State v. Christie , 2011 Ohio 520 ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Christie, 2011-Ohio-520.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
DEFIANCE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 4-10-04
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
CHAD CHRISTIE, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Defiance County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 98 CR 07411
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: February 4, 2011
APPEARANCES:
Kenneth J. Rexford for Appellant
Russell R. Herman for Appellee
Case No. 4-10-04
SHAW, J.
{¶1} The appellant, Chad D. Christie (“Christie”), appeals the January 28,
2010 judgment of the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty
of one count of attempted murder with a firearm specification, two counts of
kidnapping, and one count of aggravated burglary. Christie was sentenced to
twenty-five years in prison for these offenses.
{¶2} In late 1998, Christie and his wife, Anetta, experienced martial
difficulties and decided to separate. Anetta and the couples’ young child stayed
with Anetta’s sister, Kim Riblet, and her family during the separation. On
November 11, 1998, Christie arrived at Kim’s residence armed with a 12-gauge
shotgun which he apparently intended to use to commit suicide in front of Anetta.
To avoid detection, Christie placed a ladder on the backside of the residence and
climbed through a window.
{¶3} Once inside the residence, Christie began searching for his wife when
he encountered Kim. Armed with the shotgun, Christie ordered Kim into one of
the bedrooms where Anetta was sleeping. Christie then marched Anetta at
gunpoint downstairs to the living room where he fired the gun at Anetta’s head,
removing a significant portion of her ear. Christie then turned the gun on himself
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and fired a shot upward through the right side of his jaw. Anetta and Christie’s
gunshot wounds were not fatal; however, both were permanently disfigured.
{¶4} On December 3, 1998, the Defiance County Grand Jury indicted
Christie on the following charges: count one, attempted murder in violation of
R.C. 2923.02, a felony of the first degree; counts two and three, kidnapping in
violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) and (3), both felonies of the first degree; count
four, aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) and (2), a felony of
the first degree; count five, felonious assault in violation R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and
(2), a felony of the second degree, and count six, domestic violence in violation of
R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the fifth degree. Each count with the exception of
count six, domestic violence, was charged with a firearm specification.
{¶5} On December 10, 1998, Christie appeared for arraignment with
counsel and entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity
(“NGRI”) to all six counts. Christie’s counsel then filed a written request for an
evaluation of Christie’s competency to stand trial. The trial court accepted
Christie’s not guilty and NGRI pleas and granted Christie’s request for a
competency evaluation. The court subsequently ordered psychiatric evaluations
regarding both Christie’s competency to stand trial and his NGRI plea to be
conducted at the Court Diagnostic and Treatment Center. The matter was
continued until the evaluations were completed.
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{¶6} In early January of 1999, the Court Diagnosis and Treatment Center
completed evaluations making the following findings. With regard to Christie’s
competency to stand trial, the evaluation found that there were no psychiatric or
intellectual impediments to Christie’s competence to stand trial. The evaluation
assessing Christie’s NGRI plea concluded that Christie suffered from no signs or
symptoms of any mental illness that would have prevented him from
understanding right and wrong at the time of the offense.
{¶7} On February 18, 1999, Christie entered a negotiated plea of guilty to
the charges of attempted murder with a firearm specification, two counts of
kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. Pursuant to the negotiated plea, the
prosecution dismissed the charges of felonious assault and domestic violence as
well as the remaining firearm specifications listed in the indictment.
{¶8} On March 2, 1999, the trial court sentenced Christie to eight years of
imprisonment for the charge of attempted murder, to run consecutively with the
mandatory three-year prison term for the firearm specification, and seven years in
imprisonment on each charge of kidnapping, with each prison term to run
consecutively to the prior charges for a total of twenty-five years. The trial court
ordered Christie to serve seven years in prison on the aggravated burglary charge
to run concurrently with the twenty-five-year prison term imposed on the other
three charges.
