State v. Berry , 2013 Ohio 2380 ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Berry, 
    2013-Ohio-2380
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DEFIANCE COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                               CASE NO. 4-12-03
    v.
    DONNY L. BERRY,                                           OPINION
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    Appeal from Defiance County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. 11-CR-11115
    Judgment Affirmed
    Date of Decision: June 10, 2013
    APPEARANCES:
    Stephen D. Long for Appellant
    Morris J. Murray and Russell R. Herman for Appellee
    Case No. 4-12-03
    SHAW, J.
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Donny L. Berry (“Berry”) appeals the January 3,
    2012, judgment of the Defiance County Common Pleas Court sentencing Berry to
    life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after thirty years, upon Berry’s
    jury trial convictions for Aggravated Murder, Involuntary Manslaughter,
    Conspiracy to Traffic Cocaine, Conspiracy to Traffic Marijuana, two counts of
    Tampering with Evidence, and Berry’s subsequent guilty plea to the charge of
    Attempted Burglary.
    {¶2} On April 13, 2011, Berry was indicted for Aggravated Murder (Count
    1), in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), an unclassified felony, Involuntary
    Manslaughter (Count 2), in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), a felony of the first
    degree, Conspiracy to Traffic Cocaine (Count 3), in violation of R.C.
    2923.01(A)(2), Conspiracy to Traffic Marijuana (Count 4), in violation of R.C.
    2923.01(A)(2), a felony of the fourth degree, two counts of Tampering with
    Evidence (Counts 5 and 6), in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), both felonies of the
    third degree, Attempted Aggravated Robbery (Count 7), in violation of R.C.
    2923.02 and R.C. 2911.01(A), a felony of the second degree, and Attempted
    Burglary (Count 8), in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), a felony
    of the third degree. (Doc. 1). The first six counts were alleged to have occurred
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    on or about February 20, 2011, and the final two counts were alleged to have
    occurred on or about November 2, 2010. (Id.)
    {¶3} On April 14, 2011, Berry was taken into custody. On April 19, 2011,
    Berry appeared for arraignment and pled not guilty to all counts in the indictment.
    (Doc. 9).
    {¶4} On May 17, 2011, Berry’s counsel filed a Motion for Severance of
    Counts 1 through 6 from Counts 7 and 8, and a Motion for Funds to hire a private
    investigator. (Docs. 15, 16). On June 6, 2011, Berry’s counsel also filed a Motion
    to Compel. (Doc. 22). On June 9, 2011, the State filed a Memorandum in
    Response to Berry’s Motion to Compel, and the State also filed supplemental
    discovery. (Docs. 24, 25).
    {¶5} On June 15, 2011, Berry’s counsel filed a Motion in Limine and a
    Motion to Dismiss Counts 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8 of the Indictment. (Docs. 29, 30).
    {¶6} On June 16, 2011, a pretrial was held at which the trial court
    addressed Berry’s Motion to Sever, Motion for Funds, Motion in Limine, and
    Motion to Compel. (Doc. 126). The trial court denied Berry’s Motion to Compel,
    with the understanding that the State would supplement discovery as it became
    aware of new material. (Id.) The trial court granted Berry’s Motion to Sever
    counts one through six from counts seven and eight and granted Berry’s Motion
    for Funds. (Id.) Regarding Berry’s Motion in Limine, the trial court found the
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    motion in the nature of a Motion to Suppress and set the matter for further hearing
    along with the Motion to Dismiss. (Id.)
    {¶7} On June 27, 2011, the trial court heard Berry’s Motion to Suppress,
    styled a Motion in Limine, and Motion to Dismiss Counts 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8 of the
    Indictment. (Doc. 127). At the hearing, Berry’s counsel withdrew two of the
    branches of his Motion, the State agreed not to present testimony challenged in
    one of the branches, and the trial court denied the remainder as being premature.
    (Id.); (Doc. 42). The trial court also denied Berry’s Motion to Dismiss as being
    premature. (Id.); (Id.)
    {¶8} On July 21, 2011, Berry’s counsel filed a Motion to Vacate Trial Date
    along with a Request for a Competency Evaluation of Berry. (Doc. 36). On July
    22, 2011, the trial court granted the motion. (Doc. 37).
    {¶9} On August 4, 2011, Berry filed a Motion to Expedite Trial Date.
    (Doc. 45).
    {¶10} On September 20, 2011, Berry’s counsel filed a Motion to Suppress
    statements made by Berry in an April 15, 2011, interview. (Doc. 54).
    {¶11} On September 20, 2011, the court held a hearing on Berry’s
    competence to stand trial, finding Berry competent. (Doc. 67).
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    {¶12} On October 14, 2011, the court held a hearing on Berry’s Motion to
    Suppress statements made by Berry during an April 15, 2011 interview. The court
    denied that motion to suppress. (Doc. 68).
    {¶13} On October 31, 2011, Berry’s counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss
    arguing that Berry’s Speedy Trial rights had been violated.        (Doc. 60).   On
    November 4, 2011, a hearing was held on the motion wherein the court
    determined that due to various filings by Berry, Speedy Trial time had been tolled
    and Berry’s motion was denied. (Doc. 74).
