Disciplinary Counsel v. Doellman , 127 Ohio St. 3d 411 ( 2010 )


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  • [Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Doellman, 
    127 Ohio St.3d 411
    , 
    2010-Ohio-5990
    .]
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. DOELLMAN.
    [Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Doellman,
    
    127 Ohio St.3d 411
    , 
    2010-Ohio-5990
    .]
    Attorneys — Misconduct — Commingling of funds — Failure to maintain proper
    IOLTA account — Failure to maintain complete records of client funds in
    lawyer’s possession — Failure to promptly deliver to client funds to which
    client is entitled — Engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to
    practice law — One-year suspension, all stayed on conditions.
    (No. 2010-0805 — Submitted August 10, 2010 — Decided December 15, 2010.)
    ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
    Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-040.
    __________________
    Per Curiam.
    {¶ 1} Respondent Norbert Mark Doellman Jr. of Butler County, Ohio,
    Attorney 
    Registration No. 0002122,
     was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in
    November 1976. In October 2009, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a three-
    count amended complaint charging respondent with violations of the Code of
    Professional Responsibility.       Relator alleged that respondent had improperly
    withheld client funds and that he had not held client funds in a separate trust
    account, resulting in the commingling of client and personal and business funds.
    Respondent answered the amended complaint, and the parties agreed upon
    stipulations of facts, some (but not all) violations, and mitigating factors.
    {¶ 2} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
    Discipline heard the case, issued findings of fact, and concluded that respondent
    had violated DR 1-102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
    reflects upon his fitness to practice law), 9-102(A) (all funds paid to a lawyer
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    shall be deposited in an identifiable account containing no funds belonging to the
    lawyer), 9-102(B)(3) (a lawyer shall maintain complete records of all client funds
    coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounting), 9-
    102(B)(4) (a lawyer shall promptly pay the client any funds the client is entitled to
    receive), and 9-102(B)(1) (a lawyer shall promptly notify a client of the receipt of
    client funds). The panel further concluded that respondent had violated DR 1-
    102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) as
    alleged in Count II, but found that relator had not proved any such violation as
    alleged in Counts I and III. Finally, the panel found that relator had failed to
    prove any violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving
    dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) as alleged in Count II.
    {¶ 3} The panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the
    practice of law for one year and that the suspension be stayed on the following
    conditions: (1) respondent must make full restitution, (2) a monitor appointed by
    relator must oversee respondent’s legal practice and the management of his
    IOLTA account during the stayed suspension, and (3) respondent must comply
    with his OLAP contract and with the recommendations of his mental-health
    professionals.
    {¶ 4} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of
    law and the recommended sanction. Relator objects in part. We accept the
    board’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the recommended sanction.
    Facts
    {¶ 5} During the time in question, respondent was a sole practitioner in
    Butler County, with an emphasis on debt collections. First National Bank of
    Southwestern Ohio, n.k.a. First Financial Bank (“First Financial” or “the bank”)
    hired respondent as a collection attorney in 1981. Respondent and First Financial
    agreed that he would receive a one-third contingency fee on debts collected by
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    January Term, 2010
    him, whether they were paid to his office or directly to the bank. If debts were
    paid to his office, respondent would remit two-thirds to the bank.
    {¶ 6} When respondent began representing First Financial, separate
    client trust accounts were not required.      At the request of First Financial,
    respondent established a separate trust account to be used exclusively to deposit
    the bank’s collection funds. When IOLTA accounts became mandatory in 1985,
    respondent established such an account at First Financial and deposited other
    clients’ funds in that account as required. However, respondent did not convert
    the existing account into an IOLTA account, and he continued to deposit the
    bank’s collection proceeds in the non-IOLTA account until March 2001. He
    regularly left his portion of the fees from this collection work in the same bank
    account and used the account for personal and business transactions unrelated to
    the practice of law. Respondent testified that he continued to use the non-IOLTA
    account because he was not aware at the time that he could have more than one
    IOLTA account.
    {¶ 7} In March 2001, First Financial terminated respondent’s collection
    services. At that time, respondent had over 150 collection files. First Financial
    requested that respondent return the collection files and provide an accounting.
    Despite repeated requests, respondent did not return all of the files, provide a
    complete accounting, or turn over all funds that he had received on behalf of the
    bank.