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{¶9} On November 24, 2004, Christie, pro se, filed a motion for leave to
file a delayed appeal with this Court. As the basis for his motion, Christie claimed
that he was unable to timely file an appeal of his sentence because he was
hospitalized as a result of the self-inflicted gunshot wound which he suffered
during the commission of the underlying offenses. This Court subsequently
denied Christie’s motion for leave to file a delayed appeal.
{¶10} On May 1, 2009, Christie, through retained counsel, filed a “Motion
for Sentencing Hearing and Additional Relief.” In his motion, Christie argued that
the trial court failed to properly inform him of postrelease control and that
pursuant to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State v. Bezak his sentence
was now “void.” 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961. Christie
further maintained that because his sentence was “void,” it was as if he had never
been sentenced. Christie asserted that he was now entitled to a de novo sentencing
hearing in accordance with Bezak.
{¶11} The trial court subsequently granted Christie’s motion for sentencing.
On June 12, 2009, Christie filed a “Motion to Withdraw Plea or Alternatively to
Vacate Plea.” Christie outlined four grounds to support his claim that the trial
court should permit him to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶12} First, Christie alleged that counts two and three of the indictment,
which charged Christie with kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) and
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(3), were fatally defective because the counts alleged two separate offenses.
Second, Christie argued that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
because the trial court gave him improper advice concerning the merger of the
offenses at sentencing. Third, Christie maintained that because his sentence was
“void,” his motion to withdraw his plea was considered a pre-sentence motion and
must be “liberally granted” by the trial court. See State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d
575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422. Fourth, Christie contended that once the
issue of his competency to stand trial was raised, the trial court was mandated by
R.C. 2945.37 to conduct a hearing on the issue. Christie asserted that the trial
court failed to conduct a formal hearing on the issue of his competency and
maintained that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear his change of plea
in February of 1999.
{¶13} On July 7, 2009, the trial court conducted a hearing on Christie’s
motions for sentencing and withdrawing his guilty plea. On July 10, 2009, the
trial court denied Christie’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and imposed the
previous sentence of twenty-five years in prison. The trial court also properly
informed him of postrelease control and the possible sanctions for violation.
{¶14} On July 20, 2009, Christie filed his notice of appeal from the trial
court’s July 10, 2009 judgment. This Court subsequently dismissed the appeal
because the trial court’s July 10, 2009 Judgment Entry contained an error under
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State v. Baker by failing to include the means of conviction when it imposed
Christie’s sentence. 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163.
{¶15} On January 22, 2010, the trial court held another resentencing
hearing and entered a new Judgment Entry on January 28, 2010 correcting the
Baker error. Christie now appeals from this judgment, asserting the following
assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED A SENTENCE OF TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS BY RUNNING NON-MINIMUM SENTENCES
CONSECUTIVELY PURSUANT TO A SENTENCING LAW
THAT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR DEPRIVATION OF
CHRISTIE’S RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY ON THOSE
FACTS NECESSARILY FOUND TO SUPPORT THE
ENHANCEMENT OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING, IN
VIOLATION OF BOTH THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE PRE-
SENTENCING MOTION OF THE ACCUSED TO
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, IN VIOLATION OF THE OHIO
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE PLEA WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE COUNTS II, III,
AND IV ARE FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR ALLEGING
MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE IN A SINGLE COUNT, AS A
RESULT OF WHICH THE PLEAS AS TO EACH OF
COUNTS II, III, AND IV ARE INEFFECTIVE.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
BECAUSE COUNTS II, III, AND IV EACH ALLEGED TWO
OFFENSES, OR MORE, AND BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT DISPOSE OF EACH OF THE SEPARATE
ALLEGED OFFENSES IN THESE COUNTS, THE
RESULTING ENTRY WAS INEFFECTIVE TO ACHIEVE A
FINAL, APPEALABLE ORDER.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
THE PLEA IN THIS CASE WAS NOT KNOWING,
VOLUNTARY, AND INTELLIGENT, IN VIOLATION OF
THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI
THE PLEA, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCE ARE
VOIDABLE AND SHOULD BE DEEMED VOID BECAUSE
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT A HEARING
PURSUANT TO R.C. § 2945.37, AN ERROR THAT IS
JURISDICTIONAL.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VIII
THE OHIO STATUTE REGARDING MERGER IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT THE DETERMINATION
OF FACT NECESSARY TO DECIDE WHETHER MULTIPLE
OFFENSES DID OR DID NOT HAVE A SEPARATE ANIMUS
IS NOT PRESENTED TO A JURY, IN VIOLATION OF THE
OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, SUCH THAT IN THIS CASE, AS APPLIED
TO THIS DEFENDANT, THE STATE SHOULD BE
PRECLUDED FROM ARGUING “SEPARATE ANIMUS”
WITHOUT A JURY VERDICT FINDING THAT THOSE
FACTS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A SEPARATE
ANIMUS, OR A STIPULATION ON THAT FACT OR FACTS
BY THE ACCUSED WITH PROPER WAIVER OF THAT
RIGHT.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IX
MR. CHRISTIE WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF HIS
RIGHT THERETO AFFORDED HIM BY BOTH THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
{¶16} For ease of discussion, we elect to address some of Christie’s
assignments of error together and out of the order they were presented.