    {¶14} On November 15, 2011, Berry’s jury trial began on counts 1 through
    6 of the indictment.    The trial continued through November 21, 2011.          On
    November 21, 2011, the jury found Berry guilty of Aggravated Murder, (Count 1),
    in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), an unclassified felony, Involuntary Manslaughter
    (Count 2), in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), a felony of the first degree, Conspiracy
    to Traffic Cocaine (Count 3), in violation of R.C. 2923.01(A)(2), with the further
    finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the amount of Cocaine exceeded 100
    grams, a felony of the second degree, Conspiracy to Traffic Marijuana (Count 4),
    in violation of R.C. 2923.01(A)(2), with the further finding beyond a reasonable
    doubt that the amount of Marijuana involved exceeded 1,000 grams but was less
    than 5,000 grams, a felony of the fourth degree, and two counts of Tampering with
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    Evidence (Counts 5 and 6), in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), both felonies of the
    third degree. (Doc. 101).
    {¶15} On December 5, 2011, a pretrial was held with regard to the
    remaining two counts from the indictment. (Doc. 102). At that pretrial, Berry
    elected to change his previously tendered plea of not guilty to guilty to the charge
    of Attempted Burglary, with the State agreeing to reduce the degree of the felony
    to a felony of the third degree, and dismiss the remaining count against Berry,
    Attempted aggravated Robbery. (Id.)
    {¶16} On January 3, 2012, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Berry
    was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving
    30 years as to Count 1, Aggravated Murder. (Doc. 104). As to Count 2, the trial
    court found that the Involuntary Manslaughter was an allied offense of the
    Aggravated Murder, and therefore merged for purposes of sentencing. (Id.) The
    trial court sentenced Berry to a term of seven years of imprisonment as to Count 3,
    Conspiracy to Traffic Cocaine, a felony of the second degree, a term of twelve
    months as to Count 4, Conspiracy to Traffic in Marijuana, a felony of the fourth
    degree, with Count 4 to be served concurrently with Count 3. (Id.) The trial court
    further sentenced Berry to a term of imprisonment of 36 months, each, as to
    Counts 5 and 6, Tampering with Evidence, with Count 5 to be served concurrently
    with count 6. (Id.) The court also sentenced Berry to a term of 36 months in
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    prison on the Attempted Burglary charge. (Id.) The court ordered that Counts 3, 5
    and 8 would be served consecutively to the sentence imposed in count 1. (Id.) An
    entry reflecting Berry’s sentence was filed January 13, 2012. (Id.)
    {¶17} It is from this judgment that Berry appeals, asserting the following
    assignments of error for our review.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1
    THE   TRIAL    COURT    ERRED   IN   DENYING
    DEFENDANT/APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL
    AND THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
    THE JURY’S CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
    FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRAVATED MURDER, IN
    VIOLATION OF R.C. 2903.01, COUNT I OF THE
    INDICTMENT.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2
    THE        JURY’S        VERDICT         FINDING
    DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,      GUILTY    BEYOND     A
    REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF AGGRAVATED
    MURDER, IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2903.01, COUNT I OF
    THE INDICTMENT, IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
    OF THE EVIDENCE.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 3
    DEFENDANT APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL
    DUE TO THE INNEFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
    First and Second Assignments of Error
    {¶18} In his first and second assignments of error, Berry argues that the
    trial court erred in denying his Criminal Rule 29 motion for acquittal, that there
    was insufficient evidence to convict him of Aggravated Murder, and that his
    conviction for Aggravated Murder was against the manifest weight of the
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    evidence. In arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal
    and that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, Berry claims there was no
    proof that he was the person that actually killed Kerry Christopher. In arguing that
    his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, Berry also argues
    that there were other people with “more plausible motives” to kill Kerry
    Christopher, that the statements of various witnesses were not credible, and that
    Kerry Christopher’s death could not have been planned.
    {¶19} Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than
    credibility or weight of the evidence. State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 386
    (1997). Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question
    of law. 
    Id.
     In reviewing the record for sufficiency, the relevant inquiry is whether,
    after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any
    rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 113 (1997).
    {¶20} The test for sufficiency of evidence has also been held applicable to
    determining a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. “Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a
    court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that
    reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material
    element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.               State v.
    Bridgeman, 
    55 Ohio St.2d 261
    , syllabus (1978). This court has previously found
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    that the Bridgeman standard “must be viewed in light of the sufficiency of
    evidence test * * *.” State v. Kneply, 3d Dist. No. 7-11-02, 
    2012-Ohio-406
    , ¶ 23,
    quoting State v. Foster, 3d Dist. No. 13-97-09, (Sept. 17, 1997).
    {¶21} The Supreme Court of Ohio has “carefully distinguished the terms
    ‘sufficiency’ and ‘weight’ in criminal cases, declaring that ‘manifest weight’ and
    ‘legal sufficiency’ are ‘both quantitatively and qualitatively different.’” Eastley v.
