Nohle v. Gwiner ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as Nohle v. Gwiner, 
    2013-Ohio-3075
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    SENECA COUNTY
    DAWN-MARIE NOHLE,
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,                             CASE NO. 13-12-59
    v.
    COREY GWINER, ET AL.,                                    OPINION
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
    Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. 10CV0520
    Judgment Affirmed
    Date of Decision: July 15, 2013
    APPEARANCES:
    Dawn-Marie Nohle, Appellant
    Alan B. Dills for Appellees
    Case No. 13-12-59
    WILLAMOWSKI, J.
    {¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Dawn-Marie Nohle (“Nohle”), pro se, appeals
    the judgment of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas denying Nohle’s
    Civ.R. 60(B) motion to set aside the dismissal of her case. On appeal, Nohle
    contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for
    relief from judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed.
    {¶2} This case arises from a motor vehicle collision which occurred on
    November 14, 2005.        Defendant-Appellee Corey Gwiner (“Gwiner”) failed to
    stop at a stop sign, causing a collision with Nohle’s vehicle. Nohle’s vehicle
    suffered extensive damage and she reported that her “ankle and back [were]
    hurting.” (Appellant’s Ex. A, Traffic Crash Report) Gwiner acknowledged fault
    in causing the accident, so liability is not contested.
    {¶3} On November 13, 2007, Nohle, acting pro se, filed a complaint in
    Case No. 07-CV-0622 seeking damages for alleged injuries and naming Gwiner,
    his father (Gary Gwiner), and Buckeye State Mutual Insurance Company, as
    defendants (hereinafter, collectively “Defendants” or “Appellees”). Significant
    discovery difficulties were encountered, requiring repeated motions to compel
    against Nohle.
    {¶4} The matter was ultimately assigned for trial on October 14, 2009.
    On the morning set for trial, 41 prospective jurors, defense counsel, Defendants,
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    the judge and the court reporter were present and ready for trial. (July 28, 2011
    Pretrial Tr. 10) Nohle did not appear but, instead, faxed a Civ.R. 41(A) dismissal,
    without giving any prior notification to the court or defense counsel. (Id.)
    {¶5} Nohle re-filed a new complaint, Case No. 10-CV-0520, 364 days
    later, on October 13, 2010. Additional motions to compel completion of discovery
    followed in this second action. On January 12, 2011, the trial court scheduled this
    second case for Mediation and Final Settlement Pretrial Conference on July 28,
    2011, at 9:00 a.m. The parties had more than six months advance notice of this
    schedule.
    {¶6} On July 28, 2011, Nohle failed to appear for the scheduled mediation
    at 9:00 a.m. Instead, she called the trial court shortly after 10:00 a.m. and stated
    on the record that the reason that she was not in attendance was that she was in
    Columbus for day three of the Ohio Bar Examination. Nohle apologized for not
    attending and stated that, “suddenly at the last moment, I realized that the third day
    of the Ohio State Bar exam and this mediation were scheduled for the same day.”
    (Pretrial Tr. 3)
    {¶7} The trial court then dismissed the case, noting the long list of
    repeated difficulties experienced with Nohle during discovery proceedings, the
    previous abrupt dismissal without prior warning on the morning of trial in the first
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    case, and particularly her failure to request permission to attend the mediation and
    final settlement pretrial other than in person or to seek a continuance. (Id.)
    {¶8} The trial court filed its judgment entry on August 1, 2011, denying
    Nohle’s request for a continuance and dismissing the case with prejudice for want
    of prosecution. This judgment entry was a final appealable order. No appeal was
    taken.
    {¶9} Nohle then filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment,
    364 days later, on July 31, 2012.                           Nohle’s motion stated that her pet
    Newfoundland, Sadie Lynn, suddenly passed away on the date of the final pretrial,
    and that she had tried to call the trial court and mediator in order to request
    permission to attend the mediation via telephone. Nohle stated that “the failure to
    attend the mediation scheduled for July 28th, 2011, was solely due to the
    unexpected passing of her companion animal.” (Jul. 31, 2012 Civ.R. 60(B) Mtn.)
    Attached was a veterinary certificate of cremation confirming that the dog’s date
    of death was July 28, 2011. Also attached were phone records indicating that
    several calls were placed to the Seneca County Clerk of Court’s office on July
    28th.1 Appellees filed a brief in opposition.
    {¶10} The trial court held a hearing on Nohle’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion on
    November 13, 2012. Nohle argued that she was entitled to relief from judgment
    1
    At the hearing on the motion, the trial court clarified that the number Nohle called was not the trial court’s
    telephone number. It was the number for the clerk’s office, which is an independent office from the trial
    court. (Nov. 13, 2012 Tr. 18-19).
