs, films, microfilms, perforated tape, magnetic
    tape, other magnetic means, electronic data processing, machine
    readable means, graphic or video display, or combination of these
    processes, means, or displays, shall be admitted in evidence
    equally with the original.
    (Emphasis added.)
    {¶ 56} The fiscal officer’s contention lacks merit.      He relies on the
    sentence specifying that copies shall have “the same effect at law” as the original
    record. But R.C. 9.01 merely provides that a copy of a recorded document shall
    “have the same effect at law as the original record or of a record made by any
    other legally authorized means, and may be offered in like manner and shall be
    received in evidence in any court where the original record, or record made by
    other legally authorized means, could have been so introduced and received.”
    The manifest meaning of this provision is that copies of recorded documents have
    the same substantive legal effect as the original recorded document regardless of
    18
    January Term, 2012
    the medium in which the copy is made. This provision does not cover the price a
    county recorder may charge for an electronic copy of a recorded instrument.
    {¶ 57} The fiscal officer relies on a 1933 attorney general opinion to
    support his interpretation of R.C. 9.01 and 317.32(I). 1933 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops.
    No. 167. But “Attorney General opinions are not binding on courts; at best, they
    are persuasive authority.” State ex rel. Van Dyke v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd.,
    
    99 Ohio St.3d 430
    , 
    2003-Ohio-4123
    , 
    793 N.E.2d 438
    , ¶ 40. In the opinion, the
    attorney general ruled that the photostatic or photographic process authorized by
    G.C. 32-1, a predecessor statute to R.C. 9.01, was included in the term “printing”
    as used in G.C. 2778, a predecessor statute to R.C. 317.32.        That opinion,
    however, recognized that the common dictionary definition of “printing” in G.C.
    2778 included the photostatic or photographic process. Id. at 196. By contrast,
    the definition of “photocopying” in R.C. 317.32(I) does not include electronically
    copying documents.
    {¶ 58} In addition, the opinion addressed the fee charged for recording
    documents and not the fee for copying recorded documents.
    {¶ 59} Further, the sentence in R.C. 9.01 that confers the “same effect at
    law” and that the fiscal officer relies on was not included in the version of G.C.
    32-1 construed by the attorney general in 1933 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 167. 113
    Ohio Laws 773.
    {¶ 60} In fact, in more recent opinions, the attorney general has not cited
    1933 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 167 and has instead adopted a strict construction of
    when the R.C. 317.32(I) fee of $2 per page for photocopying a recorded document
    is applicable.   2004 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 2004-033, syllabus (“A county
    recorder who makes available in her office a photocopying machine for use by the
    public may not charge the two dollar per page fee set forth in R.C. 317.32(I)
    where the photocopier is operated by the public without the assistance of the
    recorder or her staff. The recorder is, instead, subject to R.C. 149.43(B), which
    19
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    requires a public office to provide copies of public records ‘at cost’ ”); 2004 Ohio
    Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 2004-011, paragraph one of the syllabus (“R.C. 317.32(I) does
    not require or authorize a county recorder to impose the fees described therein
    upon a member of the public who is using a digital camera or other equipment to
    make copies of documents in the recorder’s office, where the equipment is not
    provided by the county recorder. R.C. 149.43 requires a county recorder to make
    the public records he maintains available for inspection, without charge, to
    members of the public, including those that bring their own equipment to make
    copies of the records they inspect”); 2000 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 2000-046,
    paragraph three of the syllabus (“A county recorder may not charge and collect
    the fee prescribed by R.C. 317.32(I) for photocopying a document when a person
    accesses an indexed public record by way of the Internet and prints a copy of the
    record on a computer printer that the recorder neither operates nor maintains”);
    1994 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 94-006, paragraph three of the syllabus (“If a
    person requests copies of public records stored by the county recorder on
    microfiche or film, R.C. 149.43(B) requires the county recorder to make available
    in the same medium a copy of the portions of the microfiche or film containing
    those public records, * * * if the person assumes the expense of making a copy in
    that medium, in lieu of the photocopying fee prescribed by R.C. [317.32(I)]”).
    {¶ 61} Finally, this result is consistent with the practice of most county
    recorders’ offices in Ohio. In March and April 2011, a witness for relators asked
    each of the remaining 87 county recorders’ offices to provide him with a CD
    containing copies of instruments recorded on August 25, 2010. Sixty of those
    counties complied with the requests, and they charged him fees ranging from $1
    to $20 per compact disc. Only one county requested that he pay $2 per page for
    paper copies of the requested records. Cuyahoga County thus appears to be an
    outlier in requiring the $2 per page fee for electronic records of recorded
    instruments.
    20
    January Term, 2012
    {¶ 62} Therefore, relators are entitled to copies of the requested
    electronically recorded documents for July and August 2010 at actual cost rather
    than the fee of $2 per page in R.C. 317.32(I) for photocopies. Because relators
    claim that the actual cost is no more than $1 per CD, and the fiscal officer did not
    submit evidence establishing a different actual cost, relators are entitled to the
    requested records at that cost.
    Electronic Copies of Master CDs
    {¶ 63} Insofar as relators now claim that they are entitled to copies of the
    recorder’s office’s master CDs of the instruments recorded in July and August
    2010, “ ‘it is the responsibility of the person who wishes to inspect and/or copy
    records to identify with reasonable clarity the records at issue.’ ” State ex rel.
    Taxpayers Coalition v. Lakewood, 
    86 Ohio St.3d 385
    , 391, 
    715 N.E.2d 179
    (1996), quoting State ex rel. Fant v. Tober, 8th Dist. No. 63737, 
    1993 WL 173743
    , *1 (May 20, 1993), affirmed, 
    68 Ohio St.3d 117
    , 
    623 N.E.2d 1202
    (1993). In addition, “ ‘R.C. 149.43(C) requires a prior request as a prerequisite to
    a mandamus action.’ ” Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio, 
    128 Ohio St.3d 256
    ,
    
