State v. Rohrbaugh , 126 Ohio St. 3d 421 ( 2010 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Rohrbaugh, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 421
    , 
    2010-Ohio-3286
    .]
    THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. ROHRBAUGH, APPELLEE.
    [Cite as State v. Rohrbaugh, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 421
    , 
    2010-Ohio-3286
    .]
    Criminal procedure — Crim.R. 7 — Amendments to indictments.
    (Nos. 2008-2127 and 2008-2249 — Submitted November 3, 2009 — Decided
    July 20, 2010.)
    APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Logan County,
    No. 8-07-28, 
    2008-Ohio-4781
    .
    __________________
    SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
    A defendant may plead guilty to an indictment that was amended to change the
    name or identity of the charged crime when the defendant is represented
    by counsel, has bargained for the amendment, and is not prejudiced by the
    change.
    __________________
    PFEIFER, J.
    {¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether plain error exists when a
    defendant pleads guilty to a charge in an indictment that has been amended as a
    result of a plea bargain to charge a crime not originally charged in the indictment.
    We hold that a defendant may plead guilty to an indictment that was amended to
    change the name or identity of the charged crime when the defendant is
    represented by counsel, has bargained for the amendment, and is not prejudiced
    by the change.
    Factual and Procedural History
    {¶ 2} Appellee, John Rohrbaugh, was indicted on eight counts by a
    grand jury. Count one of the indictment charged Rohrbaugh with breaking and
    entering under R.C. 2911.13(A). After plea negotiations, the state sought to
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    amend the indictment, changing the charge of breaking and entering to a charge of
    receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51. The trial court allowed the
    amendment. Rohrbaugh, who was represented by an attorney, pleaded guilty to
    count one and to count eight (possession of drugs in violation of R.C.
    2925.11(A)). In return, the state agreed to dismiss the remaining six counts from
    the indictment. The court imposed a sentence of 11 months on both counts to be
    served concurrently and ordered Rohrbaugh to pay restitution.
    {¶ 3} Rohrbaugh appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in ordering
    restitution. The court of appeals did not reach the alleged error. Instead, the court
    held that the trial court had committed plain error when it amended the
    indictment. Accordingly, the court of appeals ordered that the defendant’s guilty
    plea be vacated.
    {¶ 4} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal. We also determined
    that a conflict exists between the judgment rendered by the court of appeals and
    the judgment rendered in State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. No. 90411, 2008-Ohio-
    3972. We ordered briefing on the following certified question: “May a defendant
    consent to a negotiated plea to an offense that was neither indicted, nor a lesser
    included offense of the indicted offense, without a waiver of indictment pursuant
    to Criminal Rule 7(A) and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution?”
    Analysis
    {¶ 5} The Ohio Constitution provides that “no person shall be held to
    answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless on presentment or
    indictment of a grand jury.” Section 10, Article I. Crim.R. 7(A) mirrors the
    constitutional provision by requiring that all felonies, absent proper waiver, be
    prosecuted by indictment. Indictments may be amended “before, during, or after
    a trial * * *, provided no change is made in the name or identity of the crime
    charged.” Crim.R. 7(D).
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    January Term, 2010
    {¶ 6} Rohrbaugh did not object to the indictment before trial, so he has
    waived all but plain error. See Crim.R. 12(C)(2). To reverse a decision based on
    plain error, a reviewing court must determine that a plain (or obvious) error
    occurred that affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Barnes (2002), 
    94 Ohio St.3d 21
    , 27, 
    759 N.E.2d 1240
    . See Crim.R. 52(B). Additionally, we have
    admonished courts that plain-error review must be undertaken “ ‘with the utmost
    caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest
    miscarriage of justice.’ ” 
    Id.,
     quoting State v. Long (1978), 
    53 Ohio St.2d 91
    , 
    7 O.O.3d 178
    , 
    372 N.E.2d 804
    , paragraph three of the syllabus.
    {¶ 7} We conclude that although there was error in this case, it was not
    reversible plain error, because there was no miscarriage of justice. Furthermore,
    Rohrbaugh cannot take advantage of an error that he invited through the plea
    negotiations.
    {¶ 8} The trial court erred because the amendment to the indictment
    changed the name or identity of the crime charged in count one. See Crim.R.
    7(D). The error was plain because Crim.R. 7(D) clearly bans such amendments.
    The error also “affected the outcome of the trial” because if not for the
    amendment, Rohrbaugh could not have pleaded guilty to the crime of receiving
    stolen property. See Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27, 
    759 N.E.2d 1240
    .
    {¶ 9} In State v. Davis, 
    121 Ohio St.3d 239
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4537
    , 
    903 N.E.2d 609
    , ¶12, we found plain error when a trial court amended an indictment
    to allow a defendant to be prosecuted for a higher degree of a crime. In that case,
    there was a miscarriage of justice because the prosecution was attempting to
    “increase the penalty or degree of the offense” charged. 
    Id.
     Unlike the defendant
    in Davis, Rohrbaugh was not prejudiced by the amendment to the indictment; to
    the contrary, he gained a benefit when the prosecution dismissed six charges
    against him. In Davis, the crime was amended from a felony of the fourth degree
    to a felony of the second degree. 
    Id.
     at ¶ 2–3. In this case, the amended charge of
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    receiving stolen property and the original charge of breaking and entering are both
    felonies of the fifth degree. Moreover, Rohrbaugh was represented by counsel
    and signed a statement that he had reviewed and understood the amended
    indictment. We conclude that there was no miscarriage of justice in this case.
    {¶ 10} This case also differs from Davis in that Rohrbaugh invited the
    alleged error. We have repeatedly held that a defendant may not “take advantage
    of an error that he himself invited or induced.” State ex rel. Kline v. Carroll, 
    96 Ohio St.3d 404
    , 
    2002-Ohio-4849
    , 
    775 N.E.2d 517
    , ¶ 27. In Davis, there was no
    invited-error issue because the prosecution acted unilaterally during trial. 
    Id.
     at ¶
    3–4. In this case, Rohrbaugh negotiated for the amended indictment and agreed
    to plead guilty to the amended charge. He cannot now argue that the amendment
    is plain error.
    {¶ 11} Rohrbaugh argues that he was not indicted and did not properly
    waive the right to indictment under the rule, even though Crim.R. 7(A) requires
    that a crime be prosecuted by indictment unless the indictment is properly waived.
    We conclude that Rohrbaugh was prosecuted by an indictment and that he was
    sufficiently informed of the charges in the indictment. See State v. Childs (2000),
    
    88 Ohio St.3d 558
    , 565–566, 
    728 N.E.2d 379
     (an offense is adequately charged
    when an indictment contains all elements of the offense and informs defendant of
    the charge). Because Rohrbaugh was prosecuted by indictment, Crim.R. 7(A) and
    its waiver requirements are not applicable to this case.
    Conclusion
    {¶ 12} Based on the foregoing analysis, we answer the certified question
    in the affirmative. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand
    the cause to the court of appeals so that it may reach the error concerning
    restitution that Rohrbaugh alleged in his appeal.
    Judgment reversed
    and cause remanded.
    4
    January Term, 2010
    LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP,
    JJ., concur.
    BROWN, C.J., not participating.
    __________________
    Gerald L. Heaton, Logan County Prosecuting Attorney, and Eric C.
    Stewart, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
    Marc S. Triplett, for appellee.
    ______________________
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