State ex rel. Kolcinko v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund , 131 Ohio St. 3d 111 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State ex rel. Kolcinko v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 
    131 Ohio St.3d 111
    , 2012-
    Ohio-46.]
    THE STATE EX REL. KOLCINKO, APPELLANT, v. OHIO POLICE
    AND FIRE PENSION FUND, APPELLEE.
    [Cite as State ex rel. Kolcinko v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund,
    
    131 Ohio St.3d 111
    , 
    2012-Ohio-46
    .]
    Public employees—Police and Fire Pension Fund—Disability-retirement benefits
    denied.
    (No. 2011-0850—Submitted January 3, 2012—Decided January 11, 2012.)
    APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,
    No. 10AP-269, 
    2011-Ohio-1668
    .
    __________________
    Per Curiam.
    {¶ 1} Appellant, Andrew M. Kolcinko, appeals from a judgment entered
    by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County denying his request for a writ of
    mandamus to compel the board of trustees of appellee, Ohio Police and Fire
    Pension Fund (“OP & F”), to award him disability-retirement benefits based on
    his claim that he is permanently and totally disabled as a result of the performance
    of his official duties as a member of the Solon Police Department from January
    1991 until his resignation in March 2007. We affirm.
    {¶ 2} “Because the final OP & F board decision is not appealable,
    mandamus is available to correct an abuse of discretion by the board in denying
    disability benefits.” State ex rel. Tindira v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund,
    
    130 Ohio St.3d 62
    , 
    2011-Ohio-4677
    , 
    955 N.E.2d 963
    , ¶ 28. A clear legal right to
    the requested relief in mandamus exists “where the board abuses its discretion by
    entering an order which is not supported by ‘some evidence.’ ” Kinsey v. Bd. of
    Trustees of Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension Fund of Ohio (1990), 
    49 Ohio St.3d 224
    , 225, 
    551 N.E.2d 989
    .
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 3} In November 2009, the board of trustees upheld its previous
    decision denying Kolcinko’s application for disability-retirement benefits.
    Kolcinko claimed entitlement to an award of benefits under R.C. 742.38(D)(1),
    which provides, “A member of the fund who is permanently and totally disabled
    as the result of the performance of the member’s official duties as a member of a
    police or fire department shall be paid annual disability benefits in accordance
    with division (A) of section 742.39 of the Revised Code.” “ ‘Totally disabled’
    means a member of the fund is unable to perform the duties of any gainful
    occupation for which the member is reasonably fitted by training, experience, and
    accomplishments,” and “ ‘[p]ermanently disabled’ means a condition of disability
    from which there is no present indication of recovery.” R.C. 742.38(D)(1)(a) and
    (b).
    {¶ 4} The court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus because the
    court determined that the report of Dr. Sylvester Smarty, a psychiatrist, supported
    the board’s determination that Kolcinko was not permanently and totally disabled
    due to a psychiatric or psychological impairment.
    {¶ 5} On appeal, Kolcinko claims that the court of appeals erred in
    denying the writ because the OP & F board of trustees abused its discretion in two
    different ways. Kolcinko first contends that the board abused its discretion by
    relying on Dr. Smarty’s report to support the denial of benefits. Dr. Smarty
    examined Kolcinko in February 2008, and he concluded that Kolcinko’s disability
    was temporary and that recovery could be reasonably expected within a year. Dr.
    Smarty further concluded that “[h]is prognosis would definitely be improved by a
    more aggressive approach to his treatment,” that he had a whole-person
    impairment of 15 percent, and that his score on the global assessment of
    functioning was 65. In his assessment of Kolcinko’s mental residual functional
    capacity, Dr. Smarty determined that Kolcinko’s ability to perform work-related
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    January Term, 2012
    activities on a day-to-day basis in a regular work setting ranged from very good to
    fair.
    {¶ 6} Kolcinko contends that Dr. Smarty’s report could not be
    considered probative evidence, because after a year had passed from the
    consultative evaluation, the August 2009 report of Dr. Edward Poa and Dr. Phillip
    Resnick established that his psychiatric symptoms remained.
    {¶ 7} Under R.C. 742.38 and Ohio Adm.Code 742-3-05, the OP & F
    board is vested with the exclusive authority to evaluate the weight and credibility
    of the medical evidence in determining a member’s entitlement to disability-
    retirement benefits. Notwithstanding Dr. Poa’s and Dr. Resnick’s conclusion that
    Kolcinko was permanently disabled, they further noted that Dr. Francis
    McCafferty had observed that Kolcinko complained of “certain patterns or
    combinations of features that are unusual or atypical in clinical populations but
    relatively common among individuals feigning mental disorder.” Dr. Poa and Dr.
    Resnick opined that Kolcinko had a lower whole-person impairment (12 percent)
    than the 15 percent figure determined by Dr. Smarty.
    {¶ 8} These psychiatrists also determined that Kolcinko had the same
    global assessment of functioning score (65) that Dr. Smarty found. This score
    indicates “some mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) or
    some difficulty in social, occupational, or social functioning (e.g., occasional
    truancy, or theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty well, has
    some meaningful interpersonal relationships.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
    of Mental Disorders (4th Ed.Text Rev.2000) 34. Dr. Poa and Dr. Resnick also
    found that Kolcinko’s ability to use judgment, to maintain regular attendance, to
    understand and carry out simple job instructions, and to maintain personal
    appearance was very good and that Kolcinko’s ability to follow work rules, relate
    to co-workers, deal with the public, interact with supervisors, function
    independently, perform at a consistent pace, understand and carry out detailed but
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    not complex job instructions, behave in an emotionally stable manner, and relate
    predictably in social situations was good.
    {¶ 9} As the court of appeals properly concluded, the OP & F board was
    permitted to accept the findings of Dr. Poa and Dr. Resnick but reject their
    conclusions. These findings supported the findings and conclusion of Dr. Smarty
    and refuted Kolcinko’s claim that Dr. Smarty’s report was stale and unreliable.
    The doctors’ reports were evidence to support the board’s denial of Kolcinko’s
    application for disability-retirement benefits. Under the appropriate standard of
    review, the presence of contrary evidence is immaterial if there is evidence in
    support of the board’s findings of fact. See State ex rel. Spohn v. Indus. Comm.,
    
