Jenkins v. Jenkins , 2012 Ohio 4182 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2012-Ohio-4182.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR CLARK COUNTY, OHIO
TINA M. JENKINS :
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2011 CA 86
v. : T.C. NO. 06DR555
LYLE R. JENKINS : (Civil appeal from Common
Pleas Court, Domestic Relations)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 14th day of September , 2012.
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JON PAUL RION, Atty. Reg. No. 0067020 and NICOLE RUTTER-HIRTH, Atty. Reg. No.
0081004, 130 W. Second Street, Suite 2150, P. O. Box 1262, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
WILFRED L. POTTER, Atty. Reg. No. 0029121, 234 N. Limestone Street, Springfield,
Ohio 45503
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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DONOVAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Lyle R. Jenkins appeals a judgment of the Clark County
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Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, which adopted a magistrate’s
decision finding him in civil contempt for violating a court order and awarding
plaintiff-appellee Tina M. Jenkins the right to claim their two children for tax exemption
purposes from 2010 through 2018. The magistrate’s decision was filed on May 13, 2011.
On May 26, 2011, Lyle filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court
overruled Lyle’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision in a judgment entry filed
on October 18, 2011. Lyle filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on November 10,
2011.
{¶ 2} Lyle and Tina were married in February of 2003 in Springfield, Ohio. The
couple produced two children who were born just prior to the parties’ marriage. The
parties’ decree of divorce was filed on November 27, 2007. In the divorce decree, Lyle was
awarded primary custody and legal guardianship of the couple’s minor children, and Tina
was ordered to child support for both children. To say that the parties’ relationship has been
contentious since their divorce would be a gross understatement. A review of the record
indicates that both Lyle and Tina have repeatedly been held in contempt of court for their
respective failures to abide by court orders regarding the custody and care of their minor
children, as well as certain financial matters. As noted by a magistrate in an earlier
contempt proceeding, “the parties hate each other.”
{¶ 3} At issue in the instant appeal is a provision of an Agreed Order executed by
the parties on October 22, 2009, allowing Tina to claim both children for tax exemptions
each year if Lyle has not earned sufficient taxable income during the calendar year exceeding
his personal exemption and standard deduction for tax purposes. The record establishes that
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in 2009, Lyle reported income of only $4,500.00, yet he claimed both children for
exemptions on his tax return. Lyle does not dispute that he did not report a sufficient
amount of income in order to claim the children on his return. We note that the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) disallowed his attempt to claim the children in 2009.
{¶ 4} Pursuant to her rights under the Agreed Entry, Tina filed her own tax return
for 2009, in which she claimed both children. The IRS, however, informed her that the
children had already been claimed, and that she owed money on her 2009 tax return. As a
result, Tina filed a motion requesting that Lyle be held in contempt for claiming the children
on his 2009 taxes.
{¶ 5} Additionally, Tina adduced evidence at the contempt hearing that on
February 8, 2010, Lyle signed two IRS 8332 forms presented to him by Tina during a
visitation exchange. The documents purported to allow Tina to claim both children for tax
purposes from 2010 through 2018. Tina testified that both forms were completely filled out
when Lyle signed them, and he was aware of the rights he was relinquishing. Lyle argued
that the forms were blank when he signed them, and he only agreed that Tina could claim the
children for the 2010 tax year. Lyle asserted that he signed the blank forms during the
visitation exchange only because he was preoccupied with his children at the time and
simply wanted to leave. Tina testified that Lyle stated that he would sign the forms if she
agreed to dismiss the pending contempt proceedings against him. Tina testified that she did
not agree to his request, but he, nevertheless, filled out his name and social security number
on each completed form.
{¶ 6} The magistrate found Lyle’s testimony not credible, and recommended that
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he be held in contempt for claiming both children in 2009, fined him $250.00, and ordered
him to pay court costs and $200.00 of Tina’s attorney fees. The magistrate, as part of the
contempt sancetion, awarded Tina the right to claim both children for tax exemptions from
2010 though 2018. Lyle filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court
subsequently overruled Lyle’s objections and adopted the decision of the magistrate.