    {¶ 8} At the same time, respondent was experiencing financial
    difficulties and was unable to pay First Financial for personal loans that he had
    obtained from the bank. In an effort to prevent First Financial from applying
    funds in his business accounts against the amounts owed for these personal loans,
    respondent closed his non-IOLTA First Financial account and opened a new non-
    IOLTA account for that purpose at Key Bank.
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 9} Although he had been terminated by First Financial, respondent
    continued to receive checks from debtors and clerks of court pursuant to
    garnishment and collection actions that he had undertaken on behalf of the bank.
    From June 2001 through April 2002, respondent deposited 38 checks totaling
    $2,764.46 for First Financial debt collections into the Key Bank non-IOLTA
    account. Respondent was entitled to one-third of these checks as a legal fee and
    owed First Financial two-thirds ($1,842.97).
    {¶ 10} Respondent did not segregate the funds owed to First Financial
    from his own one-third fee and expended funds from the Key Bank account for
    personal and business expenses. The account balance regularly fell below the
    $1,842.97 that respondent owed to First Financial.      Additionally, during this
    period, respondent received a large number of checks in envelopes that he did not
    open.    He did not immediately forward these checks to First Financial.
    Eventually, respondent gave the checks to his attorney, who turned them over to
    First Financial.    Respondent did not turn over the funds that he owed First
    Financial from the 38 cashed checks.
    {¶ 11} On June 22, 2001, First Financial filed suit against respondent in
    the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for breach of contract, unjust
    enrichment, conversion, and replevin.          Respondent filed an answer and
    counterclaim in which he alleged that First Financial owed him more than
    $100,000 and admitted that he possessed funds from First Financial debt
    collections that he was holding as a lien. Respondent believed that First Financial
    had obtained direct payments from debtors in collection actions that he had
    pursued on behalf of the bank without paying him his fee. Respondent testified
    that he believed that the amounts he and the bank owed each other would be
    sorted out as part of the litigation.
    {¶ 12} Respondent’s conduct during the litigation was, at best, inadequate
    and dilatory, and, at worst, contemptuous.        Respondent failed to respond
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    January Term, 2010
    adequately to written discovery requests, did not attend scheduled court hearings;
    did not comply with the trial court’s order compelling him to produce documents
    and files to First Financial, and did not appear at his scheduled deposition.1
    {¶ 13} In May 2002, First Financial moved for sanctions against
    respondent for his failure to comply with the trial court’s order compelling
    discovery. Respondent did not file a response and did not attend the June 6, 2002
    hearing on the motion. Respondent testified that the court’s bailiff had told him
    to remain with his father, who was undergoing surgery. After the hearing, the
    trial court ordered respondent to turn over all of First Financial’s files within two
    days, issued a judgment against respondent on the issue of liability, dismissed
    respondent’s counterclaims (precluding him from proving his counterclaim
    against First Financial), and ordered respondent to pay the bank’s costs and
    attorney fees for the motion for sanctions. On June 6, 2002, the trial court also
    granted the bank’s motion seeking escrow of all funds that both respondent and
    the bank had collected relating to the collection cases.
    {¶ 14} Respondent did not produce the files as ordered, and on June 18,
    2002, the trial court issued an order allowing First Financial access to his office to
    retrieve the files. Respondent’s landlord granted the bank access to the office,
    and First Financial seized every file or document that related to the bank.
    {¶ 15} The trial court scheduled a hearing to determine the bank’s
    damages, but respondent failed to appear at the hearing. In February 2003, the
    trial court entered a judgment against respondent for $279,292 as a sanction for
    his failure to comply with the bank’s discovery requests and the trial court’s
    orders. In April 2006, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals held that the trial
    court erred in holding the June 6, 2002 hearing in respondent’s absence when the
    evidence indicated that the court bailiff had excused his attendance from the
    1. Relator did not allege that respondent’s conduct during the litigation was an independent
    violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    hearing. The court remanded the case for a new hearing on the motion for
    sanctions. On remand, the trial court again issued a judgment against respondent
    on the issue of liability, dismissed his counterclaims, and issued a final judgment
    against respondent for $279,292.2
    {¶ 16} In March 2008, respondent filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition
    seeking to discharge various debts, including the $279,292 judgment granted to
    First Financial. The bank filed an adversary action contesting the dischargeability
    of the judgment, asserting that the judgment was based upon respondent’s fraud
    while acting in a fiduciary capacity. The bankruptcy court discharged the debt,
    concluding that the judgment was based on respondent’s negligence, not
    fraudulent or deceitful acts.
