Millennia Hous. Mgt., Ltd. v. Withrow , 2013 Ohio 278 ( 2013 )

[Cite as Millennia Hous. Mgt., Ltd. v. Withrow, 2013-Ohio-278.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ATHENS COUNTY
MILLENNIA HOUSING
MANAGEMENT, LTD., :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 12CA2
:
vs. :
:
MISTY WITHROW, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 01/28/13
:
________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Anne Sessums Rubin, SOUTHEASTERN OHIO LEGAL SERVICES, Athens,
Ohio, for Appellant.
Greggory B. Elzey, Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for
Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Harsha, J.
{¶1} Misty Withrow appeals the trial court’s judgment that terminated her
occupancy of a federally-subsidized lease issued pursuant to what is commonly
known as “Section 8.” Withrow raises three assignments of error, but because
Withrow did not request a stay of the trial court’s judgment, we find that her
appeal is moot. Accordingly, we dismiss Withrow’s appeal.
I. FACTS
{¶2} Millennia terminated Withrow’s federally-subsidized lease due to an
alleged violation of the lease agreement and filed a forcible entry and detainer
complaint against Withrow that sought restitution of the premises. Millennia
alleged that Withrow defaulted upon the terms of tenancy by having an
Athens App. No. 12CA2 2
unauthorized person inside the premises. The trial court subsequently restored
Millennia to the premises and issued a writ of restitution to remove Withrow from
the premises. Withrow did not request a stay of the trial court’s judgment.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶3} Withrow raises three assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error:
“The trial court erred in denying the Appellant tenant’s motion to
dismiss when the Appellee landlord’s notices to her lacked
sufficient specificity to enable her to prepare a defense.”
Second Assignment of Error:
“The trial court erred in denying the Appellant tenant an opportunity
to obtain pretrial discovery from the Appellee landlord.”
Third Assignment of Error:
“The trial court’s decision granting restitution to the Appellee
landlord is manifestly against the weight of the evidence and
contrary to law.”
III. ANALYSIS
{¶4} Millennia argues that this appeal is moot because Withrow has
been removed from the premises and it has been restored to the premises.
Withrow asserts that the appeal is not moot because, as a tenant who receives
federal housing assistance, she has a continuing interest in the outcome of the
appeal. Withrow contends that she has a continuing interest in the outcome of
this appeal because an unfavorable court proceeding could affect her eligibility
for future federal housing assistance.
{¶5} Before we can address Withrow’s assignments of error, we first
must determine whether the appeal presents a case or controversy or, instead,
Athens App. No. 12CA2 3
an abstract question not capable of judicial review. E.g., Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 60 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1979);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356, 31 S. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246 (1911).
“[I]t is the duty of every judicial tribunal to decide actual
controversies between parties legitimately affected by specific facts
and to render judgments which can be carried into effect. It has
become settled judicial responsibility for courts to refrain from
giving opinions on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition
by judgment of premature declarations or advice upon potential
controversies.”
Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St. 2d 13, 14, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970), citing Section
4(B), Article IV, of the Ohio Constitution. Accord Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., 128
Ohio St. 3d 322, 2010-Ohio-6036, 944 N.E.2d 207, &9. Moreover, the Supreme
Court of Ohio has advised us that it is reversible error for an appellate court to
consider the merits of an appeal that has become moot. See State v. Berndt
(1987), 29 Ohio St3d 3, 4, 504 NE2d 712.
{¶6} A case or controversy is lacking and the case is moot “’when the
issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.’” Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S. Ct.
1379, 59 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1979), quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496,
89 S. Ct. 1944, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1969). Accord Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277,
287, 120 S. Ct. 1382, 146 L. Ed. 2d 265 (2000). “No actual controversy exists
where a case has been rendered moot by an outside event. ‘It is not the duty of
the court to answer moot questions, and when, pending proceedings in error in
this court, an event occurs without the fault of either party, which renders it
impossible for the court to grant any relief, it will dismiss the petition in error.’