{¶ 7} It is from this judgment that Lyle now appeals.
{¶ 8} Lyle’s first assignment of error is as follows:
{¶ 9} “THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE TO
PUNISH APPELLANT AS IN CRIMINAL CONTEMPT INSTEAD OF CIVIL
CONTEMPT.”
{¶ 10} In his first assignment, Lyle contends that the trial court erred when it found
him in indirect civil contempt. Specifically, Lyle argues that although he attempted to claim
both children on his 2009 tax return, he was ultimately unsuccessful because the IRS
disallowed his attempt to use the deductions, and Tina, therefore, still has the deductions
available to her. Lyle asserts that because he was unsuccessful in his attempt to claim the
children, he did not violate the express language in the Agreed Entry that the parties
executed on October 22, 2009. Lyle also argues that the trial court erred by treating the
matter as criminal contempt action rather than an action in civil contempt when it imposed a
fine and ordered him to pay a portion of Tina’s attorney fees.
{¶ 11} In State v. Chavez-Juarez, 185 Ohio App.3d 189, 2009-Ohio-6130, 923
N.E.2d 670 (2d Dist.), we recently discussed the concept of civil and criminal contempt:
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Contempt is defined in general terms as disobedience
of a court order. It is conduct which brings the administration
of justice into disrespect, or which tends to embarrass, impede
or obstruct a court in the performance of its functions. * * *
Contempt proceedings are often classified as sui generis,
neither civil nor criminal. * * * However, most courts distinguish
between civil and criminal contempt proceedings.
The distinction is usually based on the purpose to be
served by the sanction. * * * Thus, in determining whether
a contempt is civil or criminal, the pertinent test is “what
does the court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing
sentence?” * * *Civil contempt sanctions are designed for
remedial or coercive purposes and are often employed to compel
obedience to a court order. * * * Criminal contempt sanctions,
however, are punitive in nature and are designed to
vindicate the authority of the court. * * * Thus,
civil contempts are characterized as violations against
the party for whose benefit the order was made, whereas
criminal contempts are most often described as offenses
against the dignity or process of the court. Id., at ¶s 24-25,
citing State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551,
554-555, 2001-Ohio-15, 740 N.E.2d 265.
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{¶ 12} “A prima facie case of civil contempt is made when the moving party proves
both the existence of a court order and the nonmoving party's noncompliance with the terms
of that order.” Wolf v. Wolf, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090587, 2010-Ohio-2762, ¶ 4. “Clear
and convincing evidence is the standard of proof in civil contempt proceedings.” Flowers v.
Flowers, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1176, 2011-Ohio-5972, ¶ 13. We review the trial
court’s decision whether to find a party in contempt under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Wolf at ¶4.
{¶ 13} As the Supreme Court of Ohio has determined:
“Abuse of discretion” has been defined as an attitude that is
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. (Internal citation omitted). It is
to be expected that most instances of abuse of discretion will result in
decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions that are
unconscionable or arbitrary.
A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that
would support that decision. It is not enough that the reviewing court, were
it deciding the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning process to
be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that
would support a contrary result. AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place
Community Redevelopment, 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).
{¶ 14} In the instant case, Lyle does not dispute that he attempted to claim both
children as exemptions on his 2009 tax return even though he had not earned sufficient
income to allow such use by the terms of the Agreed Entry. Lyle testified that his conduct
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was not intentional. Rather, Lyle asserts that he simply misunderstood the provision of the
Agreed Entry to allow him to claim the children if he earned some income during the year.
Moreover, Lyle points out that the IRS did not allow him to claim the children for the year of
2009. Thus, Tina was not harmed because she can still claim the children as an exemption
on her 2009 tax return. Simply put, Lyle defends his actions by arguing “no harm, no foul.”
