Parrish v. Jones ( 2012 )

[Cite as Parrish v. Jones, 2012-Ohio-1145.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROSS COUNTY
SANDY PARRISH, ADMINISTRATOR, : Case No. 11CA3238
ET AL., :
:
Plaintiffs-Appellants, :
: DECISION AND
v. : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
MICHAEL E. JONES, ET AL., :
: RELEASED 2/15/12
Defendants-Appellees. :
______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Kenneth S. Blumenthal and Jonathan R. Stoudt, Rourke & Blumenthal, LLP, Columbus,
Ohio, for appellant.
Gregory Foliano and Kevin Popham, Arnold Todaro & Welch Co., LPA, Columbus,
Ohio, for appellees Christopher J. Skocik, D.O., and Family Medicine of Chillicothe, Inc.
Frederick A. Sewards, Hammond Sewards & Williams, Columbus, Ohio, for appellee
Michael E. Jones.
______________________________________________________________________
Harsha, J.
{¶1} Sandy Parrish filed this case alleging medical negligence and the wrongful
death of his late wife. His appeal initially contests the trial court’s directed verdict in
favor of Christopher Skocik, D.O. and Family Medicine of Chillicothe (Family Medicine)
following opening statements. Mr. Parrish asserts that he was not required to
specifically set forth all the elements of his case against Dr. Skocik in his opening
statement, and it was therefore sufficient to survive a motion for a directed verdict. Mr.
Parrish also argues that the trial court erred by not allowing him the opportunity to
amend, supplement or explain his opening statement and by failing to consider the
allegations in his complaint before ruling on the motion for directed verdict. Because
Ross App. No. 11CA3238 2
the trial court failed to consider the complaint, which sets forth sufficient facts to
establish a cause of action for medical negligence, we find that the trial court erred in
granting Dr. Skocik’s and Family Medicine’s motion for directed verdict.
{¶2} Mr. Parrish also appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new
trial. He claims the directed verdict in favor of Dr. Skocik and Family Medicine
prevented him from receiving a fair trial on his remaining claim against Michael Jones,
D.O. because Dr. Jones was able to assert Dr. Skocik’s negligence as a defense.
Specifically, he contends that the absence of Dr. Skocik’s expert witnesses, who were
expected to offer criticisms of Dr. Jones medical treatment, forced Mr. Parrish to defend
Dr. Skocik’s actions alone. However, it was Mr. Parrish’s burden to prove his medical
negligence claims against Dr. Jones. This burden included introducing whatever
evidence was necessary, including expert testimony, to establish negligence. Even
though the trial court erroneously granted the motion for directed verdict, that mistake
neither absolved nor increased that burden. Therefore the court did not err in denying
Mr. Parrish’s motion for a new trial.
I. FACTS
{¶3} Acting individually and as the administrator of his wife’s estate, Mr. Parrish
filed a series of complaints asserting that Dr. Skocik, Family Medicine, Dr. Jones, and
several other medical providers are liable for the wrongful death of Mrs. Parrish and
medical negligence in her treatment. Mrs. Parrish was admitted to Adena Regional
Medical Center for acute peripheral nerve disorder. Her physician, Dr. Jones,
diagnosed her with Guillain-Barre Syndrome and after consulting with a specialist,
placed her on the medication Lovenox to prevent blood clots from forming in her legs.
Ross App. No. 11CA3238 3
Subsequently, Dr. Jones discharged Mrs. Parrish to Chillicothe Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center where she continued to receive care; however, she did not
continue to receive Lovenox. While at the facility, Dr. Skocik was assigned to provide
medical care to Mrs. Parrish. Unfortunately, four days after her arrival at the
rehabilitation center, Mrs. Parrish passed away from a pulmonary embolism.
{¶4} Mr. Parrish alleges in his complaint that various medical professionals
negligently provided medical care and treatment to his wife by failing “to exercise the
degree of skill, care and diligence an ordinarily prudent physician and/or health care
provider would have exercised under like or similar circumstances.” He explicitly
contends that the defendants failed to properly treat, to prescribe anti-coagulation
therapy, to adequately monitor, to timely respond with medical intervention, and to
properly diagnose Mrs. Parrish’s injury and condition. And as a result of this
negligence, Mr. Parrish alleges Mrs. Parrish suffered a premature death.
{¶5} The case proceeded to a jury trial and at the conclusion of Mr. Parrish’s
opening statement, Dr. Skocik and Family Medicine moved for a directed verdict on the
ground that Mr. Parrish failed to state a cause of action against them. The trial court
heard brief arguments on the motion and subsequently granted the directed verdict.
Consequently, Mr. Parrish tried his case against Dr. Jones only and the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Dr. Jones. Following the verdict, Mr. Parrish moved for a new trial,
which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶6} Mr. Parrish presents two assignments of error for our review:
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{¶7} I. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS[’]
CHRISTOPER SKOCIK, D.O AND FAMILY MEDICINE OF CHILLICOTHE, INC.’S
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE AFTER PLANITIFF-APPELLANT’S
OPENING STATEMENT.”