First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Assignments of Error
{¶17} At the outset, we observe that Christie’s first, fourth, seventh, eighth,
and ninth assignments of error each raise issues which are outside the scope of our
review on this appeal pursuant to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s recent decision in
State v. Fischer, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6238. The Court in Fischer held
that “[t]he scope of an appeal from a resentencing hearing in which a mandatory
term of postrelease control is imposed is limited to issues arising at the
resentencing hearing.” Id. at ¶ 40. Specifically, the Court held that the new
sentencing hearing “is limited to the proper imposition of postrelease control.” Id.
at ¶ 29.
{¶18} In limiting the scope of appellate review from a postrelease control
resentencing hearing, the Court in Fischer stated that “res judicata still applies to
other aspects of the merits of a conviction, including the determination of guilt and
the lawful elements of the ensuing sentence.” Id. at ¶40. The issues raised by
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Christie in his first, fourth, seventh, eighth, and ninth assignments of error should
have been addressed in a direct appeal of his sentence imposed in March of 1999.
However, Christie failed to timely file an appeal of that sentence. Because these
assignments of error address aspects of Christie’s case which are barred by res
judicata, the arguments pertaining to those assignments of error are now precluded
from review. Accordingly, Christie’s first, fourth, seventh, eighth, and ninth
assignments of error are overruled.
Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Assignments of Error
{¶19} Christie’s second, third, fifth, and sixth assignments of error are
interrelated because they raise issues concerning the merits of Christie’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. For ease of discussion, we elect to proceed by
addressing these assignments of error together.
{¶20} In his second assignment of error, Christie argues that the trial court
erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, Christie
argues that because his sentence was considered “void” pursuant to State v. Bezak,
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea is considered a “pre-sentencing” motion
and, therefore, should have been “liberally granted” by the trial court.
{¶21} In addressing this contention, we again turn our discussion to the
recently decided Fischer case. The Supreme Court clarified the concept of “void
judgments” as it relates to postrelease control, and held that “when a judge fails to
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impose statutorily mandated postrelease control as part of a defendant’s sentence,
that part of the sentence is void and must be set aside.. Neither the Constitution
nor common sense commands anything more.” Fischer, Slip Opinion No. 2010-
Ohio-6238, ¶ 26. (Emphasis in original).
{¶22} The Supreme Court modified its holding in State v. Bezak and stated
that “only the offending portion of the sentence (which improperly imposed
postrelease control) is subject to review and correction.” Id. at ¶ 27. (Emphasis
added). With respect to the procedure for properly imposing postrelease control,
the Supreme Court clarified that “when an appellate court concludes that a
sentence imposed by a trial court is in part void, only the portion that is void may
be vacated or otherwise amended. Therefore, we hold that the new sentencing
hearing to which an offender is entitled under Bezak is limited to proper
imposition of postrelease control.” Id. at ¶ 28-29.
