State v. Klintworth , 2011 Ohio 3553 ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Klintworth , 2011-Ohio-3553.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 10CA40
:
vs. : Released: July 13, 2011
:
WILLIAM T. KLINTWORTH, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Nathan Kott, West Salem, Ohio, for Appellant.
Roland W. Riggs, III., Marietta City Law Director, and Mark. C. Sleeper,
Marietta City Assistant Law Director, Marietta, Ohio, for Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
McFarland, J.:
{¶1} Appellant, William Klintworth, appeals the decision and
judgment of the Marietta Municipal Court entered after a jury found him
guilty of OVI per se, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(e). On appeal,
Appellant raises four assignments of error, contending that: 1) the trial
court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when it granted
the state’s motion in limine suppressing portions of his expert’s testimony;
2) the judgment of the trial court is against the manifest weight of the
evidence; 3) the application of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(e) is a violation of due
Washington App. No. 10CA40 2
process because the uncontroverted expert opinion demonstrates that a
person of ordinary intelligence cannot comply with the statute’s mandate;
and 4) the selective and arbitrary imposition of blood and urine tests results
in treating similarly situated individuals differently for no rational reason,
which is a violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United
States Constitutions.
{¶2} In light of our conclusion that the testimony proffered by the
expert would have constituted an impermissible attack on the general
reliability of Ohio’s approved method for determining alcohol concentration
in urine, the trial court did not err in granting the State’s motion in limine
and thereby excluding such testimony. Thus, Appellant’s first assignment of
error is overruled. Further, based upon our conclusion that the State
presented substantial evidence upon which the jury could reasonably
conclude that all essential elements of the offense of OVI per se had been
established beyond a reasonable doubt, Appellant’s second assignment of
error is overruled.
{¶3} Finally, as Appellant failed to raise the constitutional challenges
to R.C. 4511.19 set forth in his third and fourth assignments of error, he
cannot raise them for the first time on appeal. As such, we decline to
Washington App. No. 10CA40 3
address them. Accordingly, the decision and judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
FACTS
{¶4} Appellant was stopped for a marked lanes violation at
approximately 8:30 p.m. on the evening of February 3, 2010, while a driving
a vehicle owned by his passenger and friend. Trooper Gossett, upon noting
an odor of alcohol asked Appellant how much he had consumed to which
Appellant responded that he had consumed a couple of drinks. Appellant
later told the trooper he had three drinks beginning at about 5:00 p.m.,
having consumed his last drink about forty-five minutes before the stop. At
the trooper’s request, Appellant performed several field sobriety tests and
was eventually placed under arrest. After being arrested, Appellant was
transported to the Washington County Jail where he consented to a urine test
and was charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a).
{¶5} After the urine test results revealed a prohibited concentration of
alcohol in Appellant’s urine, the complaint was amended to include a charge
that Appellant had operated a vehicle with a concentration of eleven-
hundredths of one gram or more but less than two hundred thirty-eight-
thousandths of one gram by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of
Washington App. No. 10CA40 4
urine, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(e). The case proceeded to a jury
trial on October 14, 2010. At trial, the State presented testimony from
Trooper Gossett, as well as Mark Hiatt, a criminologist with the Ohio State
Highway Patrol Crime Lab, who testified regarding the procedures used to
test Appellant’ urine, which were in compliance with Department of Health
regulations. Specifically, Hiatt testified Appellant’s alcohol level was
measured at .172 grams by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of
urine, using gas chromatography.
{¶6} Appellant testified on his own behalf and also presented expert
testimony from Dr. Alfred E. Staubus, Ph.D. and emeritus faculty member
with The Ohio State University’s College of Pharmacy. After granting the
State’s motion in limine seeking to exclude any testimony from Dr. Staubus
“on the issue of first urine void testing and its reliability,” the trial court
permitted Appellant to proffer testimony by Dr. Staubus related to the
reliability of first versus second void urine testing. Further, Dr. Staubus
was permitted to testify before the jury at length regarding his opinion that
“urine collection is not a valid reflection of the alcohol in the human body at
the time the void is collected” and that the most important factor to know,
scientifically, is when a person last voided. Dr. Staubus was also permitted
to testify that whether a urine test is valid or not depends on knowing the last
Washington App. No. 10CA40 5
time the person voided before taking the test, and that in this case, that
information is not known.