    Volkman, 
    132 Ohio St.3d 328
    , 
    2012-Ohio-2179
    , ¶ 10, quoting State v. Thompkins,
    
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
     (1997), paragraph two of the syllabus.
    {¶22} Unlike our review of the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate
    court's function when reviewing the weight of the evidence is to determine
    whether the greater amount of credible evidence supports the verdict. Volkman,
    supra, at ¶ 12; State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 387 (1997). In reviewing
    whether the trial court's judgment was against the weight of the evidence, the
    appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and examines the conflicting testimony.
    
    Id.
     In doing so, this Court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and
    all of the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and
    determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder “‘clearly
    lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
    must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Andrews, 3d Dist. No. 1–05–
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    70, 
    2006-Ohio-3764
    , ¶ 30, quoting State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175 (1st
    Dist.1983); Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387.
    {¶23} Aggravated Murder is codified in Ohio Revised Code 2903.01(A). It
    reads, “No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the
    death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy.”                                R.C.
    2903.01(A).
    {¶24} At trial the State called 21 witnesses to prove Berry committed, inter
    alia, Aggravated Murder.1              The State presented the following testimony and
    evidence related to the February 20, 2011, murder of Kerry Christopher
    (hereinafter referred to by his alias “New York”), which has been arranged
    chronologically for ease of understanding.
    {¶25} On Friday February 18, 2011, two days before New York’s murder,
    Jonathan Gaines testified that Berry visited Gaines’ home in Toledo, Ohio. (Tr. at
    471). Gaines testified that Berry was looking for gun shells for a .357 Magnum
    “off the streets.” (Tr. at 472). Gaines testified that Berry told Gaines that Berry
    was going to make a “power move” and that if Berry was not seen or heard from
    by Monday, Berry was either dead or in jail. (Tr. at 473). Gaines testified that he
    1
    There was also a significant amount of testimony relating to various other charges in this case; however,
    Berry only challenges his Aggravated Murder conviction under these assignments of error. Therefore, in
    the interest of brevity, where the testimony does not directly relate to the murder conviction that is
    challenged on appeal, that testimony will not be referenced.
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    had previously been involved in drug trafficking and that he knew New York and
    Berry through that involvement. (Id.)
    {¶26} The next day, on Saturday February 19, 2011, Berry’s car broke
    down while he was on his way to Lima, Ohio. (State’s Ex 64).2 Berry called New
    York, who had an apartment in Lima with a man named Calvin Lane, to pick him
    up. (Id.) New York picked Berry up and together they traveled to Fort Wayne so
    New York could purchase two kilos of cocaine. (Id.); (Tr. at 238). New York and
    Berry spent that night in Fort Wayne at Shannon Wilson’s residence. (Tr. at 183).
    Shannon Wilson was the mother of New York’s child. (Tr. at 179).
    {¶27} On Sunday February 20, 2011, Berry stayed at Shannon’s apartment
    and watched her children while Shannon and New York left and acquired the
    cocaine. (Tr. at 183, 238). New York and Shannon then returned to Shannon’s
    Fort Wayne apartment where Berry was, and the three of them departed for Lima,
    taking two separate cars. (Tr. at 188). New York and Berry rode together in New
    York’s Cadillac, and Shannon followed them in an Audi to New York’s Lima
    apartment. (Tr. at 197). Upon their return to Lima, Shannon stayed at New
    York’s apartment for approximately 20 minutes, and then returned to Fort Wayne.
    (Tr. at 189). According to Shannon, New York’s roommate Calvin was not home
    2
    State’s Exhibit 64 is an interview of Berry that was conducted February 24, 2011. It was shown to the
    jury during the trial.
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    at the time she was present in New York’s apartment, and she left around 7 p.m.
    (Tr. at 240).
    {¶28} Later on Sunday February 20, 2011, after Shannon left New York
    and Calvin’s apartment, Calvin returned to the apartment and observed New York
    and Berry laughing and hanging out.                  (Tr. at 215).       Calvin remained at the
    residence with the two of them until New York and Berry left together,
    somewhere between 8 and 9:30 at night. (Tr. at 211, 218). According to Berry
    himself, when he and New York left New York’s apartment that night, they
    traveled to Defiance.3 (State’s 64).
    {¶29} Shortly after 10:30 on Sunday evening, Andrew Hershberger, a
    friend of New York’s, received a call from New York. (Tr. at 251). New York
    told Andrew that he was with Berry and that New York was going to come to
    Andrew’s house in Defiance and pick him up. (Id.) Andrew testified that New
    York said he would be at Andrew’s house “soon.” (Tr .at 246). Andrew waited
    for New York to arrive, but New York never came. (Id.) Andrew called and sent
    New York text messages inquiring into his whereabouts, and gave up when he
    received no response. (Id.) Phone records corroborated Andrew’s testimony.
    {¶30} Evidence revealed that at some point between 10:40 and 11 p.m.,
    New York was killed by a “contact” gunshot wound to the left side of his head
    3
    Although Berry would give multiple inconsistent statements about what happened later that evening, he
    never changed his story regarding the fact that he left New York’s apartment with New York and the two of
    them traveled to Defiance.
