In re Raheem L. , 2013 Ohio 2423 ( 2013 )

[Cite as In re Raheem L., 2013-Ohio-2423.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: RAHEEM L. : APPEAL NO. C-100608
TRIAL NO. 09-8835X
:
: O P I N I O N.
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 12, 2013
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Office of the Ohio Public Defender, and Amanda J. Powell, Assistant State Public
Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
F ISCHER , Judge.
{¶1} In this appeal, we consider whether the legislature may authorize
juvenile courts to punish children for delinquency into their adulthood under the
Due Course Clause of Article I, Section 16, of the Ohio Constitution, and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For
the following reasons, we hold that these constitutional provisions place no such
restriction on the legislature, and we, therefore, affirm the judgment of the juvenile
court.
{¶2} Raheem L. was adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act
when he was 16 years old that would have constituted gross sexual imposition, in
violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), had he been an adult. The Hamilton County Juvenile
Court committed Raheem to the legal custody of the Department of Youth Services
until his 21st birthday, but suspended that commitment and placed him on probation.
The juvenile court further classified Raheem as a juvenile offender registrant and a
Tier II sex offender/child-victim offender under R.C. 2152.83(A). This triggered the so-
called punitive registration requirements of R.C. Chapter 2950, as amended by 2007
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (the “Adam Walsh Act”), for a maximum compliance period of 20
years. R.C. 2950.07(B)(2). See State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-
3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 15 (“Following the enactment of S.B. 10, all doubt has been
removed: R.C. Chapter 2950 is punitive.”); In re D.J.S., 130 Ohio St.3d 257, 2011-Ohio-
5342, 957 N.E.2d 291 (applying Williams to juvenile offender registrants). Although he
may later petition for declassification, because Raheem was classified as a juvenile
offender registrant under R.C. 2152.83(A), he cannot do so until three years after he
completes his disposition. See R.C. 2152.84 and 2152.85. Given the length of his
2
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
suspended commitment, his first opportunity for declassification will, therefore, occur
when he is approximately 24 years old.
{¶3} In his single assignment of error, Raheem argues that by imposing
punishment for delinquency that will extend beyond his 21st birthday, the juvenile
court violated his right to due process under the state and federal constitutions.
{¶4} We begin our analysis by turning to the relevant constitutional
provisions. The Due Course Clause of the Ohio Constitution provides that “every
person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law,” and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits any state from depriving “any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law * * * .” Despite their
different wording, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that these provisions afford
“equivalent” protections. See Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540,
544, 38 N.E.2d 70 (1941). We, therefore, analyze each clause similarly absent any
argument to treat them differently. See State ex rel. O’Brien v. Heimlich, 10th Dist. No.
08AP-521, 2009-Ohio-1550, ¶ 23.
{¶5} The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Due Process
Clause has both procedural and substantive components. See, e.g., Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-720, 117 S.Ct. 2302, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). “The two
components are distinct from each other because each has different objectives, and
each imposes different constitutional limitations on government power.” Howard v.
Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir.1996). “Although the distinctions between the
two are often difficult to discern, and indeed often appear to converge, the doctrinal
foundation upon which these limitations were erected helps to explain the different
standards applicable to each and to sharpen the focus of analysis.” Id.3
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶6} Procedural due process requires “that an individual be given an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Morrison
v. Warren, 375 F.3d 468, 475, (6th Cir.2004), citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). It “also embodies the concept of
fundamental fairness.” Sohi v. State Dental Bd., 130 Ohio App.3d 414, 422, 720 N.E.2d
187 (1st Dist.1998). Over the past half-century, courts have relied on these principles to
extend many of the same procedural guarantees applicable in criminal prosecutions to
juvenile delinquency proceedings. See In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919,
874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 71-81, explaining In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d
527 (1967) (holding that a juvenile and his or her parents must be informed of certain
rights, including the juvenile's right to be represented by counsel and to have counsel
appointed if his or her family cannot afford an attorney, the right not to be forced to
incriminate himself or herself, the right to written notice of the specific charges
against him or her, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses) and its
progeny.
{¶7} Substantive due process, meanwhile, “forbids the government to
infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.” (Emphasis sic.) Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123
L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). “Fundamental rights are those liberties that are ‘deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.’ ” State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606,
861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 19, quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932,
52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977). We are extremely reluctant to recognize new fundamental rights
“because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are
scarce and open-ended.” Collins v. Harker Hts., 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117
4
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
L.Ed.2d 261 (1992), citing Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-
226, 106 S.Ct. 507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985). As Chief Justice Rehnquist aptly noted,
“[b]y extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we,
to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative
action.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2302, 138 L.Ed.2d 722. Courts must,
therefore, “ ‘exercise the utmost care whenever [they] are asked to break new ground
in this field’ * * * lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly
transformed into the policy preferences” of individual judges. Id., quoting Collins at
125, and citing Moore at 502.