    2011-Ohio-625
    , 
    943 N.E.2d 553
    , ¶ 33, quoting Taxpayers Coalition at 390.
    {¶ 64} Relators’ October 5, 2010 records requests, which are the subject
    of this mandamus case, did not specifically request copies of the recorder’s
    office’s master CDs for July and August 2010.          Instead, relators requested
    electronic copies of all documents publicly recorded in the office for those
    months. After relators filed an amended complaint, they informed the fiscal
    officer that copies of the master CDs would satisfy their record requests. But
    relators never amended their amended complaint to include a request for copies of
    the master CDs, and the fiscal officer has not consented to a modification of
    relators’ records requests or the relief prayed for in relators’ amended complaint.
    Therefore, the fiscal officer need not provide copies of the master CDs to comply
    with the relators’ requests at issue in this case.
    21
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 65} Nevertheless, the fiscal officer could now comply with the requests
    by providing copies of the master CDs for July and August 2010, which also
    constitute records subject to the Public Records Act. See R.C. 149.011(G); State
    ex rel. Margolius v. Cleveland, 
    62 Ohio St.3d 456
    , 459, 
    584 N.E.2d 665
     (1992)
    (“a compilation of information gathered from public records is a separate public
    record subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43”), citing State ex rel. Cincinnati
    Post v. Schweikert, 
    38 Ohio St.3d 170
    , 
    527 N.E.2d 1230
     (1988). The master CDs
    document the daily procedure and operation of the recorder’s office of making
    backup copies of digital images of all instruments recorded every day on compact
    discs. And notwithstanding the fiscal officer’s assertion, he has not established
    that the master CDs constitute security records, as defined in R.C. 149.433(A)(3),
    which would be exempt from disclosure. See R.C. 149.433(B); see generally
    State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 
    118 Ohio St.3d 81
    , 2008-Ohio-
    1770, 
    886 N.E.2d 206
    , paragraph two of the syllabus.
    {¶ 66} As relators ultimately acknowledge, “it really doesn’t matter
    whether the [fiscal officer or recorder’s office] dubs [the] master CDs to comply
    with relators’ requests, which takes only a few minutes, or chooses to copy digital
    deeds directly from its server to a CD, which takes longer.”               See R.C.
    149.43(B)(6) (“The public office or the person responsible for the public record
    shall permit that person to choose to have the public record duplicated upon
    paper, upon the same medium upon which the public office or person responsible
    for the public record keeps it, or upon any other medium upon which the public
    office or person responsible for the public record determines that it reasonably can
    be duplicated as an integral part of the normal operations of the public office or
    person responsible for the public record”).
    Public-Records Policy
    {¶ 67} Relators request that the fiscal officer amend the recorder’s
    office’s public-records policy so that the recorder’s office returns to the policy in
    22
    January Term, 2012
    effect when former recorder Greene was deposed, which specified a charge of $1
    per compact disc for downloaded computer files.
    {¶ 68} Under R.C. 149.43(E)(1), “all public offices shall adopt a public
    records policy in compliance with this section for responding to public records
    requests.” See also State ex rel. Morgan v. Strickland, 
    121 Ohio St.3d 600
    , 2009-
    Ohio-1901, 
    906 N.E.2d 1105
    , ¶ 11. Cuyahoga County adopted a new public-