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    Case No. 13-12-59
    because she had a meritorious claim and that the civil rules allow for relief from
    judgment due to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” Nohle
    claimed that the sudden death of her pet, which was like a member of her family,
    was sufficient to merit consideration as “surprise” that caused her to miss the
    mediation. (Nov. 13, 2012 Hrg. Tr. 5) She claimed she did not file her 60(B)
    motion sooner because she needed the time to get over her grief in order to be in a
    position where she could discuss the matter in open court. She believed the
    motion was timely filed because it was within one year after the dismissal.
    {¶11} Nohle testified that it was her intention to leave Columbus on the
    morning of the 28th and skip the third day of the bar exam in order to attend the
    mediation and pretrial hearing, but that she was unable to do so because of the
    death of her dog, who was staying with her in the hotel room. After dealing with
    the death of her pet, she realized she would not be able to travel to the mediation
    in time, so she claimed that she attempted to contact the court. She did attend the
    third day of the bar exam, although she signed in late and then took a break from
    the exam around 10:00 a.m. when she was able to reach the court by telephone
    during the pretrial hearing.2 Nohle acknowledged that she had not mentioned the
    death of her pet when she called the court, but claimed it was because it would
    have been too upsetting. (Id. at 19)
    2
    Appellees’ Exhibit D to their Appellees’ Brief is an affidavit from Rosey White, the Bar Admissions
    Manager, verifying that Nohle was present for all three days of the July 2011 Ohio bar examination.
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    Case No. 13-12-59
    {¶12} On November 20, 2012, the trial court filed its judgment entry
    denying Nohle’s motion, finding that she failed to meet two of the three
    requirements necessary for relief from judgment.      The trial court acknowledged
    that Nohle had a meritorious claim, as Gwiner had admitted liability. However,
    the trial court found that the death of a pet dog was not sufficient reason for relief
    under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and (5), and that the motion was not timely.
    Even if, however, the dog’s death did qualify as some reason
    justifying relief under 60(B), [Nohle’s] motion in this matter was not
    timely filed. [Nohle] simply argues that she filed the motion within
    the outer time limit set in the Rule, and thus, it should be considered
    timely. Defendants correctly point out, however, that the time limit
    within the Rule is a bright-line outer rule, not the end-all for
    determining whether such a motion is timely. [Nohle] has provided
    this Court with absolutely no reason why it would have taken her
    nearly an entire year to move for relief from judgment under the
    circumstances she claimed. Without any such justification, this
    Court finds that [Nohle] did not timely file her motion for relief
    under the facts presented.
    (Nov. 12, 2012 J.E. 5-6)
    {¶13} It is from this judgment that Nohle appeals, raising the following
    assignment of error for our review.
    Assignment of Error
    The trial court’s denial of [Nohle’s] Civil Rule 60(B) Motion to
    Set Aside Judgment and for Leave to Reschedule Mediation was
    an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
    {¶14} In Nohle’s sole assignment of error, she claims that she met all three
    of the requirements necessary in order to prevail on a motion brought forth under
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    Civ.R. 60(B). Nohle contends (1) that she has a meritorious claim; (2) that she is
    entitled to relief under the grounds listed in the statute; and, (3) that her motion
    was timely. Therefore, she maintains the trial court abused its discretion when it
    denied her motion, and that her claim should have been tried on the merits.
    {¶15} Civ.R. 60(B) is a mechanism whereby a party or parties may obtain
    relief by motion from a judgment or order and specifically provides:
    On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
    party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or
    proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
    surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
    by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
    a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
    denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
    misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied,
    released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based
    has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
    that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any
    other reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall be
    made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not
    more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was
    entered or taken.
    {¶16} The Ohio Supreme Court has established the following standard for
    Civ.R. 60(B) motions: “The moving party must demonstrate that he or she (1) has
    a meritorious defense or claim to present if the relief is granted, (2) is entitled to
    relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5), and (3) has
    made the motion within a reasonable time unless the motion is based upon Civ.R.
    60(B)(1), (2), or (3), in which case it must be made not more than one year after
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    the judgment.” GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 
    47 Ohio St.2d 146
     (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus. The elements entitling a movant to
    Civ.R. 60(B) relief “are independent and in the conjunctive; thus, the test is not
    fulfilled if any one of the requirements is not met.” Strack v. Pelton, 
    70 Ohio St.3d 172
    , 174, 1994–Ohio–107.