    {¶ 17} As an explanation for his conduct during the litigation, respondent
    testified before the panel that he was suffering from clinical depression. He began
    psychiatric treatment in April 2002, and his psychiatrist ordered him to be
    hospitalized for severe depression in March 2003. According to respondent’s
    testimony and a letter from his psychiatrist at the time, he had essentially “shut
    down,” could not organize or motivate himself, and did not open his
    correspondence.
    {¶ 18} During 2001 and 2002, respondent was also engaged in collection
    efforts for other clients. He deposited funds belonging to those clients into his
    Key Bank non-IOLTA account rather than his IOLTA account at First Financial.
    Respondent testified that he did so to protect the funds from being seized by First
    Financial. The non-IOLTA account regularly held respondent’s personal and
    business funds, and respondent used the account to conduct personal and business
    transactions unrelated to the practice of law.
    2. The record reflects two different figures for the amount of the sanction. Because $279,292 is
    the amount most often cited, we use that figure without endorsing it as the correct one.
    6
    January Term, 2010
    {¶ 19} Respondent currently practices law on a very limited basis. He
    does collection work, performs basic research, and assists people dealing with
    simple foreclosures. He has been diagnosed with Major Depression Recurrent
    and Generalized Anxiety Disorder and is under the care of a psychiatrist. He
    finds it difficult to complete tasks, but with effort he can work successfully for
    short periods and gains satisfaction from doing so.      On November 2, 2009,
    respondent signed a four-year contract with OLAP.          On January 28, 2010,
    respondent promised in writing to pay First Financial a total of $1,842.97 in 12
    monthly payments as restitution. He made the first payment on that date.
    Misconduct
    Count I
    {¶ 20} In Count I, relator alleged that between 1981 and March 2001
    respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by failing to maintain
    an IOLTA account to hold proceeds from his collection efforts for First Financial
    and by depositing the funds collected into his non-IOLTA trust account. Relator
    also alleged that the non-IOLTA account regularly held respondent’s personal and
    business funds and that he used that account for personal and business
    transactions unrelated to the practice of law.
    {¶ 21} The parties stipulated and the board found that the conduct
    described in Count I violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and 9-102(A).
    {¶ 22} Respondent disputed relator’s allegation that his conduct with
    regard to Count I violated DR 1-102(A)(5). The board found that relator failed to
    prove that allegation by clear and convincing evidence because there was no proof
    of injury to the client and respondent did not interfere with the administration of
    justice. The board recommended dismissal of this violation.
    Count II
    {¶ 23} In Count II, relator alleged that after First Financial terminated
    respondent, he continued to receive checks from debtors of the bank.
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    Specifically, relator alleges that respondent collected at least 38 checks worth
    $2,764 from debtors after his termination and that he did not (1) forward the
    uncashed checks to First Financial, (2) provide First Financial with any notice that
    he had received the checks, (3) provide First Financial with an accounting, or (4)
    deposit the checks into an IOLTA account for safekeeping until any payment
    dispute over the division of the checks was resolved.          Instead, respondent
    deposited the checks into his non-IOLTA account at Key Bank and utilized the
    funds for his own personal and business expenses, allowing the balance of the
    account to fall below the amount owed to First Financial on multiple occasions.
    {¶ 24} The parties stipulated and the board found that respondent’s
    conduct as described in Count II violated DR 1-102(A)(6), 9-102(A), 9-
    102(B)(3), and 9-102(B)(4).
    {¶ 25} Respondent disputed three violations alleged by relator in relation
    to Count II. First, respondent disputed that his conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(5).
    The board concluded that relator proved a violation of this Disciplinary Rule by
    clear and convincing evidence because respondent failed to maintain complete
    records of First Financial funds that came into his possession and because he
    delayed the determination of the amount owed to the bank, thereby interfering
    with the administration of justice. Respondent does not now object to the board’s
    conclusion that he violated DR 1-102(A)(5).
    {¶ 26} Respondent also disputed that his conduct violated DR 9-
    102(B)(1). The board determined that relator had proved this violation by clear
    and convincing evidence because respondent failed to provide First Financial with
    timely notice of the specific checks that he either deposited in the Key Bank
    account or left unopened. As with the previous violation, respondent does not
    object to the board’s conclusion that he violated DR 9-102(B)(1).