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    while he was sitting in the passenger seat of his Cadillac. (Tr. at 387, Tr. at 450,
    718). Through the investigation, it was determined that New York was killed on
    Domersville Road at the vacant, foreclosed-upon former residence of Berry’s
    mother. (Tr. at 353-367).
    {¶31} Evidence revealed that New York was shot in the car, dragged out of
    it, left in a spot in the driveway long enough for his blood to pool, stripped of his
    outer clothes, and then placed in the trunk of the Cadillac. (Id.).
    {¶32} For the next couple of days, New York’s baby’s mother Shannon
    attempted to find him, calling around to Andrew and Berry, and various others
    looking for New York. (Tr. at 191-195, 247). On February 23, 2011, Andrew
    called Shannon stating that he thought he recognized New York’s black Cadillac
    at Degler apartments in Defiance. (Tr. at 247, 256). Shannon called the police
    and the police responded to the scene. (Tr. at 256).
    {¶33} Patrolman Jeffrey Spelman was one of the people that responded to
    the scene and he noted that there were four wheels in the backseat of the black
    Cadillac and that there was what appeared to be blood spatter in various locations
    throughout the car. (Tr. at 169). The Cadillac was registered to New York. Berry
    and Andrew gathered at the scene when the police came to look at the Cadillac
    thinking that they might open it up. (Tr. at 256). Berry gave a statement at the
    scene to Patrolman Spelman that he had not seen New York since New York
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    dropped Berry off at his mother’s house that previous Sunday. (Tr. at 169).
    Andrew noted that he thought something did not look right with Berry that day.
    (Tr. at 257).
    {¶34} The police ultimately obtained a warrant and searched the Cadillac,
    finding New York’s body in the trunk. (Tr. at 264). It was determined that the
    location where the car was found outside of Degler Apartments was not likely the
    location where New York was killed. (Tr. at 590, 704).
    {¶35} When Defiance County Chief Deputy John Engel and Lieutenant
    Cliffton Vandemark learned that Berry was the last person that had been seen with
    New York, they started looking for places that “Berry and New York were
    comfortable in meeting.”     (Tr. at 590).     Chief Deputy Engel and Lieutenant
    Vandemark had dealt with Berry in the past as an informant, and Lieutenant
    Vandemark had met with him at the Domersville Road property. (Tr. at 591, 700).
    Thus one of the places that officers were sent to check as a potential crime scene
    was the Domersville Road location. (Tr. at 590, 704).
    {¶36} Police responded to Domersville Road, and found blood at the scene
    that was later tested and determined to be New York’s. (Tr. at 358). Inspecting
    the scene, Police determined that it was the site of New York’s murder, that he had
    been shot, dragged out of the car, left in the snow long enough for his blood to
    pool, and then placed into the trunk of the car. (Tr. at 361-367, 706).
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    {¶37} At this point, on February 24, 2011, the police conducted their first
    interview of Berry. (Tr. at 613); (State’s Ex. 64). When the police interviewed
    Berry, they were already aware that the location of New York’s murder was likely
    Berry’s mother’s former house on Domersville Road. (Tr. at 608-609). However,
    they did not initially reveal to Berry that they were aware of this information,
    choosing to ask Berry about what had happened the weekend of the homicide and
    about Berry’s last contact with New York. (State’s Ex. 64).
    {¶38} In the interview, Berry claimed that on Sunday February 20, 2011,
    New York dropped him off at his mother’s house in Defiance after they left Lima
    together and that was the last time he had seen New York. (Id.) The remainder of
    Berry’s story regarding the weekend’s previous events was similar to what was
    corroborated by other witnesses that testified at trial—Berry went to Fort Wayne
    with New York, returned to New York’s apartment in Lima on Sunday February
    20, 2011, and then left with New York. (Id.)
    {¶39} Later in the interview, after hearing Berry’s story, police told Berry
    that they thought New York had been killed at Berry’s mother’s old residence on
    Domersville Road. (Id.); (Tr. at 609). Berry then told a story about how he was
    going to give New York some tires at the old house, but stated adamantly that
    New York did not go to the house with him that night. (State’s Ex. 66). Berry
    said on the night of New York’s death he drove his mother’s car over to Spring
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    Meadows after New York dropped him off to try and meet with a female. (Id.)
    As the police repeatedly questioned Berry about whether Berry was present at the
    time of New York’s death or knows who was present, Berry adamantly denied
    being in the car, or knowing who killed New York. (State’s Ex. 66). Berry told
    police to speak with Calvin, New York’s roommate, and Andrew Hershberger,
    who Berry knew New York was going to meet in Defiance that night. (Id.) The
    police asked to search Berry’s phone. (Id.) Berry then invoked his right to speak
    to an attorney, and the interview was ended. (Id.)
    {¶40} Based on the interview with Berry, the police continued to
    investigate, speaking with people that were close to New York and may have had
    motive to kill New York or could give the police more information such as
    Shannon Wilson, Calvin, Andrew Hershberger, and Jonathan Gaines. (Tr. at 616).