{¶23} In applying the principles outlined in Fischer to the present case, we
conclude that, contrary to Christie’s assertion, his entire sentence was not rendered
“void” simply because the trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control
in the March 2, 1999 Judgment Entry setting forth his sentence. Rather, Fischer
clearly states that only the “offending portion” of the sentence—the improper
imposition of postrelease control—is considered void. Therefore, the unoffending
portion of Christie’s sentence—i.e. the remaining portion of his sentence not
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related to the imposition of postrelease control—was properly imposed and
became final when it was journalized by the trial court in the March 2, 1999
Judgment Entry of Conviction and Sentence.
{¶24} Consequently, when Christie filed his “Motion to Withdraw Plea or
Alternatively to Vacate Plea” on July 12, 2009, it was a “post-sentence” motion
because a substantial part of his sentence was final and unaffected by the minor
“offending portion” of the sentence relating to postrelease control which was
considered “void.” In making this distinction in the treatment of Christie’s motion
to withdraw his plea, we note that a “pre-sentence” motion to withdraw a guilty
plea is judged by a court under a more liberal standard and encouraged to be
“freely and liberally granted.” State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584
N.E.2d 715. However, in order for a court to grant a “post-sentence” motion to
withdraw a guilty plea, the defendant must establish the existence of a manifest
injustice, which is a much higher standard. State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d
261, 361 N.E.2d 1324.
{¶25} In reaching our conclusion on this matter we are aware that State v.
Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422, and its progeny
stand for the proposition that when postrelease control was improperly imposed in
a sentence, a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea is treated as a “pre-
sentence” motion because the entire sentence is considered “void” under Bezak.
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However, in light of the principles recently announced in Fischer, which modifies
the ruling Bezak by holding that the sentence is only “in part void,” we believe that
reviewing Christie’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea as a “post-sentence”
motion is more consistent with the Court’s more recent decision on the matter.1
{¶26} Having determined that Christie’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea
is a “post-sentence” motion, we will next address the merits of his motion.
Criminal Rule 32.1 governs motions to withdraw guilty pleas, and provides, “[a]
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before
sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may
set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or
her plea.” Crim.R. 32.1.
{¶27} As previously mentioned, a motion to withdraw a plea filed after a
defendant is sentenced will be granted only to correct a manifest injustice with the
burden of establishing the existence of a manifest injustice being placed upon the
1
We note that in Fischer, the Supreme Court declined to revisit its previous decisions in
State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422 and State v.
Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958. (Singleton held that in
cases where postrelease control was improperly imposed, the defendants who were
sentenced prior to the enactment of R.C. 2929.191 received a de novo sentencing hearing.
Those defendants who were sentenced after the enactment of the statute were entitled to a
correction of their sentence pursuant to the procedure outlined in R.C. 2929.191(C). The
rationale underpinning these cases was that the entire sentence was either “void” or
“voidable,” depending on when the original sentencing occurred. However, given the
holding in Fischer that a sentence is only “in part void,” as it relates to the postrelease
control portion, we believe it is implicit in Fischer that Christie’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea is to be treated as a “post-sentence” motion.
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individual seeking vacation of the plea. Crim.R. 32.1; State v. Smith (1977), 49
Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324. A manifest injustice is an exceptional defect in
the plea proceedings, State v. Vogelsong, 3rd Dist. No. 5-06-60, 2007-Ohio-4935,
¶ 12, or a “ ‘clear or openly unjust act.’ ” State v. Walling, 3rd Dist. No. 17-04-12,
2005-Ohio-428, ¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d
203, 208, 699 N.E.2d 83, 1998-Ohio-271. “Accordingly, a post-sentence motion
to withdraw a guilty plea is only granted in ‘extraordinary cases.’ ” State v.
Driskill, 3rd Dist. Nos. 10-08-10, 10-08-11, 2009-Ohio-2100, ¶ 32, quoting Smith,
supra. Moreover, an appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Nathan
(1995), 99 Ohio App.3d 722, 725, 651 N.E.2d 1044, citing State v. Smith, supra.