    {¶ 27} Finally, respondent disputed relator’s allegation that his conduct
    violated DR 1-102(A)(4). The board agreed with respondent that relator had
    8
    January Term, 2010
    failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his conduct violated this
    rule. The board noted that pursuant to advice from counsel, respondent’s answer
    filed in the litigation disclosed that he was holding First Financial collection funds
    upon which he claimed a lien.         The board also considered that respondent
    intended that the amount owed to him by First Financial and the amount that he
    owed the bank would be sorted out as part of the litigation.              The board
    recommended dismissal of this charge.
    Count III
    {¶ 28} In Count III, relator alleged that respondent failed to maintain an
    IOLTA account in 2001, 2002, and 2003 and that he deposited funds collected on
    behalf of multiple clients into his non-IOLTA Key Bank account. Relator further
    alleged that the account regularly held respondent’s personal and business funds
    and that respondent used the account for transactions unrelated to the practice of
    law.
    {¶ 29} The parties stipulated and the board found that respondent’s
    conduct described in Count III violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and 9-102(A).
    Respondent disputed the allegation that his conduct described in Count III
    violated DR 1-102(A)(5). As with Count I, the board agreed with respondent that
    relator had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his conduct
    violated this rule because there was no proof of injury to any clients and
    respondent did not interfere with the administration of justice.          The board
    recommended dismissal of this violation.
    Objections
    {¶ 30} Relator objects to the board’s recommendation that the charge
    alleging a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) in Count II and the charges alleging
    violations of DR 1-102(A)(5) in Counts I and III be dismissed. A question arose
    during oral argument as to whether the board’s recommendation to dismiss these
    charges precludes this court from reviewing relator’s objections and, if we find
    9
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    merit to the objections, from determining that respondent violated these
    Disciplinary Rules. We conclude that it does not.
    {¶ 31} When a unanimous panel finds insufficient evidence to support an
    alleged violation, it may dismiss the count without referring it to the board or this
    court for review pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(6)(H). Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v.
    Marosan, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 439
    , 
    2006-Ohio-2816
    , 
    848 N.E.2d 837
    , ¶13. When the
    panel has dismissed a violation for lack of sufficient evidence, we will not disturb
    that finding. 
    Id.
     However, in this case the panel did not dismiss the alleged
    violations; it recommended their dismissal. To dismiss a claim, the panel must
    give written notice of the action taken to the board, the respondent, all counsel of
    record, Disciplinary Counsel, the certified grievance committee for the local bar
    association, and others. Gov.Bar R. V(6)(H). The panel in this case, quite
    rightly, did not follow this procedure, as it was only recommending dismissal.
    {¶ 32} When the panel recommends dismissal, the board may dismiss the
    count by reporting the dismissal to the secretary of the board, who shall notify the
    same persons and organizations that would have received notice if the complaint
    had been dismissed by the hearing panel. Gov.Bar R. V(6)(K).
    {¶ 33} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law,
    and recommendation. However, the record does not establish that the board
    provided the notices required by Gov.Bar R. V.(6)(K). Thus, the board did not
    effectuate a dismissal, and this court is not precluded from addressing relator’s
    objections to the recommended dismissals. See In re Complaint Against Harper
    (1996), 
    77 Ohio St.3d 211
    , 216, 
    673 N.E.2d 1253
     (rejecting the respondent’s
    argument that the board and this court could not review allegations for which the
    panel had recommended, but had not effectuated, dismissal).
    {¶ 34} Nonetheless, we agree with the board’s recommendations to
    dismiss the alleged violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) in Count II and DR 1-102(A)(5)
    in Counts I and III. “Relator must prove by clear and convincing evidence the
    10
    January Term, 2010
    facts necessary to establish a violation of a Disciplinary Rule.” Disciplinary
    Counsel v. Bunstine, 
    123 Ohio St.3d 298
    , 
    2009-Ohio-5286
    , 
    915 N.E.2d 1224
    , ¶
    12, citing Gov.Bar R. V(6)(J) and Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson (1998), 
    81 Ohio St.3d 308
    , 310, 
    691 N.E.2d 262
    . Relator did not establish these violations
    by clear and convincing evidence.