{¶8} II. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF-APPELANT’S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.”
III. DIRECTED VERDICT
{¶9} Mr. Parrish claims that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in
favor of Dr. Skocik and Family Medicine for three reasons. First he argues that his
opening statement was sufficient to survive a directed verdict because he was not
required to specifically set forth all the elements of his case. Furthermore, even if he
was required to do that, he asserts that the trial court did not give him an opportunity to
amend, supplement or explain his opening statement prior to granting the motion for
directed verdict. Finally, he maintains that the trial court erred by failing to consider the
complaint, along with his opening statement, before making its ruling.
A. Legal Standard for Medical Negligence
{¶10} To establish a cause of action for medical negligence, a plaintiff must
demonstrate three elements: (1) the existence of a standard of care within the medical
community; (2) breach of that standard of care by the defendant; and (3) proximate
cause between the defendant’s breach and the plaintiff’s injury. Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46
Ohio St.2d 127, 131, 346 N.E.2d 673 (1976); Rhoads v. Brown, 4th Dist. No. 09CA18,
2010-Ohio-3898, ¶ 32. Expert testimony is generally required to prove these elements
Ross App. No. 11CA3238 5
when they are beyond the common knowledge and understanding of the jury. Rhoads,
at ¶ 32.
B. Standard for Directed Verdict
{¶11} We first consider whether the trial court was required to consider the
allegations in Mr. Parrish’s complaint, along with his opening statement, when ruling on
the motion. A motion for directed verdict presents a question of law, rather than factual
issues. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512,
2002-Ohio-2842, 769 N.E.2d 835, ¶ 4. As a question of law, we apply a de novo
standard of review on appeal. See id.{¶12} Under Civ.R. 50(A)(1) a party may move for a directed verdict on the
opening statement of the opponent, at the close of the opponent’s evidence or at the
close of all the evidence. When a party moves for a directed verdict on the opening
statement, the trial court “should exercise great caution in sustaining [the] motion.”
Brinkmoeller v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 223, 325 N.E.2d 233 (1975), syllabus. To grant
such a motion, “it must be clear that all the facts expected to be proved, and those that
have been stated, do not constitute a cause of action or a defense, and the statement
must be liberally construed in favor of the party against whom the motion has been
made.” Id. Moreover, we have previously held that both the opening statement and the
complaint must be considered in determining whether a directed verdict is appropriate.
See Taylor v. U.S. Health Corp., 4th Dist. No. 96-CA-2457, 1997 WL 346160, *5 and
Wright v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 4th Dist. Nos. 03CA3 & 03CA4, 2005-Ohio-3494, ¶ 99;
see also Archer v. Port Clinton, 6 Ohio St.2d 74, 76, 215 N.E.2d 707(1966). If the
Ross App. No. 11CA3238 6
opening statement along with the allegations in the complaint amount to a justiciable
claim for relief when construed liberally, the court must deny that motion. Wright, supra.
{¶13} In this case, the trial court did not consider the allegations in the complaint
when it granted Dr. Skocik’s and Family Medicine’s motion for directed verdict. The
record shows the trial court heard brief arguments from counsel for Mr. Parrish and Dr.
Skocik on the motion. During this exchange, the court clarified that Dr. Skocik was
basing his motion on Mr. Parrish’s opening statement alone, to which he affirmatively
responded. Subsequently, the trial court reviewed the transcript from Mr. Parrish’s
opening statement and granted the motion for directed verdict. In its judgment entry
addressing Mr. Parrish’s motion for a new trial, the trial court cites Blankenship v.
Kennard, 10th Dist. No. 92AP-415, 1993 WL 318825, which states no other allegations
are to be incorporated into an opening statement; the entry also confirmed that the court
granted the motion for directed verdict based solely on Mr. Parrish’s opening statement.
However, this district does not follow Blankenship and the failure to apply the rule in
Archer, Taylor and Wright resulted in the court improperly granting the motion because
it used the wrong legal standard to decide the motion.