Athens App. No. 12CA2 4
Miner v. Witt (1910), 82 Ohio St. 237, 92 N.E. 21, syllabus.” Tschantz v.
Ferguson, 57 Ohio St. 3d 131, 133, 566 N.E.2d 655 (1991). “A cause will
become moot only when it becomes impossible for a tribunal to grant meaningful
relief, even if it were to rule in favor of the party seeking relief.” Joys v. Univ. of
Toledo, 10th Dist. No. 96APE08-1040 (April 29, 1997), citing Miner, 82 Ohio St. at
238-239.
{¶7} “A forcible entry and detainer action decides the right to immediate
possession of property and ‘nothing else.’” Goldstein v. Patel, 9th Dist. Nos.
02CA8183, 02CA8199, 2003-Ohio-4386, ¶4, quoting Seventh Urban Inc. v. Univ.
Circle Prop. Dev. Inc., 67 Ohio St. 2d 19, 25, 423 N.E.2d 1070, n.11 (1981).
Thus, “[o]nce a landlord has been restored to property, the forcible entry and
detainer action becomes moot because, having been restored to the premises,
there is no further relief that may be granted to the landlord.” United States
Secy. of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Chancellor, 8th Dist. No. 73970 (Feb. 25,
1999). As the court explained in Crossings Dev. Ltd. Partnership v. H.O.T., Inc.,
96 Ohio App. 3d 475, 479-80, 645 N.E.2d 159 (1994):
“’ [A] moot case arises * * * where a judgment is sought,
upon a matter which when it is rendered, cannot have any practical
effect upon the issues raised by the pleadings. This is the status of
the case at bar. The inquiry is irresistible. Should the case be
reversed[,] upon another trial below, the paradoxical situation would
arise that the landlords were seeking to dispossess a tenant who
had already voluntarily dispossessed himself. It would
unequivocally appear that the landlord was seeking a right which he
had already acquired by consummation. * * * The course, if
plaintiffs secured judgment, would be to give them nothing but that
which they already have and prayed for, to-wit, the possession of
the premises and thus it would appear that the reason for this
possession was because of the situation created by the tenant in
vacating the property and surrendering the occupancy thereof.’”
Athens App. No. 12CA2 5
Crossings Dev. Ltd. Partnership v. H.O.T., Inc., 96 Ohio App. 3d 475, 479-480,
645 N.E.2d 159 (1994), quoting Gelfand v. Stys, 7 Ohio Law. Abs. 105, 105
(1929). Consequently, “when a plaintiff is successful and defendant does not
obtain a stay preventing its ouster and the return of the premises to the plaintiff *
* * the issues are rendered moot.” Id. at 481.
{¶8} A defendant appealing a judgment of forcible entry and detainer
may overcome a ruling of mootness by obtaining a stay of execution and/or
posting a supersedeas bond. R.C. 1923.14; Tripp v. French, 9th Dist. No.
02CA0004-M, 2002-Ohio-6996, ¶8. Accord Valente v. Johnson, 4th Dist. Nos.
06CA31 and 06CA38, 2007-Ohio-2664, ¶20. Withrow did not obtain a stay of the
judgment, and Millennia was restored to the premises If a defendant fails to
obtain a stay of execution and/or post a supersedeas bond, all issues relating to
forcible entry and detainer are rendered moot. Valente at ¶20; Tripp at ¶8. A
forcible entry and detainer defendant may overcome a mootness ruling by
demonstrating that an exception to the mootness doctrine applies.
{¶9} However, we do not believe that Withrow demonstrated that
any exception to the mootness doctrine applies. This court may address an
otherwise moot issue “‘where the issues raised are ‘capable of repetition, yet
evading review.’” State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Donaldson, 63
Ohio St. 3d 173, 175, 586 N.E.2d 101 (1992), quoting State ex rel. Plain Dealer
Publishing Co. v. Barnes, 38 Ohio St. 3d 165, 527 N.E.2d 807 (1988), paragraph
one of the syllabus. This exception “applies only in exceptional circumstances in
which the following two factors are both present: (1) the challenged action is too
Athens App. No. 12CA2 6
short in its duration to be fully litigated before its cessation or expiration, and (2)
there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject
to the same action again.” Id., citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17–18, 118
S. Ct. 978, 140 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1998). Further, “there must be more than a
theoretical possibility that the action will arise again.” James A. Keller Inc. v.