    DR 1-102(A)(4)
    {¶ 35} Relator objects to the board’s determination that the violation of
    DR 1-102(A)(4) alleged in Count II was not demonstrated by clear and
    convincing evidence. Relator argues that the following evidence sufficiently
    proved respondent’s deceptive and dishonest conduct in violation of DR 1-
    102(A)(4): (1) respondent’s failure to comply with First Financial’s repeated
    requests that he cease all collection activities on its behalf, (2) his failure to notify
    the bank of his receipt of the 38 checks that he deposited between June 2001 and
    April 2002, and (3) his use of the funds for his own personal benefit instead of
    holding them in escrow pending the court’s decision on First Financial’s lawsuit.
    {¶ 36} We agree with the board. Although respondent’s conduct was
    wrong, relator did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in
    a deceptive or dishonest manner. Respondent did not represent to the bank or to
    the trial court that he had stopped collecting funds on behalf of First Financial.
    Indeed, as the board noted, respondent filed an answer during the litigation in
    which he disclosed that he was holding funds that he had collected on behalf of
    First Financial and that he claimed a lien on the funds. Respondent believed that
    First Financial owed him fees and that the amount each owed the other would be
    sorted out as part of the litigation. Respondent’s failure to participate in the
    litigation, which was a product of his mental state at the time of the litigation,
    does not transform his violations into deceptive or dishonest conduct.
    {¶ 37} Furthermore, we note that the United States Bankruptcy Court for
    the Southern District of Ohio recently discharged the $272,292 sanction that the
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    trial court ordered respondent to pay to First Financial based on his conduct
    during the litigation. In doing so, the bankruptcy court rejected First Financial’s
    argument that respondent’s conduct was fraudulent and deceitful and concluded
    that respondent was merely negligent. Although the bankruptcy court’s decision
    is not binding on this court’s determination of whether respondent’s conduct was
    deceitful or dishonest, it further supports the board’s conclusion that respondent
    did not violate DR 1-102(A)(4).
    {¶ 38} We are not persuaded by relator’s objection. We agree with the
    board that relator has not established by clear and convincing evidence that
    respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4). Accordingly, we dismiss this violation as
    alleged in Count II.
    DR 1-102(A)(5)
    {¶ 39} Relator also objects to the board’s conclusion with respect to
    Counts I and III that respondent did not violate DR 1-102(A)(5). Relator argues
    that respondent’s failure to use an IOLTA account to hold client funds and the
    resultant commingling of personal and client funds violated DR 1-102(A)(5). In
    support of this objection, relator cites Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 
    119 Ohio St.3d 330
    , 
    2008-Ohio-3836
    , 
    894 N.E.2d 31
    (holding that the respondent violated
    DR 1-102(A)(5) by using his IOLTA account as a personal bank account,
    commingling client and personal funds, causing several IOLTA account
    overdrafts, and failing to maintain the required accounting of client funds);
    Disciplinary Counsel v. Tyack, 
    107 Ohio St.3d 35
    , 
    2005-Ohio-5833
    , 
    836 N.E.2d 568
     (holding that the respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5) by failing to deposit
    unearned retainers into an IOLTA account, commingling funds, bouncing a check
    for filing fees, and failing to respond to attempts to collect the funds from the
    dishonored check); Disciplinary Counsel v. McCauley, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 461
    , 2007-
    Ohio-4259, 
    873 N.E.2d 269
     (holding that the respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5)
    by using his IOLTA account as a personal account, commingling client funds, and
    12
    January Term, 2010
    causing multiple overdrafts); and Disciplinary Counsel v. Wise, 
    108 Ohio St.3d 381
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1194
    , 
    843 N.E.2d 1198
     (same).
    {¶ 40} Relator’s reliance on these cases is not persuasive.     First, the
    respondents in both Freeman and McCauley stipulated that their conduct violated
    DR 1-102(A)(5), whereas in this case, respondent disputed this violation.
    Freeman at ¶ 1; McCauley at ¶ 2.         Further, none of these cases demand a
    conclusion that failure to use an IOLTA account or commingling funds
    constitutes a violation of DR 1-102(A)(5).
    {¶ 41} This court has declined to find violations of DR 1-102(A)(5) when
    attorneys have commingled funds. See, e.g., Columbus Bar Assn. v. Chasser, 
    124 Ohio St.3d 578
    , 
    2010-Ohio-956
    , 
    925 N.E.2d 595
    , ¶ 18-19; Ohio State Bar Assn. v.