{¶7} After hearing the evidence presented, the jury acquitted
Appellant of the driving under the influence charge, in violation of R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(a), but convicted Appellant of the OVI per se charge, in
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(e). The trial court entered its decision and
judgment entry on October 26, 2010, and it is from this decision that
Appellant now brings his timely appeal, assigning the following errors for
our review.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
“I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED THE
STATE’S MOTION IN LIMINE.
II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
III. THE APPLICATION OF R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(e) IS A VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS BECAUSE THE UNCONTROVERTED
EXPERT OPINION DEMONSTRATES THAT A PERSON OF
ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE CANNOT COMPLY WITH THE
STATUTE’S MANDATE.
IV. THE SELECTIVE, AND ARBITRARY, IMPOSITION OF BLOOD
AND URINE TESTS RESULTS IN TREATING SIMILARLY
SITUATED INDIVIDUALS DIFFERENTLY FOR NO RATIONAL
REASON, WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE OHIO AND UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS.”
Washington App. No. 10CA40 6
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial
court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when it granted
the State’s motion in limine suppressing portions of Appellant’s expert’s
testimony. “The purpose of a motion in limine ‘is to avoid injection into
[the] trial of matters which are irrelevant, inadmissible and prejudicial[,] and
granting of [the] motion is not a ruling on evidence and, where properly
drawn, granting of [the] motion cannot be error.’ ” State v. Moon, Adams
App. No. 08CA875, 2009-Ohio-4830 at ¶ 27; citing State v. French, 72 Ohio
St.3d 446, 450, 1995-Ohio-32, 650 N.E.2d 887 (internal citations omitted).
{¶9} The record reveals that the State filed a motion in limine seeking
to exclude any testimony from Appellant’s expert, Dr. Alfred Staubus, “on
the issue of first urine void testing and its reliability,” arguing that such
testimony essentially amounted to a general attack on urine testing using
only a single sample, which it argued was barred by State v. Vega (1984), 12
Ohio St. 3d 185, 465 N.E.2d 1303, State v. Columber, Marion App. No. 9-
06-05, 2006-Ohio-5490, and State v. Peprah, 139 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 2006-
Ohio-4222, 858 N.E.2d 436.
{¶10} The trial court granted the State’s motion, finding that:
“* * * a reliability challenge on a specific first void urine test is in essence a
challenge to the general reliability of the first void urine test and procedure.
Washington App. No. 10CA40 7
This challenge is precluded by Vega, and that this ruling does not violate the
defendant’s due process rights.”
The trial court then permitted Appellant to proffer testimony from Dr.
Staubus to the effect that blood testing is much preferred over urine testing
in terms of accuracy, and testing of a second urine void is much more
accurate than a first urine void. Further, Dr. Staubus was permitted to testify
before the jury regarding his opinion that “urine collection is not a valid
reflection of the alcohol in the human body at the time the void is collected”
and that the most important factor to know, scientifically, is when a person
last voided. Dr. Staubus was also permitted to testify that whether a urine
test is valid or not depends on knowing the last time the person voided
before taking the test, and that in this case, it was not known when Appellant
last voided prior to being tested.
{¶11} In State v. Vega, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “an
accused may not make a general attack upon the reliability and validity of
the breath testing instrument.” Vega at 190. Admittedly, Vega dealt with
breath testing rather than urine testing. In State v. Columber, supra, the
Third District Court of Appeals reasoned that Dr. Staubus’ proffered
testimony regarding his preference for dual breath testing amounted to an
attack upon the reliability of the testing procedures approved by the Director
of the Ohio Department of Health. Columber at ¶ 13. We conclude that Dr.
Washington App. No. 10CA40 8
Staubus’ proffered testimony as to his preference for second void urine
testing rather than first void urine testing is akin to his opinions regarding
dual breath testing and, as such, we find the reasoning of both Vega and
Columber to be both applicable and persuasive.
{¶12} Our reasoning is supported by other court decisions. See, State
v. Peprah, supra, at ¶ 46, (holding that “this court will not allow the
defendant to us expert testimony to attack the general reliability or general
accuracy of a legislatively determined test procedure – urine testing – as a
valid scientific means of determining blood alcohol levels.”); State v. Estep
(1991), 73 Ohio App. 3d 609, 598 N.E.2d 96 (“expert testimony designed to
impeach the general reliability of Ohio’s legislatively determined urine-
alcohol testing procedures is clearly inadmissible[,]” relying on Vega,
supra.); Wellston v. Brown, Jackson App. No. 03CA25, 2005-Ohio-532
(Judge Abele, dissenting, reasoned that Dr. Staubus’ opinion did not
challenge the specific breathalyzer test results but rather was an
impermissible attack on the general reliability of alcohol testing, essentially
opening the door for future arguments that breath and urine testing are
unreliable and only blood tests should be accepted into evidence).