Abuse of discretion “connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies
that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore
v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140.
{¶28} Christie’s third, fifth, and sixth2 assignments of error assert
individual grounds to support his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In particular,
Christie argues that his plea was ineffective because: 1) the trial court failed to
hold a separate hearing to determine his competency; 2) the indictment was
2
We will address Christie’s sixth assignment of error insofar as it relates to his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. However, his arguments under this assignment of error which
relate to his conviction and sentence should have been raised on a direct appeal and are
now considered to be precluded by res judicata pursuant to Fischer.
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defective because it contained two subsections relating to each offense; 3) the trial
court improperly informed him about merger; and 4) the trial court failed to advise
him about the possibility of judicial release. We will address each of Christie’s
contentions in turn.
{¶29} Christie maintains that upon accepting his motion to determine his
competency to stand trial and his NGRI plea, the trial court was required to hold a
hearing on the matter. Christie now argues that the trial court’s failure to conduct
a hearing rendered his plea voidable. Generally, a trial court is constitutionally
required to hold an evidentiary competency hearing “whenever there are sufficient
indicia of incompetency to call into doubt [the] defendant’s competency to stand
trial.” State v. Were, 94 Ohio St.3d 173,175, 2002-Ohio-481, 761 N.E.2d 591.
However, the failure to hold a hearing may be harmless error where the record
fails to reveal sufficient indicia of incompetency. State v. Bock (1986), 28 Ohio
St.3d 108, 110, 502 N.E.2d 1016, citing Drope v. Missouri (1975), 420 U.S. 162,
180, 95 S.Ct. 896, 908. Moreover, a trial court’s finding that a defendant is
competent to stand trial must be upheld where there is reliable and credible
evidence to support that finding, because deference must be given to the trial
court’s ability to see and hear what goes on in its courtroom. State v. Vrabel, 99
Ohio St.3d 184, 2003-Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 303, ¶33.
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{¶30} After reviewing the record, we find that the record fails to contain
sufficient indicia of Christie’s incompetence. The record demonstrates that
evaluations of Christie’s competence to stand trial as well as the validity of his
NGRI plea were conducted by the Court Diagnosis and Treatment Center pursuant
to the trial court’s order. The evaluations unequivocally found that there was no
psychiatric or intellectual impediment to Christie’s competence to stand trial, and
that regarding his NRGI plea, Christie did not suffer from any signs or symptoms
of mental illness which would have prevented him from differentiating right from
wrong at the time he committed the offenses stated in the indictment. Moreover,
neither Christie nor his counsel objected during the plea and sentencing
proceedings to the fact that a separate hearing on competency and the NGRI plea
was not held. Rather, they both acknowledged that the evaluations were
performed and that the findings contained in those reports indicated that Christie
was competent to stand trial and that his NGRI plea was not supported by the
evidence. (Feb. 18, 1999 Hrg. at p.2; March 2, 1999 Hrg. at p.2-3).
{¶31} Therefore, because the record lacks any indicia of Christie’s
incompetency and fails to substantiate his NGRI plea, we conclude that the trial
court’s failure to hold a hearing on the matter was harmless error. Therefore,
despite his unsupported contention, Christie’s plea was not rendered “voidable.”
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{¶32} Next, Christie argues that counts two, three, and four each alleged
more than one offense, and therefore at the time of the plea, he did not know to
which offense he ultimately pled. Christie maintains that this rendered his plea
ineffective because it was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. We
initially note that in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Christie only raised
this argument as to counts two and three, the two kidnapping charges. It is only on
appeal that Christie first raises this argument as it relates to count four, the
aggravated burglary charge. Nevertheless, we will review Christie’s argument on
this point as to each count.
{¶33} Count two of the indictment alleged that Christie “did knowingly, by
force, threat or deception, remove another from the place where the other person
was found or restrain the liberty of the victim, to facilitate the commission of any
felony or with the purpose to terrorize, or inflict serious physical harm on the said
victim, in violation of [R.C.] 2905.01(A)(2) and (A)(3), Kidnapping, a felony of
the first degree[.]” (Indictment, Dec. 3, 1998 p.1).
