Studnicka v. Bur. of Workers' Comp. , 2012 Ohio 4266 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as Studnicka v. Bur. of Workers' Comp., 
    2012-Ohio-4266
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
    ROBERT STUDNICKA,                                :         APPEAL NO. C-110724
    TRIAL NO. A-0905674
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                     :
    O P I N I O N.
    vs.                                            :
    ADMINISTRATOR, OHIO BUREAU                       :
    OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION,
    :
    Defendant-Appellee,
    :
    and
    :
    GREEN TOWNSHIP POLICE,
    Defendant.                               :
    Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
    Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause
    Remanded
    Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 21, 2012
    Fox & Fox Co, LPA, Bernard C. Fox, Jr., and M. Christopher Kneflin for Plaintiff-
    Appellant,
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General of Ohio, and Dianna K. Bond, Assistant Attorney
    General, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Please note: This case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
    O HIO F IRST D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEALS
    D INKELACKER , Judge.
    {¶1}     The Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) denied the
    claim of plaintiff-appellant Robert Studnicka for compensation for additional
    conditions related to a workplace injury. Studnicka appealed that decision to the
    trial court, which partially affirmed the BWC’s decision after a bench trial. On
    appeal, Studnicka claims that the trial court’s decision denying his claim in part was
    against the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree.
    Facts and Procedural Background
    {¶2}     On September 4, 2008, Studnicka was working as a police officer for
    Green Township when he injured his left knee. He was initially diagnosed with a
    torn medial meniscus—a condition that was allowed by the BWC. After subsequent
    treatment, Studnicka’s treating orthopedic surgeon diagnosed the additional
    conditions of left knee synovitis and osteoarthritis. Surgery to treat those conditions
    allowed Studnicka to return to work.
    {¶3}     When Studnicka filed for the additional conditions of synovitis and
    osteoarthritis, his application was denied by the BWC. He then filed an appeal of
    that determination with the trial court. At the bench trial, Studnicka offered the
    testimony of his treating orthopedic surgeon. A second surgeon testified on behalf of
    the BWC.      Both experts acknowledged that Studnicka’s left knee had contained
    osteoarthritis prior to his industrial injury, but they differed as to whether the
    accident “substantially aggravated” the condition. The trial court concluded that the
    BWC had properly denied the condition, finding that Studnicka had failed to show
    that the osteoarthritis was a preexisting condition. And, “[i]f the osteoarthritis was
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    O HIO F IRST D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEALS
    not a preexisting condition, then it was not substantially aggravated by the * * *
    industrial accident.”
    {¶4}     As to the synovitis, both experts agreed that it was related to the
    accident, so the trial court directed a verdict in favor of Studnicka on that issue.
    Finding Contrary to Undisputed Evidence
    Requires Reversal
    {¶5}     In one assignment of error, Studnicka claims that the decision of the
    trial court upholding the BWC’s decision denying his claim for aggravation of his
    osteoarthritis was against the manifest weight of the evidence. When addressing a
    manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, this court uses the same standard in civil
    cases as in criminal matters. See Eastley v. Volkman, 
    132 Ohio St.3d 328
    , 2012-
    Ohio-2179, 
    972 N.E.2d 517
    , ¶ 17-23. Therefore, this court must review the entire
    record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of
    the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier
    of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v.
    Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997).
    {¶6}     To succeed on his workers' compensation claim to participate for the
    additional conditions, Studnicka had to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
    evidence that he suffered from the additional conditions and that they had been
    proximately caused by his workplace injury. R.C. 4123.01(C). In order to make that
    claim based on the aggravation of a preexisting condition, he had to show that the
    condition was “substantially aggravated” by the accident. R.C. 4123.01(C)(4).
    {¶7}     In this case, both experts agreed that Studnicka had osteoarthritis in
    his left knee, and that the condition had existed at the time of the injury. Expert
    testimony is not necessarily conclusive—even when it is not contradicted by the
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    O HIO F IRST D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEALS
    opposing party's evidence. See State v. Brown, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 133
    , 135, 
    449 N.E.2d 449
    (1983). But the trier of fact may not arbitrarily ignore expert testimony. State v.
    White, 
    118 Ohio St.3d 12
    , 
    2008-Ohio-1623
    , 
    885 N.E.2d 905
    , ¶ 71-73. Some objective
    reasoning must support the decision to reject it. 
    Id.
    {¶8}    In this case, the record does not contain any competent, credible
    evidence to support the trial court's judgment denying Studnicka the right to
    participate in the workers' compensation fund for the additional condition requested.
    Both sides agreed that he suffered from osteoarthritis in his left knee and that the
    condition existed prior to his workplace injury. The only dispute was whether the
    condition was substantially aggravated by the accident. There is no evidence in the
    record to support the trial court’s conclusion that Studnicka did not suffer from a
    preexisting condition.
    Conclusion
    {¶9}    As this court recently noted, we must indulge every reasonable
    presumption in favor of the trial court's judgment. Bell v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp.,
    1st Dist. No. C-110166, 
    2012-Ohio-1364
    , ¶ 27 (citations omitted). But for that
    presumption to apply, the decision must be supported by competent, credible
    evidence. See 
    id.
    {¶10}   Because the determination made by the trial court is not supported by
    the record, the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.           We
    therefore sustain Studnicka’s sole assignment of error, reverse the portion of the trial
    court’s judgment upholding the BWC’s denial of his claim for aggravation of his left-
    knee osteoarthritis, and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial on the issue
    of compensation for aggravation of the left-knee osteoarthritis.        See Hanna v.
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    O HIO F IRST D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEALS
    Wagner, 
    39 Ohio St.2d 64
    , 66, 
    313 N.E.2d 842
     (1974). The court’s judgment is
    affirmed in all other respects.
    Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
    HILDEBRANDT, P.J., and CUNNINGHAM, J., concur.
    Please note:
    The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C-110724

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 4266

Judges: Dinkelacker

Filed Date: 9/21/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014