{¶8} If no fundamental right has been implicated, we must decide only
whether the statute at issue “is reasonably related to a legitimate government
interest.” Lowe at ¶ 18. Under this test, “the law need not be in every respect
logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil
at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it.” United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126,
__, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1966, 176 L.Ed.2d 878 (2010), quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical
of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955).
{¶9} Raheem has not alleged any procedural deficiency in the classification
of juvenile offender registrants under R.C. 2152.83(A). Compare In re D.H., 120 Ohio
St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209 (holding that due process does not require a
jury when imposing a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence under R.C.
2152.13). Instead, he simply argues that his classification—together with its attendant
punitive registration requirements—violates his due-process rights by extending
punishment for his delinquency into his adulthood. We understand this assigned error
as invoking substantive due process. See In re I.A., 2d Dist. No. 25078, 2012-Ohio-
5
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
4973, ¶ 6 (applying substantive-due-process analysis where a delinquent child argued
that R.C. Chapter 2950, as amended by the Adam Walsh Act, cannot be applied to
juveniles because the law is punitive).
{¶10} Raheem cites no case law that recognizes the fundamental right of a
child to avoid punishment for delinquency that extends beyond the child’s 21st
birthday. Moreover, he provides no basis for us to say that such a right is deeply rooted
in our nation’s history and tradition. Since their inception, the juvenile courts have
constantly evolved as policymakers and courts have grappled with “the inherent tension
* * * between the goals of rehabilitation and the protection of society.” In re C.S., 115
Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 75. We believe that tying a
fundamental right to this moving target would be unwise. Further, we note that on two
recent occasions, the Ohio Supreme Court has upheld various aspects of the blended-
sentencing framework, which incorporates prison terms for delinquency that are served
beyond the child’s 21st birthday. See In re D.H., supra; In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1,
2012-Ohio-4961, 979 N.E.2d 1203. We, therefore, conclude that no fundamental right
has been implicated in this case.
{¶11} We turn then to whether such punishment is rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. The General Assembly has provided that the
overriding purposes for juvenile-court dispositions are “to provide for the care,
protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to [R.C.
Chapter 2152], protect the public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable
for the offender's actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender.” R.C.
2152.01. Although the Ohio Supreme Court has stressed the importance of
rehabilitation in the juvenile-court system, it has also recognized that the state has
“valid interests in enforcing its criminal laws against juveniles and, in at least some
6
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
cases, in requesting that the juvenile court impose significant penalties in their
dispositions * * * .” In re C.S. at ¶ 77. With this in mind, together with our highly-
deferential standard of review, we cannot say that the punishment authorized by R.C.
2152.83(A) is irrational.
{¶12} Raheem has, therefore, failed to show that either the Due Course
Clause of the Ohio Constitution or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit the juvenile courts from
punishing a child for delinquency into adulthood. The single assignment of error is
overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
D INKELACKER , J., concurs.
C UNNINGHAM , P.J., dissents.
C UNNINGHAM , P.J., dissenting.
{¶13} For juvenile offenders like Raheem L., R.C. 2152.83(A) mandates that the
juvenile court “shall issue as part of the dispositional order * * * an order that classifies the
child a juvenile offender registrant” and that specifies the child’s duties of periodic
registration with the sheriff. Because R.C. 2152.83(A) removes the essential, discretionary
role of the juvenile court in the disposition of a juvenile offender registrant, and abandons
the heightened goal of the rehabilitation of the offender, the juvenile offender cannot avoid
the adult portion of his disposition by successfully completing his juvenile rehabilitation.
The adult portion of his disposition is thus fundamentally unfair and the juvenile offender
is denied due process. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
{¶14} The overall goal of R.C. Chapter 2152 is found in the first sentences of
R.C. 2152.01(A). The statute lists five distinct purposes for juvenile dispositions. And the
first purpose is “to provide for the care, protection, mental and physical development of
7
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
children subject to this chapter.” Only then are the interests in ensuring public safety,
restoring the victim, and holding the juvenile offender accountable addressed as purposes
of a juvenile disposition. In the final sentence of the section, the General Assembly
instructs that these “purposes shall be achieved by a system of graduated sanctions and
services.” Id. (Emphasis added.)
{¶15} Three years ago, our colleague, a former long-serving juvenile court
judge, warned that, “Whenever a juvenile court judge’s discretion is removed in favor of
mandatory judicial action, there is the possibility for consequences that contradict the
stated purpose of the very law that judge is sworn to uphold.” In re Moore, 1st Dist. Nos.
C-090576, C-090577, and C-090578, 2010-Ohio-3991, ¶ 29-30 (Hendon, J., concurring).
That admonition is crystallized in the mandatory and automatic application of the adult
sanctions of R.C. 2152.83 to juvenile sex offenders.