{¶34} We note that as to count three, our review of the record reveals that
even though two subsections of the kidnapping statute are cited, the language
contained in count three only correlates to one subsection, specifically R.C
2905.01(A)(3). In particular, count three alleged that Christie, “did knowingly, by
force, threat or deception, remove another from the place where the other person
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was found or restrain the liberty of the victim, with purpose to terrorize, or inflict
serious physical harm on another person, in violation of [R.C.] 2905.01(A)(2) and
(3)[.]” (Id. p.1-2).
{¶35} Count four of the indictment alleged that Christie “did, by force,
stealth, or deception, trespass in an occupied structure, or in a separately secured
or separately occupied portion of an occupied structure, when another person was
present, with purpose to commit therein a criminal offense, and the said Chad D.
Christie inflicted, or attempted or threatened to inflict physical harm on another
person, and/or had a deadly weapon on or about his person or under his control, in
violation of [R.C.] 2911.11(A)(1) and (A)(2), Aggravated Burglary, a felony of the
first degree[.]” (Id. p.2)
{¶36} Both the Bill of Particulars and the prosecution’s recitation of the
facts at the change of plea hearing specified the following. Count two pertained to
evidence showing that Christie ordered his wife, Anetta, at gunpoint from an
upstairs bedroom where she was sleeping to the downstairs living area where he
then proceeded to shoot her in the head with a 12-gauge pump shotgun, causing
her serious physical harm. Count three pertained to evidence showing that upon
entering the downstairs living area of the residence, Christie held a 12-gauge
pump shotgun to his wife’s sister, Kim Riblet’s, head and ordered her at gunpoint
to go to the upstairs of the residence to locate his wife in one of the bedrooms.
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With respect to count four, the charge was predicated on evidence demonstrating
that Christie entered the Riblet residence without permission from the owner or
occupants, through a window with a 12-gauge pump shotgun in his possession,
which he fired at his wife, causing her serious physical harm.
{¶37} Christie now argues, over ten years later, that his plea was ineffective
because counts two, three, and four each listed two subsections of the offense and
therefore he did not know to which subsection he was pleading guilty. On appeal,
Christie cites no authority mandating that only one subsection of an offense be
listed in an indictment, and that the defendant can subsequently only plea to one
subsection. To the contrary, the Ohio Criminal Rules of Procedure state that “[i]t
may be alleged in a single count that the means by which the defendant committed
the offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more
specified means. Each count of the indictment or information shall state the
numerical designation of the statute that the defendant is alleged to have violated.”
Crim.R. 7(B). (Emphasis added).
{¶38} Moreover, despite Christie’s contention, the record clearly
demonstrates that he was fully apprised that he was pleading to two counts of
kidnapping and one count of aggravated burglary having committed each offense
by two separate means. The trial court also informed Christie that he would
receive one prison term for each count, and in fact the trial court only imposed one
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sentence for each count; which dispels Christie’s argument that he was charged
with or improperly sentenced to two different offenses in a single count.
Furthermore, at no point during the change of plea hearing did Christie express his
confusion about what he was pleading to or object to the charges listed in the
indictment.
{¶39} In addition, when the trial court sentenced Christie, it did not impose
the maximum prison term on any of the counts even though it fully apprised him
of the possibility that he could receive the maximum term on each count upon
tendering his guilty plea. The trial court further advised Christie that it was not
bound to follow the sentence stated in the plea agreement, in which the
prosecution recommended an aggregate twenty-five-year prison term for the
charges. Moreover, even though it was within the trial court’s authority to order
each prison term on all four counts to run consecutively, the trial court ordered the
prison term for the aggravated burglary to run concurrent to the sentence for the
other three counts.
{¶40} In short, Christie failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice
in the sentencing let alone a manifest injustice which would warrant the court to
allow him to withdraw his guilty plea on this basis.