{¶ 15} Initially, we note that the Agreed Entry permitted him to claim the children
only if he earned sufficient income in order to do so. Lyle acknowledges that the amount of
income that he earned in 2009 was insufficient for him to benefit from a tax exemption.
Lyle testified that he did not even receive a tax return in 2009 because of his low income.
Despite this, he still claimed both children which prevented Tina from rightfully claiming
the children herself. Clearly, Lyle violated the court order, and his actions in that regard
were to the detriment of Tina. It is irrelevant that Lyle did not benefit from his
contemptuous behavior. Tina had only to prove the existence of a court order and Lyle’s
noncompliance with the order. Tina met her burden, and the trial court correctly found Lyle
in contempt. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it adopted the
magistrate’s decision finding Lyle in contempt.
{¶ 16} We also note that the trial court did not err when it characterized Lyle’s
conduct as civil contempt rather than criminal contempt. “To determine whether [a]
proceeding involved criminal or civil contempt, we look at the character and purpose of the
penalties imposed. Punishment for civil contempt is ‘remedial or coercive and for the
benefit of the complainant.’ Brown v. Executive 200, Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 250, 253, 416
N.E.2d 610 (1980). On the other hand, imprisonment for criminal contempt operates as
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‘punishment for the completed act of disobedience, and to vindicate the authority of the law
and the court.’ Id. at 254. Civil contempt punishments are conditional in that the contemnor
can avoid the punishment by doing what [is] ordered. Thus, the contemnor is coerced into
complying with the court's order. However, criminal contempt sanctions are typically
definite and unconditional, and the contemnor is punished for the punitive purposes of the
court rather than for the benefit of the complainant. Id.” Carter v. Carter, 2d Dist.
Montgomery Nos. 14409, 14530, 14574, 1994 WL 660811 (Nov. 23, 1994); see Shapiro v.
Shapiro, 2d Dist. Miami No. 94-CA-2, 1994 WL645970 (Nov. 18, 1994).
{¶ 17} Upon review, we conclude that the sanctions imposed fall under the category
of civil contempt rather than criminal contempt. We note that Lyle failed to object to the
magistrate’s decision to find him in civil, rather than criminal, contempt. As a result, he has
waived that argument for the purposes of appeal. Nevertheless, Tina argues that the
sanctions for contempt were civil in nature, because they were designed to coerce Lyle to
comply with the Agreed Entry. We agree. The sanctions were designed to serve a
remedial purpose and employed to compel Lyle’s obedience to the Agreed Entry. Lyle’s
conduct can be characterized as a violation against the party for whose benefit the order was
made: to wit, violating the express terms of the Agreed Entry to Tina’s detriment.
Essentially, Lyle’s acts closely resemble a breach of contract for which the remedies are civil
in nature. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it found Lyle to be in indirect civil
contempt.
{¶ 18} Further, we conclude that the trial court’s decision finding Lyle in contempt
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. “A challenge to the manifest weight of
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the evidence differs from a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v.
McKnight, 107 Ohio St.3d 101,112, 2005-Ohio-6046, 837 N.E.2d 315. The court,
reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial
should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily
against the conviction. Id.{¶ 19} The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony
are matters for the trier of facts to resolve. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227
N.E.2d 212 (1967). “Because the factfinder * * * has the opportunity to see and hear the
witnesses, the cautious exercise of the discretionary power of a court of appeals to find that a
judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence requires that substantial deference
be extended to the factfinder’s determinations of credibility. The decision whether, and to
what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses is within the peculiar competence
of the factfinder, who has seen and heard the witness.” State v. Lawson , 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684 (Aug. 22, 1997).
{¶ 20} Lyle’s contempt finding is clearly not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony were
matters for the court to resolve. Although Lyle testified at trial on his own behalf, his
defense consisted of an allegation that he was simply mistaken and did not intend to violate
the Agreed Entry which restricted his ability to claim his children as tax exemptions only
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during years when he earned sufficient income. The trial court did not lose its way simply
because it chose to believe the testimony of Tina, who testified at length regarding Lyle’s
failure to abide by the Agreed Entry. Having reviewed the entire record, we cannot clearly
find that the evidence weighs heavily against a finding of contempt, or that a manifest
miscarriage of justice has occurred.