{¶14} Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred by granting Dr. Skocik and
Family Medicine’s motion for directed verdict and sustain Mr. Parrish’s first assignment
of error. As this argument proves dispositive of Mr. Parrish’s first assignment of error,
we decline to address his remaining arguments. We also decline to review the merits of
the motion in light of the allegations contained in the complaint. The law requires the
trial court to consider all the necessary factors before rendering its decision. Even
though we apply a de novo standard of review to that judgment, the Supreme Court of
Ross App. No. 11CA3238 7
Ohio has explicitly directed us to act as a reviewing court, not one that makes the
determination. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 360, 604 N.E.2d 138(1992). See also Commercial Sav. Bank v. City of Jackson, 4th Dist. No. 97CA798,
1997 WL 626410, *7.
IV. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
{¶15} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Parrish claims that he was
prevented from receiving a fair trial on his claim against Dr. Jones following the directed
verdict in favor of Dr. Skocik and Family Medicine and therefore the trial court erred by
denying his motion for a new trial. Specifically, he asserts that Dr. Jones was able to
argue Dr. Skocik’s negligence as a defense to his own liability without any response
from Dr. Skocik’s experts, who were expected to testify in support of Dr. Skocik’s acts
and offer criticisms of Dr. Jones. Consequently, Mr. Parrish claims that the act of
defending Dr. Skocik wrongly fell to him, which resulted in an unfair trial. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
{¶16} Mr. Parrish bases his argument on subsections (1), (7) and (9) of Civ.R.
59(A), which provide: “A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all
or part of the issues upon any of the following grounds: (1) Irregularity in the
proceedings of the court, jury, magistrate, or prevailing party, or any order of the court
or magistrate, or abuse of discretion, by which an aggrieved party was prevented from
having a fair trial * * * (7) The judgment is contrary to law * * * (9) Error of law occurring
at the trial and brought to the attention of the trial court by the party making the
application.”
Ross App. No. 11CA3238 8
{¶17} Depending on the basis of the motion for a new trial, we review the trial
court’s decision under either a de novo or an abuse of discretion standard of review.
Rohde v. Farmer, 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 262 N.E.2d 685 (1970), paragraphs one and two of
syllabus. “Where a trial court is authorized to grant a new trial for a reason which
requires the exercise of sound discretion, the order granting a new trial may be reversed
only upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Id. at paragraph one of
syllabus. However, “[w]here a new trial is granted by a trial court, for reasons which
involve no exercise of discretion but only a decision on a question of law, the order
granting a new trial may be reversed upon the basis of a showing that the decision was
erroneous as a matter of law.” Id. at paragraph two of syllabus. Accordingly, appellate
courts must review a motion for a new trial made on the basis that there was an error of
law at trial under the de novo standard. See Sully v. Joyce, 10th Dist. Nos. 10AP-1148
& 10AP-1151, 2011-Ohio-3825, ¶ 8.
{¶18} Mr. Parrish argues that he did not receive a fair trial because the trial
court erroneously granted Dr. Skocik and Family Medicine’s motion for directed verdict.
The decision to grant or deny a motion for directed verdict involves a question of law.
Therefore we review his motion for a new trial under a de novo standard of review.
B. Fairness of the Trial
{¶19} Although we agree that the trial court erroneously granted Dr. Skocik and
Family Medicine’s motion for directed verdict, we do not agree that that this error
caused Mr. Parrish to receive an unfair trial. “In a civil case, the plaintiff normally has
the burden of producing evidence to support his case, and the defendant has the
burden of producing evidence of any affirmative defenses.” State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio
Ross App. No. 11CA3238 9
St.2d 103, 107, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976). Accordingly, it was Mr. Parrish’s burden to
establish each element of his medical negligence claim. Dr. Jones was free to defend
this claim by asserting Dr. Skocik’s negligence. Mr. Parrish admits that he had notice
that Dr. Jones “intended to push blame” onto Dr. Skocik. Although he claims that he did
not receive a fair trial because Dr. Skocik was not there to defend his own actions, it
was Mr. Parrish’s burden to prove his case against Dr. Jones by providing his own
expert testimony. The fact that Mr. Parrish intended to rely on Dr. Skocik’s expert
witnesses to counter Dr. Jones defense does not absolve him of the ultimate burden to
prove his case and counter any defenses presented by Dr. Jones. In essence Mr.
Parrish claims it was unfair to allow Dr. Jones to try “the empty chair” at the last minute.
However, if Dr. Skocik had settled with Mr. Parrish right before trial, the burden to prove
that Dr. Jones’ negligent conduct caused Mrs. Parrish’s death would have remained
with Mr. Parrish. Because he was the plaintiff, this burden was his throughout whatever
course the proceedings took. There was nothing “unfair” about the trial against Dr.
Jones in spite of the erroneous directed verdict in favor of Dr. Skocik and Family
Medicine. Therefore, we overrule his second assignment of error.
V. CONCLUSION
{¶20} In conclusion, we sustain Mr. Parrish’s first assignment of error and
reverse the directed verdict in favor Dr. Skocik and Family Medicine. Upon remand the
trial court is to revisit its decision in light of the allegations contained in the amended
complaint. We overrule Mr. Parrish’s second assignment of error and affirm the trial
court’s judgment concerning his motion for a new trial.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
IN PART, AND CAUSE REMANDED.
Ross App. No. 11CA3238 10
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN
PART and that the CAUSE IS REMANDED. Appellants and Appellees shall split the
costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of
this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Abele, P.J. & Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________________
William H. Harsha, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing
with the clerk.