{¶41} Christie also argues that the trial court improperly informed him of
merger. Specifically, Christie alleges that counts two, three, and four were allied
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offenses and should have merged at sentencing. Christie now contends that had he
known this information, he would not have tendered his guilty plea. At the outset,
we note that Christie simply summarily argues that the two kidnapping and
aggravated burglary convictions should have merged because they were allied
offenses, and does not separately argue the particular claimed error, nor does he
provide any reasons in support his contentions. App.R.16(A)(7). Accordingly, we
may disregard this argument pursuant to App.R.12(A)(2). Nevertheless, in light of
the recent Supreme Court of Ohio decision in State v. Johnson, we do not find that
the two counts of kidnapping and the aggravated burglary charge were allied
offenses that should have merged at sentencing. State v. Johnson, Slip Opinion
No. 2010-Ohio-6314 (holding that when determining whether two offenses are
allied offenses of similar import subject to merger, the conduct of the accused
under the facts of the particular case must be considered).
{¶42} As previously mentioned, Christie committed one act of aggravated
burglary when he stealthily crawled through the back window of his sister-in-
law’s residence with a 12-gauge shotgun loaded with deer slugs. After entering
the residence, he kidnapped two different victims. In the first instance, he ordered
his sister-in-law upstairs at gunpoint to find his wife. Once he located his wife, he
marched his wife downstairs at gunpoint, where he then shot her. Based on these
facts, we do not find that counts two, three, and four were allied offenses and
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subject to merger. Moreover, because Christie fails to cite any authority to
support his contention that they should have been merged, we decline to further
develop his argument for him.
{¶43} As the last remaining ground to support his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, Christie argues that the trial court erred when it informed him that he
was not eligible for community control. At the change of plea hearing, the trial
court described the possible prison terms for each count and properly informed
Christie of postrelease control and the sanctions for violating postrelease control.
The trial court also explained to Christie that the firearm specification attached to
the attempted murder charge carried with it a mandatory three-year prison term.
Accordingly, Christie was advised that if he chose to enter a guilty plea pursuant
the negotiated agreement, he would be required to serve prison time.
{¶44} Specifically, Christie maintains that the trial court failed to inform
him of the possibility of community control “by way of judicial release.” (Appt.
Brief p.15). Again, Christie fails to cite any authority which requires a trial court
to inform the defendant of the possibility of judicial release. In fact, there is
nothing in Crim.R. 11 which requires a trial court to advise the defendant of all the
possible scenarios—i.e. that judicial release could “in theory” be imposed, prior to
accepting the defendant’s guilty plea. Moreover, because Christie was sentenced
to a prison term of twenty-five years he is not an “eligible offender” under the
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judicial release statute which limits the availability of judicial release to offenders
who are serving a prison term of ten years or less. See R.C. 2929.20(A).
Accordingly, Christie has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to
advise him of an attenuated possibility that judicial release could be granted in the
future resulted in a manifest injustice.
{¶45} After reviewing the record before us, we conclude that Christie failed
to establish the existence of a manifest injustice on any of the grounds alleged.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Christie’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Christie’s second, third, fifth, and sixth
assignments of error are, therefore, overruled.
{¶46} For all these reasons, the judgment of the Defiance County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON, J., concurs
Rogers, P.J., Concurring Separately
{¶47} I concur with the result reached by the majority. However, as to the
second, third, fifth, and sixth assignments of error, all of which address the trial
court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, I would not discuss the merits of
such motion.
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{¶48} First, the trial court has no authority to even consider a motion to
withdraw a plea after an original appeal, or, if no appeal is taken, after the time for
filing the original appeal has passed. State v. Coats, 3d Dist. Nos. 10-10-05, 10-
10-06, 2010-Ohio-4822, ¶18, citing State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-
Ohio-3831, ¶61. Second, even if the trial court had authority to consider the
motion, a decision that could have been appealed to this Court, but was not, is res
judicata. Id. at ¶16.
{¶49} Therefore, I would have overruled the second, third, fifth, and sixth
assignments of error without discussion as to the background or merits of
Appellant’s motion.
/jnc
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