Flaherty, 74 Ohio App. 3d 788, 792, 600 N.E.2d 736 (10th Dist. 1991).
{¶10} Additionally, we may consider an appeal (1) when the issue
involves “a matter of great public interest;” or (2) when “there remains a
debatable constitutional question to resolve.” Franchise Developers, Inc. v..
Cincinnati, 30 Ohio St. 3d 28, 505 N.E.2d 966 (1987), paragraph one of the
syllabus.
{¶11} Here, none of these exceptions applies. Withrow has not shown
that a reasonable expectation exists that she will be subject to the same action
again, i.e., having her lease terminated due to the presence of unauthorized
persons. This action is nothing more than a theoretical possibility. Withrow also
has not demonstrated that reviewing Millennia’s decision to terminate her lease
involves a matter of great public importance or a debatable constitutional
question.
{¶12} Withrow nevertheless asserts that her appeal is not moot because
it involves her constitutionally protected interest in continued occupancy of
federally subsidized housing. Showe Mgt. Corp. v. Moore, 5th Dist. No. 08CA10,
2009-Ohio-2312, ¶38, citing Vienna Forest Apts. v. Passmore, 12th Dist. No.
CA2004-05-104, 2005-Ohio-2368 ¶18, citing Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. Wooten, 73
Athens App. No. 12CA2 7
Ohio App. 3d 426, 432, 597 N.E.2d 554 (2nd Dist. 1992). Withrow essentially
requests that we recognize an additional exception to the mootness doctrine for a
Section 8 tenant. Withrow argues that a tenant who receives subsidized housing
has a continuing interest in the outcome of the appeal from a forcible entry and
detainer action because an unfavorable court proceeding could affect the
tenant’s eligibility for future federal housing assistance. Heritage Court, L.L.C. v.
Merritt, 187 Ohio App. 3d 117, 125, 2010-Ohio-1711, 931 N.E.2d 194, ¶26;
Showe Mgt.; Sandefur Management Co. v. Minor, 10th Dist. No. 84AP220, (Apr.
18, 1985). Withrow thus contends that her continuing interest in the outcome of
the appeal renders this case justiciable. She further points out that some Ohio
courts have refused to dismiss a forcible entry and detainer action as moot when
it involves a tenant’s constitutionally protected interest in continued federal
housing assistance. E.g., Showe Mgt.; Sandefur.
{¶13} Withrow has not persuaded us that we should follow the Fifth and
Tenth District Courts of Appeals and recognize an exception to the mootness
doctrine. She vacated the premises without even attempting to seek a stay of
the trial court’s judgment. See Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 129 Ohio St. 3d 389,
2011-Ohio-2673, 953 N.E.2d 278, ¶23 (stating that in a misdemeanor case, in
order to prevent appeal from being declared moot on basis that defendant
voluntarily completed sentence, defendant must seek stay of trial court’s
judgment; otherwise, court will infer defendant acquiesced in the judgment or
intentionally abandoned the right of appeal). She has presented no circumstance
that prevented her from seeking a stay. We recognize that Withrow is indigent,
Athens App. No. 12CA2 8
but we are unaware of any rule of law that prevents an indigent person from
seeking a stay of a trial court’s judgment. Under these circumstances, we
conclude that Withrow abandoned her right to appeal the trial court’s judgment.
{¶14} Accordingly, we dismiss Withrow’s appeal as moot.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Athens App. No. 12CA2 9
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the APPEAL BE DISMISSED and that Appellant shall
pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Athens County Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the
date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Kline, J. & McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________________
William H. Harsha, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.