{¶ 21} Lyle’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 22} Because it is dispositive to his appeal, Lyle’s third assignment of error will
be discussed next as follows:
{¶ 23} “THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND A
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS FOR LACK OF ADEQUATE NOTICE.”
{¶ 24} In his final assignment, Lyle contends that the trial court erred when it
awarded Tina the tax exemptions for both children from 2010 through 2018 in addition to
the sanctions previously imposed upon the civil contempt finding. The trial court also held
that a reallocation of the tax exemptions was proper after having found Lyle in contempt for
violating the Agreed Entry.
{¶ 25} Initially, we note that the magistrate based her civil contempt finding on the
fact the Lyle ignored the plain language of the Agreed Entry and claimed both children as tax
exemptions in 2009 when he was expressly forbidden to do so. In the magistrate’s
conclusions of law, the contempt finding also incorrectly encompassed a modification of the
Agreed Entry which reallocated the tax exemptions in 2010 through 2018. Contrary to the
assertion made by Tina in her appellate brief, Lyle specifically objected to the portion of the
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magistrate’s decision wherein Tina received the tax exemption privilege for 2010 through
2018 because there was no motion before the court requesting such relief. Simply put, the
tax documents and the issue of modification of the Agreed Entry were not properly before
the court and the magistrate erred by considering them. Lyle was not provided any notice
that Tina was asking for a modification of the Agreed Entry. The record establishes that
Tina’s show cause motion only requested that Lyle be held in contempt for improperly
claiming the children in 2009 in direct violation of the Agreed Entry. The show cause
motion contained no mention of Tina’s intention to request a modification of the Agreed
Entry for 2010 through 2018, and it was error for the magistrate to modify the Agreed Entry
without a proper motion pursuant to Civ. R. 75(J) before her and without proper notice to
Lyle pursuant to R.C. 3119.82. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to adopt the
decision of the magistrate in that regard.
{¶ 26} Lyle’s third assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 27} Lyle’s second assignment of error is as follows:
{¶ 28} “THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND
DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO FURTHER PUNISH APPELLANT BY GRANTING
APPELLEE THE TAX DEDUCTIONS UNTIL 2018.”
{¶ 29} In his second assignment, Lyle argues that the trial court’s decision giving
Tina the right to claim her children as tax exemptions from 2010 through 2018 constitutes a
second punishment for the same conduct for which he was punished when he was held in
contempt and ordered to pay a fine, court costs, and a portion of Tina’s attorney fees.
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{¶ 30} In light of our disposition with respect to Lyle’s third assignment, his second
assignment of error is rendered moot.
{¶ 31} Lyle’s first assignment of error having been overruled and his third
assignment having been sustained, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
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GRADY, P.J., concurs.
HALL, J., concurring:
{¶ 32} I agree with the well reasoned opinion authored by Judge Donovan and
concur in its holding. The defendant was properly found in contempt of court for claiming
both children as exemptions for the 2009 tax year. I also agree that absent an agreement of
the parties, confirmed by the trial court, or a motion directed to the issue, the trial court
could not modify allocation of the tax exemptions for the children.
{¶ 33} I write only to observe that the magistrate made a finding, which the court
adopted, that the defendant admitted he signed the IRS 8332 forms (release of claim to
exemption) to allow the mother to claim both children. And further, that the forms were
completed to release the exemptions for tax years from 2010 through 2018. Lyle Jenkins’
testimony to the contrary was found not credible. Therefore, even though the court order
could not be changed without a proper motion, the IRS 8332 forms allow the mother to
claim the children for future years unless and until the 8332 releases are revoked in a manner
recognized by the IRS.
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Copies mailed to:
Jon Paul Rion
Nicole Rutter-Hirth
Wilfred L. Potter
Hon. Thomas J. Capper