    115 Ohio St.3d 329
    , 
    2007-Ohio-5027
    , 
    875 N.E.2d 52
    , ¶ 33. Therefore, OP & F
    did not abuse its discretion by relying on Dr. Smarty’s report to support its
    decision denying Kolcinko’s application for disability-retirement benefits.
    {¶ 10} For his remaining contention, Kolcinko claims that the OP & F
    board abused its discretion in denying him disability-retirement benefits because
    he was also physically disabled from continuing to work. Kolcinko did not,
    however, raise any argument concerning his physical impairments until his reply
    brief in the court of appeals, and that argument was limited to claiming that the
    OP & F board failed to state particular evidence and reasons why it denied his
    permanent-disability benefits for his physical impairments. See State ex rel. Am.
    Subcontractors Assn., Inc. v. Ohio State Univ., 
    129 Ohio St.3d 111
    , 2011-Ohio-
    2881, 
    950 N.E.2d 535
    , ¶ 40 (new argument in reply brief is forbidden).
    {¶ 11} The court of appeals thus correctly concluded that “[a]lthough
    relator’s application for disability retirement also cites injuries to his left eye,
    right knee, right elbow, lower back, and left shoulder, he is only challenging [the
    board’s] decision as it relates to the allowed physical impairment.” State ex rel.
    Kolcinko v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-269, 2011-
    Ohio-1668, 
    2011 WL 1314675
    , ¶ 20.            In his objections to the magistrate’s
    4
    January Term, 2012
    decision, Kolcinko did not object to that finding, and he limited his objections to
    his claimed psychological impairments. Kolcinko thereby waived any error by
    failing to object to that portion of the magistrate’s decision recommending denial
    of the writ. State ex rel. Schmidt v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 
    100 Ohio St.3d 317
    , 
    2003-Ohio-6086
    , 
    798 N.E.2d 1088
    , ¶ 6; State ex rel. Evans v. Blackwell, 
    111 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 
    2006-Ohio-4334
    , 
    854 N.E.2d 1025
    , ¶ 18.
    {¶ 12} Therefore, Kolcinko’s alternate argument also lacks merit.
    {¶ 13} Based on the foregoing, Kolcinko did not establish that the OP & F
    board of trustees abused its discretion by denying his application for disability-
    retirement benefits. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals
    denying the writ of mandamus.          We also deny Kolcinko’s motion for oral
    argument because the parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve this case. State ex
    rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 
    111 Ohio St.3d 118
    , 
    2006-Ohio-5339
    ,
    
    855 N.E.2d 444
    , ¶ 16.
    Judgment affirmed.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL,
    LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur.
    __________________
    Marc G. Doumbas, for appellant.
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Jennifer S. M. Croskey, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    ______________________
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