    McCray, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 43
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1828
    , 
    845 N.E.2d 509
    , ¶14-15.               In
    Chasser, this court affirmed the board’s conclusions that the respondent violated,
    among other rules, DR 1-102(A)(6) and 9-102(A), the same provisions that
    respondent violated in Counts I and III in this case. Id. at ¶ 18. The court also
    affirmed the board’s conclusion that although the respondent withheld client
    funds, used the funds for his own benefit, and failed to maintain complete records
    of the funds, he did not engage in conduct that was prejudicial to the
    administration of justice in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5). Id. at ¶ 19. In McCray,
    the respondent improperly withdrew $5,000 from a client trust account. Id. at ¶
    14. This court agreed with the board’s conclusion that the relator did not establish
    that the attorney’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice,
    because there was no evidence that the withdrawal adversely affected the client or
    that the respondent’s actions were intended to or did deceive the trial court or the
    client.
    {¶ 42} Relator has not established by clear and convincing evidence that
    by depositing client funds in a non-IOLTA account and commingling client and
    personal funds, respondent prejudiced the administration of justice. We agree
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    with the board that relator has not established that respondent violated DR 1-
    102(A)(5). Accordingly, we dismiss the charge as to both Count I and Count III.
    {¶ 43} Having rejected relator’s objections, we adopt the board’s findings
    of fact and misconduct.      The record demonstrates by clear and convincing
    evidence that respondent’s conduct described in Counts I and III violated DR 1-
    102(A)(6) and 9-102(A) and that the conduct described in Count II violated DR 1-
    102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 9-102(A), 9-102(B)(1), 9-102(B)(3), and 9-102(B)(4).
    {¶ 44} We now turn to the board’s recommended sanction.
    Sanction
    {¶ 45} The primary purpose of disciplinary sanctions is not to punish the
    offender but to protect the public. Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 
    103 Ohio St.3d 204
    , 
    2004-Ohio-4704
    , 
    815 N.E.2d 286
    , ¶ 53.          When imposing sanctions for
    attorney misconduct, we consider all relevant factors, including the ethical duties
    that the lawyer has violated and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty.
    Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 
    96 Ohio St.3d 424
    , 
    2002-Ohio-4743
    , 
    775 N.E.2d 818
    , ¶
    16. We also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in
    Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints
    and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline
    (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 
    115 Ohio St.3d 473
    ,
    
    2007-Ohio-5251
    , 
    875 N.E.2d 935
    , ¶ 21. Because each disciplinary case is unique,
    we are not limited to the factors specified in the rule but may take into account
    “all relevant factors” in determining what sanction to impose. BCGD Proc.Reg.
    10(B).
    {¶ 46} The board found as an aggravating factor that respondent
    committed multiple violations.       The board also found factors mitigating
    respondent’s conduct, including (1) his lack of a prior disciplinary record, (2) his
    full and free disclosure of his conduct and his cooperative attitude toward these
    proceedings, (3) his good reputation among friends and clients, (4) his previous
    14
    January Term, 2010
    sanction for his conduct relating to the litigation, and (5) his promise to make
    restitution to First Financial.
    {¶ 47} Relator objects to the board’s failure to find that respondent’s
    conduct established a pattern of misconduct (BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c)) and
    selfish motive (BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b)) as aggravating factors. Relator
    argues that respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct by “failing to use an
    IOLTA account to hold collection proceeds for six clients over a period of 18
    years and as a result commingling client funds.”         Relator’s argument is
    technically accurate, but misleading. Although Counts I and III both involve
    misconduct with respect to respondent’s failure to use an IOLTA account and the
    commingling of client and personal funds, the counts involve separate and
    independent violations, not a pattern as relator suggests.    Count I relates to
    respondent’s failure to maintain an IOLTA account to hold proceeds collected for
    First Financial. This violation occurred because First Financial requested that
    respondent maintain a separate account for its funds and respondent did not know
    that he could maintain more than one IOLTA account. Count III relates to
    respondent’s conduct depositing other clients’ funds in a non-IOLTA account
    subsequent to his termination by First Financial. This violation resulted from
    respondent’s belief that if he placed the funds into the IOLTA account at First
    Financial, the bank would seize the funds to pay off respondent’s delinquent
    personal loans. Although both counts relate to respondent’s failure to properly
    utilize an IOLTA account, the counts relate to independent violations, not a
    pattern of misconduct. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Rohrer, 
    124 Ohio St.3d 65
    , 
    2009-Ohio-5930
    , 
    919 N.E.2d 180
    , ¶ 34, fn. 4 (declining to overturn the
    board’s conclusion that the respondent had not engaged in a pattern of misconduct
    when the conduct involved separate acts that did not constitute a “salient”
    pattern).