    records policy in January 2011, which the fiscal officer claims superseded the
    recorder’s office’s policy that relators contest here.       Relators do not claim
    otherwise. Because the policy adopted by the Cuyahoga County Council in 2011
    does not have the same defect regarding the charge for electronic copies that was
    contained in the recorder’s office policy they contested, relators are not entitled to
    a writ of mandamus to compel the fiscal officer to amend a policy that, evidently,
    no longer exists.
    Attorney Fees and Statutory Damages
    {¶ 69} Relators request an award of attorney fees and statutory damages.
    Although relators requested attorney fees and statutory damages in their amended
    complaint and reiterated their request in the conclusion of their merit briefs, they
    included no separate argument in either brief concerning their request. Relators
    thus waived this claim. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 183
    , 
    2007-Ohio-3831
    , 
    870 N.E.2d 1174
    , at ¶ 83 (relators in mandamus case
    waived claim for attorney fees by not including any argument in support of claim
    in merit brief).
    {¶ 70} Moreover, even if waiver did not apply, relators are not entitled to
    statutory damages, because they did not transmit their October 5, 2010 records
    requests “by hand delivery or certified mail,” as required by R.C. 149.43(C)(1).
    See State ex rel. Mahajan v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 
    127 Ohio St.3d 497
    , 2010-
    Ohio-5995, 
    940 N.E.2d 1280
    , ¶ 59.
    23
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    Conclusion
    {¶ 71} Based on the foregoing, we grant a writ of mandamus to compel
    the Cuyahoga County fiscal officer to provide to relators copies of electronic
    images of all documents recorded in the Cuyahoga County Recorder’s Office in
    July and August 2010 on compact discs at a cost of $1 per disc. Because the
    county’s existing public-records policy does not violate the requirement to charge
    the actual cost of these records, however, we deny the writ of mandamus insofar
    as it seeks to amend a policy that is no longer effective. By so holding, we
    recognize that the Public Records Act “protects the general right of the people of
    Ohio to monitor the decisions of their own government through the more specific
    right to freely access public records.” Rhodes, 
    129 Ohio St.3d 304
    , 2011-Ohio-
    3279, 
    951 N.E.2d 782
    , ¶ 19.
    Writ granted in part
    and denied in part.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL,
    LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur.
    __________________
    Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., David Marburger, Michael Mumford, and John
    Blanton, for relators.
    McDonald Hopkins, L.L.C., David T. Movius, and Matthew J. Cavanagh,
    for respondent.
    Lucy A. Dalglish, urging granting of the writ for amicus curiae Reporters
    Committee for Freedom of the Press.
    Zeiger, Tigges & Little, L.L.P., Marion H. Little Jr., and Kris Banvard,
    urging granting of the writ for amicus curiae Ohio Land Title Association.
    Graydon, Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., and John C. Greiner, urging granting of
    the writ for amicus curiae Ohio Newspaper Association.
    ______________________
    24
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2010-2029

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 753, 131 Ohio St. 3d 255

Judges: O'Connor, Pfeifer, Stratton, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, Cupp, Brown

Filed Date: 2/29/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

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