{¶13} This issue was also considered by the Fifth District Court of
Appeals in State v. Watson, Knox App. No. 06CA000025, 2007-Ohio-2804,
Washington App. No. 10CA40 9
albeit in the context of a motion to suppress, rather than in the context of a
motion in limine. In Watson, Appellant filed a motion to suppress, which
was ultimately denied, arguing that the test of a first void urine sample is
scientifically unreliable. Watson at ¶ 9. In evaluating what the court
deemed an attack “on the scientific reliability of testing the first void of a
urine test for alcohol[,]” the court determined it was necessary to “look at
the statutory and corresponding administrative code regulations for
guidance.” Id. at ¶ 21. As such, the court reviewed the pertinent version
R.C. 4511.19(D)(1),1 which governed the procedure for collection and
analysis of bodily substances in connection with violations of R.C.
4511.19(A). Id. at ¶ 22. The court also reviewed the former version of R.C.
3701.143, which, just as the version in effect at the time of Appellant’s
arrest, essentially provides that the director of health shall determine the
techniques and methods for chemically analyzing a person’s blood, urine,
breath and other bodily substances in order to ascertain the amount of
alcohol or other controlled substances present therein. Id. at ¶ 23-24.
{¶14} The Watson court ultimately determined that the “Ohio Director
of Health is silent on whether the urine sample collected should be the first
or second void.” Id. at ¶ 35. Thus, the court reasoned that “[s]ince there is
1
The version of R.C. 4511.19 in effect at the time of Watson’s arrest had an effective date of September
23, 2004. The statute was revised prior to Appellant’s arrest and the pertinent provision became numbered
as R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b).
Washington App. No. 10CA40 10
silence on this issue, this Court will not presume to determine whether it is
necessary to test the first or second void. This is a decision that should be
left up to the Ohio Director of Health.” Id. at ¶ 36. Admittedly, this
reasoning was issued in the context of whether or not urine tests should be
admitted as part of the State’s case, rather than whether a defendant can
attack the reliability of the results through expert testimony at trial.
Nonetheless, we find the reasoning to be pertinent to the extent that it notes
that the Director of Health does not require second void urine testing, rather
than first void urine testing. To that that end, we conclude that Dr. Staubus’
proffered testimony, which opined that first void urine testing was
unreliable, would have constituted an attack on the general reliability of
Ohio’s legislatively determined urine-alcohol testing procedures, which is
clearly impermissible. Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in
granting the State’s motion in limine excluding such testimony by
Appellant’ expert at trial. Accordingly, Appellant first assignment of error is
overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
{¶15} In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends that the
judgment of the trial court is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
When determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest
Washington App. No. 10CA40 11
weight of the evidence, we “will not reverse a conviction where there is
substantial evidence upon which the [trier of fact] could reasonably conclude
that all the elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Eskridge (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304,
paragraph two of the syllabus; see, also, State v. Smith, Pickaway App. No.
06CA7, 2007-Ohio-502 at ¶ 41. We “must review the entire record, weigh
the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the
witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial granted.” Smith
at ¶ 41, citing State v. Garrow (1995), 103 Ohio App. 3d 368, 370–371, 659
N.E.2d 814; State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d
717. However, “[o]n the trial of a case, * * * the weight to be given the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the
facts.” State v. DeHass (1967) 10 Ohio St. 2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212,
paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶16} R.C. § 4511.19(A)(1)(e) states as follows:
“No person shall operate any vehicle ... if, at the time of the operation, ...
[t]he person has a concentration of eleven-hundredths of one gram or more
but less than two hundred thirty-eight-thousandths of one gram by weight of
alcohol per one hundred milliliters of the person's urine.”
Washington App. No. 10CA40 12
Thus, the prosecution needed only to prove that that Appellant’s
concentration exceeded eleven-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol
per one hundred milliliters of urine.
{¶17} Here, the State Highway Patrol Crime Lab report states that the
alcohol result was “0.172 grams by weight of alcohol per one hundred
milliliters (grams percent) of urine.” Appellant contends that such a
concentration, if correct, would indicate substantial intoxication, and argues
that the fact that the jury acquitted him of the “under the influence” charge
further bolsters his argument that the urine test results were invalid.