    15
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 48} Although respondent did not engage in a pattern of misconduct
    with respect to the trust-account-related violations in Counts I and III, we agree
    with relator that respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct in relation to
    Count II by accepting and depositing 38 checks totaling $2,764.46 from bank
    debtors over ten months and expending these funds instead of turning them over
    to the bank or escrowing them.
    {¶ 49} Relator also contends that the board erred by not considering
    respondent’s selfish motive as an aggravating factor. We agree. Respondent
    acted with a selfish motive in retaining the funds owed to First Financial because
    he believed that he was “entitled to [his] share of those funds.”
    {¶ 50} After considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, the board
    recommended a one-year suspension from the practice of law, all of it stayed on
    certain conditions. Relator objects to the recommended sanction and argues that
    respondent’s conduct mandates an actual suspension. Relator asks the court to
    impose a 24-month suspension with 12 months stayed. Although we agree with
    relator that the board failed to consider as aggravating factors that respondent
    engaged in a pattern of misconduct and acted with a selfish motive, we agree with
    the board’s recommended sanction, even considering these additional aggravating
    factors.
    {¶ 51} While relator’s brief sets forth multiple arguments in support of an
    actual suspension, relator conceded during oral argument that the appropriate
    sanction depends on whether relator violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by engaging in
    dishonest or deceitful conduct.3 Relator argues that this court’s case law requires
    3. {¶ a} Although relator concedes that the appropriate sanction turns on whether respondent’s
    conduct was deceitful or dishonest, we must address another argument that relator sets forth in
    support of an actual suspension. Relator points to a letter from licensed social worker Mary
    Hattemer, who observed that respondent “demonstrates a lack of motivation and follow through,”
    “finds it difficult to complete a task,” “lacks the energy to accomplish the task,” “ha[s] some
    trouble accomplishing * * * goals,” and “at times does not maintain basic hygiene.” Relator argues
    that based on this letter, an actual suspension is appropriate because respondent’s recovery is
    16
    January Term, 2010
    an actual suspension when an attorney engages in a pattern of dishonest conduct.
    See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Brumbaugh, 
    99 Ohio St.3d 65
    , 2003-Ohio-
    2470, 
    788 N.E.2d 1076
    , at ¶ 13 (“An actual suspension from the practice of law is
    the general sanction for an attorney that engages in a course of conduct that
    violates DR 1-102(A)(4)”); Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), 
    74 Ohio St.3d 187
    , 190, 
    658 N.E.2d 237
     (“Respect for our profession is diminished with
    every deceitful act of a lawyer. We cannot expect citizens to trust that lawyers are
    honest if we have not yet sanctioned those who are not. * * * When an attorney
    engages in a course of conduct resulting in a finding that the attorney has violated
    DR 1-102(A)(4), the attorney will be actually suspended from the practice of law
    for an appropriate period of time”).
    {¶ 52} Relator is correct that dishonest or deceitful conduct generally
    mandates an actual suspension. However, as we stated in relation to Count II,
    although respondent’s conduct was wrong, it was not deceptive or dishonest.
    Accordingly, we are not constrained to impose an actual suspension.
    {¶ 53} Further, as the board noted, the cases cited by relator in support of
    a more severe sanction are not persuasive in this case. See Disciplinary Counsel
    v. Wolanin, 
    121 Ohio St.3d 390
    , 
    2009-Ohio-1393
    , 
    904 N.E.2d 879
    ; Cuyahoga
    Cty. Bar Assn. v. Maybaum, 
    112 Ohio St.3d 93
    , 
    2006-Ohio-6507
    , 
    858 N.E.2d 359
    ; and Disciplinary Counsel v. Claflin, 
    107 Ohio St.3d 31
    , 
    2005-Ohio-5827
    ,
    incomplete, and in the interest of protecting the public, more time should be allowed so that
    respondent may complete treatment and recovery. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 
    119 Ohio St.3d 330
    , 
    2008-Ohio-3836
    , 
    894 N.E.2d 31
    , ¶ 22.
    {¶ b} Relator ignores the second paragraph of the same letter, in which Hattemer states: “Mr.