    Gaines was interviewed and had an alibi, which was corroborated through
    investigation. (Tr. at 618).
    {¶41} The police also obtained a search warrant to search Berry’s mother’s
    current home. (Tr. at 618). The police then searched Berry’s mother’s residence.
    (Tr. at 622). Afterward, the police requested to search Berry’s mother’s vehicle, a
    Chrysler Pacifica, which police had learned from Berry and Jonathan Gaines, that
    Berry had been driving the day after New York’s death. (Tr. at 625-26). Berry’s
    mother consented to allow her Chrysler Pacifica to be searched and the police
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    uncovered blood in the Pacifica, which was tested and determined to be New
    York’s. (Tr. at 625, 358).
    {¶42} When searching Berry’s mother’s residence, the police mistakenly
    left the affidavit along with the search warrant, which contained all the
    information that the police had up to that point in the investigation. (Tr. at 624).
    Later that night after the search, Berry contacted police and informed police that
    he wanted to speak with them again. (Tr. at 624-626).
    {¶43} Berry then appeared with counsel to talk to police and give a second
    interview. (Tr. at 627). In the second interview, Berry stated that on the night of
    New York’s death, he and New York had gone out to his mother’s old house on
    Domersville Road and a black SUV pulled in behind them. (State’s Ex. 68).
    Berry stated that three men got out of the SUV, one he recognized as “Moon,” and
    ordered Berry out of the car. (Id.) Berry stated that he did not know Moon’s real
    name, he just knew him by “Moon.” (Id.) Berry stated that New York was then
    shot in the Cadillac, taken out of the car, stripped, and that Berry then placed New
    York in the trunk of the Cadillac at the behest of the three men. (Id.) Berry stated
    that the three men then took his wallet and took both vehicles and drove off,
    leaving him at the Domersville Road property.4 (Id.) Berry claimed that he then
    4
    Berry would later be seen on Wal Mart’s security cameras with a wallet “exactly as he described” that he
    claimed in this interview had been taken by the three men. (Tr. at 640).
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    walked back to his mother’s house, which was over five miles, in a snow/ice storm
    on a four-lane highway. (Tr. at 632); (State’s Ex. 68).
    {¶44} During the interview, Chief Deputy Engel noted inconsistencies in
    Berry’s story, including what Berry did with the bloody clothes, whether Andrew
    Hershberger was at the scene, and where the tires that were in the backseat of the
    Cadillac had been taken from. (Tr. at 631-33).
    {¶45} Following the interview, the police attempted to track down “Moon.”
    (Tr. at 634). After speaking with the FBI and other local law enforcement groups,
    the police came up with two men that could have been the “Moon” Berry was
    referring to: one who was known locally as “Moon” and the other who was
    known as “Moony.” (Id.) Berry was brought back in to attempt to identify
    “Moon,” and he selected the man, Ralph Upshaw, known as “Moon.” Berry said
    that this “Moon” was involved in New York’s death. (Tr. at 635).
    {¶46} Police investigated Moon, who was found to be “very cooperative”
    with the investigation. (Tr. at 712). Police also searched Moon’s girlfriend’s
    vehicle with Moon’s consent, which was a black Dodge Durango (SUV), as Moon
    did not otherwise own an SUV. (Tr. at 713). Although police did find traces of
    blood in the vehicle, the blood was determined not to be New York’s. (Tr. at 390).
    Moon testified that he had known New York for five or six years but had only met
    Berry twice with New York. (Tr. at 526). Moon testified during one of those
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    meetings, New York and Berry had two guns, one of which was a .357. (Tr. at
    534). After looking into Moon’s alibi, police were “comfortable” eliminating
    Moon as a suspect. (Tr. at 724).
    {¶47} Subsequently, Berry was indicted and arrested for, inter alia, the
    Aggravated Murder of New York. The day after he was arrested, Berry contacted
    the police and stated that he again wanted to speak with police regarding New
    York’s death. (Tr. at 641-42).
    {¶48} This time, in his third interview, Berry stated that on the night of
    New York’s death, Berry and New York drove out to the Domersville Road
    property to meet up with Berry’s brother Sidney. (State’s Ex. 70). Berry stated
    that he was under the impression that Sidney and New York had business to
    conduct. (Id.) Berry told police that Sidney, Moon, and one other person pulled
    up behind the Cadillac in a black SUV, and ordered Berry out of the car. (Id.)
    Berry stated that he got in the back of the SUV, and watched a flash go off in the
    Cadillac as his brother Sidney shot New York. (Id.) Berry then stated that he was
    made to help put New York’s body in the trunk, and that he was then driven to his
    mother’s house and dropped off. (Id.) Berry stated that he had not talked to
    Sidney since the incident. (Id.) In prior interviews, Berry had stated that he did
    not know where his brother was and thought he might have been out of state, and
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    that they had not had contact in over six months because they did not talk. (Tr. at
    655).