{¶18} R.C. 4511.19 is a strict liability statute. State v. Sabo, Franklin
App. No. 04AP-1114, 2006-Ohio-1521 at ¶ 18; citing Defiance v. Kretz
(1991), 60 Ohio St. 3d 1, 3, 573 N.E.2d 32. When determining whether
Appellant committed the “per se” offense set forth in R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(e),
the trier of fact was not required to find that Appellant operated a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs; rather, the trier of fact
was only required to find that Appellant’s chemical test reading was at the
proscribed level and he operated a motor vehicle within the state. Sabo at ¶
18; citing Kretz, supra; citing Newark v. Lucas (1988), 40 Ohio St. 3d 100,
103, 532 N.E.2d 130; see also, State v. Gordon, 155 Ohio App. 3d 357,
2003-Ohio-6160, 801 N.E.2d 493 at ¶ 57 (concurring opinion noting that an
Washington App. No. 10CA40 13
acquittal on an “impairment” charge is not an affirmative defense to a
conviction under a per se violation). As such, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s reasoning.
{¶19} Further, after reviewing the record, we find there was sufficient
evidence to establish appellant violated R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(e).
Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR III AND IV
{¶20} In his third and fourth assignments of error, Appellant raises
facial and as applied constitutional arguments related to R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(e). Specifically, Appellant claims that the application of R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(e) is a violation of due process based upon a void for
vagueness argument. Appellant further claims that the statute’s “selective,
and arbitrary, imposition of blood and urine tests results in treating similarly
situated individuals differently for no rational reason, which is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.”
{¶21} The State contends that Appellant failed to raise these
constitutional arguments at the trial court level and thus has waived them for
purposes of appeal. This Court was recently presented with a similar
situation in State v. Countryman, Washington App. No. 08CA12, 2008-
Ohio-6700. As explained in Countryman, “App.R. 12(A)(2) states, ‘The
Washington App. No. 10CA40 14
court may disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the party
raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the assignment of
error is based[.]’ ” Countryman at ¶ 8. Similar to Countryman, Appellant
herein does not cite to the record to show where the trial court overruled the
issues he now presents for review. Further, our review of the record
confirms that Appellant failed to raise these issues in the trial court. Thus, as
Appellant failed to raise his constitutional arguments in the trial court, we
first address whether he may raise them for the first time on appeal. Id.
{¶22} “Failure to raise at the trial court level the issue of the
constitutionality of a statute or its application, which issue is apparent at the
time of trial, constitutes a waiver of such issue and a deviation from this
state's orderly procedure, and therefore need not be heard for the first time
on appeal.” Countryman at ¶ 9; citing State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St. 3d
120, 489 N.E.2d 277, syllabus. “The waiver doctrine announced in Awan is
discretionary.” Countryman at ¶ 9; citing In re M.D. (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d
149, 151, 527 N.E.2d 286.
{¶23} Here, as in Countryman, we decline to exercise our discretion
to review Appellant’s assignment of error and find that he has forfeited his
right to raise the constitutional issues asserted in his third and fourth
Washington App. No. 10CA40 15
assignments of error. See also, State v. Longpre, Ross App. No. 08CA3017,
2008-Ohio-3832.
{¶24} In addition, however, we note that the Eighth District has
briefly considered and rejected such a claim that R.C. 4511.19’s “per se”
provisions are impermissibly vague. In State v. Keister, 8 Ohio Misc.2d 1,
455 N.E.2d 1370, the court was presented with constitutional challenges to
Ohio’s newly enacted legislation creating “per se” offenses. Refusing to
find that the statute was impermissibly vague, the Keister court rejected the
arguments, reasoning, in part, as follows:
“It is obvious that a person of normal intelligence who is contemplating
mixing drinking with driving can understand the statutory prohibition of
driving with alcohol in his body exceeding the specified level. Various
materials are readily available to the public which explain in common
language how one may estimate the amount of alcohol that may be
consumed without exceeding the statutory limit. And one obviously can
choose to not drink at all if he intends to drive.” Keister at 2.
We find the reasoning contained in Keister to be persuasive. As such, and
in light of Appellant’s failure to raise these constitutional issues at the trial
court level, we decline to address them and they are therefore overruled.
{¶25} Having overruled each of Appellant’s assignments of error, the
decision and judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Washington App. No. 10CA40 16
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the
Appellee recover of Appellant costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Marietta Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE
UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to
exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a
continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio
an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If
a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the
expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a
notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date
of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Harsha, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion as to Assignments of Error
II, III, & IV and Concurs in Judgment Only as to Assignment of Error I.
For the Court,
BY: _________________________
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.