In re Adoption of B.M.W. , 2010 Ohio 5214 ( 2010 )

[Cite as In re Adoption of B.M.W., 2010-Ohio-5214.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ADAMS COUNTY
In re Adoption of: :
:
[B.M.W.], : Case No. 10CA899
:
:
: DECISION AND
: JUDGMENT ENTRY
: File-stamped date: 10-22-10
______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Diana Hanson and Jerry Hanson, pro se Appellants/Petitioners.
Nathaniel Waller, pro se Appellee/Biological Father.
Faith M. Darr, pro se Appellee/Biological Mother.
______________________________________________________________________
Kline, J.:
{¶1} Diana Hanson and Jerry Hanson (together, the “Hansons”) appeal the
decision of the Adams County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division. The probate
court allowed the biological father to withdraw his consent to an adoption of B.M.W.
(hereinafter the “Child”) by the Hansons. On appeal, the Hansons contend that the
probate court erred when it allowed the father to withdraw his consent. Because the
probate court did not determine whether the withdrawal of consent was in the Child’s
best interest, we agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the probate court and
remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Adams App. No. 10CA899 2
{¶2} Nathaniel Waller (hereinafter “Waller”) and Faith M. Darr (hereinafter “Darr”)
are the Child’s biological parents. In 2005, the Hansons petitioned the probate court to
adopt the Child, and, on September 12, 2005, Waller consented to the adoption. For
some reason, however, the probate court dismissed the Hansons’ 2005 adoption
petition.
{¶3} On September 15, 2009, the Hansons once again petitioned to adopt the
Child. Along with their petition, the Hansons filed the following motion: “Petitioners
herein * * * respectfully move[] the court for an Order transferring and adopting the
Consent to Adoption of Nathaniel Wayne Waller, biological father, executed on
September 12, 2005, before this Honorable Court and filed in the case captioned In the
Matter of the Adoption of [B.M.W.], Case no. 20054005.” Essentially, the Hansons
claimed that Waller’s September 12, 2005 Consent to Adoption remained valid and in
force as to the 2009 adoption petition. The probate court granted the Hansons’ motion
based on In re Adoption of Koszycki (1999), 133 Ohio App. 3d 434, which held that
“consent to adoption is viable until the court grants a motion to withdraw it[.]” Id. at 438.
{¶4} On December 21, 2009, Waller filed his Motion to Withdraw Consent to
Adoption. During a hearing on Waller’s motion, the Hansons’ trial counsel requested an
evidentiary hearing on the Child’s best interest.
{¶5} “[HANSONS’ TRIAL COUNSEL]: * * * I was anticipating having an evidentiary
hearing on best interest regarding the withdrawal of the consent today, is that not
correct?
{¶6} “COURT: The best interest of allowing the withdrawal of consent? I believe
it’s statutorily permitted, that in the, that while a consent is granted, initially, that until the
Adams App. No. 10CA899 3
final decree of adoption, that the consent can be withdrawn, and I think statutorily it’s
unambiguous in that respect.
{¶7} “[HANSONS’ TRIAL COUNSEL]: And my understanding was that if that was
determined by the Court to be in the best interest of the child to withdraw the consent.
{¶8} “COURT: Based upon what?
{¶9} “[HANSONS’ TRIAL COUNSEL]: The Koszy, Koszycki case.” Transcript at
10-11.
{¶10} Despite the Hansons’ request, the probate court heard no evidence related to
the Child’s best interest. Nevertheless, in a May 20, 2010 judgment entry, the probate
court granted Waller’s Motion to Withdraw Consent to Adoption.
{¶11} The Hansons appeal the probate court’s May 20, 2010 judgment, and they
assert the following assignment of error:1 “Appellants contend the trial court erred by: 1.
allowing the valid Consent to Adoption signed 12th day of September 2005 to be
withdrawn due to court’s interpretation, (Transcript, page 12, line 1-3 and page 21, line
13-22) and/or 2. before the court held a best interest of the child hearing. (Transcript,
page 12, lines 14-22.) [sic]”
II.
{¶12} Waller has filed nothing in relation to this appeal. Darr did file a pro se brief
on August 19, 2010, but that brief did not comply with App.R. 16 and 19. This court
gave Darr the opportunity to file another brief, but she failed to do so. Therefore, neither
Waller nor Darr are participating in this appeal, and, because of App.R. 18(C), “we are
authorized to accept [the Hansons’] statement of the facts and issues as correct and
1
Because the Hansons use the term “and/or,” we construe these two issues as a single assignment of
error.