    {¶49} The police then investigated whether there was any connection
    between Sidney and New York, and Sidney and Moon. (Tr. at 659, 715). The
    police found no connections between Moon and Sidney, and found that there was
    no indication of any recent contact between Sidney and New York. (Id.) In
    addition, police found through Sidney’s cell phone records that Sidney was around
    Pontiac Michigan shortly before and shortly after the death of New York.5 (Id. at
    715)
    {¶50} Further testimony produced at trial illustrated that Berry was in
    possession of New York’s bag that contained the marijuana and cocaine that New
    York had been transporting, and that Berry also had money after New York’s
    death whereas there was testimony that he was “broke” on the Friday before New
    York’s death.        (Tr. at 472).       Testimony was also given that Berry sent text
    messages and made calls to New York on the day following New York’s death,
    when Berry, even according to his own later statements, would have known New
    York was dead. (State’s Ex. 70). Moreover, testimony was presented at trial that
    5
    Lieutenant Cliffton Vandemark testified that Sidney’s phone records established that he made a call from
    Pontiac, Michigan at roughly 8:35 p.m. on the night of New York’s death, and then again at roughly 12:30
    a.m. (Tr. at 715). Vandemark testified that he drove the distance between the site of death and Pontiac
    Michigan and found it to be roughly 2 hours and 40 minutes one way, making it highly improbable for
    Sidney to have been present. (Id.)
    -20-
    Case No. 4-12-03
    in the days following New York’s death, Berry repeatedly told others that he did
    not know where New York was. (Tr. at 193, 486, 504).
    {¶51} Thus at trial there was testimony of Berry looking for bullets for a
    gun and that Berry stated he was looking to make a “power move.” There was
    testimony that Berry was the last person seen with New York, and that New York
    was killed outside of Berry’s mother’s vacant house. In addition, New York’s
    blood was found in Berry’s mother’s car, which Berry was driving the day after
    New York’s murder. Berry also had New York’s bag of drugs, and suddenly had
    money whereas on Friday he was broke.
    {¶52} Furthermore, Berry gave multiple accounts of what happened on the
    night of the incident, changing his story repeatedly. First, Berry stated that New
    York had merely dropped him off at his mother’s residence in Defiance. He told
    this story to the police and to New York’s friends who were looking for New
    York. Second, Berry stated that he was present when New York was shot by an
    unknown gunman, and that he was left at the scene to walk back the five miles
    into Defiance to his mother’s house on a busy highway during a winter storm.
    Third, Berry stated that the he was present when his brother Sidney had shot New
    York and that he was driven to his mother’s residence and dropped off.
    {¶53} While Berry argues first on appeal that the trial court erred in
    denying his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, we find that reasonable minds could
    -21-
    Case No. 4-12-03
    find that each element had been proven and that Berry had committed Aggravated
    Murder. In addition, although Berry argues that there was insufficient evidence to
    convict him claiming that there was no proof that he was the person that killed
    New York, under these circumstances, we find that there was sufficient direct and
    circumstantial evidence presented to establish that Berry committed each element
    of Aggravated Murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Berry’s first
    assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶54} In arguing that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, Berry contends that there were other people with plausible motives,
    there was no direct evidence that Berry caused New York’s death (only that he
    was present), and that the murder could not have been pre-planned because Berry
    could not have predicted that his car would break down on the way to Lima on the
    day before the murder.
    {¶55} Although Berry argues that there were other people with motive to
    kill New York, the jury heard testimony regarding all of the other people who had
    potential motives to kill New York, and the police’s investigation into those
    individuals. Through the investigation, none of the people that Berry accused in
    his repeatedly altering statements could be connected to the February 20, 2011,
    homicide.
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    Case No. 4-12-03
    {¶56} Moreover, the jury heard testimony regarding Berry’s potential
    motives. The jury heard Jonathan Gaines testify that Berry said he was going to
    make a “power move.” The jury also heard Detective John Engel testify that
    Berry had, at least at one point in time, wanted to “control Defiance” (in reference
    to drugs). (Tr. at 663-664).
    {¶57} Based upon our review of the evidence including the transcripts and
    the exhibits, we cannot find that the jury “clearly lost its way” or that there was a
    “manifest miscarriage of justice.” Therefore, we do not find Berry’s conviction
    was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Berry’s second
    assignment of error is overruled.6
    {¶58} Berry makes another argument before his final assignment of error
    that is not listed separately as an actual assignment of error, so we will address it
    here, as it does not fall under any of the other assignments. In this argument,
    Berry claims that the trial court erred in allowing Shannon Wilson to be recalled
    over the objections of counsel.
    {¶59} Evid. R. 611(A) provides that the trial court exercises control over
    the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and the presentation of evidence to
    ensure that the interrogation and presentation of evidence are effective in
    6
    In Berry’s statements of his first two assignments of error, he only challenges his conviction for
    Aggravated Murder. However, had he argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his remaining
    convictions, or that the remaining convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence, those
    assignments would be overruled as well, as our review of the transcript and the evidence supports the jury’s
    findings.