    {¶17} The decision to grant or deny a motion to vacate judgment pursuant
    to Civ.R. 60(B) lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
    disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
    Id.
     An abuse of discretion means that the
    trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore
    v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
     (1983).
    {¶18} The parties and the trial court agree that Nohle met the first prong of
    the three-part test in that she had a meritorious claim. However, the trial court
    found she had failed to meet the other two requirements in that the death of her
    dog was not an excusable reason under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) or (5), and that her motion
    was not timely.
    {¶19} Concerning whether the motion was filed within a reasonable time,
    we acknowledge that the motion was filed within one year – one day short of the
    outermost deadline stated in the rule. However, Civ.R. 60(B) first provides that
    the motion must be filed within a “reasonable time.” Thus, while a motion may be
    filed within one year, that may not be a reasonable time depending upon the
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    circumstances of the case. “[W]here the rules provide for up to one year from a
    judgment in which to file, where a party learns of grounds to set aside a judgment
    within a month of that judgment, but waits until the last day before the year is up,
    the motion may be considered to have been brought too late.” Falk v. Wachs, 
    116 Ohio App.3d 716
    , 721 (9th Dist.1996), citing Staff Notes, Civil Rule 60(B).
    {¶20} The relief provided by Civ.R. 60(B) is equitable in nature, and a
    party must act diligently in order to be entitled to it. GMAC Mtge., L.L.C. v. Lee,
    10th Dist. 11AP-795, 
    2012-Ohio-1157
    , ¶ 23, citing Morris v. Grubb, 2d Dist. No.
    15177 (Mar. 8, 1996). Failure to seek relief from judgment for a substantial
    period of time after the movant is aware of the grounds for relief demonstrates a
    lack of due diligence. 
    Id.
     The one-year provision for certain of the grounds for
    relief is not to be considered an acceptable maximum time limit, because the court
    must determine if the time delay in requesting such relief is reasonable under the
    circumstances. Bankers Trust Co. of California, N.A. v. Munoz, 
    142 Ohio App.3d 103
     (8th Dist. 2001). Periods as short as twelve weeks have been found to be
    unreasonable. Fouts v. Weiss-Carson, 
    77 Ohio App.3d 563
    , 566 (11th Dist.1991).
    There are numerous cases wherein a trial court has found that the motion for relief
    from judgment was not filed within a reasonable time, even though it was filed
    within one year. See, e.g., Busselle v. Redden’s Auto Body and Garage, 8th Dist.
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    Case No. 13-12-59
    No. 85824, 
    2005-Ohio-4011
    , ¶ 9 (listing several cases wherein trial courts found
    that the time for filing was unreasonable, even though less than one year).
    {¶21} Nohle was aware that the case was being dismissed when the trial
    court announced its decision at the pretrial conference on July 28, 2011. However,
    she waited for an entire year, until July 31, 2012, before filing her motion for relief
    from judgment. This is a case involving a 2005 automobile accident; the parties
    are entitled to have the matter resolved within a reasonable time. Given the
    history of delays in this matter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
    found that the motion for relief from judgment was untimely.
    {¶22} Because all three prongs of the GTE test must be met in order for a
    motion for relief for default judgment to be granted, the fact that Nohle failed to
    file her motion within a reasonable time is sufficient to justify the trial court’s
    decision. Therefore, we need not consider whether Nohle established that her
    failure to attend the required mediation and pretrial hearing was the result of an
    excusable reason under the statute.
    {¶23} Nohle also raises an issue concerning the fact that she was not
    warned that her failure to attend the mediation and prosecute her claim could lead
    to dismissal with prejudice. She also maintains that the trial court erred when it
    failed to consider less drastic sanctions. However, these are matters that could
    have been raised in an appeal from the judgment entry dismissing the case. Civ.R.
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    60(B) cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. See, e.g., Key v. Mitchell, 
    81 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 90-91, 
    1998-Ohio-643
    . Because Nohle did not file a timely appeal of the
    dismissal of the case, these matters are now barred by res judicata.
    {¶24} Upon review, we find that the trial court did not act unreasonably,
    arbitrarily or unconscionably by concluding that Nohle failed to meet her burden
    of establishing the timeliness of her motion for relief from judgment.
    Accordingly, Nohle’s assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the Appellant herein, in the
    particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Judgment Affirmed
    PRESTON, P.J. and ROGERS, J., concur.
    /jlr
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Document Info

Docket Number: 13-12-59

Judges: Willamowski

Filed Date: 7/15/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014