Adams App. No. 10CA899 4
reverse the trial court’s judgment as long as [their] brief reasonably appears to sustain
such action.” Sprouse v. Miller, Lawrence App. No. 06CA37, 2007-Ohio-4397, at fn. 1,
citing State v. Miller (1996), 110 Ohio App. 3d 159, 161-162. See, also, Pryor v. Pryor,
Ross App. No. 09CA3096, 2009-Ohio-6670, at ¶19. However, in deciding this appeal,
we have chosen to review (1) the entire record and (2) the merits of the Hansons’
assignment of error.
III.
{¶13} In their assignment of error, the Hansons contend that the probate court erred
in allowing Waller to withdraw his consent to the Child’s adoption. As such, the
Hansons’ argument requires us to interpret and apply R.C. 3107.084. “When
interpreting statutes and their application, an appellate court conducts a de novo review,
without deference to the trial court’s determination.” Roberts v. Bolin, Athens App. No.
09CA44, 2010-Ohio-3783, at ¶20, quoting State v. Sufronko (1995), 105 Ohio App. 3d
504, 506. “The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to
the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute. * * * The court must first look to the plain
language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. * * * We apply a statute
as it is written when its meaning is unambiguous and definite. * * * An unambiguous
statute must be applied in a manner consistent with the plain meaning of the statutory
language.” State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St. 3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, at ¶9 (citations omitted).
In other words, “[c]ourts do not have the authority to ignore the plain and unambiguous
language of a statute under the guise of statutory interpretation, but must give effect to
the words used.” In re O.H., Washington App. No. 09CA38, 2010-Ohio-1244, at ¶8
(quotation omitted).
Adams App. No. 10CA899 5
{¶14} In relevant part, R.C. 3107.084 provides the following: “(A) A consent to
adoption is irrevocable and cannot be withdrawn after the entry of an interlocutory order
or after the entry of a final decree of adoption when no interlocutory order has been
entered. * * * (B) A consent to adoption may be withdrawn prior to the entry of an
interlocutory order or prior to the entry of a final decree of adoption when no
interlocutory order has been entered if the court finds after hearing that the withdrawal is
in the best interest of the person to be adopted and the court by order authorizes the
withdrawal of consent. Notice of the hearing shall be given to the petitioner, the person
seeking the withdrawal of consent, and the agency placing the minor for adoption.”
{¶15} We will analyze the Hansons’ arguments under both R.C. 3107.084(A) and
(B). As to R.C. 3107.084(A), the probate court has entered neither (1) an interlocutory
order of adoption nor (2) a final decree of adoption. See, generally, R.C. 3107.14
(discussing interlocutory orders of adoption and final decrees of adoption). Therefore,
based on the plain language of R.C. 3107.084(A), the probate court correctly allowed
Waller the opportunity to withdraw his consent to adoption. See Koszycki at 438
(stating that a motion to withdraw consent “must be filed before the entry of an
interlocutory order or the entry of a final order of adoption”).
{¶16} However, the language of R.C. 3107.084(B) is also clear and unambiguous.
Before it could authorize Waller’s withdrawal of consent, the probate court had to find
that the withdrawal was in the Child’s best interest. And here, unfortunately, the probate
court did not comply with the requirements of R.C. 3107.084(B). The Hansons’ trial
counsel specifically requested “an evidentiary hearing as to whether it is in the best
interest of [the Child] for the consent to be withdrawn.” Transcript at 17-18. But the
Adams App. No. 10CA899 6
probate court “did not take any evidence nor did the parties testify” as to the Child’s best
interest. May 20, 2010 Judgment Entry. Furthermore, the probate court made no best-
interest-related findings. Instead, the probate court found merely that Waller had the
“authority to request a withdrawal of [a] previously executed consent prior to a final
order of adoption.” Id. This finding, however, does not comply with the clear,
unambiguous language of R.C. 3107.084(B).
{¶17} Accordingly, we sustain the Hansons’ assignment of error. On remand, we
order the probate court to hold a hearing and determine whether the withdrawal of
Waller’s consent to adoption is in the Child’s best interest. If, after the hearing, the
probate court determines that withdrawal is in the Child’s best interest, the probate court
may grant Waller’s Motion to Withdraw Consent to Adoption. If, however, the probate
court finds that withdrawal is not in the Child’s best interest, Waller’s Motion to Withdraw
Consent to Adoption should be denied.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
Adams App. No. 10CA899 7
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED and that this CAUSE BE
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellees shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams
County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
McFarland, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
For the Court
BY:
Roger L. Kline, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing
with the clerk.