    -23-
    Case No. 4-12-03
    ascertaining the truth. Whether to permit a witness to be recalled to the stand to
    give additional testimony is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial
    court. State v. Taylor, 3d Dist. No 1-3-20, 
    2003-Ohio-7115
    , ¶ 18, citing State v.
    Sims, 
    3 Ohio App.3d 321
    , 329 (8th Dist.1981). An abuse of discretion connotes
    more than an error of law or judgment; it implies an attitude of the trial court that
    is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    , 219 (1983).
    {¶60} In this case, the State called Shannon Wilson, the mother of New
    York’s child. (Tr. at 179). Shannon Wilson testified originally that Berry and
    New York came to her residence in Fort Wayne. (Tr. at 183). Shannon testified
    that Berry stayed at her residence while New York and Wilson left, and that when
    New York returned he had a shoebox she believed had two kilos of cocaine in it—
    cocaine which she originally testified she did not personally see. (Tr. at 198).
    After Shannon was cross-examined, the State called its next witness, Calvin Lane,
    and once Lane finished testifying, the State recalled Shannon. (Tr. at 207, 230).
    {¶61} When Shannon was recalled, she testified that she knew New York
    was purchasing cocaine in Fort Wayne and she knew that he had acquired cocaine.
    (Tr. at 238). She testified that she wanted some of the cocaine to sell but New
    York told her he needed it, so he gave her $200 instead. (Tr. at 238).
    -24-
    Case No. 4-12-03
    {¶62} Thus the difference between Wilson’s original testimony and her
    testimony when she was recalled was her definitively stating that she knew New
    York was acquiring and had acquired cocaine when he went to Fort Wayne. (Tr.
    at 240). When asked why her testimony had changed, Wilson testified that when
    she came into court that day she was arrested on a bench warrant and was afraid of
    incriminating herself. (Tr. at 232). Wilson testified that issue had been cleared
    up, so she gave the new testimony. (Id.)
    {¶63} Defense counsel repeatedly objected to allowing Wilson to testify
    again. (Tr. at 230, 233, 237). The court inquired into the circumstances of why
    Wilson should be allowed to be recalled, and specifically stated that Wilson was
    subject to cross-examination and that the matters could be inquired into on cross-
    examination. (Tr. at 237).
    {¶64} Based on the court’s inherent authority to regulate witnesses called,
    we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Shannon to be
    recalled, especially in light of the fact that she was fully subject to cross-
    examination and the jury had the ability to judge her credibility. Accordingly, this
    argument is found not well taken, and if it was styled specifically as an assignment
    of error, it would be overruled.
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    Case No. 4-12-03
    Third Assignment of Error
    {¶65} In his third assignment of error, Berry argues that he was denied a
    fair trial due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Specifically, Berry
    claims that counsel’s failure to object to certain testimony was prejudicial to
    Berry, and that counsel made premature and ineffective motions that tolled the
    running time under the speedy trial statute, thus allowing the State further time to
    prepare its case against Berry.
    {¶66} “Reversal of convictions on ineffective assistance requires the
    defendant to show ‘first that counsel's performance was deficient and, second that
    the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of
    a fair trial.’” State v. Cassano, 
    96 Ohio St.3d 94
    , 
    2002-Ohio-3751
    , at ¶ 105,
    quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 669, 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
     (1984).
    When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court “must
    indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
    reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 689
    .
    {¶67} A tactical decision by trial counsel, who as a licensed attorney is
    presumed to be competent, is not by itself enough to show ineffective assistance of
    counsel simply because the strategy did not result in an acquittal. State v. Clayton,
    
    62 Ohio St.2d 45
    , 48-49 (1980); State v. Timm, 3d Dist. No. 13–11–23, 2012-
    Ohio-410, ¶ 31. “Furthermore, trial counsel’s failure to object is generally viewed
    -26-
    Case No. 4-12-03
    as trial strategy and does not establish ineffective assistance.” State v. Turks, 3d.
    Dist. No. 1–08–44, 
    2009-Ohio-1837
    , ¶ 43, citing State v. McKinney, 11th Dist.
    No.2007–T–0004, 
    2008-Ohio-3256
    , ¶ 191; State v. Gumm, 
    73 Ohio St.3d 413
    ,
    428; State v. Conway, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 412
    , 
    2006-Ohio-2815
    , ¶ 103.
    {¶68} In arguing that his counsel was ineffective, Berry first contends that
    his counsel failed to object to inadmissible hearsay evidence. Hearsay is defined
    as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
    hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R.
    801(C). Hearsay is generally not admissible unless an exception applies. Evid.R.
    802.