    Doellman is engaging in a limited practice of law at this time. According to the client he helps
    with collections; does basic research, and volunteers to assist people dealing with simple
    foreclosures. When he is focused on simple tasks, he appears to be more energized. According to
    Mr. Doellman he is able to follow through with these simple tasks and receives a sense of
    satisfaction when the task is completed.” Moreover, respondent has voluntarily limited his legal
    practice to a small number of basic matters that he is able to manage in his current mental state.
    We do not agree with relator that an actual suspension is necessary to protect the public or to allow
    respondent additional time for treatment and recovery.
    17
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    
    836 N.E.2d 564
    . These cases involved more egregious misconduct, included
    findings of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and involved other
    aggravating factors, such as failure to fully participate in and a dismissive attitude
    toward the disciplinary process, lack of sincerity in the disciplinary hearing, client
    vulnerability, lack of remorse, or a prior disciplinary record.
    {¶ 54} In cases where attorneys have misused client trust accounts, as
    respondent did in this case, but without an improper motive or deceit, this court
    has regularly imposed six-month suspensions, conditionally stayed. See, e.g.,
    Disciplinary Counsel v. Vivyan, 
    125 Ohio St.3d 12
    , 
    2010-Ohio-650
    , 
    925 N.E.2d 947
    , ¶ 7-12; Disciplinary Counsel v. Fletcher, 
    122 Ohio St.3d 390
    , 2009-Ohio-
    3480, 
    911 N.E.2d 897
    ; Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Nance, 
    119 Ohio St.3d 55
    ,
    
    2008-Ohio-3333
    , 
    891 N.E.2d 746
    ; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Peden, 
    118 Ohio St.3d 244
    , 
    2008-Ohio-2237
    , 
    887 N.E.2d 1183
    ; Disciplinary Counsel v. Newcomer, 
    119 Ohio St.3d 351
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4492
    , 
    894 N.E.2d 50
    .
    {¶ 55} But respondent’s conduct went beyond misusing his IOLTA
    account and commingling funds.         He deliberately withheld funds from First
    Financial and failed to maintain and provide the bank with an accounting of the
    funds. We agree with the board that a more severe sanction than a six-month
    stayed suspension is appropriate. At the same time, although we recognize as
    aggravating the fact that respondent (1) committed multiple violations, (2)
    engaged in a pattern of misconduct, and (3) acted with a selfish motive, these
    factors are outweighed by the mitigating factors. These mitigating factors include
    (1) respondent’s lack of a prior disciplinary record, (2) his full and free disclosure
    of his conduct and his cooperative attitude toward these proceedings, (3) his good
    reputation among friends and clients, (4) the sanction already imposed by the
    Butler County Common Pleas Court in the First Financial litigation, and (5) his
    promise to make restitution to First Financial. Further, we agree with the board
    18
    January Term, 2010
    that respondent is not likely to ever repeat his transgressions. See, e.g., Stark Cty.
    Bar Assn. v. Ake, 
    111 Ohio St.3d 266
    , 
    2006-Ohio-5704
    , 
    855 N.E.2d 1206
    .
    {¶ 56} Having reviewed the record, weighed the aggravating and
    mitigating factors, and considered the sanctions imposed for comparable conduct,
    we adopt the board’s recommended sanction of a one-year suspension, stayed on
    conditions.
    Conclusion
    {¶ 57} Norbert Mark Doellman Jr. is suspended from the practice of law
    in Ohio for one year.      However, the suspension is stayed on the following
    conditions: (1) respondent must not commit any further misconduct during the
    stayed suspension period, (2) respondent must make full restitution to First
    Financial, totaling $1,842.97 plus five percent interest from January 28, 2010, in
    12 monthly payments as agreed, (3) relator must appoint a monitor to oversee
    respondent’s legal practice and the management of his IOLTA account during the
    period of the stayed suspension, and (4) respondent must comply with his OLAP
    contract and follow the recommendations of his current mental-health
    professionals. If respondent violates these conditions, the stay will be lifted, and
    respondent will serve the one-year suspension. Costs are taxed to respondent.
    Judgment accordingly.
    PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., and BRYANT, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR,
    O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
    PEGGY L. BRYANT, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for BROWN,
    C.J.
    __________________
    Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger, Senior
    Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
    Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson and George Jonson, for respondent.
    ______________________
    19