{¶16} In its recent decision, In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967
N.E.2d 729, syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the automatic, lifelong
registration and notification requirements, placed on more serious juvenile sex offenders
by R.C. 2152.86, violate the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment, and violate the Due Process Clauses of the federal and Ohio constitutions.
The court noted that “[t]he disposition of a child is so different from the sentencing of an
adult that fundamental fairness to the child demands the unique expertise of a juvenile
judge.” Id. at ¶ 76, citing State v. D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209,
¶ 59.
{¶17} When a statutory scheme seeking to impose adult penalties on juvenile
offenders retains the juvenile court’s key role in the disposition of an offender, it passes
constitutional muster. As the majority noted, in State v. D.H., the Ohio Supreme Court
upheld the application of adult prison terms to juvenile offenders in blended-sentencing
cases, including the imposition of prison sentences that extend beyond the offender’s 21st
8
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
birthday. But the adult prison penalty cannot be automatically imposed at the time of
disposition. It is stayed “unless the juvenile fails to successfully complete his or her
traditional juvenile disposition.” D.H. at ¶ 18, citing R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(iii). The threat
of the adult sentence thus “encourages a juvenile’s cooperation in his own rehabilitation,
functioning as both carrot and stick.” D.H. at ¶ 18. Moreover, the juvenile court cannot
impose the adult sentence solely for the acts that led to the juvenile’s blended sentence.
“Only further bad acts by the juvenile as he is rehabilitated in the juvenile system can
cause the stayed adult penalty to be invoked.” C.P. at 15; see D.H. at ¶ 18. Even then, the
juvenile court has the discretion to avoid invoking the adult penalty. Before lifting the
stay, the juvenile court must make a finding, supported by clear and convincing evidence,
that its efforts to rehabilitate the juvenile have failed, and that the juvenile is “unlikely to
be rehabilitated during the remaining period of juvenile jurisdiction.” R.C.
2151.14(E)(1)(c); see D.H. at ¶ 31.
{¶18} When, however, an adult penalty is imposed immediately upon
disposition, and “the juvenile is not given the opportunity to avoid the adult portion of his
punishment by successfully completing his juvenile rehabilitation,” the sentence imposed
is fundamentally unfair and the juvenile offender is denied due process. C.P. at ¶ 16.
{¶19} Here, the juvenile court has neither carrot nor stick with which to
attempt to rehabilitate the offender. Rather than employing a system of graduated
sanctions and services, the juvenile court must label the offender as a juvenile offender
registrant solely for the commission of the act that led to his adjudication. No additional
act, signaling a possible failure of rehabilitation, is required. The automatically imposed
registration obligations extend beyond the offender’s 21st birthday, “anchor[ing] the
juvenile offender to his crime.” C.P. at ¶ 47. And the court must impose this sanction at
the beginning of its rehabilitative efforts, rather than at the end when it has concluded that
the offender’s rehabilitation has failed and that, now, the focus of the juvenile court’s
9
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
efforts must shift solely to the protection of the public from a juvenile unwilling or unable
to conform to society’s norms of behavior. Here, Raheem L.’s mandatory classification
occurred and the sanctions were imposed less than seven weeks after the initial complaint
had been filed.
{¶20} I note that the Ohio Supreme Court has catalogued the significant
differences between the automatic lifelong notification and registration requirements for
public-registry-qualified juvenile offender registrants, under R.C. 2152.86, and the
penalties imposed on other juvenile offender registrants like Raheem L. See C.P. at ¶ 20 et
seq. But R.C. 2152.83(A) also mandates a “penalty that extends well beyond the age at
which the juvenile court loses jurisdiction” as “a consequence that attaches immediately
and leaves [him] with no means of avoiding the penalty by demonstrating that he will
benefit from rehabilitative opportunities.” C.P. at ¶ 24. Therefore, I would find that R.C.
2152.83(A), like R.C. 2152.86, denies a juvenile the fundamental fairness guaranteed by
the Due Process Clauses of the federal and Ohio constitutions.
{¶21} Finally, as the majority correctly notes, Raheem L.’s first opportunity to
petition the juvenile court “judge who made the classification, or that judge’s successor in
office,” to end his 20-year classification would arise when he is 24 years old. See R.C.
2152.84(A)(2) and 2152.85. Yet two recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions highlight the
difficulties he might face in having the juvenile court judge who made the classification
exercise jurisdiction over his petition. See State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 134 Ohio
St.3d 421, 2012-Ohio-5697, 983 N.E.2d 302, ¶ 32 (“[T]he juvenile court lacks jurisdiction
to classify [a juvenile sex offender], who is now no longer a ‘child’ under the applicable
statute.”); In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, 979 N.E.2d 1203 (“[J]uvenile
courts do not have jurisdiction over adjudicated delinquents once they are 21 years old.”).
{¶22} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
10