    {¶69} Berry first claims that his counsel should have objected to the
    testimony of Detective Dave Richards when Detective Richards was testifying as
    to what Shannon Wilson had informed him. In the portion of testimony cited,
    Detective Richards was being asked if he spoke to Shannon Wilson, and what he
    learned in speaking to Shannon Wilson. Berry argues that allowing Detective
    Richards to tell the jury what Shannon Wilson had informed him of improperly
    bolstered her credibility and was hearsay. However, at this point in the trial,
    Detective Richards was merely testifying to how he proceeded with his
    investigation and what he learned from one witness to the next that led him
    forward. We do not find this is hearsay. However, even if the statements were
    -27-
    Case No. 4-12-03
    hearsay, Shannon Wilson took the stand and was fully subject to cross-
    examination. Moreover, much of the information learned from Shannon, such as
    New York having an apartment with Calvin Lane, Berry made in statements in
    interviews to the police. Under these circumstances, we cannot find that counsel’s
    failure to object was deficient or prejudicial.
    {¶70} Berry makes a similar claim regarding the testimony of Sergeant
    Delaney who spoke with Jonathan Gaines. Sergeant Delaney’s testimony merely
    detailed how his part of the investigation proceeded, including when and why he
    spoke with Jonathan Gaines, and Delaney’s attempts to track Berry’s movement
    around the date of the murder. In addition, Jonathan Gaines took the stand, and
    was fully subject to cross-examination. Thus we cannot find counsel’s failure to
    object to Sergeant Delaney’s testimony was deficient or prejudicial.
    {¶71} Berry next argues that Deputy Engel was improperly allowed to
    testify as to what he thought Berry was “thinking” during Berry’s interviews.
    Berry does not cite specific provisions of the transcript to support his argument
    that Deputy Engel improperly testified as to Berry’s thoughts. Our own review of
    the transcript revealed the following locations where Deputy Engel might have
    referred to Berry’s thoughts during the interview.
    And if you saw at first, we did not have to urge the Defendant,
    Donny Berry, to explain to us why he was at the sheriff’s office.
    He already had a predisposition. He knew why we wanted to
    talk to him.
    -28-
    Case No. 4-12-03
    (Tr. at 614).
    ***
    Then his story changes to meet what our knowledge is of the
    crime at that point in time and he then addresses the fact that he
    is there at the scene but only trying to state that he’s just there
    so it’s not his fault but that, again the further we look into it goes
    away.
    (Tr. at 651).
    ***
    In this – During all the interviews, Donny would – We watch his
    movements, his body language. When he would – He can turn
    on the charm or he can turn on the false pretenses, so to speak.
    He – He begins to act like he’s crying. He – But then he quickly
    shuts that off. There is [sic] no tears shed. He can sniffle and,
    and over the years of dealing with Donny, he can do this quite
    often. He changes quite rapidly. He can turn the charm on and
    then he can be very angry, very intimidating and, and abusive.
    (Tr. at 653-654).
    ***
    Q. So if he were still looking for it, and the Defendant had it
    [drug bag], he might want some protection? You understand
    what I’m saying?
    A. Yes, I do. Again, that’s kind of a – He – He may think that
    he needs protection.
    (Tr. at 696-97).
    {¶72} Based on a review of the transcript and these sections, we do not find
    that Chief Deputy Engel testified to anything other than his observations. In fact,
    -29-
    Case No. 4-12-03
    in the one section where the prosecutor specifically asked Chief Deputy Engel
    about why Berry thought he might have needed protection, Berry’s counsel did
    object, and it was sustained on grounds that it called for speculation. (Tr. at 652).
    Thus it is unclear from the transcript where Berry’s trial counsel failed to object to
    inadmissible testimony, and how any failure to object so prejudiced Berry as to
    warrant a new trial.
    {¶73} Finally, Berry argues that trial counsel filed premature and
    ineffective motions that provided the State more time to prepare for trial and tolled
    the running of speedy trial time. At the outset, it should be noted that a hearing
    was held on whether Berry’s speedy trial rights had been violated approximately
    two weeks before the trial, and it was found that the trial was being held well
    within the allotted time. Next, it should be noted that Berry’s trial counsel filed a
    motion to suppress a statement that Berry made to Carolyn Kuntz, a classification
    officer at the Corrections Center of Northwest Ohio, where Berry told yet another
    story, that Jonathan Gaines had killed New York. Rather than proceed on the
    matter, the State ultimately agreed not to present that testimony. So while the
    suppression motion might not have been “granted” on that issue, counsel was still
    able to “leverage” a motion to suppress into keeping out a statement that clearly
    would have been against Berry’s interest for the jury to hear.
    -30-
    Case No. 4-12-03
    {¶74} Berry contends on appeal that counsel’s premature and “ineffective”
    motions allowed the State more time to prepare for trial, but there is absolutely
    nothing in the record to establish that the State was not prepared for trial at any
    stage and that had Berry’s counsel not filed any of the motions that he filed the
    State would have been unable to secure the same witnesses and exhibits used
    against him. Thus even if there was error in filing any of the motions, Berry is
    completely unable to establish any prejudice, as any claims that the State would
    not have been prepared are entirely speculative.
    {¶75} Having found no errors by counsel and no prejudice to Berry,
    Berry’s third assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶76} For the foregoing reasons, Berry’s assignments of error are overruled
    and the judgment of the Defiance County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
    Judgment Affirmed
    PRESTON, P.J. and ROGERS, J., concur.
    /jlr
    -31-